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Huang v. The New River Church Community CA6

Huang v. The New River Church Community CA6
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09:14:2026

Filed 9/14/26 Huang v. The New River Church Community CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DANA HUANG, H053764
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 24CV444180)

v.

THE NEW RIVER CHURCH
COMMUNITY, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

Dana Huang is a former youth minister at The New River Church Community, Inc.
(River Church). Over the course of several months in 2021, many youth members disclosed
to Huang alleged sexual abuse and other misconduct by Brett Bymaster, the church’s former
youth pastor, who had resigned in 2019 due to earlier accusations by Huang and others of
sexual harassment and misconduct. Huang reported the youth members’ new accusations to
both church officials and Child Protective Services. Although the church conducted an
internal investigation which found that Bymaster had engaged in “spiritual abuse” while
youth pastor, Huang was disappointed by the church’s failure to acknowledge the sexual
nature of the abuse and by restrictions the church imposed on disclosures concerning
Bymaster’s alleged misconduct. Indeed, Huang allegedly was so distressed that her physical
health declined, and at the end of 2021 she resigned from her position at the church.
In 2024, Huang sued River Church as well as The Evangelical Covenant Church
(Covenant Church), the River Church’s denomination, and the Pacific Southwest
Conference of the Evangelical Covenant Church (Pacific Southwest Conference), the
denomination’s regional conference. Huang asserted a single cause of action for retaliation
under Labor Code section 1102.5. She amended her complaint three times, and in
August 2025 the trial court sustained without leave to amend River Church’s demurrer to
the third amended complaint on the ground that Huang had failed to allege any adverse
employment action. In sustaining the separate demurrer filed by Covenant Church and the
Pacific Southwest Conference, the trial court also found insufficient Huang’s allegations
that the two were joint employers with River Church.
Huang challenges both rulings. She argues that defendants’ alleged failure to
acknowledge the sexual nature of Bymaster’s alleged misconduct and hostility to her efforts
to disclose that misconduct created an intolerable situation which constituted constructive
termination and therefore adverse employment action. As explained below, we disagree.
Especially at the pleading stage, we have no reason to doubt the sincerity of Huang’s
disappointment at River Church’s response to the accusations against Bymaster or the
physical suffering that she endured from the distress caused by the disappointment.
However, that disappointment does not constitute adverse employment action under Labor
Code section 1102.5. Nor does defendants’ alleged hostility to Huang’s efforts to disclose
more broadly Bymaster’s alleged misconduct, which hostility did not involve any physical
or verbal abuse. As a result, we conclude that Huang failed to state a valid retaliation claim
against any of the defendants.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Huang’s Allegations
Below we recount Huang’s allegations in her third amended complaint, the operative
pleading, which for purposes of evaluating defendants’ demurrers are admitted as true and
liberally construed in favor of the asserted claim. (See, e.g., Committee on Children’s
Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214, superseded by

2
statute on other grounds as stated in Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 227; Liapes v. Facebook, Inc. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910, 919.)
1. Huang’s Employment with River Church
In January 2017 River Church hired Huang as a part-time middle school youth
minister. In the fall, Huang was promoted to a full-time position as an associate youth
minister and assistant minister of youth ministries. In both 2018 and 2019, Huang received
pay raises. In August 2020 she was promoted to interim youth pastor, and in 2021 she
received another raise.
2. Bymaster’s Alleged Misconduct
When Huang was hired in 2017, Brett Bymaster was the River Church’s youth
pastor. Initially, he also was Huang’s supervisor.
Huang alleges that during 2017 Bymaster had several unwanted conversations with
her about sexual topics. In these conversations, he allegedly disclosed intimate details of his
marital sex life, inquired into Huang’s sexual experiences, and offered opinions concerning
grooming of pubic hair. Huang also alleges that in 2018, Bymaster frequently commented
on her figure, which he compared favorably to his wife’s. Huang complained to one of the
church’s executive pastors about Bymaster’s conduct, and although the executive pastor was
unreceptive, Huang successfully requested a different supervisor.
In addition to alleging that Bymaster subjected her to sexual harassment and abuse,
Huang alleged that Bymaster abused church youth members. For example, while on a
mission trip with youth members, Bymaster and his wife encouraged everyone on the
mission, including the youth members, to shower together naked in communal showers at a
public pool. During another mission trip in 2018, Bymaster singled out a female youth
member, criticized her for wearing a white shirt over a wet bathing suit, and chastised her
not to “provide someone an invitation” with what she wore. When she returned from the
trip, the youth member attempted suicide.

