Filed 9/22/26 In re L.J. CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re L.J., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,
A175148
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (City & County of San Francisco
Super. Ct. No. JW236145)
L.J.,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant L.J. was committed to a secure youth treatment facility in
September 2024. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 875.)1 In this appeal, he challenges a
December 2025 order transferring him to a “less restrictive program.” (Id.,
subd. (f).) A few months after filing the present appeal, L.J. was discharged
from his secure youth treatment facility commitment and placed on
probation.
L.J.’s appellate counsel has filed a brief that raises no issue for appeal
and asks this court for independent review of the record pursuant to People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. The Wende brief does not draw our attention to

Statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code, unless
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otherwise indicated.

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any issues under Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, 744. L.J. was
notified of his right to file a supplemental brief and to request to have counsel
relieved (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 118), but he did neither.
Following Wende guidelines, we have conducted an independent review and
conclude there are no meritorious issues to be argued in this moot appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL
The San Mateo Petitions
In June 2023, the San Mateo County District Attorney filed an
amended petition alleging that 16-year-old L.J. came within the juvenile
court’s wardship jurisdiction due to his commission of three felonies:
burglary of a motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (b)); receiving stolen
property, a motor vehicle (id., § 496d, subd. (a)); and attempted driving or
taking of a vehicle without consent (id., § 664, Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)).
According to police reports, L.J. and three others committed the offenses over
a two-day period, and their crimes were captured on surveillance video.
L.J. admitted that he committed a felony by attempting to drive or take
a vehicle without consent in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. The
San Mateo court found the admission was knowing and voluntary, sustained
allegations as to the felony, set a one-year maximum term of confinement and
transferred the matter to San Francisco, where L.J. lived with his mother.
In July 2023, the San Francisco juvenile court held a disposition
hearing, declared L.J. a ward of the court, placed him on juvenile probation
and released him to his mother. In October, L.J. was arrested in San Mateo
County and taken into custody. The San Francisco Probation Department
(Department) filed a motion to revoke L.J.’s probation and the San Mateo
District Attorney filed another wardship petition.

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 The second San Mateo petition, as amended, alleged that L.J.
committed the following felonies: reckless driving while fleeing a pursuing
peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)); carrying a concealed loaded
weapon (Pen. Code, § 25400, subd. (c)(6)); carrying a loaded firearm in a
public place (id., § 25850, subd. (c)(6)); manufacturing, importing, keeping for
sale, giving or receiving a large capacity magazine (id., § 32310, subd. (a));
vandalism (id., § 594, subd. (b)(1)). L.J. was also charged with misdemeanor
damaging or tampering with a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10852); and
misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd (b)(2)(a)). According to the
police report, L.J. and two cohorts were detained after crashing a stolen
vehicle used in a recently reported robbery. L.J. and one of his companions
told officers they were “Tre-4 gang members.”
L.J. admitted recklessly fleeing a pursuing a peace officer, a felony, and
that he also committed misdemeanor vandalism. The San Mateo court
accepted L.J.’s admissions, finding they were knowingly and voluntarily
made; set the maximum term of confinement at two years, four months; and
ordered the matter transferred to San Francisco.
On November 16, 2023, the San Francisco juvenile court ordered that
L.J. be detained from his home and placed him in the care of the Department
pending disposition. On November 22, the Department released L.J. on home
detention, subject to GPS monitoring and other terms and conditions.
A disposition hearing was set for January 2024. The Department
reported that L.J. had not been complying with conditions of his home
release, and his current offenses were serious. The Department had referred
the family for wraparound services and it presented L.J.’s case to a
multidisciplinary team “in an effort to determine the least restrictive
dispositional option that would adequately meet the minor’s needs, promote

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rehabilitation, and address public safety.” Out-of-home placement was
seriously contemplated, but the Department remained hopeful L.J. could
make the requisite changes. It recommended redeclaring L.J.’s wardship and
giving him one more opportunity on probation. At the January 2024 hearing,
the court dismissed the probation revocation petition in the interests of
justice and continued the matter for disposition.
A disposition hearing on the second San Mateo petition was held in
March 2024. The Department reported L.J. was showing some improvement.
Wardship was redeclared and the court ordered that L.J. was to reside in the
home of his mother under the Department’s supervision.
The San Francisco Petitions
In early June 2024, the Department reported L.J. was not engaged in
services or complying with the terms of juvenile probation; he was not
attending school regularly, refraining from drug use, or adhering to GPS
compliance. Nor would he comply with the most basic directives from his
probation officer, despite repeated counseling. Later that month, L.J. was
detained by San Francisco police and the Department filed another motion to
revoke probation.
The San Francisco District Attorney filed two separate wardship
petition alleging that 17-year-old L.J. had committed a multitude of offenses
in May and June 2024.
The first petition, filed June 20, 2024, alleged that L.J. committed the
following offenses: carjacking (Pen. Code, §215, subd. (a)); three felony
firearm offenses (id., §§ 25850, subd. (a), 25400, subd (a), 29610, subd. (a));
three misdemeanor firearm offenses (id., §§ 23920, subd. (b), 32310, subd. (a),
29650); and falsely reporting his identity to the police, a misdemeanor (id.,

