Filed 9/24/26 Williams v. City of Torrance CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
BLAKE WILLIAMS, B345170
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 21TRCV00034)
v.
CITY OF TORRANCE et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gary Y. Tanaka, Judge. Reversed in part and
remanded.
Corey W. Glave for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, James E. Oldendorph and
Nicholas M. Grether, for Defendants and Respondents.
Blake Williams, a peace officer employed by the Torrance
Police Department (TPD), was subjected to one audit and three
investigations for potential violations of departmental policy. He
commenced this lawsuit against his employer and the City of
Torrance (City) for violations of the Public Safety Officers
Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) (Gov. Code, § 3300 et
seq.),1 declaratory relief, and whistleblower retaliation (Labor
Code, § 1102.5). He appeals from judgment following an order
granting summary judgment in favor of his employer and the
City (collectively the Department).
Williams has forfeited many of his contentions on appeal.
To the extent his legal arguments can be readily correlated with
the appellate record, we find triable issues on his POBRA and
declaratory relief claims under sections 3304, 3304.5, and 3306.
We reverse the judgment and direct the lower court to enter an
order denying summary adjudication on these claims. The order
shall again grant summary adjudication on the remaining claims.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Audit, Three Investigations, and Interviews
In April 2019, a supervising officer audited Williams and
his partner for continuing a high-speed vehicle pursuit outside
City limits after command terminated the pursuit. In an audit
report, the supervising officer found various violations of
departmental policy, including the failure to timely notify
communications of their actions. Williams wrote a rebuttal to the
findings. Williams testified that TPD prevented him from
attaching it to the audit report because he was neither
1 Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the
Government Code.
2
disciplined nor subjected to further investigation. The audit
report was placed in Williams’s divisional file,2 but not his
personnel file.
The Department investigated Williams for another high-
speed vehicle pursuit occurring on a freeway in June 2019
(PD2019-006); a use of force incident occurring during a
pedestrian stop outside city limits in June 2019 (PD2019-007);
and a vehicle intervention incident occurring in February 2020
(PD2020-004). Following administrative reviews of each of these
incidents, Williams was issued personnel complaints for potential
violations of departmental policy. Williams received copies of the
complaints after he was notified of each.
Between September 2019 and June 2020, officers
conducting each of the three investigations requested interviews
with Williams. In each request, or by additional correspondence
before his interview, Williams was given the name and rank of
each interviewing officer and the policies alleged to have been
violated.
Williams was interviewed once during each investigation
with his chosen counsel present. Prior to questioning at each
interview, Williams was again informed of the name and rank of
the interviewing officer. He was also advised of his constitutional
rights and provided with relevant police and pursuit report(s),
the operative personnel complaint, and relevant TPD policies. In
addition, he was given the opportunity to review video footage of
each incident before questioning. Before Williams’s first
interview (PD2019-006), his counsel lodged objections under
2 A divisional file contains “corrective actions or positive
comments” for every employee. It is used primarily for evaluations
and is maintained in the employee’s division.
3
POBRA regarding notice, timing of the Department’s disclosure
of investigative materials, and one false statement appearing in a
pursuit review report.
B. Investigation Findings and Corrective Actions
Following the investigation of the freeway vehicle pursuit
(PD2019-006), Williams was exonerated of all alleged violations
but found in violation of one unalleged policy for unsafe and
improper driving. Williams received a May 2020 personal
counseling memorandum reminding him of this policy. Several
days later, his counsel requested an administrative appeal and
copies of all investigative materials. Williams was given these
materials (except internal affairs interviews) several weeks later.
In June 2020, Williams received an educational reminder that
“more accurately” reflected the Department’s intended corrective
action. The educational reminder withdrew and “permanently”
removed the personal counseling memorandum. It also directed
Williams to comply with a vehicle pursuit policy alleged in the
personnel complaint.
The use of force investigation (PD2019-007) resulted in
Williams receiving a November 2019 reprimand for being outside
his assigned territory and the City without just cause and failing
to timely broadcast his contact. The reprimand noted “previous
corrective actions” for both improper actions. According to
Deputy Chief Jon Megeff’s deposition testimony, “it stands to
reason” this notation referred to the April 2019 pursuit audit
findings.3 In December 2019, Williams’s counsel requested
3 The investigating officer who interviewed Williams admittedly
reviewed Williams’s divisional file to “see if there [were] similar
allegations” to those alleged in the use of force incident (PD2019-007).
