Filed 9/14/26

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B348938
(Super. Ct. No. 2023029813)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

KAVI MICHAEL SINGH,

Defendant and Appellant.

Kavi Michael Singh violently raped a university freshman
in her dorm room. A felony information charged appellant with
forcible rape (Penal Code, 1 § 261, subd. (a)(2)), oral copulation
against victim’s will by force, duress, menace, or fear (§ 287,
subd. (c)(2)(A)), sexual penetration with force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)), and assault with intent to
commit rape (§ 220, subd. (a)(1)). He pleaded guilty to one count
of forcible rape. Singh received a low term sentence of three
years, with the trial court awarding him nearly two years of
custody credit. It ordered him to pay his victim, among other

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless

otherwise stated.
things, $20,000 in restitution to compensate her for the four-year
scholarship she lost after leaving the institution where he
sexually assaulted her.
Singh, presumably since released, now seeks to lighten the
financial burden of his crime. He contends: (1) restitution is
“punishment” under Ellingburg v. United States (2026) 607 U.S.
163 [223 L.Ed.2d 446] (Ellingburg), so all restitution amounts
must be pled and proved to a jury; and (2) there is no rational
basis for the $20,000 awarded to his victim.
We will affirm. Ellingburg does not create a right to trial
by jury on the issue of restitution in California. If it did, Singh
waived the right. There is also a rational basis for the award,
i.e., to restore his victim’s ability to fund the education cut short
by Singh’s sexual violence. We will, however, affirm the trial
court’s order to the extent it stayed accrual of interest on the
award pending appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Crime
Jane Doe entered a four year university her freshman year
as a pre-nursing major. 2 Singh messaged Doe on Instagram after
briefly meeting her at a Halloween party. They agreed to meet at
a retail mall, where he worked. After walking around the mall
together, Singh recommended they return to Doe’s dorm room to
watch a movie. Doe agreed because she knew her roommate
would be present.
The roommate left before the movie finished. Appellant
promptly raped and assaulted Doe—at one point threatening to
impregnate her if she made noise. He also pushed her head down

2 We take the facts from the reporter’s transcript of the

preliminary hearing.

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to his penis and forced her to orally copulate him several times.
A sexual assault nurse later documented symptoms consistent
with rape and strangulation. Doe developed bruising around her
neck.
Doe was psychologically unable to return to college. She
arranged for “incompletes” in her fall semester classes. She
enrolled in spring semester classes, switched dorms, and adopted
a service dog, but was only able to return to college for two
nights. Her anxiety attacks were so severe that her therapist
and psychiatrist recommended she stop attending.
Plea and Sentencing
Singh signed a felony disposition statement acknowledging,
“I will be ordered to pay restitution to the victim(s). I understand
that I am entitled to a judicial determination of the amount of
restitution and that, unless otherwise ordered, the probation and
sentencing hearing will constitute the hearing on the amount of
restitution.” Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
The court sentenced appellant to the low term of three
years in state prison with 736 days of custody credit. He
stipulated to pay $3,865.04 in restitution for Doe’s medical costs,
counseling, and the cost of her therapy dog. The court ordered
him to pay additional restitution “in an amount to be determined”
and scheduled a restitution hearing.
Restitution Hearing and Order
The People sought an additional $20,000 in restitution at
the hearing. Doe’s mother testified that the university awarded
Doe $6,000 for her first academic year (2023-2024). The
scholarship would be renewed each year, up to a maximum of

3
$20,000, if Doe carried at least 12 units each semester and
maintained a minimum grade point average.
Doe’s mother testified at trial about how Doe’s trauma
symptoms prevented her from returning to the university after
the crime. Defense counsel objected, then stipulated that Doe
“couldn’t go back [because of] the rape . . . .” Doe’s mother
explained her daughter took time off from college then applied to
a two-year respiratory therapist program. The program cost
$20,000 to complete and no scholarships were available. Even if
Doe returned to the university, she no longer qualified for the
original scholarship because it was available only to first-time
freshman.
Defense counsel argued there was no rational basis to
award the additional $20,000. She highlighted that section
1202.4 does not list scholarships as recoverable loss and
described the amount as “speculative.” The court disagreed. It
analogized the lost scholarship to future lost wages. It noted
section 1202.4’s list of economic losses was not exhaustive and
rejected defense counsel’s description of the amount as
speculative. “[I]n this particular case,” the court remarked, “the
amount of economic loss is specific. She had a $20,000
scholarship and then she did not. She would not qualify even if
she tried to reapply, and the law does not require her to reapply
to prove she lost what she lost to begin with.”
The trial court initially ordered that the restitution award
“shall include interest and shall be enforceable as if it were a civil
judgment.” Defense counsel objected to the assessment of
interest during the time between sentencing and the restitution
hearing (which had been continued through no fault of
appellant). The court stayed interest accrual for one year,

