Filed 9/22/26 Logan v. Sanders CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ETHAN LOGAN,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G064967, G064972

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-
01375066)
NICHOLAS A. SANDERS et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Lee
L. Gabriel, Judge. Affirmed.
Facts Law Truth Justice and Nicole C. Pearson for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Straggas Law Group, George D. Straggas; Grammatico Law Firm
and Paul A. Grammatico for Defendant and Respondent Nicholas A. Sanders.
Shulman Bastian Friedman Bui & O’Dea, Shane M. Biornstad
and Brooke S. Thompson for Defendants and Respondents Justice Meritus
LLC and John Collins.
 Plaintiff Ethan Logan1 appeals from the court’s orders granting
special motions to strike (anti-SLAPP motion) under Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.162 by defendants Nicholas A. Sanders, Trustee of the Joseph L.
and Kathleen H. Sanders Family Trust dated January 28, 1986 (Sanders),
John Collins, and Justice Meritus LLC (Justice Meritus).
On appeal, Logan contends the anti-SLAPP statute does not
apply to his claims for breach of contract and specific performance. He also
argues he has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on those claims. We
disagree and affirm the court’s orders.

1
We deny Logan’s motion for leave to amend the notice of appeal
to add Statewide Ministorage/Barstow, LLC (Barstow) as an appellant and to
vacate our prior order denying Logan’s request. Logan argues Barstow’s
omission was a clerical error, and defendants will suffer no prejudice because
Barstow’s appeal would raise no new issues. Logan also emphasizes Barstow
jointly opposed the anti-SLAPP motions. Regardless, the notices of appeal
only identified Logan as the appealing party. There was no indication that
multiple plaintiffs would appeal. Although Logan claims he previously filed
an amended notice of appeal, which identified Barstow, Logan concedes the
amended notice was “procedurally improper.” Logan also did not timely
respond to this court’s prior invitation that the parties address “whether any
authority supports the filing of an ‘amended’ notice of appeal to include a new
appellant (as opposed to the additional appellant simply filing their own
notice of appeal with their own filing fee).” Because Logan’s proposed
amendment would add a new appellant after the time to appeal expired, we
lack jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules
8.60(d), 8.104(b); Garg v. Garg (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1044–1045.)
2
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

2
 FACTS
I.
THE COMPLAINT
In January 2024, Logan filed the operative complaint against
defendants alleging four causes of action: (1) breach of oral contract against
Sanders; (2) specific performance against Sanders and Justice Meritus; (3)
intentional interference with contract against Collins and Justice Meritus;
and (4) fraud against Sanders.3 Only the first two causes of action are at
issue in this appeal.
According to the complaint, Sanders filed an action against Logan
and others in 2022 (the 2022 Action). The 2022 Action related to a 2013
judgment in Sanders’ favor. In the 2022 Action, the parties participated in a
mandatory settlement conference (MSC). The parties allegedly reached an
oral settlement agreement whereby one party would pay money to Sanders in
exchange for his dismissal of the 2022 Action and in satisfaction of the 2013
judgment. The payment included an initial sum of $100,000 followed by
$10,000 per month for 20 months. The party providing payment would
“provide collateral for the monthly payments acceptable to . . . Sanders.”
At the conclusion of the MSC, the settlement conference officer
directed the parties to place the terms of the settlement agreement on the
record. Sanders’ counsel then informed everyone that Sanders had left the
courthouse. After the settlement conference officer informed the court that a
settlement had been reached, the court set a virtual hearing for later in the

3
The complaint identified additional plaintiffs and a defendant
who are not parties to the instant appeal. We summarize the allegations and
facts relevant to the parties in this appeal.

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day. Sanders’ counsel again informed the parties that Sanders was not
available, so the court rescheduled the hearing for the next day.
Over the next few days, Sanders’ counsel allegedly exchanged
numerous emails and “discussed terms of the collateral that would be
acceptable to” Sanders. His counsel purportedly “never repudiated or denied
the existence of the” settlement agreement. But his counsel again indicated
Sanders was not available for the scheduled hearing to place the terms of the
agreement on the record. The court rescheduled the hearing once again.
On the day before the hearing, Sanders’ counsel advised the
parties that Sanders “had sold the [2013] judgment, and that [he] no longer
intended to honor the” settlement agreement. At the hearing, Sanders’
counsel likewise advised the court that Sanders had sold the 2013 judgment
to Collins.
Later, Logan was “advised” that Sanders assigned his interest in
the 2022 Action to Collins who subsequently assigned his rights in the 2022
Action and the 2013 judgment to Justice Meritus. Collins allegedly owned
Justice Meritus, which was formed on the same day as the MSC.
The complaint accordingly asserted Sanders breached the
settlement agreement by refusing to perform his obligations under the
agreement. The complaint also sought an order requiring specific
performance by Sanders and Justice Meritus.
As to the intentional interference cause of action, the complaint
alleged Collins knew about the settlement agreement and intentionally
interfered with it. The complaint stated “[i]nterference is inferred by
[Collins’] and [Justice Meritus’] conduct in making an offer to buy [Sanders’]
interest in the 2013 [judgment] . . . and in . . . [Sanders’ refusal] to honor the
terms of the [settlement agreement].”

