Filed 9/21/26 Rickey v. Nielsen CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

TRACY LYNN RICKEY, D086436

Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2015-
00029072-PR-TR-CTL)
v.

JAN NIELSEN et al.,

Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Olga Alvarez, Judge. Affirmed.
Tracy Lynn Rickey, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Henderson, Caverly & Pum, Kristen E. Caverly, and Lisa B. Roper for
Respondents.

Tracy Lynn Rickey appeals from the probate court’s order sustaining a
demurrer to her “First Amended Petition to Mandate” reimbursements and
distributions from two trusts and objecting to accountings of the trusts in
2021 and 2022. Rickey, who is self-represented, has not shown the probate
court erred by sustaining the demurrer. Accordingly, the order is affirmed.
 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jan Nielsen, Rickey’s mother, created the Tracy L. Rickey 2003 Trust
(2003 Trust) for Rickey’s benefit. The trust was drafted by Nancy Henderson,
and appointed Nielsen’s brother, Kurt Nielsen, as the trustee.
In 2015, Kurt filed a petition in the probate division of the San Diego
Superior Court seeking to (1) approve three accountings of the 2003 Trust by
Kurt that were completed according to its terms and (2) release Kurt from
liability, accountability and responsibility during the four accounting periods
under Probate Code sections 15644, 16062, 16063 and 17200,

subdivision (b)(5).1 There was no objection or opposition to Kurt’s petition,
and on December 18, 2015, the probate court granted the petition. In its
order, the court approved the accountings for the periods of (1) July 1, 2008
through May 21, 2013, (2) June 1, 2013 through December 21, 2014, and
(3) January 1, 2015 through June 30, 2015. The order also relieved Kurt of
“liability, accountability, and responsibility for his acts, elections not to act,
and transactions as the sole trustee during the” same three “accounting
periods.”
On May 6, 2024, Rickey, in propria persona, filed the underlying

petition in the same probate matter.2 In her petition, Rickey sought
reimbursements and distributions from the 2003 Trust and another trust
created for her benefit, the Tracey Rickey S.D. 2015 Trust (2015 Trust). In

1 First names are used in the interest of readability and to avoid
confusion. No disrespect is intended.

2 As the respondents point out, the petition was 212 pages long and
attached over 1,300 pages of exhibits, including multiple copies of the trust
documents.

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addition, the petition contained “Objections to the 2021 Accounting” of the
2003 Trust “done by Susanna Starcevic,” who was the trustee at the time,
“Gregory Borawski, Jan Nielsen, and Nancy Henderson,” and “Objections to
the 2022 Accounting” of the 2015 Trust “done by Lisa Schneiderman, The
South Dakota Trust Company, Jan Nielsen and Nancy Henderson.”
In response to Rickey’s petition, Jan, Kurt, and Henderson filed a
demurrer under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and
(f), and section 425.10, subdivision (a)(1), asserting Rickey had failed to state
a claim for relief. In addition, they asserted the petition was barred by the
doctrine of res judicata based on the probate court’s 2015 order approving
Kurt’s petition to affirm the accountings. They also argued that the petition
was barred by the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section

338, subdivision (d), section 340.6, subdivision (a), and section 343.3 Rickey
opposed the motion and a hearing, that was not reported, took place on
October 30, 2024. After the hearing, the probate court sustained the
demurrer with leave to amend.

3 Rickey also named the South Dakota Trust Company (SDTC) as a
defendant in her petition and SDTC filed a motion to quash service of process
for lack of personal jurisdiction. The probate court’s register of action
contained in the appellate record shows the motion was not resolved before
the court issued the order that is the subject of this appeal. On December 22,
2025, Rickey filed a motion to augment the appellate record with various
documents, including a copy of SDTC’s reply brief to its motion to quash.
Thereafter, we issued an order on the motion to augment deferring a ruling to
this panel. Because it is not relevant to Rickey’s appeal, the motion to
augment the record with SDTC’s reply brief to the motion to quash is denied.
(See Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
686, 696, fn. 4 [denying augmentation because materials not relevant to
issues on appeal].)