4
stating, “We’ll do it one year just to make sure the appeal runs its
full course.” The People agreed to the stay.
DISCUSSION
Restitution in California
Courts must order a convicted wrongdoer to pay restitution
in every case in which a crime victim suffers a loss. (Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(B).) Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)
implements this requirement, providing that “in every case in
which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the
defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant
make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount
established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed
by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.”
While section 1202.4 requires full restitution of victims’
economic losses, it “does not authorize direct restitution for
noneconomic losses. [Citation.]” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42
Cal.4th 644, 656.) “[D]irect victims of crime have a statutory
right to restitution on the full amount of their losses without
regard to the full or partial recoupment from other sources
(except the state Restitution Fund). [Citations.]” (People v.
Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 468.)
At a victim restitution hearing, a prima facie case for
restitution is made by the People based in part on a victim’s
testimony on, or other claim or statement of, the amount of his or
her economic loss. (People v. Prosser (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 682,
690-691.) “Once the victim has made a prima facie showing of his
or her loss, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate
that the amount of the loss is other than that claimed by the
victim. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 691.)

5
 No Right to a Jury Trial on Restitution
Appellant contends he had a Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial on restitution under Ellingburg and Apprendi v. New
Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, [147 L.Ed.2d 435] (Apprendi) because
victim restitution increases the punishment for a crime. The
People contend appellant forfeited this argument because he did
not raise it below. We reach the merits because Ellingburg was
decided after his restitution hearing. We review constitutional
issues de novo. (California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 177, 208.)
California courts have held uniformly that restitution does
not constitute punishment and, therefore, does not implicate a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. (People v. Millard (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 7, 35-36 (Millard); People v. Sy (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 44, 65; People v. Smith (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 415,
433.) Appellant argues Ellingburg overturned this precedent
when it held that restitution under the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) constitutes criminal punishment
under the ex post facto clause. Apprendi error thus occurred
because his punishment exceeded the statutory maximum.
(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490 [“any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond reasonable
doubt”].) We disagree for two reasons.
First, victim restitution is not criminal punishment. (See
People v. Pangan (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 574, 585 (Pangan)
[“neither Southern Union [nor] Apprendi . . . have any application
to direct victim restitution, because direct victim restitution is
not a criminal penalty”]; People v. Foalima (2015) 239
Cal.App.4th 1376, 1398 (Foalima); People v. Wasbotten (2014) 225

6
Cal.App.4th 306, 308-309; People v. Chappelone (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 1159, 1184; Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at
p. 35.) “[D]irect victim restitution is a substitute for a civil
remedy so that victims of crime do not need to file separate civil
suits.” (Pangan at p. 585.)
Second, direct restitution is not subject to any statutory
maximum. (Pangan, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at pp. 585-586; see
Foalima, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1398 [“Section 1202.4
imposes no statutory limits on the amount of direct restitution a
court may order.”].) Federal courts have rejected Apprendi
challenges to restitution for the same reasons. (See, e.g., United
States v. LaGrou Distribution Sys., Inc. (7th Cir. 2006) 466 F.3d
585, 593 [“[R]estitution is not a penalty for a crime for Apprendi
purposes since ‘restitution for harm done is a classic civil
remedy’”]; U.S. v. Sosebee (6th Cir. 2005) 419 F.3d 451, 461
[“restitution orders are not affected by the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Apprendi . . . because the restitution statutes do not
specify a statutory maximum”].)
Ellingburg did not change either of these long-held
rationales for denying defendants jury trials on restitution in
California. It analyzed the “text and structure” of the MVRA and
found that Congress intended the statute to be criminal
punishment. (Ellingburg, supra, 607 U.S. at p. 169.) In so doing,
the Court identified several features of the MVRA which “ma[de]
abundantly clear” that, when “viewed as a whole,” the act
imposed punishment. (Id. at p. 167.) This included:
(1) “label[ing] restitution as a ‘penalty’ for a criminal ‘offense’”;
(2) imposing restitution at the time of sentencing; (3) identifying
the government, not the victim, being the party adverse to the
defendant when restitution is ordered; (4) allowing restitution for

7
misdemeanors to be imposed “‘in lieu of’” other punishments,
such as imprisonment, making it the “sole punishment” for those
offenses; (5) allowing noncompliance with restitution payments to
result in a court modification of supervised release, probation, or
even imprisonment; and (6) codifying the MVRA in the criminal
code. (Id. at p. 166, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1).)
California’s restitution framework shares some of these
features but lacks others. Section 1202.4 does not mention
imposing restitution “in lieu of” other punishments or describe it
as a penalty. It speaks of compensating crime victims for
“economic loss” and “fully reimburs[ing]” them. (§ 1202.4, subds.
(a)(1) & (f)(3).) Restitution is enforceable “as if the order were a
civil judgment.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(B), italics added.) Indeed, the
Legislature enacted section 1202.4 to implement Marsy’s Law, a
successful ballot initiative guaranteeing crime victims certain
legal rights. One of those rights is to “seek and secure
restitution” for losses resulting from criminal activity. (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).) This constitutional guaranty
is designed to compensate victims, not punish defendants. When
“viewed as a whole,” the features of restitution under section
1202.4 do not indicate punitive intent.
Finally, Apprendi applies only to determinate punishments.
“[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose based solely on the basis
of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant.” (Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303 [159
L.Ed.2d 403], italics omitted.) There is no statutory maximum to
restitution in California. (See § 1202.4, subd. (f) [“The court shall
order full restitution”].) Section 1202.4 is an indeterminate
framework for imposition of restitution. Apprendi and therefore

