Filed 9/24/26 P. v. Buford CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B346471

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24AVCF00951

TIMOTHY ERIC BUFORD,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Denise McLaughlin-Bennett, Judge.
Affirmed.

Jennifer Peabody and Richard B. Lennon, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
 Appellant Timothy Eric Buford appeals his conviction
following a no contest plea to one count of assault by means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury while confined in a
state prison. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436
(Wende), Buford’s appellate counsel requested that we review
the record and determine whether any arguable issues exist.
We have reviewed the entire record and find no arguable issues.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On July 1, 2024, the District Attorney filed a complaint
charging Buford with assault by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury while confined in a state prison (Pen. Code,
§ 4501, subd. (b))1 and battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243,
subd. (d)). The People alleged Buford committed the offenses
while confined in state prison (§ 1170.01, subd. (c)), personally
inflicted great bodily injury on another person (§ 969f), and
had suffered two prior serious or violent felony convictions. The
People also alleged various aggravating circumstances. The court
appointed counsel to represent Buford, and he pleaded not guilty.
In September 2024, Buford filed a motion to dismiss.
Buford asserted a magistrate had dismissed the same charges
for insufficiency of the evidence following a preliminary hearing
in March 2024. He argued the District Attorney could not
refile the charges, and instead was required to challenge the
magistrate’s decision by filing a motion under section 871.5
within 15 days.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code,
unless indicated otherwise.

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 The court heard and denied the motion on October 11,
2024. At the end of the hearing, Buford asked the court to
allow him to represent himself. The court granted the request
and appointed former defense counsel as standby counsel.
While representing himself, Buford filed more than
a dozen motions, including motions to appoint experts and
investigators, suppress evidence under section 1538.5, dismiss
under section 995, dismiss “based on prosecutor’s decision not
to prosecute,” dismiss for violations of sections 1381 and 1382,
set aside the information under sections 995 and 871, strike
enhancement allegations, compel discovery, reassign the case to
the master calendar department, and continue the preliminary
hearing.
The court ruled on some, but not all, of Buford’s motions.
It agreed to hear his motion to suppress and one of his motions
to dismiss on the day of the preliminary hearing. The court
ordered the parties to appear on March 26, 2025 to prepare for
the preliminary hearing. Buford did not appear at that hearing
because of a transportation issue.
The parties appeared on April 1, 2025 for the preliminary
hearing. A judicial officer who was new to the case presided
over the hearing. Buford told the court he had pending motions
to dismiss, suppress evidence, strike enhancement allegations,
and compel discovery. The court said it had reviewed the case
file and it seemed the only unresolved issue was a possible
affirmative defense.
The court then started the preliminary hearing.
Immediately after the People called their first witness, Buford
announced he wanted to stop representing himself and accept
a plea offer. The court terminated Buford’s pro per status and

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appointed his former counsel—who had been acting as standby
counsel—to represent him.
Buford waived his constitutional rights and pleaded no
contest to a single count of violating section 4501, subdivision (b).
Defense counsel joined the plea, concurred in the waivers, and
stipulated to a factual basis. The court accepted the plea and
found Buford guilty.
The court sentenced Buford to the middle term of four
years. It imposed a $325 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)),
a stayed $325 parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45), a $40 court
operations fee (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a $30 criminal
conviction assessment fee (Gov. Code, § 70373). The court
declined to award Buford presentence custody credits because
he had been serving a prison sentence for a different offense.
The court granted the People’s motion to dismiss the remaining
counts and allegations under section 1385.
On April 24, 2025, Buford filed a motion for resentencing
under sections 1170 and 2900.5, subdivision (d) on the ground
that he was entitled to presentence custody credits. The court
denied the motion.
On May 22, 2025, Buford filed a notice of appeal and
request for certificate of probable cause. Buford attached to his
notice his April 24, 2025 motion for resentencing and a complaint
for damages against the California Department of Corrections
and other defendants. Buford sought a certificate of probable
cause on the grounds that he was deprived of the right to counsel
and/or self-representation, the trial court denied motions outside
his presence, and there was judicial bias and misconduct. The
trial court denied Buford’s request, and this court issued an order

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limiting the appeal to issues that do not require a certificate of
probable cause.
DISCUSSION
I. Independent Review Pursuant to People v. Wende
We appointed counsel to represent Buford on appeal.2
Counsel filed an opening brief that includes the facts and
procedural history of the case and requests that we review the
record and determine whether there are any arguable issues
on appeal. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.) We ordered
counsel to advise Buford of the right to file a supplemental brief.3