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 The following month, Rickey, who continued to be unrepresented by
legal counsel, filed an amended petition seeking the same relief requested in
her initial petition. The amended petition is 271 pages long, is very difficult
to comprehend, and includes over 1,000 pages of exhibits. The Nielsens and
Henderson filed a second demurrer on the same grounds asserted in their
earlier demurrer, which Rickey opposed.
Thereafter, the court issued a tentative ruling sustaining the demurrer
on the grounds that the amended petition failed to address the deficiencies
previously found by the court, Rickey had not stated any cognizable claim for
relief, and the petition was vague and uncertain. A hearing on the demurrer,

which was not reported, took place on April 9, 2025.4 At the conclusion of the
hearing, the court adopted its tentative ruling and sustained the demurrer.
The order explained that to the extent the court understood Rickey’s
claims, she sought distributions from the 2003 and 2015 Trusts, and she
objected to the accountings prepared in 2021 and 2022. The court found
these grievances were not legally cognizable claims. The court explained
Rickey had not provided sufficient “factual allegations to support any viable
claims against Respondents, particularly against attorneys Henderson and

4 After Rickey filed her notice of appeal, she obtained a settled statement
in accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 8.137 that is included in
the record on appeal prepared by the probate court. The settled statement
covers that hearing, as well as three prior hearings, including the hearing on
the respondents’ first demurrer. In her briefing, Rickey mentions repeatedly
this court’s order denying her motion to augment the record with the
pleadings filed in the probate court to obtain the settled statement. However,
the settled statement included in the record contains the version of the
statement prepared by Rickey, the respondents’ suggested revisions to her
proposal, and the final settled statement adopted by the probate court.

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Borawski, who did not serve as trustees.” Further, the court concluded that
to the extent the petition sought relief based on breach of fiduciary duty, the
allegations were unclear.
The probate court also noted the petition “consists of discussions
regarding self-representation, constitutional law and due process violations,
conservatorship law, and civil jury instructions, which add to the confusion
regarding the claims in the [petition]. As such, the allegations are vague and
uncertain, and the [petition] fails to state sufficient facts to sustain causes of
action against Respondents.” The probate court found that to the extent
Rickey intended to assert claims relating to matters occurring before the
court’s December 18, 2015 order, those claims were “barred by res judicata
and the applicable statute of limitations.” The court further found that while
the petition alleged a scheme to defraud Rickey, it was “not sufficiently pled
such that the Court [could] discern legally cognizable claims.” Finally, the
court noted that objections to the 2021 and 2022 accountings also appeared to
be barred by res judicata, pointing to the notice of entry of order from a South
Dakota court submitted by Rickey as an attachment to the petition, which
approved the 2022 accounting for the 2015 Trust.
Rickey timely appealed from the probate court’s order.
DISCUSSION
Like the briefing that Rickey filed in the trial court, her appellate
briefing is extremely difficult to decipher. To the best of our ability to discern
her assertions, Rickey argues the probate court failed to adequately consider
the arguments she submitted, which she contends violated her rights under
the United States and California Constitutions. Similarly, she argues the

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court violated her due process and equal protection rights by not considering
the exhibits she incorporated into her petition.
Rickey next appears to argue that to the extent the court found her
claims were barred by the statute of limitations, this finding violated her due
process rights and infringed her rights to access justice. She specifically
asserts that “application of res judicata to the September 2022 South Dakota
petition infringed her due process and equal protection rights.” Similarly,
she argues the court violated her due process rights by applying res judicata
to “2015 accountings signed in 2015 and 2016.”
Rickey also argues that she was denied the ability to video record the
oral proceedings, which she asserts violated her rights to access and due
process. In an argument she also set forth in her petitions in the probate
court, Rickey asserts that Assembly Bill No. 1194 “is an under-inclusive law
whose under-inclusion violates Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
rights” and the California Constitution. Finally, Rickey argues that the
probate court’s failure to appoint counsel for her violated her due process
rights.
I
Legal Standards
As the appellant, Rickey has the burden of providing an adequate
record, of showing that an error occurred, and of showing the error was
prejudicial. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295–1296; Aguilar v.
Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132.) In addition,
arguments on appeal are restricted to documents in the record, and we
generally may not consider references to matters outside the record. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) [appellant’s opening brief must provide a
summary of significant facts limited to matters in the record on appeal].)

