Filed 9/23/26 Marriage of Nobime and Geh CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re the Marriage of JOANEDA
NOBIME and NELSON ACHIRI
GEH.
JOANEDA NOBIME,
Appellant, A174745
v.
(Alameda County
NELSON ACHIRI GEH, Super. Ct. No. HF22123924)
Respondent.
Joaneda Nobime filed for dissolution of her 20-month marriage to
Nelson Achiri Geh in April 2022. Nobime requested $17,408 in need-based
attorney’s fees under Family Code section 2030.1 Contending that Geh
needlessly prolonged the litigation to stretch nearly twice as long as the
marriage, including by failing to fully respond to discovery requests and
comply with court orders, she also sought sanctions under section 271. The
trial court excluded Nobime’s evidence of attorney’s fees as hearsay, then
denied her motion under section 2030 after finding “there is no ability to pay,
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
1
no disparity in access, and no evidence that the fees incurred are necessary.”
The court granted $6,200 in sanctions.
Nobime, proceeding in propria persona, appeals the denial of attorney’s
fees under section 2030 and also challenges the valuation of certain
community property and a purported denial of sanctions. We affirm.
BACKGROUND2
Nobime and Geh were married for approximately one year and eight
months. They separated in November 2021, and Nobime, representing
herself, filed for dissolution of the marriage in April 2022 and a restraining
order in May 2022, a petition that was later dismissed. Geh retained counsel,
though the parties dispute when. Nobime then retained counsel, who entered
an appearance in September 2022.
In July 2023, Nobime served document and form interrogatory requests
seeking information on Geh’s finances, including those related to two
businesses he owned, Geh Towing and Chop and Yamo African Grill. Geh
failed fully to respond to the requests after three meet-and-confer attempts,
so Nobime in December 2023 moved to compel responses. She also sought
$6,500 in attorney’s fees as a sanction under section 271. In January 2024,
the trial court ordered Geh to file an updated FL-150, produce certain bank
2 Nobime submitted copies of 83 exhibits, which appear to be a subset of
the 93 exhibits she designated in her proposed exhibit list, though she did not
move to augment the record or request judicial notice. We sua sponte order
the record augmented to include the tax return documents designated as
Petitioner’s Exhibit 14 , which the court received into evidence at trial. We
also order the record augmented to include the attorney’s fees exhibits the
trial court reviewed and excluded, designated before us as Petitioner’s
Exhibits 55 and 56. The other exhibits were not introduced before the trial
court, and Nobime has not identified any basis to take judicial notice of them.
Accordingly, we have not relied on them. (See Vons Companies, Inc. v.
Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.)
2
statements, and produce a profit and loss statement for Geh Towing. It
reserved jurisdiction on the sanctions request.
Geh served his FL-150 a few days later, but it was only partially
completed. He claimed “$11000” in gross income as the owner/operator of
Geh Towing but did not specify the time period for that income. He did not
calculate his average or last month’s income from Geh Towing after
subtracting business expenses, as required by the form. He identified no
assets. He claimed $12,716.93 in monthly expenses. Geh attached several
bills, a truck lease agreement, and a copy of his 2022 tax return, which
showed $1 in gross sales from Chop and Yamo, $14,174 in gross income and
$150 in net income from driving for Uber, and $1 in gross sales from Geh
Towing.
In a status conference questionnaire filed in March 2024, Nobime
reported Geh still had not fully responded to the discovery requests and had
rejected all settlement offers related to her attorney’s fees claim, asserting his
inability to pay. In June 2024, Nobime reverted to representing herself. She
later explained she could not afford continued representation. In a
September 2024 status conference questionnaire, she indicated she would be
seeking $17,408 in attorney’s fees. At some point, Geh also began to
represent himself.
In April 2025, Nobime reported that Geh still had not produced certain
documents, including the profit and loss statement for Geh Towing, and she
requested the matter be set for trial. The court set trial for September 15,
2025. In advance of trial, Nobime filed proposed exhibit and witness lists, as
well as an issues statement, memorandum of points and authorities, and trial
brief, as required by the pretrial order. As relevant to the appeal, Nobime
identified the primary issues for trial as her attorney’s fees claim and request
3
for sanctions, Geh’s alleged breaches of fiduciary duty based on his failure to
respond to discovery requests, division of community assets, and confirmation
of the parties’ separate property. Geh filed nothing.
