Filed 9/22/26 Sanchez v. K.J. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JULIAN ISMAEL RAMIREZ H052883
SANCHEZ, (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 24CH012530)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Julian Ismael Ramirez Sanchez sought and obtained a two-year civil harassment
restraining order (CHRO) against his former roommate, K.J. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6.)1
Representing herself on appeal, K.J. argues the order is not supported by substantial
evidence and contends the trial court erred by applying section 527.6 to this case because
it involved a domestic violence dispute between former romantic partners. K.J. also
contends that the trial court violated her right to due process by prohibiting her from
presenting testimony and from challenging Ramirez Sanchez’s evidence.
We find no merit to these contentions and will affirm the order.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ramirez Sanchez lived in an apartment for about two years before K.J. moved in
as his roommate in January 2024. Ramirez Sanchez filed a request for a CHRO against

1
Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
K.J in May 2024. He alleged that K.J. threatened him at his workplace. According to
Ramirez Sanchez, K.J. approached him at night while he was in his car, started screaming
that he was avoiding her to “skip out on the rent,” called him “disgusting,” threatened to
sue him, and told him he “better not” call the police. Ramirez Sanchez did not feel safe
and messaged his friend to contact law enforcement since he was afraid to do so.
Ramirez Sanchez also alleged that K.J. slapped him in his car a few weeks before
the workplace incident and later threatened him at their apartment. Describing the latter
incident, Ramirez Sanchez stated that K.J. was “throwing things,” told him to come out
of his bedroom to avoid “consequences,” called him a “disgusting” and “horrible” person,
and threatened to burn down the apartment. He called the police but that “ma[de] the
situation worse.” Ramirez Sanchez believed the incidents had “escalated,” and he feared
for his safety. He requested personal conduct orders, a stay-away order, and an order
requiring K.J. to move out of the apartment. He also requested a temporary restraining
order pending the hearing on his CHRO request. The trial court issued a temporary
restraining order but denied Ramirez Sanchez’s request for K.J. to move out.
The hearing on Ramirez Sanchez’s CHRO request occurred in October 2024.2
Before the presentation of evidence, K.J. moved to dismiss the proceeding, arguing that
Ramirez Sanchez should have instead sought a restraining order under the Domestic
Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) because she and Ramirez
Sanchez were former romantic partners. The trial court denied the motion.
Ramirez Sanchez testified about the incident described in his CHRO application
where he called the police after K.J. threatened to burn down the apartment. He also
testified that he called the police twice after K.J. harassed him at his workplace. During
the first incident, K.J. yelled at him in the parking lot after he had finished a conversation

2
The hearing was originally scheduled for a date in June 2024 according to the
notice of hearing. The record does not reveal why the hearing was rescheduled to a later
date.

2
with his boss. During the second incident, K.J. approached him at his laboratory during
the workday. K.J. initially left after Ramirez Sanchez said he could not speak with her
but she returned while Ramirez Sanchez was still working. He told K.J. that she needed
to leave, which she eventually did. Ramirez Sanchez called the police and asked them to
contact K.J. because she was trespassing. Ramirez Sanchez ultimately moved out of the
shared apartment.
During Ramirez Sanchez’s testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence a letter
from one of his coworkers over K.J.’s hearsay objection, noting “how much weight I give
it … will be determined.”
K.J. testified that Ramirez Sanchez’s testimony and evidence were false.
According to K.J., she had attempted to discuss a joint business proposal with Ramirez
Sanchez over the phone while he was driving home from work, but he was “acting
strange” and the phone call disconnected. Ramirez Sanchez would not talk to K.J. when
he arrived at their apartment and went into his bedroom, so K.J. went to his window to try
and talk to him. After their conversation ended, she accidently knocked over
microbrewery equipment set up in the living room, and Ramirez Sanchez called the
police. She waited a week to contact him again to discuss why he had called the police
and whether he and a third roommate were moving out. She went to see him two more
times at his workplace because he was not returning her text messages or calls to discuss
the apartment and rental agreement. After her second attempt to talk to him at work, she
did not talk to him again even though he did not move out until weeks later. K.J. testified
that she was unaware of his CHRO request or the temporary restraining order until “mid-
July.”
The trial court determined Ramirez Sanchez had met his burden of proof and
granted a CHRO for two years. The order, filed October 29, prohibited K.J. from
harassing or contacting Ramirez Sanchez and required her to stay at least 100 yards away
from Ramirez Sanchez, his home, and his workplace. K.J. timely appealed.