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Absent an adequate record and argument to demonstrate error, a reviewing
court presumes the judgment or order is supported by the evidence and that
the lower court correctly applied the law. (In re Angel L. (2008) 159
Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136–1137; see Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc.
(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187 [It is a “cardinal rule of appellate review
that a judgment or order of the trial court is presumed correct and prejudicial
error must be affirmatively shown.”])
In addition, “[i]n propria persona litigants are entitled to the same, but
no greater, rights than represented litigants and are presumed to know the
[procedural and court] rules.” (Wantuch v. Davis (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 786,
795; see also First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th
956, 958, fn. 1 [“A party proceeding in propria persona ‘is to be treated like
any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater[,] consideration
than other litigants and attorneys.’ ”].) “[W]hen a litigant accepts the risks of
proceeding without counsel, he or she is stuck with the outcome, and has no
greater opportunity to cast off an unfavorable judgment than he or she would
if represented by counsel.” (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267; see Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229,
1246–1247.)
For any appellant, “[a]ppellate briefs must provide argument and legal
authority for the positions taken. ‘When an appellant fails to raise a point, or
asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to
authority, we treat the point as waived.’ ” (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners
Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862.) “We are not bound to develop
appellants’ arguments for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal
argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contentions as
waived.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830;

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Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119 [lack of reasoned
argument may constitute abandonment of appeal, justifying dismissal].)
Under these general rules of appellate procedure, we examine the
probate court’s order sustaining the respondents’ demurrer without leave to
amend. “ ‘ “The purpose of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a complaint
by raising questions of law.” ’ ” (Frayo v. Martin (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
1025, 1032.) “ ‘In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the
operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to
state a cause of action under any legal theory.’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘ “We treat the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ... We also consider
matters which may be judicially noticed.” ... Further, we give the complaint a
reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their
context.’ ” ’ ” (Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768.)
When a trial court sustains a demurrer “ ‘without leave to amend, we
decide whether [the appellant has shown] there is a reasonable possibility
that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has
abused its discretion and we reverse.’ ” (County of Santa Clara v. Superior
Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1034, 1041.)
II
Analysis
A
Rickey first asserts that the probate court violated her constitutional
rights because it did not sufficiently evaluate her amended petition. For
example, she states the probate court’s statement that she failed to plead
around the court’s prior ruling that her “claims relating to matters that
occurred prior to [the] December 18, 2015 [order] are barred by res judicata

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and the applicable statute[] of limitation,” suggests the court “automatically
transferred” its prior demurrer decision to the current decision. Rickey also
argues that the court’s inability to comprehend her amended petition resulted
from her own lack of understanding as to why her prior petition was
deficient. Rickey states that the court should have appointed her a “legal
interpreter” so she could understand the proceedings.
Rickey’s arguments provide no basis for this court to understand what
claims she is attempting to assert in her petition or on what basis the probate
court’s decision to sustain the demurrer constituted error. She repeats vague
allegations that she “specified the defendants and their collusive
malfeasance” and states that “the only facts missing are those necessarily
held by defendants.” These statements, however, do not provide us with any
greater understanding of how Rickey was defrauded by the former trustee,
her mother, or the attorneys who drafted the trusts. And her arguments
provide no basis for us to surmise how the probate court erred. Contrary to
Rickey’s assertion, it is not this court’s role to develop arguments for an
appellant, even a self-represented litigant like her. (See Okorie v. Los
Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 600, disapproved on
another ground in Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995,
1011 [“it is not this court’s role to construct theories or arguments that would
undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness”].)
As with Rickey’s complaint that the probate court failed to consider her
amended petition, her assertion that the court did not consider the exhibits
she submitted with her petition also does not provide us with a basis to
overturn the probate court’s order. She does not explain how those exhibits
support any claim or what specifically within the exhibits the probate court
failed to consider. As stated, we cannot develop factual or legal arguments