3
The youth member’s parents complained about Bymaster’s conduct and urged the
church to terminate him. Although the church took no corrective action against Bymaster—
and, indeed, had him lead a suicide prevention training course—Huang’s new supervisor
began listening to her concerns about Bymaster and reprimanded him. In June 2019,
Bymaster received a negative performance review and was warned to make changes or face
termination. Two months later, Bymaster chose to resign. Nevertheless, in the fall of 2019
River Church provided Bymaster over $250,000 to establish his own ministry as well as
selling him a bus below cost.
3. The 2021 Accusations
Beginning in February 2021, about one and one-half years after Bymaster’s
resignation, Huang received a flood of accusations from church youth members concerning
unlawful, inappropriate, and abusive behavior by Bymaster while he was working at River
Church.
In late February 2021, several female church youth members met with Huang, who
had established herself as a trusted figure in the church’s youth community, and they
described several incidents in which Bymaster had discussed sexual topics and engaged in
sexual grooming. The next day one of the members, this time accompanied by her mother,
reiterated these incidents and related that her brother had felt uncomfortable during the
mission trip in which Bymaster pressured youth members to shower together naked. Two
days later, Huang filed a report concerning Bymaster with Child Protective Services.
In early March 2021, another female youth member confided in Huang that Bymaster
had touched her inappropriately and then used scriptures to justify his actions. Huang
shared with River Church’s lead pastor these and other reports that she had received from
church youth members of Bymaster’s alleged misconduct. The pastor questioned the
accounts, tried to diminish them, and suggested that Huang needed to put her dislike for
Bymaster aside and trust church leadership.

4
Later in March, three more female youth members met with Huang. One said that
she no longer felt safe at church because of Bymaster. Another, who was viewed as close to
Bymaster, said that Bymaster had described to her graphic sexual acts with his wife and that
the member felt manipulated and groomed by him.
Church officials subsequently decided to conduct an internal investigation into
Bymaster’s conduct. However, Huang was disappointed to learn that this investigation was
to be kept confidential and that it was characterized as a “Pastoral Inquiry” rather than an
investigation into sexual misconduct.
Around this time, Huang filed a second report with Child Protective Services, this
time concerning the 2018 incident that led to the attempted suicide. Later in April, Huang
had four more meetings with youth members about Bymaster. One member disclosed that
Bymaster had touched her inner thigh. A second recounted an overly explicit discussion of
sexuality in a class for sixth graders in which Bymaster instructed youth members to yell out
“penis.” In May, Huang met with another female youth member who reported
“uncomfortable touching from Bymaster.” And in September two male students reported to
Huang that Bymaster abused and took advantage of people in their neighborhood.
However, when the pastoral inquiry concluded in the summer of 2021, River Church
did not inform church members of any reported sexual abuse. Instead, the church informed
members that it had found “ ‘signs of spiritual abuse resulting from Bymaster’s
leadership.’ ” In addition, the investigative report on Bymaster and details of the
accusations concerning him were not made public, and the church refused to allow Huang to
see the report, which made her feel reprimanded and that she was being prevented from
doing the right thing. Indeed, Huang felt that effectively she had received a “gag order.”
Huang allegedly experienced severe distress over the situation. She felt that River
Church’s failure to report the accusations of Bymaster’s sexual abuse created a “toxic and
hostile work environment,” and its downplaying of the alleged misconduct eroded her trust
that church leadership would do the right thing. Indeed, Huang’s distress was so severe that

5
she began to have blood in her stools, and later she suffered hair loss, weight loss, and
insomnia as well as a severe Crohn’s disease flare-up. In September, following her doctor’s
advice, Huang took a two-month medical leave of absence in late 2021. After returning,
Huang resigned her position but stayed on for several months in a reduced role to complete
ongoing projects. Huang ceased working at River Church in Spring 2022.
B. The Proceedings Below
In July 2024, Huang sued River Church, Covenant Church, and the Pacific Southwest
Conference. She alleged a single claim: retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 for
disclosing accusations of illegal conduct by Bymaster. After Huang amended the complaint
twice, defendants filed demurrers, which the trial court sustained with leave to amend.
Huang then filed the third amended complaint, which is the operative pleading. In response,
River Church filed a demurrer, and Covenant Church and Pacific Southwest Conference
jointly filed a separate demurrer.
The trial court sustained both demurrers without leave to amend. The court sustained
the demurrer of Covenant Church and the Pacific Southwest Conference on the ground that
Huang had failed to allege adequately that they, along with River Church, were joint
employers. The court sustained River Church’s demurrer on the ground that Huang failed to
allege a valid retaliation claim because she did not adequately allege an adverse
employment action.
In concluding that Huang failed to allege an adverse employment action, the trial
court noted that Huang had resigned and that she did not allege a typical adverse
employment action such as termination, transfer, demotion, reduction in pay or benefits, or
imposition of more burdensome job duties. Indeed, the court observed, Huang had received
pay raises and her request for medical leave in September 2021 was granted after her reports
to Child Protective Services. The trial court also ruled that Huang had not alleged that she
was forced to work under such objectively intolerable working conditions that she was
constructively discharged. The court recognized that Huang had alleged frustration and