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§ 148.9, subd. (a)). This petition was later amended to allege L.J. also
committed grand theft, auto (id., § 487, subd. (d)(1)).
Police reports that led to the filing of the June 20 petition indicate that
on May 1, 2024, four suspects were captured on surveillance video breaking
into a car parked at San Francisco State University. The suspects were
confronted by the car owner, threatened her with a gun; and stole her car.
Several weeks later L.J. and his teenaged brother were walking on campus
when police identified L.J. as a suspect in the May 1 incident. L.J. initially
gave a false name, but was subsequently identified and found to be in
possession of a loaded handgun.
The second San Francisco petition, filed June 21, 2024, alleged that
L.J. committed attempted murder (Pen. Code, § 664/187, subd. (a)); assault
with a semiautomatic firearm (id., § 245, subd. (b)); robbery (id., § 211); and
multiple firearm-related felonies (id., §§ 25850, subd. (a), 25400, subd. (a)(2),
29610, subd. (a)). This petition contained additional allegations that L.J. was
subject to sentence enhancements for personally using and intentionally
discharging a semiautomatic firearm (id., §§ 12022.5, subd (a), 12022.53,
subd (d)) and for personal infliction of great bodily injury (id., § 12022.7,
subd. (a)).
Police reports pertaining to the June 21 petition indicate that multiple
suspects entered a store, put merchandise in their pockets, and shot the
victim who confronted them. The incident was captured on surveillance video
and L.J.’s probation officer identified him as one of the assailants.
On June 24, 2024, the juvenile court made findings to detain L.J.
pending trial on the petitions. L.J. objected and, following an evidentiary
hearing, the court affirmed its prior detention findings. A contested

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jurisdiction hearing set for August 2024 was vacated after L.J. waived time,
and the matter was continued for further pretrial proceedings.
On August 28, 2024, the court denied L.J.’s motion to suppress
evidence, after which he entered a negotiated plea covering both petitions.
L.J. admitted that he committed the following felony offenses: possession of a
loaded firearm (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a)); grand theft auto (id., §487,
subd. (d)(1)); and assault with a semiautomatic firearm (id., §245, subd. (b)).
The court found L.J.’s admissions were knowingly and voluntarily made and
sustained amended allegations corresponding to the admitted offenses.
A two-day disposition hearing was held in September 2024. On
September 12, the juvenile court declared L.J. a ward of the court and
committed him to a secure youth treatment facility. (See § 875.) The court
dismissed allegations in the San Francisco petitions that L.J. had not
admitted, determined his maximum term of confinement for all admitted
offenses was 11 years, and found that his baseline term of confinement based
on the most serious adjudicated offense was two years. The June 2024
motion to revoke probation was dismissed pursuant to the negotiated plea.
The court ordered the Department to develop and propose an individual
rehabilitation plan for L.J. pursuant to section 875, subdivision (d).
In October 2024, the Department filed L.J.’s Secure Track Individual
Rehabilitation Plan, which was prepared with input from the family and
service providers and was approved and adopted by the court. In March
2025, the Department filed an updated Plan, documenting L.J.’s progress and
recommending that a less restrictive program was not appropriate at that
juncture. On March 11, the court granted L.J. a six-month reduction from his
two-year baseline term. The court held subsequent review hearings and
continued to receive positive reports from the Department.

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 In October 2025, another San Mateo matter was transferred to San
Francisco for disposition. Earlier that month, L.J. admitted allegations that
in June 2024, he committed felony grand theft of a person (Pen. Code, § 487,
subd. (c)) and misdemeanor battery (id., § 242) pursuant to a negotiated
disposition resulting in dismissal of a robbery count. The San Mateo court
found L.J.’s admissions were knowing and voluntary, sustained the
allegations, and set a maximum term of confinement at two years, two
months.
At an October 29, 2025, review hearing, the San Francisco court
accepted transfer of the San Mateo matter and the parties’ stipulation that
no additional time would be added as a result of the sustained petition. The
court also received the Department’s status report regarding a planning
timeline for a less restrictive program placement, in light of L.R.’s continued
progress. Sunset Youth Services had agreed to be L.J.’s reentry coordinator
and service provider and was working with the Department to develop a
reentry plan. At the October 29 hearing, the court granted L.J. a one-month
reduction of the baseline term, and continued the matter until December 10
for receipt of the Department’s proposed Less Restrictive Plan (or LRP).
In advance of the December 10, 2025 hearing, the Department filed
L.J.’s Secure Track Less Restrictive Plan. The eight-page document
summarized a comprehensive plan designed to assist L.J. to successfully
transition to a less restrictive placement, pursuant to which he would live at
home with his mother and receive intensive services coordinated by Sunset
Youth Services. While in custody, L.J. had graduated high school and begun
taking college courses. The LRP reflected that L.J. had registered for one in-
person course and two on-line classes for the Spring 2006 semester, and
provided for his reentry supervisor to assist him in becoming acclimated to

