Filed 9/21/26 Rodin v. Silver CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ELLEN RODIN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172065
v.
JESSICA SILVER, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 24FL095055)
Defendant and Appellant.

Respondent Ellen Rodin obtained a restraining order against appellant
Jessica Silver, an alleged squatter on Rodin’s property, under the Elder
Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protections Act (Elder Abuse Act), Welfare
and Institutions Code section 15600 et seq.1 Silver contends that the order
must be reversed because: (1) there is insufficient evidence to establish elder
abuse; (2) her due process rights were violated; and (3) Rodin misused the
Elder Abuse Act to evict her. We are not persuaded and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Rodin owned, through her family’s limited liability company, a multi-
unit property in Oakland, California (property). At the time Rodin bought

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions

Code.

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the property in May 2022, a number of purported squatters, including Silver,
lived in the property’s downstairs unit.
On October 11, 2024, Rodin filed a request for a restraining order
against Silver pursuant to the Elder Abuse Act. As part of the request, Rodin
sought a move-out order. In the request, Rodin alleged, among other things,
that Silver was “a squatter tenant” who had “engaged in 100+ acts of major
vandalism . . . and other harassment . . . to lower the value and take over the
property . . . .” The trial court issued a temporary restraining order, which
included an order that Silver “move out from and not return to” the property,
and scheduled an evidentiary hearing.
At the evidentiary hearing on November 27, 2024, the trial court heard
Rodin’s requests for a restraining order against Silver and Steven Haluchak,
another purported squatter who lived in the downstairs unit of the property.
Haluchak was represented by counsel. Silver appeared in propria persona
but, according to the reporter’s transcript, did not speak.
Rodin, Rodin’s husband, and Adelaide Lomavita, Rodin’s realtor,
testified on behalf of Rodin. Rodin testified that for years, Silver and the
other purported squatters, including Haluchak, had “engaged in a campaign
to prevent [her] from managing the property.” According to Rodin, Silver,
Haluchak, and the other purported squatters cut “every lock” at the property
multiple times, “took down” mailboxes at the property multiple times,
“dumped enormous loads of heavy metal garbage” on the property, “moved
vehicles onto the property,” and regularly made fun of and laughed at her.
Rodin also testified that Silver “pushed [her] in the face.” When she tried to
sell the property, Silver and the other purported squatters “never allowed
[her] to inspect or allow[ed] buyers downstairs” and “deliberately
intimidat[ed] [her] and [her] realtor to try to prevent the sale.” According to

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Rodin, Haluchuk told her that he wanted the value of the property to drop so
he could buy it.
Rodin’s husband testified that Haluchak told the husband that “he cut
the lock” on the property and wanted to “buy” the property. The husband
also testified that Haluchak left garbage, including “tables, chairs, washing
machines, [and] dishwashers”, in front of the house to bring its value down.
Lomavita testified that when she went to stage the property, there was
“furniture, garbage, debris, [and a] toilet out front.” Lomavita also testified
that the purported squatters had cut locks, vandalized her sign in the front
yard, and refused to speak to Rodin.
Haluchak testified at the hearing on behalf of himself and Silver.
Haluchak, who had lived at the property for “four and a half years,” denied
threatening Rodin, calling her names, dumping garbage on the property,
cutting any locks on the property, or damaging any mailboxes. He also
denied seeing anybody cause damage to the property, stack debris on the
property, or otherwise try to delay the sale of the property.
After the close of evidence, the trial court found that Silver, Haluchak,
and the other purported squatters were responsible for cutting the locks. The
court also found that the evidence “suggests that there was some concerted
effort to keep the property in the less appealing condition” in order to
“devalu[e] the property or prevent[ ] it from selling so that they can remain
there.” According to the court, this amounted to “financial abuse, not to
mention possible mental suffering.” The court therefore issued a restraining
order against Silver, expiring on November 27, 2027. Among other things,
the order required that Silver “stay at least 100 yards away from” Rodin and
her husband and Rodin’s home, workplace, and vehicle. It also ordered that
Silver “move out from and not return to” the property.