Both Nobime and Geh represented themselves at trial. Both waived
the requirement for a final income and expense declaration. The trial
testimony focused on three main issues, summarized below: (1) valuation
and division of community property vehicles; (2) valuation of Geh’s
businesses; and (3) Nobime’s request for attorney’s fees.
Valuation of Vehicles. The parties identified four community
property vehicles: a 2021 Jeep Wrangler with approximately 30,000 miles, a
2018 Toyota Rav4 with approximately 100,000 miles, a Toyota Sienna, and a
Toyota Corolla. Following their separation, Nobime took the Wrangler, Geh
took the Rav4 and Sienna, and Nobime’s adult daughter took the Corolla.
The trial court asked Nobime how much the Wrangler was worth and
she responded that she did not know. The court then took judicial notice of
the Kelley Blue Book and, with input from Nobime and Geh on the
characteristics of the Wrangler, determined its approximate value to be
$32,000. It then subtracted $11,000, which Nobime still owed on the
financing plan, to reach a value of $21,000.
As to the Rav4, Geh testified he was still making payments on a
financing plan when the car was in an accident. An insurer paid Geh’s
balance with the financing company and Geh received about $2,200. The
trial court interpreted Geh’s testimony to mean the car was totaled.
As to the Sienna, Geh testified he bought it for $300 and was unable to
sell it before joining the Army after his separation from Nobime. He testified
he gave the car to a friend who scraps cars for parts, and the friend gave him
about $100. Nobime disputed the initial purchase price, placing it closer to
4
$1,000, but she had no evidence and instead urged Geh to produce the
vehicle’s title to establish the price. Geh reiterated he no longer possessed
the Sienna.
Finally, with respect to the Corolla, the trial court determined Nobime
and Geh had given the car as a community gift to Nobime’s adult daughter
during the marriage.
Geh Towing and Chop and Yamo. Geh owned two businesses
during the marriage: a towing company and a grill. As to Geh Towing, Geh
testified that he leased a tow truck while attempting to build credit to
eventually purchase his own tow truck. He ended the lease when he joined
the Army after the separation. Geh testified that his primary business was
to transport cars purchased on Facebook or elsewhere online. For example, if
a customer who lives in San Francisco purchased a car in Los Angeles, the
customer would deposit the price of the car with Geh, Geh would drive to Los
Angeles and pay for the car, then tow the car back to San Francisco for a
commission. Geh estimated his gross proceeds from the towing business were
between $15,000 and $20,000, but after deducting costs, his net proceeds
were “zero.” Because he was not making a profit, he transitioned to driving
for Uber. The trial court asked Nobime several times whether she had
evidence that Geh Towing was worth more than Geh claimed, but she had
nothing other than tax returns, which showed no profit, and bank
statements. The court credited Geh’s explanation that the bank statements
reflected customer deposits, not profits.
Similarly, for Chop and Yamo, the only evidence of value was tax
returns that showed a loss of $5,270 in 2021 and a profit of $1 in 2022.
Attorney’s Fees. In support of her request for attorney’s fees under
section 2030, Nobime attempted to introduce an email from her counsel
5
reciting her payment history and an itemized bill from October through
December 2022. Geh objected to the admission of the evidence, though he did
not offer a valid ground. The court, recognizing Geh was not familiar with
the rules of evidence, sustained the objection “because it’s hearsay. You’re
offering an out of court statement for its truth.” The court went on to explain:
What you need is the attorney to come to court and say,
yes, I billed her $17,638. That’s what you need as far as evidence
or the attorney signs a declaration under penalty of perjury, yes,
that’s how much I billed. This is what I did to earn that fee.
How do I know she didn’t spend one hour of work and billed you
$17,000? Or, how do I know this isn’t all for a DV matter which
is completely different from the dissolution matter? So I’m
struggling with where does this number come from.
Nobime offered to get a letter from her attorney, but the court
responded that it was too late: “Not after today you can’t. We’re done. This
is the trial. I’m going to enter a judgment. This case is over. You two go
your separate ways after today.”
The court established that Nobime’s gross monthly income was about
$11,000 and she had about $9,000 in monthly expenses. Geh estimated his
current gross monthly income to be about $6,000, with about $5,000 in
monthly expenses. Nobime argued his FL-150 disclosed $11,000 in monthly
income, but the court ultimately determined the FL-150 was poorly filled out
and so opted to rely on Geh’s testimony of his current income.