4
another administrative appeal and copies of investigative
materials. Several days later, Captain Mark Athan issued
Williams a “correction,” changing the reprimand effective date.
Captain Athan also confirmed Williams’s receipt of the
investigation summary, personnel complaint, captain review
report, and interview recording. Due to “an oversight, mistake,
and/or inadvertence,” Police Chief Jeremiah Hart informed
Williams in October 2021 that his administrative appeal had not
been scheduled. Despite coordinating tentative dates with
Williams’s counsel, the Department did not hold an
administrative appeal hearing.
Williams was fully exonerated in the vehicle intervention
investigation (PD2020-004). In light of his exoneration, Williams
did not receive additional investigative materials.
C. Trial Court Proceedings
Williams commenced this action in 2021 and filed the
operative third amended complaint in 2024. He alleged three
causes of action for (1) violations of POBRA (§§ 3303, subds. (c),
(g), (h), 3304, subds. (a)–(b), 3305, 3306, 3306.5, subds. (a)–(b));
(2) declaratory relief for each POBRA violation; and
(3) whistleblower retaliation (Lab. Code, § 1102.5) for reporting
POBRA and other state law violations.
The Department moved for summary judgment or
adjudication. It argued Williams was afforded every applicable
POBRA right and received no adverse employment action
supporting a whistleblower claim. Following briefing and several
hearings, the court granted the motion and entered judgment in
favor of the Department. Williams appealed.
5
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment or adjudication may properly be
granted if there is no question of fact and the issues raised by the
pleadings may be decided as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (c).) To obtain summary judgment or adjudication,
the defendant must establish a complete defense or show that one
or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established.
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849–850.)
If the defendant satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to establish a triable issue or defense to the cause(s) of
action. (Id. at p. 849.)
We review de novo whether triable issues of fact exist and
whether the Department is entitled to judgment. (Wiener v.
Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.)
Depending on our review, we may affirm the judgment or reverse
with directions to enter an order granting or denying summary
adjudication on individual causes of action. (Venegas v. County of
Los Angeles (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1239.)
B. Forfeiture
The Department contends, and we agree, that Williams has
failed to adequately brief his appellate contentions with citations
to the record. Williams’s appellate brief furnishes almost no
citations to the record to support factual assertions made in the
course of his legal discussion or arguments.4 It is Williams’s
“responsibility to support claims of error with citation and
4 Williams’s opening brief contains background statements of fact.
At times, the brief cites exhibit numbers that do not comprise part of
the appellate record. Williams did not file a reply brief.
6
authority; this court is not obligated to perform that function on
[his] behalf.” (Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 656;
see Claudio v. Regents of University of California (2005) 134
Cal.App.4th 224, 230 [de novo review “‘does not obligate us to cull
the record’” for triable issues].)
“If a party fails to support an argument with the necessary
citations to the record, that portion of the brief may be stricken”
and the argument will be deemed forfeited. (Moulton Niguel
Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1220, italics
added.) We decline to consider Williams’s contentions regarding
sections 3303, subdivision (g), 3305, and 3306.5, subdivision (a).
To the extent we can readily correlate his remaining contentions
with the appellate record, we exercise our discretion to consider
them.
C. POBRA Violations
Williams contends he raised triable issues of fact under his
first cause of action for violations of POBRA. This cause of action
combines “‘separate and distinct wrongful acts’” (Edward
Fineman Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118)
under various POBRA statutes, which prescribe “basic rights and
protections which must be afforded all peace officers” during
proceedings that may lead to punitive action. (Baggett v. Gates
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135; see also § 3309.5, subds. (a)–(e)
[vesting jurisdiction and prescribing judicial relief].)
We address each alleged act despite their combination
“with other wrongful acts alleged in the same cause of action.”
(Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th
1848, 1855.)
7
1. Investigation and Interrogation Rights (§ 3303)
Williams contends the Department violated various
investigation and interrogation rights under section 3303. These
rights apply whenever a “public safety officer is under
investigation and subjected to interrogation by his or her
commanding officer, or any other member of the employing public
safety department, that could lead to punitive action, . . . For the
purpose of this chapter, punitive action means any action that
may lead to dismissal, demotion, suspension, reduction in salary,
written reprimand, or transfer for purposes of punishment.”
a. Notice of Name and Rank of Interrogating
Officer
Williams first contends he raised triable issues under
section 3303, subdivision (b). This provision requires notice to
the officer under investigation of the “rank, name, and command”
of any interrogating officer “prior to the interrogation.” Williams
argues the Department violated this right during the initial
“administrative” reviews of each incident. We are not persuaded.