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for Rickey and we must presume the probate court considered the facts before
it. (See Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277
(Hernandez) [“ ‘[T]o demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and
citation to the record.’ [Citation.] ‘We are not obliged to make other
arguments for [appellant] [citation], nor are we obliged to speculate about
which issues counsel intend to raise.’ ”].)
Rickey also provides citations to Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220
Cal.App.3d 59 and Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91 to support
her assertion the probate court did not adequately consider her exhibits. She
does not explain, however, how these cases support her assertions of error.
Stansfield affirmed a judgment after the trial court sustained the defendants’
demurrer to the plaintiff’s fifth amended complaint, holding the plaintiff had
failed to show an abuse of discretion or that the claims could be adequately
amended. (Stansfield, at p. 63.) Likewise, Frantz affirmed a judgment
entered after the court sustained a demurrer on the grounds that the plaintiff
had failed to plead sufficient facts to support his claim for discrimination,
where the claims were based not on a particular characteristic of the plaintiff
but on the defendant’s decision not to sell property to speculators. (Frantz, at
p. 95.) Neither case has any relevance to the present appeal.
B
Rickey next argues the probate court’s application of the statute of
limitations to bar her claims violated her constitutional rights. She contends
that Henderson and her mother engaged in a continuous act of deception and,
therefore, the statute of limitation does not apply. However, she provides no
legal basis for this assertion and does not point to any factual allegations in
her petition to support this claim, or otherwise explain the circumstances of

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the alleged fraud. (See United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146 (United Grand) [“ ‘an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and
citation to the record’ ”].)
Rickey also asserts that her failure to obtain counsel delayed her
discovery of the facts needed to substantiate her claims, and that she did not
assert her claims earlier because she feared it would jeopardize the payments
she was receiving from the trusts. Again, these vague assertions of
misconduct provide no legal basis to reverse the probate court’s finding that
to the extent Rickey’s claims concern conduct arising before 2015, such
allegations are barred by any applicable statues of limitations. (United
Grand, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 146.)
C
Rickey next asserts that “Application of Res Judicata to the September
2022 South Dakota Petition Infringes Due Process and Equal Protection
Rights.” This section of Rickey’s brief is extremely confusing and difficult to
discern. Rickey states that the court did not reach the issue of jurisdiction,
but this issue “overlap[s] with [her] arguments against res judicata.” She
then states “honoring the 2022 SD Petition makes a safe haven of South
Dakota” in violation of the constitution. We are unable to determine what
this section of Rickey’s brief means and cannot find within it any possible
basis to reverse the probate court’s order. (Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th
at p. 277.)
D
Rickey’s next argument concerns the probate court’s denial of her
request to video-record the proceedings, which she contends was a violation of
her due process rights and her right to access justice. Rickey also asserts

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that this court should invalidate Government Code section 69957 and
Assembly Bill No. 882 “to the extent they undermine these rights.”
As the respondents point out, Rickey does not provide any authority for
her assertion that the court erred by denying her request to record the
proceedings. Further, Rickey acknowledges Government Code section 69957
authorizes only limited electronic court reporting and did not allow for

recording of the demurrer hearing.5 Instead, Rickey asserts that under
Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 (Jameson), she was entitled to a court
reporter at no cost because she is an indigent litigant. To support this
assertion, she points to the court’s order denying her request for a fee waiver
and instituting a payment plan of $50 per month to pay applicable court fees.
We do not agree with Rickey that the probate court’s decision to provide
a payment plan equated to a finding she was entitled to a fee waiver, and
therefore a court reporter at no cost. In Jameson, the California Supreme
Court held the trial court could not withhold court reporter services from in
forma pauperis litigants, i.e. litigants with fee waivers in place, where
litigants who can afford to pay for private court reporters are permitted to
obtain those services. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 612.) Here, Rickey

5 The statute provides in pertinent part, “If an official reporter or an
official reporter pro tempore is unavailable to report an action or proceeding
in a court, subject to the availability of approved equipment and equipment
monitors, the court may order that, in a limited civil case, or a misdemeanor
or infraction case, the action or proceeding be electronically recorded,
including all the testimony, the objections made, the ruling of the court, the
exceptions taken, all arraignments, pleas, and sentences of defendants in
criminal cases, the arguments of the attorneys to the jury, and all statements
and remarks made and oral instructions given by the judge. A transcript
derived from an electronic recording may be utilized whenever a transcript of
court proceedings is required.” (Gov. Code, § 69957, subd. (a).)