2 On December 22, 2025, Buford filed a request to appoint
different appellate counsel or allow him to file a direct appeal
on his own. We construe Buford’s request for the appointment
of different counsel as a motion under People v. Marsden (1970)
2 Cal.3d 118. Buford has not shown his right to appellate counsel
has been “ ‘ “ ‘substantially impaired.’ ” ’ ” (See People v. Sanchez
(2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 90.) Moreover, “there is no right—
constitutional, statutory, or otherwise—to self-representation
in a criminal appeal in California.” (In re Barnett (2003)
31 Cal.4th 466, 473.) Therefore, we deny his requests.
3 Buford personally filed motions to augment the appellate
record on March 26, April 17, and April 24, 2026. We denied the
March 26 and April 17 requests without prejudice, noting only
Buford’s appellate counsel may file such requests. Our order did
not address the April 24 request, which appears to be identical
in all meaningful respects to the April 17 request. To the extent
an order is necessary, we deny the April 24 request for the same
reason we denied the other requests.

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II. Buford’s Supplemental Brief
In June 2026, Buford filed a supplemental brief and
request for judicial notice. He purports to raise 13 separate
issues in his brief. However, Buford’s plea and the lack of a
certificate of probable cause significantly limit the potential
scope of his appeal.
Generally, a defendant may not take an appeal from a
judgment of conviction entered on a guilty or no contest plea,
except to challenge the legality of the proceedings, including the
validity of the plea. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084,
1094 (Mendez).) Before appealing the legality of the proceedings,
the defendant must file in the superior court a statement of
certificate grounds and obtain a certificate of probable cause
for the appeal. (Id. at p. 1095.) If the defendant fails to procure
a certificate of probable cause, the reviewing court “must decline
to address certificate issues.” (Id. at p. 1096.)
The vast majority of the issues Buford raises in his
supplemental brief require a certificate of probable cause.
This includes his arguments related to the violation of his right
to a speedy trial and preliminary hearing, failure to comply
with laws related to the refiling of charges, violation of his right
to self-representation, prosecutorial and judicial misconduct,
destruction of evidence, violation of his right to prepare a
defense, consideration of motions outside his presence, denial of
the opportunity to litigate motions, coercion and insufficient plea
advisements, and refusal to grant a continuance. Because Buford
did not obtain a certificate of probable cause, we may not consider
those arguments. (Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1096.)
Nor can we consider Buford’s arguments related to his
motion to suppress. A defendant does not need a certificate of

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probable cause to challenge the “denial of a motion to suppress.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2)(A).) However, Buford’s
appeal could not concern a “denial of a motion to suppress,”
as he entered his no contest plea before the court ruled on his
suppression motion.
Buford seems to believe the trial court denied his
suppression motion outside his presence at a hearing on
March 26, 2025. His motion was not set to be heard on that
date, and there is nothing in the record of the hearing to suggest
the court considered the motion. The minute order of the
hearing states only that Buford was a “miss out” because of
transportation issues and that the preliminary hearing date
would remain on calendar.
Buford’s belief that the court ruled on his suppression
motion seems to be based on a miscommunication with the trial
court on the day of his preliminary hearing. Buford mistakenly
told the court he had “a number of motions” that were scheduled
to be heard “on the 27th [sic].” The court told Buford it believed
those issues had been resolved by another judicial officer. This
appears to have been a mistake, as the court was not aware of
all the motions Buford had filed. However, apart from that
statement, there is nothing in the record even to suggest the
court denied Buford’s motion outside his presence. Instead,
the suppression motion remained pending when Buford elected
to plead no contest.
Buford raises a single issue in his supplemental brief that
does not require a certificate of probable cause. Buford argues
he was entitled to presentence work-time credit under sections

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2930 and 2933.4 A defendant is entitled to presentence custody
credit “only where the custody to be credited is attributable to
proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant
has been convicted.” (§ 2900.5, subd. (b).) Here, Buford was in
custody because he was serving a sentence on a prior conviction.
He was not in custody because of the conduct for which he
ultimately was convicted. Therefore, he was not entitled to
any presentence credit, including work-time credit.
We have independently reviewed the entire record. We
are satisfied that no arguable issues exist and Buford’s counsel
has fully satisfied his responsibilities under Wende. (Smith v.
Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277–279; People v. Kelly (2006)
40 Cal.4th 106, 123–124; Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 443.)

4 Buford asks us to take judicial notice of 19 exhibits,
consisting of documents related to a complaint that was
dismissed, CDCR records, and conformed copies of documents
that are already in the appellate record. None of the exhibits
in his request are relevant to the custody credit issue, which
is the only issue that does not require a certificate of probable
cause. Therefore, the exhibits are irrelevant to the appeal and
we decline to take judicial notice of them. (See Voris v. Lampert
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141, 1147, fn. 5 [declining to take judicial notice
of document that was irrelevant to the decision].)

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 DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.

We concur:

ADAMS, P. J.

ASHWORTH, J.


Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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