4
 Regarding the fraud cause of action, the complaint alleged
Sanders and his counsel “engaged in conversations with [Collins] in advance
of the MSC and had agreed upon some arrangement.” The complaint added:
“It appears . . . the MSC was intended by [Sanders and his counsel] to set the
market value of the [2013 judgment] and the claims in the [2022 Action]
pursuant to negotiations with [Collins].” In other words, Sanders concealed
that he was negotiating with Collins and knew he would repudiate the
settlement agreement.
II.
THE ANTI-SLAPP MOTIONS
A few months later, Collins and Justice Meritus filed an anti-
SLAPP motion. They asserted Logan’s claims arose from protected activity
because the challenged conduct and statements were “made in connection
with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(2).) They argued that Logan sought to hold Collins and Justice
Meritus liable for Sanders’ statements in negotiating a potential settlement
at and after an MSC and in conjunction with various hearings. They
emphasized Collins and Sanders entered into an assignment agreement, and
Collins later executed an assignment in favor of Justice Meritus. A few days
later, Justice Meritus appeared ex parte before the court and obtained an
order substituting Justice Meritus as plaintiff in the 2022 Action. Given these
facts, they argued Logan’s claims “would not exist in the absence of . . .
protected litigation activity.” They added that their conduct and statements
“were ‘in furtherance of’ their rights ‘of petition’” because they “were directed
at Sanders for the purpose of becoming the party plaintiff in the action, which
[Justice Meritus] became, at a time when Sanders was plaintiff and had a

5
direct and undeniable interest in [the] litigation matter.” Finally, they
asserted Logan could not show a probability of success on the merits.
Shortly after, Sanders filed an anti-SLAPP motion. He likewise
argued Logan’s claims arose from protected activity because the challenged
conduct and statements “were made in connection with an alleged settlement
of the [2022 Action].” He argued that the claims against him were based on
his alleged conduct, both directly and through his attorney, of: (1) Sanders
entering into a settlement agreement at the MSC but refusing to put the
matter on the record before the court; (2) Sanders concealing that he could
not settle the case because he had already made arrangements to sell the
2013 judgment and assign his claims under the related case; and (3) Sanders’
attorney misrepresenting that the case had settled and concealing the fact
that Sanders had made arrangements to sell the 2013 judgment and assign
his claims under the related case. Sanders noted his decision to sell the 2013
judgment and assign his claims “were strategic decisions related to the
potential collectability of any potential judgment.” Sanders further claimed
Logan could not show a probability of success on the merits.
In opposition, Logan argued his claims did not relate to any
statements made to a judicial body or to conduct in furtherance of the right of
petition or free speech. Instead, his claims concerned non-communicative
conduct—i.e., Sanders’ nonperformance of the settlement agreement.
Regardless, Logan asserted he could establish a probability of prevailing on
his claims.
III.
THE COURT’S ORDERS GRANTING THE ANTI-SLAPP MOTIONS
In October 2024, the court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP
motions and dismissed Logan’s claims with prejudice. First, the court held

6
defendants demonstrated Logan’s claims arose from protected activity.
Regarding Collins and Justice Meritus, the court found their conduct and
statements related to the 2022 Action and were directed at Sanders so
Justice Meritus could become a party to the 2022 Action. The court concluded
their conduct and statements were in furtherance of their rights of petition.
As to Sanders, the court held “settlement negotiations during [an MSC] are
protected activity within the scope of section 425.16.”
Second, the court found Logan had not demonstrated a
probability of prevailing on his claims. The court noted Logan did not present
any evidence in opposition to the anti-SLAPP motions. Even if Logan had
submitted evidence, the court concluded he could not meet his burden
because he did not cite to the elements of any cause of action, analyze
declarations or exhibits, or tie the evidence to the claims. The court did not
reach defendants’ arguments as to whether the litigation privilege applied.
Logan timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Logan contends the court erred by granting defendants’ anti-
SLAPP motions. He argues his breach of contract and specific performance
claims do not arise out of protected activity because they are based on non-
communicative conduct. He adds that none of the relevant allegations
concern a “statement or writing” as required under section 425.16,
subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2). He also insists defendants’ conduct was
unlawful, and there is no public issue or issue of public interest as required
under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). Assuming his claims arise from