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did not have a fee waiver in place; thus, Jameson did not mandate the
probate court provide her with a reporter at no cost. Further, Rickey
successfully obtained settled statements for both demurrer hearings,
diminishing her need for reporters’ transcripts. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.137(a) [“A settled statement is a summary of the superior court proceedings
approved by the superior court.”].)
With respect to the constitutionality of Government Code section
69957, Rickey has not provided this court with any cogent argument to
overturn this provision. Her general assertions that the law violates the
Federal and California constitutions do not provide us with a basis to hold
the law invalid generally or as applied to Rickey’s case. (See Hernandez,
supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277 [“ ‘When an appellant raises an issue “but
fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we
treat the point as waived.” ’ ”].) Assembly Bill No. 882, which was introduced
in the Legislature last year, would broaden the availability of electronic
recording in court proceedings. (See Sen. Judiciary Com., Analysis of Assem.
Bill No. 882 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 17, 2025.) The
legislation, however, has not been made law and, thus, has no applicability in
this case.
E
In the next section of her brief, Rickey asserts that Assembly Bill
No. 1194, which reformed California’s law of conservatorships, is
unconstitutional. This argument has no relationship to Rickey’s petition,
which she brings as the beneficiary of a trust and which does not involve a
conservatorship. Further, Rickey’s briefing does not relate the legislation to
her claims in any logical way. Accordingly, this section of Rickey’s briefing

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provides us with no basis to reverse the probate court’s order sustaining the
respondents’ demurrer. (Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.)
F
Rickey’s final argument is that the court’s failure to appoint her an
attorney violated her due process rights. This argument does not support
reversal of the probate court’s order. “[T]he general rule is that there is no
due process right to counsel in civil cases.” (Walker v. State Bar (1989) 49
Cal.3d 1107, 1116; accord Iraheta v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th
1500, 1508.) The right of an indigent litigant to appointed counsel generally
“has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical
liberty if he loses the litigation.” (Lassiter v. Department of Social Services
(1981) 452 U.S. 18, 25 (Lassiter).) When loss of physical liberty is not at
stake, factors relevant to the determination of whether due process requires
appointment of counsel for an indigent litigant are “the private interests at
stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will
lead to erroneous decisions.” (Lassiter, at p. 27.) Courts “must balance these
elements against each other, and then set their net weight in the scales
against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where
the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom.” (Ibid.)
Here, Rickey asserts that she was entitled to appointed counsel because
she “cannot uncover the facts for Court” and because of fundamental
unfairness. She makes no reference to the applicable balancing test and
otherwise provides no legal basis to support her contention that reversal is
required because she should have been afforded an attorney. Her briefing
instead discusses matters that bear no relation to her underlying petition.
For instance, she includes a discussion of forced sterilization in North
Carolina; a long section, citing Lassiter and Turner v. Rogers (2011) 564

14
U.S.431 (Turner)6, equating racial discrimination with discrimination based
on mental health; and an argument that this court should abolish the
California Bar Association because the fees of the attorneys she contacted for
representation are too high. Rickey has not provided any reasonable
argument to support her assertion that the court erred by denying her
requests for appointed counsel.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Costs of appeal are awarded to Respondents.

MCCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

DO, J.

6 In Lassiter, the United States Supreme Court held that an indigent
parent’s due process rights were not violated by the trial court’s failure to
appoint counsel for her in a proceeding to terminate her parental rights.
(Lassiter, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 33.) Turner addressed the right to counsel in
child support proceedings that could statutorily result in incarceration.
Turner held that where a “custodial parent (entitled to receive [child]
support) is unrepresented by counsel, the State need not provide counsel to
the noncustodial parent (required to provide the support). But … the State
must nonetheless have in place alternative procedures that ensure a
fundamentally fair determination of the critical incarceration-related
question, whether the supporting parent is able to comply with the support
order.” (Turner, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 435.)

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