Filed 9/24/26 P. v. Jackson CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B347766

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA020015)
v.

ARTHUR DUANE JACKSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Charles Carbone and Charles Carbone for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
 INTRODUCTION

In this appeal after an evidentiary hearing under Penal
Code section 1172.6, we affirm the superior court’s order denying
appellant Arthur Duane Jackson’s petition because substantial
evidence supports the court’s finding Jackson is guilty of
attempted murder under a currently valid theory.1
In 1994, Jackson committed a carjacking with his
codefendant John Holani.2 The carjacking victim was Hugo
Leiva, a tow truck driver who had come to assist Jackson and
Holani with a flat tire on the freeway in the middle of the night.
During the carjacking, Jackson put a gun to Leiva’s head, then
Holani pulled Leiva out of his tow truck, ordered him to lay face
down on the ground, then shot him in the back. Leiva was able to
run away and survived. At trial, the jury was instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, and it convicted
Jackson and Holani of willful, deliberate, and premeditated
attempted murder.
In 2025, the superior court conducted an evidentiary
hearing under section 1172.6. The superior court denied
Jackson’s petition because it found he was a principal in the
commission of an attempted murder who acted with the intent to
kill. Jackson contends the court’s finding is unsupported by
substantial evidence. We conclude the record contains
substantial evidence supporting the court’s conclusion Jackson is
ineligible for relief, including Leiva’s testimony at Jackson’s trial

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Holani is not a party to this appeal.

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describing the carjacking and shooting, as well as Jackson’s
statements during a parole assessment reflecting he had the
requisite intent to kill Leiva. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Underlying Crime
On April 28, 1994, at 1:32 a.m., a request for assistance
was made from a freeway callbox on the 605 freeway at Whittier
Boulevard. In response to the request, a California Highway
Patrol (CHP) dispatcher contacted Hadley Tow Service, which
sent a tow truck to the scene. At 2:08 a.m., Hadley informed
CHP the requesting party had refused towing because he only
wanted a spare tire replaced. At 2:10 a.m., a second assistance
request was made from the same freeway callbox. In response,
CHP contacted Freddie Mac Tow Service, which sent tow truck
driver Hugo Leiva to the scene.
Leiva arrived around 3:00 a.m. and saw a 1975 Chevrolet
Monte Carlo parked on the shoulder of the northbound 605
freeway. Two people were asleep inside the car, and the car had
a flat tire. Leiva knocked on the window, awakening Jackson
and Holani. Holani told Leiva they had a flat tire but no spare
and needed a tow to Long Beach. Leiva attached the Monte Carlo
to his tow truck, and the three men entered Leiva’s tow truck,
with Jackson sitting in the middle.
At a certain point, Jackson asked Leiva to pull over so
Holani could use the restroom, apparently as a ruse. Holani got
out of the truck, took a few steps, reached toward his waist,
pulled out a gun, pointed it at Leiva, and said “ ‘give me all your
money.’ ” Jackson, still seated next to Leiva, also pulled out a

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gun, pushed Leiva’s head down, placed the gun to Leiva’s head,
and ordered Leiva to surrender his wallet.
Holani reached across Jackson, grabbed Leiva by the neck,
pulled Leiva over Jackson out of the truck, and ordered Leiva to
lie on the ground. Leiva saw Jackson slide over to the driver’s
seat of the tow truck. Holani told Leiva to turn face down on the
ground. When Leiva complied and turned face down, Holani shot
him in the back. Leiva got up and started running. He heard
two more gunshots, but they did not hit him. Bleeding and
feeling weak, Leiva fell. He saw Jackson and Holani drive his
tow truck away with the Monte Carlo still attached. Leiva waved
at other cars for help, but no one stopped. He eventually was
able to get to the call box and ask for help. CHP officers arrived,
followed by paramedics, who took Leiva to a hospital.3

B. Verdicts, Sentencing, and Direct Appeal
The jury found Jackson and Holani guilty of attempted
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187,
subd. (a)) and carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)), and it also found each
defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the
offenses (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury additionally found that
Jackson sustained a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Jackson to a term of life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole.
In Jackson’s direct appeal, this court affirmed the judgment
of conviction, but corrected the minimum parole eligibility.
(People v. Jackson (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 232, review granted

3 We omit the details surrounding Jackson and Holani’s
subsequent arrest because they are not relevant to the issue
presented in this appeal.

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Mar. 28, 1996, S051863, review dism. and cause remanded
Oct. 23, 1996.)

