Filed 9/23/26 In re H.C. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re H.C., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
HUMBOLDT COUNTY A176038
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, (Humboldt County
Super Ct. No. JV2500121)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
The juvenile court designated appellant J.L. the biological father of a
very young H.C. in the dependency proceeding below. J.L. sought to have the
juvenile court designate him as H.C.’s presumed father over another man,
P.C., who was listed as father on H.C.’s birth certificate and who had signed a
voluntary declaration of paternity.
At a contested jurisdiction hearing, the dependency court found there
was insufficient evidence to establish jurisdiction over H.C. and ordered the
case dismissed. It declined to resolve the paternity dispute before doing so.
Here on appeal, J.L. does not challenge any aspect of the dependency court’s
findings that underlie its dismissal order. Rather, his argument is that the
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court was legally required to resolve the paternity dispute prior to dismissing
the case.
Because J.L. does not actually challenge the basis for the court’s
dismissal of the case, we conclude the appeal is moot and will dismiss it.
I. BACKGROUND
In September 2025, the Humboldt County Department of Health and
Human Services (Department) filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The Department
alleged that then two-month-old H.C was at substantial risk of physical harm
because H.C.’s mother (Mother) and alleged father, P.C., may have been
using nitrous oxide in July 2025, had a long history of substance abuse, had
an open family reunification case regarding H.C.’s half-sibling, O.C., due to
their substance abuse, and had engaged in the use of nitrous oxide on a
recreational basis since July 2025. The Department also alleged that H.C.
was at substantial risk of being neglected or abused because in October 2024,
the juvenile court had sustained a petition regarding O.C. based on Mother’s
and P.C.’s relapse and recent positive test for methamphetamine.
The Department reported that another man, J.L., incarcerated at the
time, was claiming to be H.C.’s alleged father. Previously, he had petitioned
for paternity testing in family court, which petition the family court denied
because he was not the presumed father. At an early hearing, the court
checked its records and determined that J.L.’s petition had been dismissed
without prejudice. The court noted that P.C. was listed on H.C.’s birth
certificate as her father, and Mother asserted at the same hearing that P.C.
had undergone genetic testing through P.C.’s Indian tribe but that she did
not know the result. Among other things, the court ordered genetic testing
for both J.L. and P.C.
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In October 2025, the Department reported to the court that genetic
testing showed it was 99.9 percent certain that J.L. was H.C.’s biological
father. At an October 30, 2025 hearing, the court set a date for a jurisdiction
hearing, and also set a date prior to the jurisdiction hearing to consider the
paternity issues. The court invited the parties to submit briefing regarding
the child’s paternity; and advised both J.L. and P.C. to file JV-505
“Statement[s] Regarding Parentage.”
Later that same month, P.C. filed a statement regarding parentage
with the court. He stated that he had signed a voluntary declaration of
parentage for H.C. in June 2025, asked that he be found her presumed
father, and stated that he generally held H.C. out to the community as his
daughter. He further stated that he had participated in H.C.’s birth, doctor’s
visits, and family outings, provided for her daily needs, and had been with
her since her birth.
In November 2025, J.L. filed his own statement regarding parentage
with the court. He requested the court find him to be H.C.’s presumed father.
He stated that he openly indicated H.C. was his daughter, including to his
mother, other family members, friends and acquaintances. Further, he
wrote, “I have helped to provide items and food for the mother at times
during her pregnancy. I have obtained items for my daughter at my mother’s
home, with my mother’s help, including all necessities to care for my
daughter.” J.L. also moved to invalidate the voluntary declaration of
paternity signed by P.C. as fraudulently executed. In the course of the
proceedings, J.L. further indicated that he wanted his mother to have full
custody of H.C and visitation, among other things.1
1 Also in the course of the proceedings, Mother requested the court
designate P.C. as H.C.’s presumed father and designate J.L. as a mere
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At a January 7, 2026 hearing at which the paternity issues were raised,
the parties advised the court that they were discussing a possible resolution
of the paternity issues. The court set a pretrial hearing for the next week at
which the court thought it possible to resolve the paternity issues, and
scheduled a contested jurisdiction hearing for the following month. The next
week, the parties reported that discussions continued but that a resolution of
the paternity dispute had not been reached. The court kept the date set of
the contested jurisdiction hearing “for all issues.” At the jurisdiction hearing,
J.L.’s counsel continued to request that the paternity issues be heard prior to
the jurisdiction issues. The court found there was not sufficient evidence to
sustain the petition. It declined to address the paternity issue and ordered
the petition dismissed.
J.L. filed a timely notice of appeal from the dismissal order.
II. DISCUSSION
J.L. acknowledges that our Supreme Court in In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32
Cal.4th 588 held that a juvenile court has the discretion to decide whether or
not to make paternity determinations during the pendency of a dependency
case (id. at p. 621), and attempts to distinguish the facts of that case from
his. He argues the dependency court was required as a matter of law to
biological father. Minor’s counsel opined it was in H.C.’s best interests to
have the birth certificate accurately reflect her parentage but deferred on
whether J.L. should be designated as H.C.’s presumed father until he could
demonstrate his capacity to be a father to H.C. Counsel for the Big Lagoon
Rancheria Tribe, appearing in the action because Mother was eligible for
enrollment in it, declined to take a position on presumed father status and
concurred with minor’s counsel that it was in the child’s best interests to
have an accurate birth certificate, especially because of its relevance to tribal
enrollment and membership. The Department’s counsel represented to the
court that the Department was in general agreement with the positions
taken by minor’s counsel and the child’s Tribe.