The court inquired about Geh’s ability to pay part of Nobime’s
attorney’s fees, and while Geh did not directly respond to the question, he did
say that he had offered to pay her $5,000 on a payment plan, but Nobime had
refused the offer. Nobime then suggested that she would accept if Geh
offered to pay $5,000 today “plus a little bit more,” and the court then
recessed for the parties to discuss settlement. Following recess, Nobime and
6
Geh both testified that Geh had again offered $5,000 on a payment plan,
while Nobime insisted on $12,000. Because they could not agree, the court
proceeded to rule on the outstanding issues.
Disposition. The trial court ruled that Nobime would keep the
Wrangler, valued at $21,000. Geh would keep the $2,200 he was paid for the
Rav4 and the $100 he was paid for the Sienna, totaling $2,300. Geh would
pay half of the $10,000 in community credit card debt Nobime incurred
during the marriage. The court also found both parties were “credible” and
“believable and the Court does not believe either party is lying or attempting
to mislead the Court.” It found Nobime had not met her burden to prove a
breach of fiduciary duty.
As to Nobime’s request for attorney’s fees under section 2030, the court
denied the request. It found there was no disparity in access, Geh had no
ability to pay, and there was no evidence of the amount of fees incurred or
that they were reasonably necessary.
As to sanctions under section 271, the court awarded Nobime $6,200,
which the court intended to zero out the balance between the parties such
that no money would need to change hands after the trial.
Nobime timely appealed. Geh has not appeared in the appeal or filed a
respondent’s brief.
DISCUSSION
Nobime makes several arguments on appeal that appear to overlap.
We group and reorder the issues as follows: (1) whether the superior court
erred by excluding Nobime’s evidence of attorney’s fees as hearsay;
(2) whether the superior court’s valuation of the community assets is
supported by substantial evidence; (3) whether the superior court abused its
discretion in denying Nobime’s application for attorney’s fees under section
7
2030; (4) whether the court erred by purportedly denying sanctions under
section 271; and (5) whether the superior court’s rulings amounted to a
violation of Nobime’s procedural due process rights. We address these issues
in turn.
I. The Court Did Not Err by Excluding Attorney’s Fees Evidence
Nobime challenges the trial court’s exclusion as hearsay of an invoice
from her attorney and an email summarizing her payment history. “ ‘We
review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion’ ” (In re Marriage of M.P. &
M.C. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1107), meaning “we review the trial
court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial
evidence, and we reverse its application of the law to the facts only if it was
arbitrary and capricious.” (Swan v. Hatchett (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1206,
1215 (Swan); In re Marriage of Smith (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 529, 532.) The
burden falls upon the appellant to show such an abuse occurred. (Kevin Q. v.
Lauren W. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 633, 644 (Kevin Q.).)
Marital dissolution proceedings “are governed by the same statutory
rules of evidence and procedure that apply in other civil actions (with
exceptions inapplicable to the present case).” (Elkins v. Superior Court
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1354, superseded by statute on other grounds; see
also Fam. Code, § 210 [“the rules of practice and procedure applicable to civil
actions generally . . . apply to . . . proceedings under [the Family Code]”].)
Here, Geh objected to the admission of the attorney’s fee evidence but
not on hearsay grounds. The trial court then sustained its own hearsay
objection “because it’s hearsay,” explaining: “What you need is the attorney
to come to court and say, [‘]yes, I billed her $17,638[’] . . . or the attorney
signs a declaration under penalty of perjury, [‘]yes, that’s how much I billed.
This is what I did to earn that fee.[’] ” The court then attempted to explain
8
the reasoning behind the hearsay rule by giving examples: “How do I know
she didn’t spend one hour of work and billed you $17,000? Or, how do I know
this isn’t all for a DV matter which is completely different from the
dissolution matter?”
Nobime first argues the court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion
because the factual premise underlying the ruling was false. Specifically, she
contends the court’s rationale for excluding her attorney’s fees evidence was
based on speculation that the fees might have included services for her
restraining order application, yet the record establishes she filed the
application pro per and only later engaged her attorney. We agree with
Nobime’s account of the timeline involved, but we disagree with the legal
conclusion she draws from it. The trial court did not exclude the evidence
because the fees may have included services related to the restraining order
application. It excluded the evidence “because it’s hearsay”—that is, because
Nobime was “offering an out of court statement for its truth.” It mentioned
the possibility of the payment including services for other matters only as an
attempt to explain the hearsay rule to Nobime. The fact that the record
disproves one of the court’s hypotheticals does not render the ruling an abuse
of discretion.
