Filed 9/16/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B343669
(Super. Ct. No. 22F-02065)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

CHARLES NELSON
AMMONS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Charles Nelson Ammons appeals his conviction, by
jury, of the attempted murder of City of Pismo Beach police
officer Christopher Siglin (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187),1 assault with a
semi-automatic firearm on a police officer (§ 245, subd. (d)(2)),
resisting an executive officer (§ 69), carrying a loaded and
unregistered firearm (§ 25850), two counts of driving under the
influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)), and public intoxication.
(§ 647, subd. (f).) The trial court sentenced appellant to an
aggregate term in state prison of 15 years to life plus 12 years.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
1

otherwise stated.
 Appellant limits this appeal to the attempted murder
conviction. He contends the trial court erred when it instructed
the jury, in terms of CALCRIM No. 3426, that it could “consider
[evidence of appellant’s voluntary intoxication] only in deciding
whether [appellant] acted with the intent to kill Siglin and the
knowledge that Siglin was a peace officer.” He argues that the
trial court erred by precluding the jury from also considering his
intoxication in deciding whether he premeditated and
deliberated. Finally he contends his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance because counsel did not object to the
instruction as worded. We affirm.
Facts
Officer Siglin was in uniform, patrolling on his police
motorcycle when he saw appellant, driving a white van, make an
illegal left turn. Appellant ignored Siglin’s initial efforts to pull
him over but eventually stopped after Siglin drove his motorcycle
ahead of the van and stopped in front of it. Siglin radioed for
backup before approaching the van.
The interaction between Siglin and appellant was
recorded on Siglin’s body camera. Video from the camera
confirms that when Siglin reached the van, he ordered appellant
to turn off the ignition. Appellant was confrontational and
refused to turn off the engine. Siglin opened the driver’s side
door and reached into the van to get appellant to step out of the
vehicle. Appellant swung his right hand toward Siglin while
holding a handgun. Siglin diverted the blow with his left hand
and tried to disarm appellant.
The two men grappled with each other for a
considerable amount of time, at extremely close quarters inside
the van. Siglin constantly tried to pry appellant’s fingers from

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the firearm and press its muzzle away from his head and face.
For his part, appellant struggled to maintain control of the
firearm and to pry Siglin’s fingers off it. During the struggle, the
firearm was about 12 inches away and pointed at Siglin’s face.
The pistol “clicked” but did not fire. Eventually Siglin was able to
retrieve the firearm. Backup officers arrived. Together, the
officers removed appellant from the van and took him into
custody.
Siglin’s body camera documented a “clicking” sound
that occurred when appellant pulled the trigger. An examination
of the firearm, a .40 caliber Beretta semi-automatic 96 pistol
explained the “clicking” but not the firing: the bullets in the
magazine clip were loaded backwards. Had the firearm been
properly loaded, it would have fired.2
After his arrest, appellant was taken to the hospital.
A screening test determined his blood alcohol content was .21.
Procedural History
Appellant’s first jury trial resulted in his conviction of
assault with a semi-automatic firearm, carrying a loaded and
unregistered firearm, driving under the influence and public
intoxication. That jury was unable to reach a verdict on the
attempted murder and resisting arrest charges. Appellant’s
second jury trial was limited to attempted murder and resisting
arrest charges and resulted in his conviction.

2 We parenthetically comment on appellant’s lack of even a

rudimentary knowledge of firearms. The fact that he loaded the
magazine with bullets facing backwards is the only reason Siglin
was not murdered.

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 Voluntary Intoxication Instruction
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 3426: “You may consider evidence, if any, of the defendant’s
voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider
that evidence only in deciding whether the defendant acted with
the intent to kill [Christopher] Siglin and the knowledge that
[Christopher] Siglin was a peace officer. [¶] A person is
voluntarily intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated by
willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance
knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly
assuming the risk of that effect. [¶] In connection with the
charge of attempted murder, the People have the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with
intent to kill. If the People have not met this burden, you must
find the defendant not guilty of attempted murder.”
Appellant contends the trial court erred because this
instruction did not expressly address premeditation and
deliberation. We are not persuaded. The instructions, read as a
whole, allowed the jury to consider voluntary intoxication in
connection with premeditation and deliberation. Because
appellant did not request that the trial court clarify or modify its
proposed instruction on the issue, he has forfeited this
contention.
Evidence of a defendant’s voluntary intoxication is
admissible “solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant
actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with
murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or
harbored express malice aforethought.” (§ 29.4, subd. (b).) An
instruction on voluntary intoxication, “is a form of pinpoint
instruction that the trial court is not required to give in the

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absence of a request.” (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515,
559; see also, People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119-1120
(Saille).)
Here, the trial court’s instruction on voluntary
intoxication correctly informed the jury that voluntary
intoxication could be considered in deciding whether appellant
acted with the intent to kill Siglin. The jury was further
instructed, “If you find the defendant guilty of attempted murder
under Count One, you must then decide whether the People have
proved the additional allegation that the attempted murder was
done willfully, and with deliberation and premeditation. [¶] The
defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill when he acted.
The defendant deliberated if he carefully weighed the
considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the
consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted with
premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the act of
attempted murder.” (CALCRIM No. 601.)
As the court noted, in People v. Castillo (1997) 16
Cal.4th 1009, these instructions connect the concepts of
willfulness, premeditation and deliberation with the related
concept of the intent to kill that is required for attempted
murder. (Id. at pp. 1016-1017.) “No reasonable juror would
understand the instructions to permit the jury to consider
intoxication in determining whether defendant specifically
intended to kill but to prohibit it from considering that same
intoxication in determining whether he premeditated and
deliberated. Premeditation and deliberation are clearly mental
states; no reasonable juror would assume otherwise.” (Id. at p.
1017.)

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 Moreover, because the instruction on voluntary
intoxication is a pinpoint instruction, it was appellant’s
responsibility to request any modifications or clarifications he
required. (Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1120.) His election not to
do so forfeits the contention that the instruction did not
sufficiently connect voluntary intoxication to the concepts of
premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Lewis (2001) 25
Cal.4th 610, 650.)
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Finally, we reject the contention that appellant’s
counsel was ineffective because he did not request that the
instruction expressly mention premeditation and deliberation.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, appellant
must show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and
that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
(People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 679.) “ ‘This requires
showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.)
Here, the jury’s verdict establishes that it found
appellant formed the specific intent to kill Siglin and that his
voluntary intoxication did not prevent him from doing so. There
is no reasonable probability the jury would have reached a
different result had the voluntary intoxication instruction
specifically mentioned premeditation and deliberation. To reach
a more favorable result on that issue, the jury would have to find
that appellant was sober enough to form the intent to kill Siglin
but simultaneously too intoxicated to premeditate and deliberate
that killing. No rational jury could reach that conclusion,
especially after reviewing the body camera video of the incident.

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(See, e.g., People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 45 [jury could not
rationally find defendant intended to kill but was too intoxicated
to intend to rape].)
Conclusion
The judgment is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

CODY, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

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 Crystal T. Seiler, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Law Offices of James Koester and James Koester, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Christopher G. Sanchez, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.