C. Prior Section 1172.6 Proceedings
In 2019, Jackson filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). The superior court
denied the petition without appointing counsel, concluding the
statute did not apply to attempted murder. This court affirmed.
(People v. Jackson (July 24, 2020, B296340 [nonpub. opn.].) The
Supreme Court granted Jackson’s petition for review and
transferred the case to this court for reconsideration in light of
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551)
and People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis). We reversed
the order denying Jackson’s petition and directed the superior
court to appoint counsel and proceed in accordance with section
1172.6, subdivision (c). (People v. Jackson (Mar. 2, 2022,
B296340) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2022, the superior court appointed counsel after
Jackson, representing himself, filed a declaration in support of
his petition for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 775. In their
opposition, the People acknowledged the jury was instructed on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, but argued
Jackson was ineligible for relief because the jury found him guilty
of attempted premediated murder with personal use of a firearm.
Jackson, through counsel, filed a reply in which he argued he
made a prima facie showing for relief. The superior court denied
Jackson’s petition without issuing an order to show cause. The
court emphasized the jury found Jackson “used a gun” to commit
attempted murder with premeditation, “which by definition,
requires the express intent to kill.” The court’s minute order

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specified it was denying the petition because, “[b]ased on the
charges for which he was convicted, [Jackson] had a specific
intent to kill.” This court reversed. (People v. Jackson (Apr. 19,
2024, B329874) [nonpub. opn.].) We concluded the natural and
probable consequences doctrine instruction left open the
possibility the jury convicted Jackson of attempted murder based
on imputed malice, and the jury’s premeditation and gun use
findings did not foreclose that possibility as a matter of law. We
remanded the case to the superior court with directions to issue
an order to show cause and proceed under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d).

D. Section 1172.6 Evidentiary Hearing
At Jackson’s evidentiary hearing, the People introduced the
reporter’s transcript of Jackson and Holani’s jury trial. That
transcript contains Leiva’s testimony identifying Jackson and
Holani as his assailants and describing the carjacking and
shooting. The People also introduced Jackson’s parole board
comprehensive risk assessment (CRA) report from 2020.
According to that report, Jackson stated during his assessment
that he and Holani intended to kill Leiva so they could “ ‘get
away with the carjacking.’ ” The defense introduced codefendant
Holani’s 2013 parole hearing. During that hearing, Holani stated
that he shot Leiva out of anger because he “just snapped,”
suggesting he decided on his own to shoot Leiva without
participation from Jackson.

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 1. Jackson’s Inculpatory Statements During his Parole
Evaluation
In 2020, Jackson underwent a CRA as part of his parole
evaluation. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2240.) Jackson’s CRA
was conducted by Dr. T. McGinley, a licensed forensic
psychologist with the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. Dr. McGinley informed Jackson the interview
was not confidential and that Jackson had the right not to
participate. Jackson stated he understood the contents of the
interview would not be confidential and that he understood it was
his right not to participate.
During his CRA interview, Jackson gave the following
account of the carjacking and attempted murder:

On this particular night, April 28th of 1994, I started out at
my girlfriend’s house. I went to the Santa Fe complex to
meet with John Holani. He asked me for money. I said,
“No, we can go get money.” We had done robberies before.
He said, “Ok.” . . . He knew of somebody we could rob. I
didn’t actually know this guy. He sold [marijuana]. [That’s
who] we [were] originally going to rob . . . We went to take
my car. It got a flat. We called the tow truck. The first one
came out. I sent him away. He didn’t have a spare tire.
We called another. The second one comes with Mr. Leiva.
[He] didn’t have a spare tire but could hook us up to take us
to Long Beach. John asked him to pull over, to use the
restroom. John pulled the gun. I pulled my gun. I told
him to climb over my legs and get out of the truck. John
had him lie on the ground. John shot him, and we got in

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 the truck and we drove off; and later John was arrested and
I was arrested right after that.

Dr. McGinley asked Jackson if their intention was to kill Leiva,
and Jackson answered, “Yes.” When asked why they wanted to
kill Leiva, Jackson said “[t]o get away with the carjacking.”
Jackson stated they intended to sell Leiva’s truck for parts and
use the money to buy clothes and the tire for Jackson’s car.
Jackson also stated he was the leader of the events that
transpired during the crime. He took responsibility for what
happened. Jackson expressed remorse for hurting Leiva, and as
the interview drew to a close, he was close to tears.