Nobime next asserts she did not offer the invoices for the truth of the
matters asserted (e.g., that the services were actually performed as
described), but rather to demonstrate she incurred legal expenses of a certain
amount, which she says is a non-hearsay purpose. But offering an email
stating how much Nobime has paid in attorney’s fees to establish how much
she has paid in attorney’s fees is offering the statement for its truth.
Similarly, offering an attorney’s invoice as evidence of the work the attorney
actually performed is offering the statement for its truth. And in any event,
9
the trial court seems to have accepted the truth of Nobime’s testimony that
she was billed, and has paid, substantial attorney’s fees in this matter. After
all, it awarded her attorney fees as a sanction for respondent’s litigation
conduct, in an amount sufficient to wipe out Nobime’s obligation to make an
equalizing payment to Geh for a distribution of community property that
favored her.3
Nobime does not identify authority in support of her hearsay argument,
except in asserting the trial court violated principles of due process and her
fundamental right to present evidence. But the case she cites for this
proposition, In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281
(Carlsson), is readily distinguishable. In Carlsson, the trial court “abruptly
ended the trial in the middle of a witness’s testimony, prior to the completion
of one side’s case and without giving the parties the opportunity to introduce
or even propose additional evidence.” (Id. at p. 292.) Excluding two proposed
exhibits under the hearsay rule, as the trial court did here, is not comparable
to the conduct in Carlsson and does not constitute a procedural due process
violation.
II. The Valuation of the Community Property Vehicles Was
Supported by Substantial Evidence
Nobime also challenges the trial court’s valuation of certain community
property. “Issues concerning the valuation and apportionment of community
property are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (In re Marriage of Finby
3 In a parallel argument, Nobime asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding on hearsay grounds “bank statements showing
Respondent’s actual income and deposits totaling over $65,000 in an eight-
month period.” The trial court did not exclude the bank records. It
considered them, noted Nobime was unable to trace the source of deposits or
destination of withdrawals, and credited Geh’s explanation that most
deposits and withdrawals reflected the operation of his towing business, not
profits and personal expenditures.
10
(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 977, 984; see also In re Marriage of Honer (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 687, 694 [reviewing valuation determinations for substantial
evidence].) “ ‘Appellate courts “do not reweigh evidence or reassess the
credibility of witnesses.” ’ ” (Swan, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1215, quoting
In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1531.)
Nobime contends the trial court’s valuation of three vehicles was
arbitrary because it referenced the Kelley Blue Book to determine the value
of her Wrangler, but it accepted Geh’s testimony to establish the value of the
Rav4 and Sienna without requiring documentary evidence or referencing the
Kelley Blue Book. We disagree.
The trial court gave Nobime the opportunity to testify as to the Jeep’s
value, but she responded that she did not know its value. The court then
proceeded to take judicial notice of the Kelley Blue Book’s valuation of a Jeep
with characteristics roughly similar to Nobime’s and subtracted from that the
amount Nobime still owed on the financing plan. As to the Rav4, Geh
testified that car had been in an accident. While his testimony was
somewhat hard to follow, the trial court concluded Geh had totaled the car
and the insurance company paid the balance Geh owed to the financing
company and paid Geh about $2,200. As to the Sienna, Geh testified he
bought the car for $300 and sold it to a friend who scrapped cars for $100
before he joined the Army. The court found Geh’s testimony credible.
Nobime did not put forward any competing evidence of either vehicle’s value.
On this record, it was not arbitrary for the court to rely on Geh’s
testimony about how much he actually received for each vehicle that was no
longer in his possession, and his testimony constituted substantial evidence.
(See Swan, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1215 [appellate court does not
reassess credibility of witnesses].)
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III. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Section 2030
Attorney’s Fees
“Sections 2030 and 2032 authorize the trial court in a dissolution action
to ‘award fees and costs between the parties based on their relative
circumstances in order to ensure parity of legal representation in the
action.’ ” (In re Marriage of Hearn (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 380, 393 (Hearn),
quoting In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 974.)
“When a request for attorney’s fees and costs is made, the court shall make
findings on whether an award of attorney’s fees and costs under this section
is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain
counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both
parties. If the findings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the
court shall make an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs.”
