Filed 9/14/26 Stiglmier v. Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Dept. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
ROBERT STIGLMIER, 2d Civ. No. B339601
(Super. Ct. No. 20CV03501)
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT et
al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
Robert Stiglmier appeals an order granting summary
judgment and a judgment dismissing his action entered in favor
of Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department, County of Santa
Barbara, Sheriff Bill Brown and deputies Christopher Brady and
Dan Caulderon (collectively respondents). He alleged
respondents violated his civil rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983) by, among
other things, unlawfully arresting and detaining him and using
excessive force. We conclude, among other things, that he did not
file a proper opposition to respondents’ summary judgment
motion. He did not file a separate statement of facts in
opposition to respondents’ separate statement of undisputed facts
and he has not shown error. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of October 20, 2019, Santa Barbara County
deputy sheriff Christopher Brady saw Stiglmier violating the
Vehicle Code by traveling on a bicycle in the wrong direction and
the bicycle did not have correct lights and reflectors. (Veh. Code,
§§ 21650, 21201, subd. (d).) Stiglmier claimed he borrowed the
bicycle from Kit Delmarsh, but the bicycle was registered to
Aashka Pandya. Deputy Sheriff Brady believed Stiglmier was
guilty of theft. Stiglmier repeatedly refused to cooperate with
Deputy Sheriff Brady’s requests to sit on the curb or lean against
the patrol car. He began yelling at Deputy Sheriff Brady and
became “hostile.” Stiglmier was handcuffed and placed in the
patrol car.
In 2020, Stiglmier filed an action against respondents for
damages for false arrest and other causes of action.
On March 28, 2022, Stiglmier filed his fourth amended
complaint alleging 12 causes of action for violating the federal
Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983). He alleged “he was stopped,
detained, harassed, and terrorized” and the officers arrested him
“without probable cause and falsely accused him of crimes” and
that they failed “to render medical attention” for him.
Stiglmier claimed the police department: 1) had policies
that allowed the “negligent” hiring of officers who received
“inadequate training,” 2) violated his right to substantive due
process, and 3) he alleged claims for unlawful detention,
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retaliation, excessive force, arrest without probable cause, false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution.
Respondents answered the complaint. The trial court
sanctioned Stiglmier for discovery violations.
In 2024, respondents filed a motion for summary judgment
supported by a separate statement of 75 undisputed material
facts establishing that Stiglmier’s detention and arrest were
lawful. Among these, respondents asserted Deputy Brady had
reasonable suspicion to stop Stiglmier because he violated the
Vehicle Code by traveling the wrong way on a bicycle that did not
have the proper lights and reflectors. Stiglmier said he borrowed
the bicycle from Kit Demarsh, but the police had probable cause
to believe he stole the bicycle because it was registered to another
person.
Stiglmier was resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1))
because he repeatedly refused to follow Deputy Sheriff Brady’s
instructions, yelled at him, and became hostile. He refused to sit
on the curb or lean against the patrol car, even though he was
able to do so. Deputy Sheriff Brady declared “Stiglmier’s hostility
was a pre-assaultive indicator and he placed [Stiglmier] in
handcuffs for officer safety.” He then placed Stiglmier in the
patrol car.
Stiglmier was provided with medical care. He was
“screened by nurses at the Santa Barbara County jail as part of
his booking process.” They asked about Stiglmier’s “medications,
allergies, medical conditions, recent hospitalizations, past
infections, mental health and social health history.” The nurses
took his blood pressure and listened to his heart. The “Santa
Barbara County Sheriff’s Office works toward best law
enforcement practices and does not endorse unconstitutional
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practices.” It hires “qualified applicants.” New applicants are
sent to an academy for months of field training. The applicants
must meet the standards of the Peace Officer Standards and
Training Commission.
Stiglmier filed a declaration in opposition to the motion,
but he did not file a separate statement of facts to respond to the
75 facts that respondents provided. Stiglmier claimed he was
entitled to a continuance. The trial court found his request for a
continuance was untimely and not a proper motion. It granted
summary judgment and subsequently denied Stiglmier’s motions
for reconsideration, new trial, and a motion to set aside the
judgment.
DISCUSSION
Stiglmier contends the trial court erred by granting
respondents’ motion for summary judgment. We disagree.
We review the record de novo to determine whether the
party moving for summary judgment met its burden of proof.
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 859.) “In
order to support summary judgment for a defendant, it must
appear from the record either that the plaintiff cannot establish
one or more of the elements of the cause of action or that the
plaintiff cannot refute an affirmative defense established by the
defendant.” (Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93
Cal.App.4th 107, 115 (Lewis); Code Civ, Proc. § 437c, subd. (n).)
“When a defendant’s motion for summary judgment is supported
by affidavits and declarations sufficient to sustain the motion,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable
issue of material fact.” (Lewis, supra, at pp. 115-116.)
“In opposing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
the plaintiff must submit a separate statement setting forth the
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specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.”
(Lewis, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 116.) “Without a separate
statement of undisputed facts with references to supporting
evidence in the form of affidavits or declarations, it is impossible
for the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of disputed facts.”
(Ibid.) Where the plaintiff fails to file an opposition separate
statement of undisputed facts the trial court may grant summary
judgment to the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3);
California School of Culinary Arts v. Lujan (2003) 112
Cal.App.4th 16, 22.)1
Actions for compensation under the federal Civil Rights Act
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) “may be brought in either state or federal
court.” (Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348.)