Williams did not allege this theory in the operative
complaint and may not rely on it to avoid summary judgment
here. (Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings, LLC v. Avery (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 218, 224.)
Even on the merits, we discern no triable issue under
section 3303, subdivision (b). The right prescribed under this
statute applies to interrogations or formal interviews; it does not
apply to “‘normal exchange[s] between supervisor and
subordinate’” even if those exchanges result in “‘counseling,
instruction, or informal verbal admonishment.’” (Lozano v. Los
Angeles (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 711, 731–732; see § 3303, subd. (i);
8
Steinert v. City of Covina (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 458, 462
[“interaction in the normal course of duty”].) Each time Williams
was subjected to an interrogation or formal interview, he was
provided advance notice of the names, ranks, and commands of
each interviewing officer. No triable issue exists under this
provision.
b. Notice of Nature of Investigation
Williams contends the Department violated his right to be
notified of the “nature of the investigation[s] prior to any
interrogation.” (§ 3303, subd. (c).) He challenges the notices’
timing (“prior to any interrogation”) and substance (“nature”).
We reject both challenges.
Under section 3303, subdivision (c), notice must be made
“‘reasonably prior to’ the interrogation—that is, with enough time
for the officer to meaningfully consult with any representative he
elects to have present.” (Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre (2016) 244
Cal.App.4th 445, 453 (Ellins).) Whether notice is “reasonably
prior” to an interrogation “may depend upon whether the officer
has already retained a representative (or instead needs time to
secure one) and upon the nature of the allegations; their
complexity; and, if they are unrelated, their number.” (Ibid.)
Williams received notice reasonably prior to his interviews.
The Department notified Williams of each investigation and
provided him with copies of the personnel complaints well in
advance of each interview. At each interview, Williams and his
chosen counsel either confirmed advance receipt of investigative
materials or were allowed to review them before questioning.
Williams could, and did, “meaningfully consult with his [chosen]
9
representative” prior to questioning. (Ellins, supra, 244
Cal.App.4th at p. 455.) The advance notice was reasonable.
Williams was also notified of the “nature” of each
investigation. (§ 3303, subd. (c).) He was informed of the
incidents under investigation and nearly every vehicle pursuit or
pedestrian stop policy implicated in each investigation. As
Williams admits, this information apprised him of the subject of
the investigations well before his interviews, giving him time to
review “any reports relating to that [incident] number,” “any
police report” he may have drafted, and “any [relevant] video
footage.” In other words, Williams admits the notice he received
allowed him to make “‘a full and cogent presentation of [his] view
of the matter, bringing to light justifications, explanations,
extenuating circumstances, and other mitigating factors’ . . .
[Citation.]” (Ellins, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 454.)
To the extent Williams contends his notice of the freeway
vehicle pursuit investigation (PD2019-006) violated Hinrichs v.
County of Orange (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 921 by omitting the
specific policy cited in the educational reminder, he is mistaken.
In that case, the pre-interrogation notice cited a “particular
regulation” and gave “no other description of the alleged wrongful
conduct” from which discipline under a “different regulation”
could be based. (Id. at p. 933.) No similar deficiency appears in
the vehicle pursuit notice. Beyond notifying Williams of several
policies under investigation, the Department’s notice further
provided a description of the alleged wrongful conduct: pursuing
a vehicle at speeds reaching 119 miles per hour; weaving around
slower traffic; and exposing those engaged in the chase and the
public to danger. Given this description, the Department could
10
“thereafter impose discipline based upon a different regulation.”
(Ibid.) No triable issues exist under section 3303, subdivision (c).
c. Admonition of Constitutional Rights
Williams contends he was not timely admonished of his
constitutional rights under section 3303, subdivision (h), which
provides: “If prior to or during the interrogation of a public safety
officer it is deemed that he or she may be charged with a criminal
offense, he or she shall be immediately informed of his or her
constitutional rights.”
Like Miranda5 advisements, section 3303, subdivision (h)
admonishments are designed to protect an officer’s right against
self-incrimination. (Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of
Pasadena (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, 577–578; see People v. Gwillim
(1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1254, 1267.) Like Miranda, section 3303,
subdivision (h) requires admonishments be given before the
officer is “being required to answer an employer’s investigatory
questions.” (Spielbauer v. County of Santa Clara (2009) 45
Cal.4th 704, 724, fn. 5; see Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560
U.S. 370, 387 [advisements given with “opportunity to invoke
[one’s] rights before giving any answers or admissions”].)