(§ 2030, subd. (a)(2).) The court must make explicit findings on the issues
listed in section 2030, subdivision (a)(2). (In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27
Cal.App.5th 1025, 1050 (Morton).)
A fee award is limited to the amount that is “reasonably necessary” to
maintain or defend the proceeding (§ 2030, subd. (a)(1)), and must be “just
and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties.”
(§ 2032, subd. (a).) In determining what is just and reasonable under the
circumstances, section 2032, subdivision (b), directs the court to consider the
circumstances listed in section 4320, which include the parties’ earning
capacity (§ 4320, subds. (a), (c)), as well as a catch-all that encompasses
“[a]ny other factors the court determines are just and equitable.” (§ 4320,
subd. (n).) “Financial resources are only one factor for the court to consider in
determining how to apportion the overall cost of the litigation equitably
between the parties under their relative circumstances.” (§ 2032, subd. (b).)
“Among other things, the court may consider the party’s litigation tactics in
12
making an award under section 2030.” (Hearn, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
p. 394.)
We review the trial court’s ruling on an attorney’s fees application
under section 2030 for abuse of discretion. (Hearn, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
p. 394.)
Nobime challenges the trial court’s section 2030 analysis on several
grounds, including that it failed (1) to make the findings required by
section 2030, subdivision (a)(2), (2) to accurately assess Geh’s ability to
contribute to Nobime’s attorney’s fees, (3) to analyze the billing records from
her attorney, (4) to assess reasonableness, as required by section 2032, and
(5) to evaluate the effect of Geh’s litigation tactics.
A. Express Findings Under Section 2030
The findings section 2030, subdivision (a)(2) requires—whether a fee
award is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain
counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both
parties—must be “express findings—that is, findings stated in words, either
in writing or orally on the record.” (Morton, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1050.) We reject Nobime’s implicit contention that the trial court failed to
make such express findings here. In fact, the trial court stated findings on
the record several times, including when it said, “There was no disparity in
access. Respondent has no ability to pay. There was no evidence that the
fees—the amount of the fees incurred. There is no evidence[] that they were
reasonably necessary.”
B. Geh’s Ability to Pay
Nobime advances two challenges related to the trial court’s finding that
Geh had no ability to contribute to her attorney’s fees. First, she contends
the trial court’s calculation of Geh’s monthly income was not supported by
13
substantial evidence. Specifically, Nobime asserts Geh disclosed $11,000 in
monthly income in his FL-150, yet the trial court erroneously determined
Geh’s monthly income to be $1,100.
According to the reporter’s transcript, the court first asked Geh his
current monthly income and Geh testified it was “before taxes like 6000.”
Nobime then pointed out the FL-150 Geh filed in January 2024 indicated a
monthly income of $11,000. (We note Geh wrote the amount as “$11000” and
he did not check the box to indicate the income was monthly, as opposed to
weekly or some other interval, but we assume for the sake of argument it is
monthly.) Apparently referencing questions 5 through 7 on the second page
of the form, which break out income by type, the court said, “you say you
make—well, it’s blank. He doesn’t list his money [sic] income.” Nobime
directed the court back to the first page, apparently referencing question 1.h:
“Not page two. The one where it says what you make grossly, annually or
monthly or weekly.” The court responded, “He put $110,000,” to which
Nobime replied, “That’s not $110,000. There is no point there. There is no
dot.”
While there does seem to have been confusion during the discussion of
Geh’s FL-150, we see no indication the trial court determined Geh’s monthly
income to be $1,100, as Nobime contends, let alone that it relied on that
amount in its findings. To the contrary, the court commented in its review of
the form, “This is filled out very poorly. I don’t know how much he made in a
given month.” After another brief exchange related to whether it could draw
inferences from Geh’s reported monthly expenses of more than $12,000, the
court adopted Geh’s testimony estimating $6,000 in current monthly income
and $5,000 in monthly expenses for purposes of the analysis under section
2030.
14
Nobime does not expressly attack the court’s reliance on Geh’s $6,000
monthly income estimate, and it is not our role to supply arguments for the
parties. (See Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) As
a result, we conclude Nobime has not carried her burden of establishing
prejudicial error as to the court’s determination of Geh’s monthly income.4
(See Kevin Q., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 644.)