3
 II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, K.J. challenges the CHRO as an abuse of discretion and unsupported
by substantial evidence. She also contends the trial court violated her right to due process
in its conduct of the hearing, erred by denying her motion to dismiss, and improperly
admitted hearsay evidence over her objection. We address these arguments but first
describe the appellate principles and legal standards that govern our review.
A. APPELLATE PRINCIPLES
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is
ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the
basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error
that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–
609.) In reflection of that burden, the California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B),
(a)(1)(C), require that the appellant provide “some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis and citation to the record.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 266, 287.) The appellant’s briefs must have more “than a mere assertion
that the judgment is wrong” because “ ‘[i]ssues do not have a life of their own.’ ”
(Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.) Also, “[i]t is not
our place to construct theories or arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the
presumption of correctness.” (Ibid.) “If a party fails to support an argument with the
necessary citations to the record, the argument will be deemed waived.” (LA Investments,
LLC v. Spix (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1061 (LA Investments).) These principles and
the requirement to follow the correct rules of procedure apply with equal force to self-
represented parties. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.
Furthermore, not every error will result in a reversal of the order on appeal.
Instead, “an appellant must show that the error was prejudicial to compel reversal.”
(Guardianship of C.E. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1054 (C.E.).) Prejudice exists if the

4
appellant demonstrates there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable result in
the absence of the error. (Ibid.)
B. LEGAL STANDARD AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A person may seek a CHRO if they have suffered “harassment,” which is defined
as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person,
and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subds. (a)(1) & (b)(3).) “Section 527.6,
subdivision (b)(1) defines ‘ “[c]ourse of conduct” ’ as ‘a pattern of conduct composed of
a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose,
including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an
individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means,
including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice mail, facsimile,
or email. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of
“course of conduct.” ’ ” (E.G. v. M.L. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 688, 698 (E.G.).) The trial
court must issue a CHRO if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful
harassment exists. (§ 527.6, subd. (i)(1); E.G., at p. 698.) “The standard of proof known
as clear and convincing evidence demands a degree of certainty greater than that involved
with the preponderance standard, but less than what is required by the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998.)
Generally, “a past act of harassment is insufficient to justify a restraining order”
because an injunction “ ‘serves to prevent future injury and is not applicable to wrongs
that have been completed.’ ” (E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 706.) “ ‘An injunction
is authorized only when it appears that wrongful acts are likely to recur.’ ” (Ibid., citing
Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 399, 402.)
We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a CHRO for abuse of discretion.
(Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420.) The trial court’s factual findings,
whether express or implied, are reviewed for substantial evidence. (E.G., supra,

5
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 698–699; Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 497.)
We view the record in the light most favorable to prevailing party without reweighing the
evidence and “ ‘give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated
the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable
inferences from the evidence.’ [Citation.]” (E.G., at p. 699.) Whether the facts
supported by substantial evidence and construed in the petitioner’s favor are legally
sufficient to constitute civil harassment is a question of law subject to de novo review.
(Ibid.)
C. APPLICATION
1. Substantial Evidence Supports the CHRO
K.J. argues the CHRO is not supported by substantial evidence. To that end, she
asserts that Ramirez Sanchez’s testimony was “unsubstantiated, inconsistent, and largely
hearsay,” and that the alleged incidents of harassment “either lacked police reports,
eyewitness testimony, or verifiable documentation.” At the same time, K.J. claims that
her own evidence undermines a finding that harassment was ongoing or likely to recur
because she testified that she did not interact with Ramirez Sanchez before he moved out
of the apartment.
As an initial matter, K.J.’s appellate briefs are deficient. Despite arguing that there
was insufficient evidence of harassment and that the trial court erroneously relied on the
testimony of only one witness, neither her opening brief nor her reply brief contain
citations to the record. Additionally, several of her legal contentions are not accompanied
by relevant authority. For example, she argues in her reply brief that Ramirez Sanchez’s
case citations are misplaced but provides no citations of her own to demonstrate that her
contrary position is the correct one. However, K.J.’s substantial evidence challenge
necessarily relies on the evidence presented to the trial court, and K.J. cannot
affirmatively demonstrate error in the absence of a persuasive argument with supportive
legal authorities. Consequently, K.J. has waived the argument that the CHRO lacks