Williams admits he received these admonishments “before
questioning” at each interview. We discern no triable issue under
section 3303, subdivision (h).
2. Retaliation (§ 3304, subd. (a))
Section 3304, subdivision (a) prohibits an employer from
retaliating against a public safety officer for lawfully exercising
5 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
11
their POBRA rights. To establish such claim, the employer must
“arbitrarily increase a punishment” or engage in a “vindictive
measure.” (Holcomb v. City of Los Angeles (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d
1560, 1568.)
Williams contends he established triable issues under
section 3304, subdivision (a) for the following departmental
actions: (1) “creating forms” to circumvent an administrative
appeal; (2) investigating him “for allegations that did not violate
any policy”; and (3) opening the vehicle intervention investigation
(PD2020-004) the same day he requested an appeal in the
freeway vehicle pursuit investigation (PD2019-006).
Williams forfeited the last assertion by not pursuing it
below. (Miller v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
1161, 1170.) Absent any discussion on the effect of his
exoneration in the vehicle intervention investigation
(PD2020-004), or the effect(s) of the Department creating forms
or investigating him for penalty-free actions, Williams has also
failed to establish how any of these actions “fall within the scope”
of vindictive or punitive actions under section 3304,
subdivision (a). (Otto v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2001)
89 Cal.App.4th 985, 998 (Otto).) No triable issue exists under
this provision.
3. Right of Response to Adverse Comments (§ 3306)
Next, Williams contends he raised triable issues under
section 3306 based on his inability to submit written responses to
the pursuit audit report and educational reminder. We agree.
Section 3306 grants a public safety officer “30 days within
which to file a written response to any adverse comment entered
12
in his personnel file.” Such response “shall be attached to, and
shall accompany, the adverse comment.”
Contrary to the Department’s suggestion, section 3306
applies “regardless of whether the information at issue actually
was placed” in an officer’s personnel file. (Commission on Peace
Officer Standards & Training v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th
278, 292.) A law enforcement agency may not avoid statutory
requirements like those imposed by POBRA by maintaining a
“personnel file” independent of another file, maintained under a
different label, containing “reports of complaints or similar
matters that could affect the status of their employment . . . .”
(Ibid. [“internal affairs files” and “memorandum summarizing
[adverse] comments”]; see Sacramento Police Officers Assn. v.
Venegas (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 916, 919–920, 926 (Venegas)
[“internal affairs index card”].) Section 3306 further provides
officers with the opportunity to file a written response to an
adverse comment even if the comment culminates in no punitive
action. “It is enough that [these documents] ‘will be considered in
future personnel decisions . . .’ [Citation.]” (Otto, supra, 89
Cal.App.4th at p. 998; see Venegas, at pp. 926, 929 [documents
create an “adverse impression” influencing future decisions].)6
Williams has established triable issues concerning the
violation of his section 3306 right to respond to adverse
comments. He provided evidence indicating TPD did not permit
him to attach rebuttal comments to the pursuit audit report
6 A May 2023 TPD Policy Manual defines “corrective action” as
any supervisory action directed toward an employee for censurable
conduct. If in writing, the corrective action must be recorded as an
“Educational Reminder” or “Incident” and be “incorporated into the
employee’s next evaluation, and retained for a period of two years[.]”
13
placed in his divisional file. He also presented evidence that TPD
issued him an educational reminder, which could be considered in
future personnel decisions, without giving him the opportunity to
respond. His section 3306 cause of action may proceed.
4. Right to Administrative Appeal (§§ 3304, subd. (b),
3304.5)
We further agree with Williams that triable issues exist on
his right to administratively appeal the educational reminder
and written reprimand. Section 3304, subdivision (b) provides:
“No punitive action, nor denial of promotion on grounds other
than merit, shall be undertaken by any public agency . . . without
providing the public safety officer with an opportunity for
administrative appeal.” Like the right of response to an adverse
comment, the right to an administrative appeal “does not require
a showing that an adverse employment consequence has occurred
or is likely to occur. It is sufficient if the report’s issuance . . .
‘may lead’ to such consequences in the future.” (Otto, supra, 89
Cal.App.4th at p. 997.) To determine whether written action
triggers section 3304, subdivision (b), we look to its “contents”
rather than its “title” or the employer’s intent. (Id. at pp. 995,
998.)