We turn now to Nobime’s argument that the trial court erred by failing
to investigate Geh’s earning capacity, primarily based on his two businesses,
Geh Towing and Chop and Yamo. The transcript again tells a different story.
The court spent a significant amount of time questioning both parties about
the businesses and considering the evidence Nobime offered, including tax
returns and bank statements. It also asked Nobime several times whether
she had any other evidence to offer related to the businesses’ value. It
concluded, on the evidence the parties presented, that Geh did not make net
profits from these businesses, and that conclusion is supported by substantial
evidence, including Geh’s testimony (which, again, the trial court found
credible) and the tax returns.
Nobime argues the trial court ignored evidence Geh earned $142,800
the year of their separation, pointing to Line 7 on Geh’s 2021 tax return
Schedule SE, the schedule for calculating tax on self-employment income.
4 We are left with significant questions about Geh’s income, including
the source of his estimated $6,000 in monthly income and when and why his
income ostensibly decreased by nearly half from the $11,000 he reported in
January 2024 on his FL-150. But even if we were to consider these issues, we
would find any error to have been harmless. The highest monthly income
supported by the record—$11,000—was equal to Nobime’s at the time of the
hearing, and Geh’s claimed monthly expenses were higher than Nobime’s.
Thus, even the highest monthly income for Geh that is supported by the
record demonstrates no disparity in access or ability to pay.
15
Again, the court did not ignore this evidence; it examined the tax return,
including the separate Schedule C’s for each of Geh’s businesses, and it
determined it could not rely on the $142,800 figure in Line 7 because that
sum was inconsistent with the individual schedules for the businesses.
The trial court was correct to rely on the Schedule C’s rather than Line
7, for an additional reason as well: Line 7 does not reflect Geh’s self-
employment income; it reflects a universally applicable limit set by the Social
Security Administration, the “[m]aximum amount of combined wages and
self-employment earnings subject to social security tax.” (Internal Revenue
Service Schedule SE (Form 1040) line 7; see 42 U.S.C. § 430; Contribution
and Benefit Base, Social Security Administration, available at
and employees do not pay social security taxes on wages above that limit,
which in 2021 was $142,800. (42 U.S.C. § 430; see also 85 Fed.Reg. 67413-01,
67413–67414 (Oct. 22, 2020); 2021 Instructions for Schedule SE, Department
of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service at p. 1, available at
2026].5) Schedule SE requires all filers to insert this taxable maximum on
Line 7, then instructs them to perform several calculations and take the
lesser of two numbers—one derived from this statutory maximum and the
other from a taxpayer’s reported “[n]et profit.” (Instructions for Schedule
SE.) Geh’s reported net profit on his 2021 SE form was $1,639, a number so
5 We take judicial notice of official publications by the Social Security
Administration and Internal Revenue Service. (See Evid. Code, § 452,
subd. (c); Sandoval v. Pali Institute, Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 616, 627, fn.
2 [taking judicial notice of federal government publications]; Walt Rankin &
Associates, Inc. v. City of Murrieta (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 605, 624, fn. 12
[taking judicial notice of government website].)
16
low that the $142,800 statutory maximum on Line 7 proved entirely
irrelevant to calculating his self-employment tax. In short, the trial court did
not err by declining to consider that limit as evidence of Geh’s income because
it was not.
C. Other Arguments
Nobime’s remaining arguments lack merit.
Nobime contends the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
review her attorney’s billing records, citing In re Marriage of Tharp (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 1295. That case is readily distinguishable. In Tharp, the
wife submitted a declaration outlining both her and her husband’s finances,
and the wife’s attorney submitted a 53-page declaration explaining the
“chronological, procedural, and substantive history of the case” and “each
motion and action taken in the case . . . , the reasons therefore, and the
results.” (Id. at p. 1305.) The attorney also attached detailed billing records
to his declaration. They submitted similar documentation for later fees
motions. (Id. at p. 1308.) The family court repeatedly refused to review the
records, citing their volume and asserting it was not the court’s duty to
determine which fees were justified. (Id. at pp. 1307–1308, 1314.) The Fifth
District Court of Appeal held the family court abused its discretion by
“refus[ing] to spend the necessary time to review and consider the time
records and billings . . . in a case the family court had deemed complex.” (Id.
at p. 1314.) Here, the trial court did not refuse to consider properly
submitted evidence. Instead, it correctly determined that without the
attorney’s declaration or testimony, an email summarizing Nobime’s payment
history and one itemized bill were hearsay. (See ante, section I.) It was not
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to consider inadmissible
evidence.