Their purpose is to provide compensation “ ‘for violations of
federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state
law.’ ” (Ibid.) Such violations may include police stopping
persons without a “reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal
activity ‘ “may be afoot,’’ ’ ” or arresting people without probable
cause (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273); use of
excessive force (Susag v. City of Lake Forrest (2002) 94
Cal.App.4th 1401, 1409); “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s
serious illness or injury” (Lucas v. County of Los Angeles (1996)
47 Cal.App.4th 277, 287); a local government policy of failing to
1 Stiglmier’s motion to augment the record is denied. He
has failed to show why the evidence he seeks to add was not
referenced in a separate statement in response to the
respondents’ separate statement of undisputed facts in the trial
court. (Lewis, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 115-116.) Further,
Stiglmier has not shown grounds to excuse the unreasonable
delay in filing this motion. (Russi v. Bank of America Nat. Trust
& Savings Assn. (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d. 100, 102.)
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train police officers as a result of “ ‘deliberate indifference to the
rights of persons with whom the police come into contact’ ”
(Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1016);
or violations of substantive due process where the police officer’s
conduct “ ‘is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said
to shock the contemporary conscience.’ ” (Id. at p. 1008.)
Respondents’ separate statement of undisputed material
facts showed the police had reasonable suspicion to stop Stiglmier
and probable cause to arrest him. They provided him with
medical care and had a policy of properly training police officers.
There was no substantive due process violation because their
actions were supported by reasonable suspicion and probable
cause. The trial court correctly noted Stiglmier failed to file a
separate statement of facts showing he “required more care than
he received or that he had any serious medical needs.”
Stiglmier alleged excessive force. But the separate
statement showed Deputy Sheriff Brady placed handcuffs on him
and placed him in the police car. The handcuffs were necessary
for “officer safety” because of Stiglmier’s hostile conduct and
refusal to comply with Deputy Sheriff Brady’s instructions.
The separate statement of 75 undisputed material facts
showed the lack of merit of every cause of action in Stiglmier’s
fourth amended complaint. Stiglmier filed a response that did
not contain a separate statement of oppositional facts.
Consequently, the 75 undisputed material facts supported
respondents’ motion, and the trial court did not err by granting
summary judgment. (Lewis, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 116.)
Denying a continuance
Stiglmier contends the trial court erred by not granting a
“sua sponte” motion to continue the summary judgment motion.
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He claimed he needed more time to present additional evidence.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (h).)
“The decision whether to grant such a continuance is
within the discretion of the trial court.” (Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95
Cal.App.4th 627, 633.) “The nonmoving party seeking a
continuance ‘MUST SHOW: (1) the facts to be obtained are
essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe
such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time is
needed to obtain these facts. [Citations.].’ ” (Ibid.)
Stiglmier filed a declaration with an attached letter he
wrote to opposing counsel on March 19, 2024, wherein he
requested a 120-day continuance to present “new evidence of
medical damages” based on future medical tests. The trial court
found he did not make an adequate showing for a continuance.
Stiglmier did not file a motion for continuance with the court. He
simply filed the declaration with the attached letter. His
declaration containing a request for a continuance was untimely
because it was filed one day before the hearing without a showing
of good cause. (Code Civ. Proc. §437c, subd. (b)(2).) The court
also found “the motion for summary judgment is based on
Stiglmier’s inability to prove liability. Any new evidence of
damages would have no bearing on the liability issues. Further,
Stiglmier fails to show how any new medical evidence is essential
to opposing the motion or why additional time would be needed to
obtain that evidence more than three years into this case.” He
failed to show why he could not have filed a separate statement of
facts to respond to respondents’ 75 undisputed facts. Stiglmier
has not shown an abuse of discretion.
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Motions for Reconsideration, New Trial and to Set Aside
Stiglmier contends the trial court erred by denying his
motions for reconsideration, new trial, and to set aside the
judgment. He claimed defense counsel deceived him to obtain a
continuance of trial with the hidden motive to be able to file a
summary judgment motion that would otherwise be untimely.
The trial court found the summary judgment motion was timely
and his speculation about counsel’s motives was not proven or
credible. We are bound by the trial court’s credibility findings
(Carrington v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 518)
and Stiglmier has not supported his claims by making sufficient
cites to the record.
Stiglmier claimed he should have been excused for non-
compliance with court rules because he represented himself and
because he suffers from disability. But mere “self-representation
is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment. . . . [T]he
rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented
by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation.”
(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) Even so,
Stiglmier received lenient treatment by being allowed to amend
his complaint multiple times and maintain his action for three
years. This shows that appellant was given every opportunity to
cure pleading defects even though he was self-represented and
suffered from disability.
Stiglmier also claimed respondents’ counsel concealed
arrest video evidence. The trial court rejected that claim as not
credible. The court noted “that, despite no proper discovery
requests from Stiglmier, they provided the video in October 2022
and even followed-up with Stiglmier to ensure that he was able to
access the video.” The court found “Stiglmier has provided stills
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of the videos to the court. This fact establishes that he was in
fact provided copies of the videos.” As respondents note,
Stiglmier has not made a proper showing to challenge the court’s
findings because he has not provided sufficient cites to the record
or legal authorities to support his claims. (Hernandez v. First
Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 283.) His remaining
contentions do not show grounds for a reversal.
DISPOSITION
The order granting summary judgment and the judgment
dismissing Stiglmier’s action are affirmed. Costs on appeal are
awarded to the respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
CODY, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Donna D. Geck, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Robert Stiglmier, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Heather Smith,
Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents.