7
protected activity, Logan argues he established his claims have minimal
merit.4
Contrary to Logan’s assertion, the court did not err. Logan’s
claims for breach of contract and specific performance arise out of protected
activity. Logan also has not established his claims have minimal merit.
I.
APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[T]he anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from
meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and
petition on matters of public concern. [Citations.] To that end, the statute
authorizes a special motion to strike a claim ‘arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with
a public issue.’” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871,
883–884.)
The trial court conducts a potentially two-step inquiry to evaluate
an anti-SLAPP motion. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th
995, 1009 (Bonni).) First, the court must decide whether the defendant has

4
Logan filed two requests for judicial notice asking that we take
judicial notice of: (1) the 2013 judgment filed in the Superior Court of Orange
County, case No. 30-2011-00468519-PR-TR-LJC; (2) the register of actions in
the Superior Court of Orange County, case Nos. 30-2019-01092238-CU-PO-
CJC and 30-2022-01254056-CU-MC-WJC; (3) the register of actions in the
instant action; (4) Logan’s opposition to another party’s anti-SLAPP motion
in the instant action; and (5) a minute order dated August 27, 2024, filed in
the Superior Court of Orange County, case No. 30-2022-01254056-CU-MC-
CJC. We grant Logan’s request as to the register of actions in the instant
case. We deny the remainder of Logan’s request because the documents are
unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal.

8
met its burden of establishing the plaintiff’s claim arises from protected
activity in which the defendant has engaged. (Ibid.) Second, assuming
defendant has met its burden, the court determines whether the plaintiff has
established “there is a probability . . . the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) In meeting this burden, “the plaintiff must show the
claim has ‘at least “minimal merit.”’” (Bonni, at p. 1009.)
We review the court’s ruling de novo, applying the legal
principles discussed above. (Falcon Brands, Inc. v. Mousavi & Lee, LLP
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 506, 518.)
II.
PROTECTED ACTIVITY
In determining whether a plaintiff’s claims arise from protected
activity, “the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on
the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Navellier v.
Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) “‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed
after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that
activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’” (Park v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063.) “At this
first step, courts are to ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and
what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form
the basis for liability.’ [Citation.] The defendant’s burden is to identify what
acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected
under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.” (Bonni, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 1009.) “We review the parties’ pleadings, declarations, and other
supporting documents at this stage of the analysis only ‘to determine what
conduct is actually being challenged, not to determine whether the conduct is
actionable.’” (Castleman v. Sagaser (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 481, 491.)

9
 The anti-SLAPP statute identifies four categories of protected
activity: “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a
legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,
(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the
public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4)
any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of
petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public
issue or on an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subds. (e)(1)–(4).)
A. Sanders: Breach of Contract and Specific Performance5
Logan contends his claims for breach of contract and specific
performance do not arise from protected activity because they are not based
on any “statement or writing.” (§ 425.16, subds. (e)(1)–(2).) Instead, Logan
insists his claims are based on non-communicative conduct—i.e., Sanders’
“failure to appear, refusal to perform agreed-upon settlement obligations
(placing the settlement on the record, reducing it to writing, executing
documents, dismissing claims), [and] conceal[ment] [of] material facts.”
We disagree.
Here, the breach of contract and specific performance claims arise
from protected activity because they are based on Sanders’ participation in
an MSC and ongoing settlement discussions during litigation. (§ 425.16,

5
Logan states the breach of contract and specific performance
claims are “at issue in this appeal.” He does not challenge the court’s holding
as to the remaining causes of action. We accordingly need not address the
intentional interference with contract or fraud claims.