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determine his paternity issues before dismissing this case because California
Rules of Court, rule 5.635(h) states, “If a person appears at a hearing in a
dependency matter . . . and requests a judgment of parentage on form JV-
505, the court must determine . . . [w]hether that person is the presumed
parent of the child, if that finding is requested.” (Italics added.) He further
argues that the court’s legal error has prejudiced him.
Anticipating that we may conclude we should dismiss his appeal as
moot, he argues against such a dismissal in one short paragraph: “[T]he
juvenile court’s failure to make a finding regarding parentage had an
immediate adverse effect on J.L.’s custody and visitation and could continue
to affect him in the future if other dependency or family law proceedings are
initiated. Therefore, this court should exercise its discretion to address the
merits of this appeal.”
1. Legal Standards
a. Mootness
“An order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally renders an
appeal from an earlier order moot.” (In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
156, 163; In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) “A case becomes
moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the
case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.] For
relief to be ‘effective,’ . . . the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm
[and] . . . the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the
outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).)
“A reviewing court must decide on a case-by-case basis whether it is
appropriate to exercise discretionary review to reach the merits of a moot
appeal, keeping in mind” such broad principles as “the overarching goals of
the dependency system.” These goals include “ ‘to provide maximum safety
and protection for children’ with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the family as
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well as the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of the
child.’ ” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 287, 286.)
b. Uniform Parentage Act
Under the Uniform Parentage Act (Fam. Code, § 7600 et seq.; Elisa B.
v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 108, 116), there are multiple rebuttable
presumptions under which a man may qualify as a child’s presumed father.
(Fam. Code, § 7611.) An alleged or biological father may rebut these
statutory presumptions by presenting sufficient evidence that he instead is
entitled to presumed father status. (Fam. Code, § 7612; see Martinez v.
Vaziri (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 373, 389 [remanding to determine, if
necessary, whether petitioner’s presumed parent status was rebutted under
section 7612].) Where a voluntary declaration of paternity has been filed, a
participant may also move to set aside a declaration of paternity on the basis
of fraud, duress, or mistake. (Fam. Code, § 7576, see also § 7646.)
While these actions may be taken in family court, once a dependency
petition has been filed to declare a child a dependent or ward, the juvenile
court with jurisdiction over the action has exclusive jurisdiction to hear an
action filed under Family Code sections 7630 until the dependency case is
terminated. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 316.2, subd. (e); Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.635(a).)
Because J.L. argues the dependency court committed legal error by not
deciding the paternity issues before dismissing the case, a de novo review of
the issue is in order. J.L. must also show prejudice. (See In re James F.
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 915 [“procedure used to appoint a guardian ad litem
for a parent in a dependency proceeding is trial error that is amenable to
harmless error analysis”].)
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2. Analysis
By failing to argue otherwise, J.L. implicitly acknowledges that his
appeal is moot because there is no active case below, nor should there be.
Further, he does not challenge at all the court’s determination that there was
insufficient evidence to establish jurisdiction over H.C., the basis for the
court’s dismissal order.
Rather, J.L. argues we should exercise our discretion to consider his
appeal because he has been and could in the future be prejudiced if we do not.
We decline to do so. He fails to show that the overarching goals of the
dependency system, which focus on the courts’ interest in ensuring the safety
and well-being of the child, will be served by considering his contentions
about the dependency court’s need to address his dependency concerns. (See
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 286–287.)
Nor does J.L. persuade us that any purported prejudice to him is so
great that we should address the merits of his moot appeal. J.L. merely
argues that the court’s “failure to make a finding regarding parentage had an
immediate adverse effect on J.L.’s custody and visitation and could continue
to affect him in the future if other dependency or family law proceedings are
initiated.” Any alleged prejudice to his custody and visitation rights below
was neither based on any findings of significance nor of any lasting effect.
And “speculative future harm” is not sufficient to avoid mootness. (D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278.)
Even if we were to address the merits of J.L.’s appeal, we very likely
would reject it. Our Supreme Court has made clear in Jesusa V. that
dependency courts have the discretion to determine whether or not to
consider paternity issues, and nothing in the rule he cites, Rule, 5.635,
indicates otherwise; indeed, he fails to note that the first paragraph of Rule
5.635 recognizes this discretion. It states that during the pendency of a
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dependency case, “[t]he court may establish and enter a judgment of
parentage under the Uniform Parentage Act. (Fam. Code, § 7600 et seq.)
(California Rules of Court, rule 5.635(a), italics added.)
Second, J.L.’s additional prejudice arguments, which he offers with
regard to the court’s supposed legal error, are unpersuasive in light of his
ability to pursue his issues in family court. He contends he will be forced to
pursue the matter in that forum without appointed counsel; that the family
court will not have the information that was already before the juvenile court
and that it “may” be difficult to present that information to the family court
in light of the general confidentiality of dependency proceedings; that he is
prejudiced by the passage of time because an action to set aside a voluntary
declaration of parentage must be filed no later than two years after the
effective date of the declaration and, as of the end of May 2026, almost a year
had passed; that the passage of time before making such a challenge is a
factor in evaluating his family court action; and that the failure of the
juvenile court to correct H.C.’s birth certificate “may” have collateral
consequences and “may” impede the Indian tribes’ ability to proceed to
determine H.C.’s membership eligibility.
The problems J.L. identifies are unsupported by legal authority, almost
entirely speculative, and do not persuade us that we should take the unusual
step of declaring an exception to the mootness doctrine.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is ordered dismissed as moot.
STREETER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.
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