Filed 9/23/26 In re M.R. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re M.R., B353077

a Person Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP03542B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Christine E. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant
County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 MEMORANDUM OPINION1
J.G. (mother) appeals the termination of parental rights over her son,
M. Mother argues that M. had a bond with his older brother, Na., and the
benefits of ongoing contact with Na. outweighed the benefits of permanency
and stability of adoption for M. The record demonstrates that the juvenile
court acted well within its discretion in rejecting mother’s argument. We
therefore affirm.
Section 366.26 provides procedural requirements for the termination of
parental rights. When, as here, the trial court finds at a section 366.26
hearing that “it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate
parental rights” unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
One of the statutory exceptions is the sibling relationship exception in section
366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). That subdivision states that a court may find
that termination would be detrimental to the child if “[t]here would be
substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into
consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not
limited to, … whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including
the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal
permanence through adoption.” Mother argues that this exception applies
here.
“The parent has the burden of establishing an exception to termination
of parental rights.” (In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 291; see also

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin.,
§ 8.1.) We do not recite the factual and procedural background because our
opinion is unpublished and the parties are familiar with the facts of the case
and its procedural history. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851
[unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness of trial court’s decision
“does not merit extensive factual or legal statement”].) Undesignated
statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630–631; Cal. Rules of Court, Rule
5.725(d)(2) [“The party claiming that termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child has the burden of proving the detriment”].) To find
that an exception applies, the court must find “a compelling reason for
determining the termination would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B).)
“[W]e apply … the abuse of discretion standard to the court’s weighing
of competing interests.” (In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 174; see also
In re V.S. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1167.) Mother contends the juvenile
court abused its discretion in finding that for M., the benefit of legal
permanence through adoption outweighed the benefit of ongoing contact with
Na.2
We find no abuse of discretion.
Na. was born in 2009 and M. was born in 2013. They share a father,
who was not involved with the children or this case.3

2 Mother asserts three contentions: first, that there was a “significant
sibling bond” between M. and Na.; second, that adoption would likely
interfere with that bond; and third, that the juvenile court abused its
discretion by finding that the benefits of adoption outweighed any
interference with the sibling relationship. We need not address each of these
arguments. Even if we were to assume without deciding that there was a
bond between M. and Na. and that adoption would interfere with that bond,
the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the benefit of
legal permanence through adoption for M. outweighed any benefit of M.
maintaining an ongoing relationship with Na.

3 The children’s half-brother, Ni., was born in 2020, and while this case
was pending, mother gave birth to a fourth child, A., in April 2024. Ni. was
placed in a separate home upon removal from mother. Ni. and A.’s father
died in January 2025.
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 The children were removed from mother in August 2022 due to
mother’s physical abuse of the children. M., age nine, was placed with his
current caregiver, Ms. U., in September 2022. Na., age 12, was also initially
placed with Ms. U., but he was removed due to his “aggressive behavior.”
Subsequent efforts to return Na. to Ms. U.’s care were unsuccessful because
of Na.’s ongoing aggression toward M. As reported by the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services, Na. had been “getting
verbally aggressive with M[.], which later escalated ... to physically
aggressive to the point where [Ms. U.] intervened and ended up being hit on
two separate occasion[s] protecting M[.] from Na[.]” In one incident, Na. was
“choking M[.] against the wall.” Na. did not live with M. after August 2023.
Thereafter, M. and Na. mostly saw each other during monitored
visitation with mother and their half-siblings.4 Monitors of the visits noted
that Na. was frequently angry and rude toward M., observing that Na. yelled
at M., called M. fat and an idiot, told M. to shut up, told M. “you suck,” and
cussed at M. In addition, Na. often sat by himself during visits and did not
interact with the family. M. told a children’s social worker in July 2025 that
“although Na[.] seems calmer during visits, he doesn’t interact much and
‘barely talks.’” Monitors noted that sometimes M. and Na. played together, or
discussed video games, therapy, or computers.
Mother often showed favoritism to Na., such as giving expensive gifts to
Na., but not to M. Ms. U. observed that M. often came home from visits

4 M. and Na. had some sibling visits, but these ended in May 2024
because Na. was “having difficulty transitioning between” the two homes.

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“upset or angry” “due to perceived favoritism” by mother, which was
consistent across the years M. had lived with her.5
Meanwhile, M. was thriving in Ms. U.’s care. He played soccer, took
karate classes, was student council president, and won awards at school. Ms.
U. loved M. and was committed to providing him with permanency. Ms. U.
said that if she adopted M., she was willing to maintain contact with his
siblings. In an interview on January 14, 2026, M. “expressed concerns as to
having to be at Court as he wants to be adopted by his current caregiver but
does not want to have to say it to his mom due to fear about retaliation from
the mother and Na[.]” As the potential for adoption approached in January
and February 2026, M. began refusing to visit with mother and Na.
At the section 366.26 hearing on February 27, 2026, M., now age 12,
testified that he wanted to be adopted. He testified that his relationship with
Na. was “good and bad.” When asked if he was aware that Na. “will no longer
be your brother” if he were adopted, M. said yes, but he still wanted to be
adopted. M. testified that if he did not see Na. anymore, M. would miss Na.
“at some point.” But when Na.’s counsel asked M. if he might prefer legal
guardianship over adoption so he could guarantee a continuing relationship
with Na., M. said, “No.” M. struggled to testify about the time that Na.
choked him before Na. was removed from Ms. U.’s home, saying that it still
gave him “an intense feeling … like pressure in my neck.” M. testified again
that he wanted to be adopted, and that his bond with Na. did not outweigh
that.

5 Mother also frequently ignored M. when he tried to get mother’s
attention. In addition, mother often asked only M. to help care for the
younger children. One monitor noted, “The tone of mother’s voice would
change whenever she had interactions with M[.], as it was monotone.”
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 Na. testified that he knew M. wanted to be adopted, because M. told
him so. Na. also testified that he thought M. would miss the family if he was
adopted. When asked why he believed this, Na. testified, “Well, I don’t
remember him saying that he misses the family but he will.”
“The sibling bond exception is evaluated from the perspective of the
child who is being considered for adoption, not the perspective of that child’s
siblings.” (In re D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 174.) Throughout the
case, M. remained safe, happy, and comfortable in Ms. U.’s home. M. clearly
expressed that he wanted the stability and permanency of being adopted by
Ms. U. This evidence supports a finding that adoption would be highly
beneficial to M. (See In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1076
[Children have “‘“compelling rights … to have a placement that is stable,
permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional
commitment to the child”’”].)
By contrast, the record contains very little evidence that M.’s
relationship with Na. was beneficial to M. Their relationship was
characterized by Na.’s aggressive behavior and angry outbursts directed
toward M., as well as mother’s favoritism toward Na. Instances of bonding
between M. and Na. were sporadic.
The juvenile court therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding that
mother failed to demonstrate that this was one of the “‘exceptional
circumstances’” (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631) in which
maintaining the sibling relationship outweighed the benefits of adoption.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s March 2, 2026 order terminating parental rights is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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 DAUM, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J. TAMZARIAN, J.

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