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the campus and preparing for the school year. L.J. also expressed interest in
seeking employment and would receive services to assist in that endeavor.
He would continue with therapy, have a life coach, and participate in a
program for managing medical needs. With assistance, L.J. had also
prepared a safety plan for himself, as he had “previously allowed himself to
gravitate toward negative peers.”
The Department reported that “previous interventions in the
community had little to no effect, leading [L.J.] down a fast track of criminal
behavior that compromised the safety of the community,” but his Secure
Track commitment had afforded him “a stable chance for rehabilitation.” The
LRP would afford intensive reentry services during an initial transition
period and ongoing support thereafter. Moreover, the Department planned to
“act timely” to ensure not only that L.J. was following through with his plan
but that he was receiving community-based services to assist with his
rehabilitation.
The Secure Track LRP also incorporated terms and conditions, which
included requirements that L.J. live in his mother’s home, follow a curfew,
stay away from specific geographic areas and specific people, attend school
regularly, seek employment, and submit to warrantless searches of his
person and electronic devices.
On December 10, 2025, the court approved L.J.’s Secure Track LRP. At
the December 10 hearing, L.J. submitted the matter, and his counsel
expressed enthusiasm about the plan. However, when the court reviewed the
terms and conditions, L.J.’s counsel made two objections. First, he objected
to a condition requiring regular school attendance, with no unexcused
absences, on the ground that L.J. was 18 and would be taking college classes.

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The court ruled that the “City College release program” was a key component
of the LRP, and necessary to keep L.J. on track.
Second, L.J. objected that the requirement he submit to searches of his
electronic devices was irrelevant to the facts of his case and an invasion of
privacy rights. The court responded that the requirement would remain “in
place at this time,” inviting L.J.’s counsel to renew his objection at a later
date. The court reasoned that the LRP was a “big change,” and the electronic
search requirement was appropriate during the transition. It would address
concerns that L.J. would be tempted to head down the wrong path and would
assist him staying on track.
L.J. filed this timely appeal from the December 10 order. While the
appeal was pending, the court held another review hearing in February 2026.
At the February 11, 2026 hearing, L.J. was discharged from his secured
youth treatment facility commitment and placed on wardship probation.2
The terms of L.J.’s probation did not include an electronic search condition.
Moreover, the requirement that L.J. attend school regularly was modified to
apply only if L.J. re-enrolled in a college course. At the review hearing, the
court clarified that L.J. had chosen to shift his focus from attending college to
getting a job, and his probation conditions should reflect that choice.
DISCUSSION
For three related reasons, we conclude there are no meritorious issues
to be argued on appeal.
First, the scope of this appeal is narrow, as it is limited to the progress
review hearing held on December 10, 2024. L.J. did not timely appeal from

2 At the hearing, the court also accepted the parties’ stipulation that
disposition in yet another matter transferred from San Mateo matter would
not result in any additional commitment time for L.J.

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the September 2024 disposition order committing him to a secure youth
treatment facility pursuant to section 875. As our Supreme Court has
affirmed, “clear authority” prohibits “a challenge to a final dispositional order
through an appeal from a later order. (In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1127;
see also In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532.)
Second, this appeal is moot. “It is our ‘duty to decide “ ‘ “actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give
opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case
before it.” ’ ” ’ ” (In re Sebastian C. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 1187, 1194.) Here
the record shows that a decision reversing the approval of L.J.’s less
restrictive program would have no practical impact on L.J., as he has been
discharged from his commitment to a secure youth treatment facility.
In most instances, the court will dismiss an appeal when it cannot
grant effective relief, although we have “inherent discretion to resolve an
issue when there remain ‘material questions for the court’s determination’
[citation], where a ‘pending case poses an issue of broad public interest that is
likely to recur’ [citation], or where ‘there is a likelihood of recurrence of the
controversy between the same parties or others.’ ” ’ ” (In re Sebastian C.,
supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1194.) These exceptions to the general dismissal
rule do not apply here, in a case that presents a unique factual situation
during protracted wardship proceedings.
Finally, and relatedly, the only objections made by L.J. at his progress
review hearing pertained to the juvenile court’s decision to impose certain
temporary conditions in implementing a less restrictive plan. “The purpose
of a less restrictive program is to facilitate the safe and successful
reintegration of the ward into the community.” (§ 875, subd. (f)(1).) When

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the court orders a ward to be transferred from “a secure youth treatment
facility to a less restrictive program, the court may require the ward to
observe any conditions of performance or compliance with the program that
are reasonable and appropriate in the individual case and that are within the
capacity of the ward to perform.” (§ 875, subd. (f)(2).) Here, L.J.’s counsel
invited the juvenile court to approve the less restrictive program proposed for
L.J. and then made conclusory objections to temporary measures intended to
ensure a successful transition to the less restrictive placement, measures that
were not carried over when L.J. was subsequently placed on probation.
These circumstances are integral to our conclusions that there are no
material issues to be argued and that the appeal is moot.
DISPOSITION
L.J.’s appeal from the juvenile court’s December 2025 post-disposition
review order is dismissed.

TUCHER, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

In re L.J. (A175148)

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