6
distress at “what she perceived as insufficient and arguably illegal actions” by River Church
regarding Bymaster. However, it concluded that these actions did not constitute an adverse
employment action against Huang or create conditions so intolerable that she was
constructively discharged.
Huang filed a notice of appeal in October 2025, a little less than two months after the
trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers. However, the trial court did not enter judgment
until December 1, 2025. Three days later, Huang filed a timely amended notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Huang challenges the trial court’s rulings that she did not adequately allege either an
adverse employment action or that Covenant Church and the Pacific Southwest Conference
were joint employers. We review orders that sustain demurrers de novo, assuming all
properly pleaded facts to be true. (See, e.g., Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara
County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311,
318.) As explained below, we conclude that Huang failed to adequately allege an adverse
employment action and therefore that the trial court correctly sustained the demurrers to her
retaliation claim. Because this ruling resolves the claims against all three defendants, we do
not reach the joint employer allegations.
A. Relevant Legal Principles
Huang has alleged a single claim against all three defendants under Labor Code
section 1102.5, “California’s general whistleblower statute.” (Carter v. Escondido Union
High School Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 922, 933.) This section prohibits employers from
retaliating against employees for disclosing statutory violations: “An employer . . . shall not
retaliate against an employee for disclosing information . . . to a government or law
enforcement agency, [or] to a person with authority over the employee or another employee
who has authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance” if the
employee had a reasonable basis for believing that a violation of state or federal statute
occurred. (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).) To establish a violation of this prohibition, an

7
employee must show that “ ‘(1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) her employer
subjected her to an adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal link between the
two.’ [Citation.]” (McVeigh v. Recology San Francisco (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 443, 468.)
“ ‘[A]dverse employment action’ ” is “a term of art that generally is used as a
shorthand description of the kind of adverse treatment imposed upon an employee that will
support a cause of action” under statutes prohibiting employment discrimination and
retaliation. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1035-1036 (Yanowitz).)
The term is not limited to “ultimate employment actions” such as terminations, demotions,
and refusals to promote. (Id. at p. 1054.) Instead, it extends to any action “materially
affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” (Ibid.) Consequently,
adverse employment actions cover “the entire spectrum of employment actions that are
reasonably likely to adversely and materially affect an employee’s job performance or
opportunity for advancement in his or her career.” (Ibid.) However, an adverse
employment action must be “ ‘more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of
job responsibilities.’ ” (Thomas v. Department of Corrections (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 507,
511 (Thomas).) The terms, conditions, and privileges of employment are not materially
affected by a “mere offensive utterance,” “pattern of social slights,” or “[m]inor or relatively
trivial adverse actions . . . that, from an objective perspective, are reasonably likely to do no
more than anger or upset an employee.” (Yanowitz, at p. 1054.) As a consequence, none of
these circumstances constitutes an adverse employment action. (Ibid.)
A broad range of actions may constitute adverse employment actions. For example,
“ ‘courts have found adverse job impact where there was no reduction in salary or benefits,
in an employer’s moving an employee’s office to any undesirable location, transferring an
employee to an isolated corner of the workplace, and requiring an employee to relocate her
personal files while forbidding her to use the firm’s stations and support services.’ ”
(Thomas, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 511.) In addition, according to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, “[w]ork-related threats, warnings, reprimands, transfers,