2. Holani’s Parole Hearing Testimony
In February 2013, Holani testified at his initial parole
consideration hearing. Holani disputed the veracity of the
factual summary contained in this court’s opinion resolving
Jackson and Holani’s direct appeal. When asked to recount his
recollection of what happened, Holani stated that he and Jackson
called for a tow truck. Holani wanted to use the restroom, then,
when Jackson began arguing with Leiva, Holani “just snapped.”
Holani grabbed Leiva, pulled him out of the truck, told him to lie
down, then shot him. Holani claimed he shot Leiva in his
buttocks rather than in his back. According to Holani, his motive
for shooting Leiva was anger. Holani was angry because Leiva
did not let him use the radio when they were in the tow truck and
also because he felt Leiva had been giving him attitude. Jackson
and Holani were armed during the crimes, and Holani claimed
Jackson had given him the gun he used to shoot Leiva. Holani
also stated he had consumed beer and was drunk the night of the

8
crime. He asserted that he and Jackson had not planned to rob
Leiva, and the shooting occurred in “the heat of the moment.” He
claimed that he did not remember anything about robbing Leiva.

3. The Superior Court Denies the Petition
Citing the evidence surrounding the attempted murder of
Leiva, as well as Jackson’s statements during the CRA indicating
he and Holani intended to kill Leiva, the superior court found the
prosecution had satisfied its burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that Jackson was guilty of attempted murder
under a currently valid theory because he was a principal who
acted with the intent to kill.
Jackson timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Superior Court’s
Finding Jackson Is Guilty of Attempted Murder under
Current Law Because He Aided and Abetted Holani While
Harboring the Intent To Kill
1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Effective 2019, the Legislature, through Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), amended
section 188 to eliminate the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as it applies to murder and to require, with certain
exceptions under the felony murder rule, that a defendant act
with malice to be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
Effective 2022, through Senate Bill No. 775, the Legislature
amended section 1172.6 to apply to persons convicted of

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“attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Upon receipt of a facially sufficient section 1172.6 petition,
the court “shall appoint counsel” for petitioner if requested. (Id.,
subd. (b)(3).) The court then assesses whether the petitioner
made a prima facie showing he is eligible for relief. (Id., subd. (c);
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.) If the court determines the
petitioner made a prima facie showing, the court must issue an
order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the
prosecution bears the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of attempted murder under
current law. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d).) At the evidentiary
hearing, the court may consider evidence “previously admitted at
any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law,”
including witness testimony. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The
petitioner and the prosecutor may also offer new or additional
evidence “to meet their respective burdens.” (Ibid.)
In assessing Jackson’s appeal from the evidentiary hearing,
we review the record in the light most favorable to the order
below to determine if there is substantial evidence from which
any rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Jackson is guilty of attempted murder under current law.
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.) Substantial
evidence includes circumstantial evidence and reasonable
inferences based on that evidence. (People v. Navarro (2021)
12 Cal.5th 285, 339.) We “presume in support of the judgment
the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably
deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th
913, 919.) Accordingly, we do not substitute our own evaluation
of a witness’s credibility for that of the finder of fact. (People v.

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Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206 (Ochoa).) “Because we must
draw all inferences in support of the judgment, [a] defendant
‘bears an enormous burden’ when challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence.” (People v. Vasco (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 137, 161.)4

2. Analysis
As relevant here, a “principal” is defined as any person who
aids and abets in the commission of a criminal offense. (§ 31.)
“Direct aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted
murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.” (People v.
Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley).) “ ‘[T]o be guilty of
attempted murder as an aider and abettor, a person must give
aid or encouragement with knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s
intent to kill and with the purpose of facilitating the direct
perpetrator’s accomplishment of the intended killing—which
means that the person guilty of attempted murder as an aider
and abettor must intend to kill.’ ” (People v. Nguyen (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054 (Nguyen).)
The record from Jackson’s trial contains substantial
evidence, including circumstantial evidence, that Jackson knew
of Holani’s intent to kill Leiva, shared that intent, and aided and
abetted Holani in the attempted murder. Leiva testified that,
after he picked up Jackson and Holani and was driving to Long
Beach, Jackson asked Leiva to pull over so Holani could use the

4 Jackson is incorrect that this appeal raises questions of law
warranting de novo review. (See People v. Underwood (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 303, 314 [“a trial court’s decision denying a
petition under section 1172.6 following an evidentiary hearing is
predominantly a question of fact” that warrants substantial
evidence review on appeal].)