6
substantial evidence. (LA Investments, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1061; LNSU #1, LLC
v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Assn. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1070
[“appellants must affirmatively establish prejudicial error by … citing to the record, and
presenting a persuasive argument with citations to supportive legal authorities”]; Lee v.
Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721, italics omitted [appellant’s burden “ ‘includes the
obligation to present argument and legal authority on each point raised’ ”].)
Even if we were to consider the argument on its merits, we would reject it.
Through his written declaration and at the hearing, Ramirez Sanchez described at least
two incidents where K.J. made threatening statements and one incident where K.J.
slapped him. He testified that K.J. threw items, said she would burn down their
apartment, and showed up twice at his workplace—once at night in the parking lot and
once during the day inside his laboratory. During the second incident, although K.J.
initially left, she returned to the laboratory later that day, causing Ramirez Sanchez to
notify the police. This evidence, which the trial court implicitly found credible, qualifies
as “harassment” under section 527.6, subdivisions (a)(1) and (b)(3), and is substantial
evidence supporting the decision to grant the CHRO. (See Melissa G. v. Raymond M.
(2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 360, 374 [evidence is substantial where “ ‘reasonable in nature,
credible, and of solid value; it must actually be “substantial” proof of the essentials which
the law requires in a particular case’ ”].) Also, given the number of incidents and the
evidence that K.J. persisted in her conduct, the trial court could justifiably find that
harassment was likely to recur without a restraining order. (E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th
at p. 706.)
K.J.’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive. She claims that Ramirez Sanchez’s
evidence and testimony were uncorroborated and inconsistent and implies that Ramirez
Sanchez was not credible. She also contends that her own testimony shows a CHRO was
not justified. But we do not reweigh evidence or reassess a witness’ credibility on appeal.
(E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 699; Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court

7
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 334 [“ ‘questions as to ... the credibility of witnesses ... are matters
for the trial court to resolve’ ”].) Nor do we gauge the strength of K.J.’s testimony
against the testimony of Ramirez Sanchez when determining whether the CHRO is
supported by substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Balcof (2006)
141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1521 [“ ‘[t]he power of a reviewing court begins and ends with a
determination of whether there is in the record substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, which supports the result reached; and we must also assume in favor of
the determination below the existence of every fact which the trier of facts could have
reasonably deduced from the evidence’ ”].) Furthermore, the trial court was not required
to discount evidence simply because it was uncorroborated. “The testimony of one
witness, even that of a party, may constitute substantial evidence.” (In re Marriage of
Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 703.)
K.J. also argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the letter from
Ramirez Sanchez’s coworker because it was hearsay and not authenticated. However,
when considering whether to grant a CHRO, the trial court must receive any relevant
evidence, even if hearsay. (§ 527.6, subd. (i); Yost v. Forestiere (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 509, 521 [“hearsay evidence … is admissible during hearings conducted
pursuant to section 527.6”].) Regardless, any error in admitting the letter was harmless
given Ramirez Sanchez’s testimony, which we have determined sufficiently supports the
trial court’s decision to issue the CHRO. (C.E., supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 1054.)
2. The Trial Court Did Not Misapply section 527.6
K.J. argues the trial court improperly denied her motion to dismiss and applied the
wrong legal standard because the matter should have been considered under the DVPA as
a dispute between former romantic partners.
Before the commencement of testimony, K.J. represented to the trial court that she
and Ramirez Sanchez had a “dating relationship.” She did not mention the issue further
after the court denied her motion to dismiss, and she has failed to provide any record