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 Silver timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Silver makes a number of arguments that can be grouped into three
categories: (1) that the restraining order was not supported by substantial
evidence, (2) that she was denied due process, and (3) that Rodin used the
Elder Abuse Act as an improper means of eviction. Silver also raises a
number of arguments for the first time in her reply brief. We reject all of
Silver’s arguments and affirm the restraining order.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s issuance of a restraining order under the
Elder Abuse Act for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for
substantial evidence. (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 524
(Tanguilig).) In doing so, “[w]e resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of
respondent . . . and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor
of upholding the . . . court’s findings.” (Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 1131, 1137–1138 (Bookout).) “[W]e will only find an abuse of
discretion when the . . . court exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards the
uncontradicted evidence.” (Id. at p. 1140.) “Under the substantial evidence
standard, the testimony of even one witness may support a finding based
thereon.” (Newman v. Casey (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 359, 375 (Newman).)
Although Silver appeared here and below in propria persona, she “is
entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and
attorneys.” (Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638.) Accordingly,
“[w]e may disregard legal arguments that are not supported by citations to
legal authority . . . or are conclusory,” as well as “factual contentions that are
not supported by citations to the record.” (Tanguilig, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th
at p. 520.) We may also disregard “[a]rguments raised for the first time in

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the reply brief,” which are “considered untimely.” (Hernandez v. Vitamin
Shoppe Industries Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1461, fn.10
(Hernandez).)
B. Substantial Evidence
Silver contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the
restraining order. We disagree.
“Under the Elder Abuse Act, a trial court may issue a restraining order
to protect an ‘elder’ who has suffered ‘abuse.’ ” (Newman, supra, 99
Cal.App.5th at p. 374.) As part of the restraining order, the court may
“exclude a person from a residence or dwelling” if it finds that “physical or
emotional harm would otherwise result to the petitioner.” (§ 15657.03,
subd. (h).) “ ‘Abuse of an elder’ ” includes “treatment with resulting . . .
mental suffering,” as well as “[f]inancial abuse” within the meaning of section
15610.30. (§ 15610.07.)
Here, there is ample evidence to support the trial court’s finding of
financial abuse and treatment resulting in mental suffering. Rodin testified
that Silver, together with other purported squatters, left debris all over the
property, cut locks, and took down mailboxes. She also testified that Silver
“pushed [her] in the face.” Finally, she testified that Silver and the other
purported squatters sought to intimidate her and her realtor to prevent the
sale of the property. Rodin’s husband and realtor confirmed that Silver and
the other purported squatters left lots of garbage on the property and that
they sought to depress the value of the property. This is more than enough to
support the court’s finding of “mental suffering” and financial abuse due to
Silver’s conduct.
Indeed, the facts in this case are similar to Tanguilig, where the Court
of Appeal upheld a restraining order under the Elder Abuse Act. In that

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case, the petitioner testified that his neighbor placed trash cans in his
driveway every trash day, blocking him from exiting, and sprayed him with
water from a hose “ ‘[s]everal times.’ ” (Tanguilig, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 517–519.) The Court of Appeal found that this evidence was sufficient to
establish treatment resulting in “mental suffering” and was therefore
sufficient to support the restraining order against the neighbor. (Id. at p.
527.) Silver’s conduct, particularly when the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the restraining order, is just as egregious, if not more so.
Nonetheless, Silver contends that the evidence is insufficient because
Rodin did not provide “any medical records, police reports, or neutral witness
corroboration supporting allegations of abuse.” According to Silver, the trial
court erroneously relied upon “uncorroborated, false statements, along with
multiple contradictions to [Rodin’s] testimony.” But Rodin’s husband and
Lomavita independently corroborated much of Rodin’s testimony, including
that the purported squatters cut locks and left debris on the property.
Lomavita also confirmed that the purported squatters tried to devalue the
property and delay its sale. In any event, we must resolve all conflicts in the
evidence in favor of Rodin under the substantial evidence standard.
(Bookout, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1137–1138.) And the testimony of a
single witness may “support a [court’s] finding.” (Newman, supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at p. 375.) Thus, Rodin’s testimony, even though it was
disputed, is enough, by itself, to support the restraining order.
C. Due Process or Misuse of Elder Abuse Act Claims
Silver raises various due process claims. She also contends that Rodin
misused the Elder Abuse Act. We are not persuaded.
Silver first contends that the trial court “limited [her] ability to
participate [in the hearing], including restricting [her] attempts to present