8
Ellingburg do not apply for this reason. (See United States v.
Zafaranchi (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 2026) 2026 U.S. Dist.Lexis
48144 [no right to a jury trial on restitution under the MVRA,
even after Ellingburg]; United States v. Carruth (8th Cir. 2005)
418 F.3d 900, 905 [Apprendi does not prohibit judicial fact-
finding for restitution orders because there is no statutory
maximum for restitution].)
Appellant Waived His Right to a Jury Trial
on the Issue of Restitution
The People contend appellant waived his right a jury trial
assuming he were entitled to one. We agree. Appellant
acknowledged in his felony disposition statement that he would
be ordered to pay restitution after a “judicial” determination of
the amount—not a “jury” determination. He waived his rights to
a jury trial and to confront witnesses on the next page.
Rational Basis for the $20,000 Award
Appellant contends the court’s $20,000 award for the lost
scholarship is speculative and lacks a rational basis. We review
the decision for abuse of discretion. (Millard, supra, 175
Cal.App.4th at p. 26.) “‘“‘When there is a factual and rational
basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no
abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court.’”’” (Ibid.)
“‘Further, the standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a
preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citation.] “If the circumstances reasonably justify the
[trial court’s] findings,” the judgment may not be overturned
when the circumstances might also reasonably support a contrary
finding. [Citation.] We do not reweigh or reinterpret the
evidence; rather, we determine whether there is sufficient

9
evidence to support the inference drawn by the trier of fact.
[Citations.]’” (Ibid.)
Appellant argues the restitution order has no rational basis
because: (1) the People offered no psychological evidence showing
why Doe could not return to the university to claim the
scholarship; (2) the People did not call Doe to testify about her
plans to attend trade school instead of returning to the
university; and (3) Doe did not suffer any loss or incur any
expense because she “elected” not to return to the university.
Appellant also argues the court should have reduced the $20,000
award by the $6,000 Doe received her first year. None of these
arguments are persuasive.
The restitution order placed Doe in the position she would
have been in but for appellant’s criminal conduct. At the
restitution hearing, the trial court considered Doe’s mother’s
testimony about the specifics of the $20,000 scholarship and why
Doe could not use it. The court received documentation about the
scholarship as well as Doe’s victim impact statement. Appellant
stipulated Doe “couldn’t go back [to the university] based on the
rape itself.” Even if she could return, it was too late to claim the
remainder of the scholarship.
Appellant failed to rebut this prima facie showing of loss.
The Court compared the lost scholarship money to lost wages and
found it was not “speculative” to believe Doe would have met the
minimum requirements to maintain the scholarship year to year.
The order gives Doe the same ability to fund her education that
she had before appellant committed the crime. “[D]irect victims
of crime have a statutory right to restitution on the full amount
of their losses.” (People v. Baker, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at
p. 468.)

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 Lastly, we decline to credit appellant for the portion of the
scholarship Doe received shortly before he raped her. He cites no
evidence Doe received $6,000 in cash. Doe’s mother testified this
amount went towards tuition. We can infer she received a tuition
credit. Regardless, Doe received no benefit from the scholarship
because she received no academic credits for the year.
Stay on Interest Accrual
The People stipulated at the restitution hearing to stay the
accrual of interest accrual on the $20,000 award. They now
contend the trial court should have imposed interest immediately
despite the stipulation because section 1202.4, subdivision
(f)(3)(G) requires imposing interest “as of the date of the
sentencing or loss . . . .” We disagree.
The People cite People v. Gross (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th
1313, 1318 to argue that “[a] victim’s right to restitution is . . .
constitutional [and] cannot be bargained away or limited.” Gross
held only that restitution survives dismissal under section
1203.4. It does not prohibit the People from stipulating to a
temporary stay on the accrual of interest.
The People assert an unauthorized sentence is “subject to
judicial correction whenever the error comes to the attention of
the reviewing court.” (People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547,
554, fn. 6.) However, “the ‘unauthorized sentence’ concept
constitutes a narrow exception to the general requirement that
only those claims properly raised and preserved by the parties
are reviewable on appeal. [Citations].” (People v. Scott (1994) 9
Cal.4th 331, 354.) We are not persuaded the award of interest on
restitution is the type of criminal “sentence” that falls within this
“narrow exception.”

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 DISPOSITION
The judgment (restitution order) is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

CODY, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

BALTODANO, J.

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 Catherine Volker, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________

James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General, and Patricia Rosman, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.