10
subd. (e)(2).) The complaint specifically alleges the parties’ discussions at an
MSC amounted to an oral settlement agreement. It further alleges Sanders,
through his counsel, communicated about the settlement agreement’s terms
via e-mail and concealed Sanders’ intent not to perform. Logan also does not
dispute his claims are based, in part, on Sanders’ failure to appear in court to
place the settlement on the record. Settlement negotiations conducted in
connection with pending litigation constitute protected activity. (Bonni,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1024; Suarez v. Trigg Laboratories, Inc. (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 118, 123; Seltzer v. Barnes (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 963–
964.)
Logan also complains that defendants’ conduct was not
performed in connection with a public issue or issue of public interest as
required under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). Regardless, defendants’ acts
fall under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) so they are “not required to
independently demonstrate that the matter is a ‘public issue’ within the
statute’s meaning.” (Navarro v. IHOP Properties, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th
834, 842–843.)
Relying on Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 (Flatley),
Logan next claims section 425.16 does not apply because defendants’ conduct
was unlawful. According to Logan, defendants “engaged in intentional
concealment and misrepresentation to induce reliance and forbearance of
legal rights, and to manipulate litigation posture, including inducing trial
continuances to finalize a transaction, effect substitutions, transfer the case,
seek further continuances, and reopen discovery.” We are not persuaded.
In Flatley, our Supreme Court held “section 425.16 cannot be
invoked by a defendant whose assertedly protected activity is illegal as a
matter of law and, for that reason, not protected by constitutional guarantees

11
of free speech and petition.” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 317.) Our
Supreme Court later clarified the “conduct must be illegal as a matter of law
to defeat a defendant’s showing of protected activity.” (City of Montebello v.
Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 424.) “The defendant must concede the point,
or the evidence conclusively demonstrate it, for a claim of illegality to defeat
an anti-SLAPP motion at the first step.” (Ibid.) Logan has not conclusively
demonstrated defendants engaged in illegal conduct as a matter of law, and
defendants have not conceded they engaged in such illegal conduct.
Finally, Logan suggests defendants should have raised their
arguments in a demurrer, motion to strike, or judgment on the pleadings. Not
so. These alternative procedures do not divest defendants of their right to
proceed under section 425.16 where, as here, the claims arise from protected
activity.
In short, the court did not err by finding Sanders satisfied his
burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute.
B. Justice Meritus: Specific Performance6
Logan’s claim for specific performance against Justice Meritus
arises from protected activity. Because specific performance is a remedy
rather than an independent cause of action, the relevant inquiry is whether
the acts supplying the basis for the underlying claim (breach of contract)
arise from protected activity. (Timothy W. v. Julie W. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th
648, 663.) As noted ante, the acts supplying the basis for Logan’s breach of
contract claim arise from protected activity. The complaint also seeks to hold

6
Because Logan only identifies the breach of contract and specific
performance claims as relevant to this appeal, the only remaining issue is the
specific performance claim against Justice Meritus.

12
Justice Meritus liable for conduct and statements made in furtherance of
Justice Meritus’ right to participate in the 2022 Action. (§ 425.16, subd.
(e)(2).) For example, the complaint alleges Sanders assigned his interest in
the 2013 judgment and 2022 Action to Collins who subsequently assigned his
rights to Justice Meritus. Justice Meritus thereafter filed an ex parte
application to substitute into the underlying action. All of these allegations
are related to the 2022 Action and were directed at Sanders for purposes of
becoming the party plaintiff. In other words, the acts were taken to acquire
Sanders’ litigation rights and further Justice Meritus’ right to petition. (See
Rohde v. Wolf (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 28, 35 [the anti-SLAPP statute “is
‘construed broadly, to protect the right of litigants to “‘the utmost freedom of
access to the courts . . . .’”’”].)
For these reasons, the court did not err by finding Justice
Meritus satisfied its burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute.
Because defendants met their burden of showing Logan’s breach of contract
and specific performance claims arose from protected activity, the burden
shifted to Logan to establish a probability of prevailing on the claims.
III.
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS
Our Supreme Court has described the second step of the anti-
SLAPP analysis “as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ [Citation.] The
court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry
is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and
made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable
judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the
defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a

13
matter of law. [Citation.] ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may
proceed.’” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384–385, fn. omitted.)
As the trial court noted, Logan did not submit any evidence with
his oppositions to the anti-SLAPP motions. Instead, he only relied on his
complaint. But “a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim [in
opposition to an anti-SLAPP motion] ‘may not rely solely on its complaint,
even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible
evidence.’” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co.
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940; see HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004)
118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212.)
By failing to submit any admissible evidence in support of his
oppositions to the anti-SLAPP motions, Logan did not meet his burden to
establish a probability of success on his breach of contract and specific
performance claims. We accordingly need not address the parties’ remaining
arguments as to whether the litigation privilege applies.

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 DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. Sanders, Collins, and Justice Meritus
shall recover their costs incurred on appeal.

SERVINO, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, P. J.

MOORE, J.

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