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documents, testify fully, and question [Rodin].” But she provides no record
citations or legal authority to support this contention. Instead, she only cites
to instances at the hearing where she was referred to by name. Her failure to
support her contention with any record evidence confirms what we discovered
upon our own review of the record: Silver never spoke at the hearing and the
court never prevented Silver from presenting any evidence. For this same
reason, we reject Silver’s contention that she “was not clearly sworn for
testimony at critical stages” and that the court “imposed time limitations
preventing [her] from fully explaining [her] position.”
Silver also contends that the trial court “never clarified . . . whether
[she] understood her right to independent representation or knowingly
waived it.” Again, she provides no legal authority to support this contention.
And we are aware of no duty on the part of the court to ensure that a civil
litigant has legal representation. In any event, the court’s minute order
makes clear that Silver was representing herself at the hearing.
Finally, Silver contends that Rodin misused the Elder Abuse Act “as a
shortcut to remove [her] from the residence, rather than filing a proper
eviction action.” In support, she claims that the trial court “acknowledged on
the record that elder-abuse proceedings are ‘not meant for landlord-tenant
issues.’ ” We could not, however, find the quoted language in the record.
Although the court did acknowledge that there was “some merit” to
Haluchuk’s counsel’s claim that the “restraining order process is not meant to
. . . substitute for an unlawful detainer,” it never stated that Rodin had
misused the Elder Abuse Act. In any event, the Act expressly authorizes a

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move-out order (§ 15657.03, subd. (h)), and there is substantial evidence to
support that order here.
D. New Arguments on Reply
Silver also raises a number of arguments for the first time on reply that
we reject as “untimely.” (Hernandez, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1461, fn.
10.) The arguments are also not persuasive on their merits.
Silver first contends that Oakland ordinances “require . . . substantial
relocation benefits before a tenant can be required to vacate.” Even assuming
that the ordinances apply here, they are irrelevant because the trial court
properly issued a move-out order under the Elder Abuse Act. Silver then
contends that the court abused its discretion by issuing the move-out order
without making a “specific finding that physical or emotional harm would
result if [she] remained.” But she cites no legal authority requiring that the
court expressly make such a finding, and we presume that the court followed
the law. (Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 299,
333 [“Normally, we must presume the . . . court was aware of and understood
the scope of its authority and discretion under the applicable law”].) Finally,
Silver contends that there were numerous “late and defective filings,” as well
as “incomplete court forms” but points to nothing in the record to support
these contentions. In any event, she fails to show any prejudice.

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 DISPOSITION2
The restraining order issued on November 27, 2024 is affirmed.3

CHOU, J.

WE CONCUR.

JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.

A172065/ Rodin v. Silver

2 Rodin’s request for judicial notice is denied as moot.(Miller v. Zurich
American Ins. Co. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 247, 255, fn. 5 [request for judicial
notice denied as moot because documents were not necessary to resolve
appellate issues].)
3 At oral argument, Rodin asserted that, as requested in the conclusion

of her respondent’s brief, the matter should be remanded so the trial court
could consider an award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and damages. But the court
did not award any fees, costs, or damages to Rodin, and she did not cross-
appeal from the court’s order. Moreover, she provided no legal argument or
authority to support her assertion. Thus, she has forfeited the issue. (See
People v. Sorden (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 582, 603 [“failure to present reasoned
argument and legal authorities” forfeits issue on appeal]; Preserve Poway v.
City of Poway (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 560, 587 [“absent a cross-appeal,”
respondent “cannot appeal from adverse determinations . . . that involve
different portions of the judgment from which appellants have appealed”].)

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