17
Recasting the same alleged errors as a failure to assess the
reasonableness of the attorney’s fees or the parties’ respective financial
positions fares no better. Without admissible evidence of the attorney’s work
and fees, the trial court could not further assess reasonableness. And the
trial court reasonably evaluated the limited evidence it had about the parties’
finances, including Geh’s businesses. Its determination that there was no
disparity in access was supported by substantial evidence, including
testimony Nobime had nearly double the gross monthly income ($11,000 for
Nobime vs. $6,000 for Geh) at the time of trial.
Finally, Nobime asserts the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring
Geh’s role in prolonging the litigation. But the trial court did not ignore
Geh’s conduct—to the contrary, it awarded more than $6,000 in sanctions
under section 271 based on his conduct, as discussed further below. To the
extent Nobime contends the trial court erred by considering Geh’s conduct
only under the rubric of section 271 and not section 2030, we fail to discern
any prejudice.
IV. The Court Did Award Sanctions Under Section 271, Contrary to
Nobime’s Argument
Nobime argues the trial court erred by denying sanctions despite Geh’s
breach of fiduciary duty, but this argument is meritless because the trial
court in fact awarded Nobime sanctions. The trial court explained it granted
Nobime $6,200 in sanctions under section 271. Geh was not required to make
a payment to Nobime, though, because the sanctions order equalized the
division of community assets and debts. In other words, because Nobime’s
Jeep was worth substantially more than Geh’s two vehicles and because they
were evenly dividing Nobime’s credit card debt, an equal division would have
required Nobime to pay Geh in the absence of sanctions. But the trial court
awarded her sanctions, meaning neither party needed to pay the other. We
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thus reject Nobime’s argument that the court erred by failing to award
sanctions.
V. The Court Did Not Violate Nobime’s Procedural Due Process
Rights
Finally, Nobime argues the trial court violated her procedural due
process rights by improperly restricting her presentation of evidence related
to Geh’s income and by relying on the Kelley Blue Book to determine her
vehicle’s value without providing prior notice or an opportunity for her to
challenge its accuracy. We disagree.
The trial court generally must allow parties to present relevant
testimony and evidence. (See Carlsson, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 291.)
Here, Nobime does not identify what evidence about Geh’s income or assets
she was prevented from offering or include any record citation showing she
was denied the opportunity to introduce such evidence. She cites two brief
portions of the trial transcript, but the first concerned the court’s exclusion of
her attorney’s fees evidence on hearsay grounds, which we already addressed.
In the second, the court asked both parties whether there was anything they
wanted to add before it made its decision, and both Nobime and Geh
responded “No.” Similarly, at the beginning of the trial, the court gave both
parties the opportunity to insist on a final financial disclosure, which both
waived. And after considering Nobime’s evidence related to Geh’s business
assets, including the tax returns and bank statements, the court asked
Nobime whether she had any documentation of the towing business’s income
or “any evidence to say he’s lying or he’s wrong or he’s mistaken.” Nobime
confirmed she had nothing other than what they had already reviewed. On
this record, we see no due process violation.
Nor was the trial court’s reliance on the Kelley Blue Book a due process
violation. As discussed above, the trial court invited Nobime to testify as to
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the Jeep’s value, but she said she did not know it. The court then took
judicial notice of the Kelley Blue Book and solicited Nobime’s input to arrive
at an example with characteristics reasonably similar to Nobime’s vehicle’s.
Judicial notice is permitted by the Evidence Code. (See Evid. Code, § 452,
subd. (h); Martinez v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 46,
56 [Kelley Blue Book is a “widely accepted source” for objectively establishing
the retail value of cars].) Nobime did not object to the use of the Kelley Blue
Book at trial, nor has she identified any criticisms of its methodology or any
competing valuation evidence she would have presented if given another
opportunity. As a result, she has not established a violation on this ground.
(See In re Marriage of Alan Freeman (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 406, 417–418
[rejecting due process argument where party did not object to alleged
procedural violation at trial].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on
appeal.6
TUCHER, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
PETROU, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
In re Marriage of Noimbe & Geh (A174745)
6 Because Geh did not file a respondent’s brief, we decline to award him
costs as the prevailing party. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
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