8
citations in her appellate briefing that would support her contention that she and Ramirez
Sanchez were romantic partners. Accordingly, K.J. has waived her argument that the trial
court misapplied section 527.6. (LA Investments, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1061.)
Nevertheless, we would conclude that K.J. could not show reversible error even if
the record showed a dating relationship. Restraining order requests under the DVPA are
subject to a less stringent standard of proof than requests made under section 527.6.
(R.M. v. A.G. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 384, 396 [“ ‘DVPA requires a showing of past
abuse by a preponderance of the evidence’ ”].) The definition of what qualifies as
“abuse” under the DVPA is also broader (Fam. Code, § 6203), and a restraining order can
issue under the statute based on a showing of past abuse without a threat of future harm.
(Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 334 [“trial court is vested with
discretion to issue a protective order under the DVPA simply on the basis of an affidavit
showing past abuse”]; Gdowski v. Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 128, 137.) Under
these standards, courts “exercise their discretion to grant a DVRO ‘more liberally than
[their] discretion to restrain civil harassment generally.’ ” (R.M., at p. 397; Nakamura, at
p. 334.) Here, because the trial court granted a CHRO under a clear and convincing
standard of proof, K.J. cannot demonstrate that she would have obtained a more favorable
result had the restraining order request been subjected to the less burdensome evidentiary
standard that applies under the DVPA. (C.E., supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 1054.)
3. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Due Process
K.J. raises various due process violations. She asserts that she was not served with
the CHRO request until months after it was filed, that Ramirez Sanchez testified to
allegations not included in the written request, and that she was not permitted to present
evidence and rebut his allegations at the hearing.
Although the procedures set forth under section 527.6 are expedited, a respondent
charged with harassment must be given “a full opportunity to present his or her case.”
(Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 730.) “[T]he

9
court must hold a hearing, receive relevant testimony, and issue the injunction if it finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, that harassment exists.” (Nora v. Kaddo (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1028.) On this record, we discern no violation of these principles.
After Ramirez Sanchez’s testimony concluded, the trial court permitted K.J. to testify in
the narrative without interruption. Indeed, K.J.’s testimony occupies over five full pages
of the reporter’s transcript. Although the trial court eventually interjected and stated it
would issue a CHRO based on the evidence that had been presented by that point, it only
did so after K.J. had related her versions of each of the incidents cited by Ramirez
Sanchez. Thus, the record belies K.J.’s claim that she was not permitted to present
evidence or rebut Ramirez Sanchez’s allegations, even if he raised new incidents at the
hearing that were not included in his CHRO application.
To the extent K.J. contends the trial court erred by excluding evidence, we are not
persuaded. Toward the end of the hearing, K.J. notified the trial court that she had
“phone records,” which she implied the court had not considered because it issued its
ruling before she introduced them. However, she has not shown that the trial court
abused its discretion in declining to consider the phone records because she does not
describe them or explain why they were relevant to the proceedings. (Qaadir v. Figueroa
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 790, 803 [evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of
discretion].)
Finally, reversal is not required due to any delay in the service of Ramirez
Sanchez’s CHRO request. Even accepting K.J.’s contention that she was not served until
July 2024, she does not articulate how the delay was prejudicial to her other than a bare
statement that she was deprived of an opportunity to respond or to contest Ramirez
Sanchez’s claims in a timely manner. Regardless, the record shows that K.J. was able to
submit a written response to the request in July 2024 and actively participated in the
subsequent hearing, which did not occur until October 2024. That being so, K.J. was

10
afforded sufficient time and opportunity to contest the allegations made against her both
in writing and through her testimony at the hearing.
For the reasons we have explained, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in granting the CHRO.3
III. DISPOSITION
The October 29, 2024 CHRO is affirmed. Ramirez Sanchez shall recover costs on
appeal by operation of California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).

3
Because we have found no errors, we also reject K.J.’s cumulative error claim.
(People v. Sedillo (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1068 [no cumulative error where
challenged rulings are not erroneous].)

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 ______________________________________
Adams, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________________
Danner, J.

H052883
Ramirez Sanchez v. K.J.