Williams has established triable issues under section 3304,
subdivision (b) as to the educational reminder and his written
reprimand. The latter document is per se punitive. (§ 3303.)
The former document, while not punitive per se, did identify a
specific “‘criticism’” that may be “considered in the future with
regard to personnel decisions affecting [Williams that] might lead
to punitive action.” (Otto, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 997, 999;
see also James v. City of Coronado (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 905,
14
909 [“criticisms” may hinder advancement or result in adverse
future consequences].)7
Williams also established triable issues under
section 3304.5, which requires conducting an administrative
appeal “in conformance with rules and procedures adopted by the
local public agency.” These rules and procedures appear in a
TPD-Torrance Police Officers Association memorandum of
understanding (MOU). Under that MOU, the Deputy Chief (or
their designee) must schedule an appeal hearing no later than
30 days from the date an officer receives notice of punitive action.
The Department did not schedule an appeal hearing for the
educational reminder and attempted to schedule one for the
reprimand well beyond the MOU timeframe. Even if Williams
admittedly engaged in the conduct for which he was
reprimanded, he may still seek reversal “through proof of
mitigating circumstances.” (Browning v. Block (1985) 175
Cal.App.3d 423, 430.) On these facts, Williams has raised triable
issues concerning his right to relief under sections 3304 and
3304.5.
D. Declaratory Relief
The parties agree that Williams has raised cognizable
claims for declaratory relief to the extent he raised triable
POBRA issues above. (See Mounger v. Gates (1987) 193
7 We reject the Department’s argument that Williams’s “‘Above
Standards’” performance evaluation in June 2020 conclusively
eliminated any negative consequence from his educational reminder.
That evaluation was for a rating period between June 9, 2019, and
June 8, 2020—the very day Williams received the educational
reminder.
15
Cal.App.3d 1248, 1253, fn. 7.) We agree and conclude Williams
has raised triable issues on his right to declaratory relief relating
to the pursuit audit report (§ 3306), educational reminder
(§§ 3306, 3304, 3304.5), and written reprimand (§§ 3304, 3304.5).
E. Whistleblower Retaliation
Finally, Williams fails to establish triable issues for
whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5.
(McVeigh v. Recology San Francisco (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 443,
468.)8 To establish this claim, Williams must establish protected
activity (i.e., reporting violation(s) of law), an adverse
employment action, and causation. (Lawson v. PPG Architectural
Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 718.)
Unlike the indeterminacy with which punitive action may
arise under section 3303, an adverse employment action under
Labor Code section 1102.5 must have a “‘detrimental and
substantial effect’” on the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment. (St. Myers v. Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th
301, 318.) Actions that are “‘“merely contrary to the employee’s
interests”’” or “‘reasonably would deter an employee from
engaging in the protected activity’” do not constitute adverse
employment actions. (Ibid.)
Williams contends the Department retaliated against him
for reporting POBRA and other state law violations during the
vehicle pursuit investigation (PD2019-006) by (1) denying him
8 Subdivision (b) of Labor Code section 1102.5 provides: “An
employer . . . shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing
information . . . to a government or law enforcement agency . . . if the
employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information
discloses a violation” of federal, state, or local law or regulation.
16
the ability to challenge allegations of misconduct that “could”
impair prospects for advancement; (2) investigating him for
penalty-free actions; and (3) barring him from seeking promotion
or advancement during each investigation.
Williams has failed to demonstrate how these actions,
singularly or in the collective, detrimentally or substantially
affected the terms or conditions of his employment. It is not
enough for him to show his prospects could be impacted, though
he suffered no penalty. Further, Williams offers no evidence he
sought a promotion or was dissuaded from pursuing one during
the investigations. His “‘speculation, conjecture, imagination, or
guesswork’” these actions could impair his employment does not
establish triable issues. (Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v.
Century Indemnity Co. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1035.)9
9 In light of our conclusion, we decline to consider whether the
trial court erred by relying on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
(1973) 411 U.S. 792, when summarily adjudicating Williams’s
whistleblower retaliation claim. (See Clarke v. Yu (2026) 119
Cal.App.5th 199, 205–206.)
17
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the
trial court with directions to vacate the order granting the motion
for summary judgment and enter an order denying summary
adjudication of William’s first and second causes of action under
sections 3304, 3304.5, and 3306. The order shall again grant
summary adjudication on all remaining causes of action. The
parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
DAUM, J.
18