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restroom. Holani did not use the bathroom, and instead after
Holani exited the tow truck he pointed a gun at Leiva. Jackson
then pulled out a gun, pushed Leiva’s head down, and put the
gun to Leiva’s head. As Holani pulled Leiva from the truck, told
him to lay face down on the ground, and shot him in the back,
Jackson slid over to the driver’s seat of Leiva’s tow truck to drive
away. Leiva’s testimony reasonably supports the inference that
Jackson and Holani acted in concert with the shared intent to
shoot and kill Leiva in order to get away with the carjacking
without leaving a witness. (See Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 1054 [relevant factors in determining whether an individual
acted as an aider and abettor include presence at the scene of the
crime, relationship to the direct perpetrator, and the individual’s
conduct before and after the offense]; People v. Campbell (1994)
25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409 [substantial evidence supported a
finding of aiding and abetting, in part, because two perpetrators’
actions in concert reasonably implies a common purpose]; see also
People v. Player (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 931, 965 (Player) [the
testimony of one witness constitutes substantial evidence;
affirming denial of section 1172.6 petition after evidentiary
hearing].)
“Direct evidence of intent to kill is rare, and ordinarily the
intent to kill must be inferred from the statements and actions of
the defendant and the circumstances surrounding the crime.”
(People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602.) In this case,
however, the superior court also had before it direct evidence:
Jackson’s own admission, during his parole evaluation, that he

12
intended to kill Leiva in order to get away with the carjacking.5
We conclude Jackson’s admission, along with Leiva’s testimony,
are substantial evidence reasonably supporting the superior
court’s finding that Jackson is guilty of attempted murder under
a currently valid theory as a direct aider and abettor who
harbored the intent to kill. (See Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 548.)
Jackson argues substantial evidence does not support the
superior court’s finding because the court erred by giving too
much weight to his statements during his parole evaluation that
he and Holani intended to kill Leiva in order to get away with the
carjacking. Jackson suggests his inculpatory statements should
be disregarded because he had an incentive in his parole
proceedings to admit culpability and show remorse. Jackson
further contends Holani’s parole hearing testimony, which could
support an inference that Jackson did not intend to kill Leiva,
should be given more weight than his own statements that he
intended to kill Leiva.
We acknowledge that defendants, such as Jackson, who
participate in parole proceedings may have an incentive to admit
culpability and show remorse to increase their chances of being
granted parole. (See In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241, 1257,

5 Jackson concedes that his statements at his parole
assessment were admissible at his evidentiary hearing. “It is
well settled that a defendant’s statements in a parole risk
assessment report and testimony at a parole hearing fall within
the ambit of ‘ “new or additional evidence[]” ’ ” that may be
admitted at a section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary
hearing. (People v. Zavala (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 366, 373
[collecting cases].)

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fn. 16, citing Regs., § 2402, subd. (d) [parole suitability factors
include signs of remorse].) We also acknowledge that unlike
Jackson, Holani, during his parole proceedings, did not mention a
shared intent to kill Leiva in order to accomplish the carjacking.
But we cannot, on substantial evidence review, reweigh the
evidence before the superior court, and we are bound by its
finding that Jackson’s inculpatory statements were credible.
(Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1206; Player, supra,
119 Cal.App.5th at p. 963 [in reviewing a section 1172.6
ineligibility finding for substantial evidence, we resolve all
evidentiary conflicts and questions of witness credibility in favor
of the ineligibility finding]; People v. Grandberry (2025)
116 Cal.App.5th 934, 946 [same].)
Contrary to Jackon’s assertion, the superior court was not
required to believe Holani’s testimony over that of Jackson
because the court was permitted to weigh the evidence and make
its own credibility determinations. (People v. Tyler (2026)
121 Cal.App.5th 724, 728 [“The [superior] court assumes the role
of independent fact finder” at section 1172.6 evidentiary
hearings]; People v. Davis (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 500, 510-511
[credibility determinations are the “exclusive province” of the
superior court at section 1172.6 evidentiary hearings].) Nor can
we, as Jackson invites us to, disregard the evidence supporting
the superior court’s finding that Jackson was an aider and
abettor who had the requisite intent to kill and credit only the
evidence that favors him. (See People v. Williams (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 652, 664-665.)6

6 Jackson acknowledges the question on appeal is whether
substantial evidence supports the superior court’s finding that he

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 DISPOSITION

The order denying Jackson’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:

SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.

harbored the intent to kill. But, as the People observe, the
primary focus of Jackson’s opening brief was whether the
prosecution adequately proved in the superior court that Jackson
was a major participant in the carjacking who acted with reckless
indifference to human life under People v. Banks (2015)
61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522. This is
not the relevant inquiry. Under the felony murder rule, a
participant in any one of several statutorily enumerated felonies
is guilty of murder if the person was a major participant in the
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189,
subd. (e)(3).) Attempted murder is not one of those statutorily
enumerated felonies. (Ibid.; People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th
653, 661, fn. 2.) “California has no crime of attempted felony
murder.” (People v. Billa (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1071, fn. 4.)
Counsel appears to have conflated the felony murder inquiry of
major participation/reckless indifference with the question
presented here, namely whether Jackson aided and abetted
attempted murder while harboring the intent to kill.

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