8
threatening reassignment, negative or lowered evaluations,” disparagement to others and in
the media, “[m]aking false reports to government authorities,” “[s]crutinizing work or
attendance more closely than that of other employees, without justification,” “[r]emoval of
supervisory responsibilities,” “[a]busive verbal or physical behavior that is reasonably likely
to deter protected activity,” and “[r]equiring reverification of work status” all constitute
adverse employment actions. (Wrongful Termination Practice: Discrimination, Harassment
and Retaliation (2d ed. Cal. CEB 2026) § 3A.18.)
Nonetheless, the adverse employment action requirement imposes an important limit
on employment discrimination and retaliation claims. “Employers need to be able to
manage employees without fear that routine employment decisions . . . will lead to
litigation.” (McRae v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 377,
387 (McRae).) “ ‘Requiring an employe to prove a substantial adverse job effect “guards
against both ‘judicial micromanagement of business practices’ [citation] and frivolous suits
over insignificant slights.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see Francis v. City of Los Angeles (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 532, 541 (Francis).) Thus, “ ‘the mere fact that an employee is displeased by
an employer’s act or omission does not elevate that act or omission to the level of a
materially adverse employment action.’ ” (Thomas, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 511; see
also Akers v. County of San Diego (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1455 (Akers) [“A change
that is merely contrary to the employee’s interest or not to the employee’s liking is
insufficient.”].)
B. Application
Huang does not allege defendants took a typical adverse employment action. She
does not allege that defendants terminated, disciplined or demoted her, reduced her salary or
benefits, removed supervisory responsibilities, imposed unfair scrutiny or undesirable
assignments, verbally abused her, or publicly disparaged her. To the contrary, Huang
admits in her pleadings that she received promotions and pay raises, including one after her
first report to Child Protective Services about the accusations against Bymaster; she later

9
was allowed to take medical leave; and she resigned on a timetable of her own choosing.
Instead, Huang contends that defendants’ failure to respond adequately to the accusations of
Bymaster’s misconduct and their hostility towards her efforts to have those accusations
disclosed fully constituted adverse employment action. We disagree.
In cases that we have been able to find where employers have denied employee
requests for remedial actions, courts have found no adverse employment action. For
example, in Doe v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 721 (Doe),
an employee requested accommodations for his disabilities, and after the employer denied
those requests, the employee claimed that the denials constituted an adverse employment
action. (Id. at p. 735.) The Court of Appeal disagreed. (Ibid.) It observed that “[n]o court
has ever held that a failure to reasonably accommodate an employee’s disability . . . can
qualify as the adverse action underlying a discrimination or retaliation of claim” and that
there was “simply no evidence CDCR [the employer], materially changed the terms or
conditions of Doe’s employment by, for example, firing him or reducing his position, salary,
benefits, or work hours.” (Id. at pp. 735-736.)
In several decisions, federal courts have considered retaliation claims based on an
employer’s refusal to investigate an employee’s discrimination claims. These decisions
have held that “at least in a run-of-the-mine case . . . , an employer’s failure to investigate a
complaint of discrimination cannot be considered an adverse employment action taken in
retaliation for the filing of the same discrimination complaint.” (Fincher v. Depository
Trust and Clearing Corp. (2d Cir. 2010) 604 F.3d 712, 721 (Fincher); see also Daniels v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc. (10th Cir. 2012) 701 F.3d 620, 640 [following Fincher in holding
that “failure to investigate an internal complaint cannot be considered retaliatory in
circumstances here”], disapproved on another ground in Mudrow v. City of St. Louis,
Missouri (2024 601 U.S. 346, 355-356; Moyal v. Schollenberger (10th Cir. 2006) 465 F.3d
444, 457 [“failing to respond to an employee’s complaints to that employee’s satisfaction
does not” constitute an adverse employment action].) As one decision explained, retaliation

10
claims require punishment of the employee for complaining. (Fincher, at p. 721.)
However, “[a]n employee whose complaint is not investigated cannot be said to have
thereby suffered a punishment” because “[h]er situation in the wake of her having made the
complaint is the same as it would have been had she not brought the complaint or had the
complaint been investigated but denied for good reason or none at all.” (Ibid.)
The same is true here. Defendants cannot be said to have punished Huang for having
made referrals to Child Protective Services or reporting accusations against Bymaster to
church officials because defendants failed to recognize that Bymaster may have engaged in
sexual misconduct or impeded her from disseminating accusations of such misconduct.
Indeed, it is even clearer here than in the cases discussed above that there was no adverse
employment action because Huang did not remain in the same situation that she would have
been had she not disclosed these allegations. To the contrary, after Huang made her first
report of the accusations of sexual abuse against Bymaster to Child Protective Services in
February 2021, River Church conducted an inquiry into those accusations, and eventually it
disclosed in a communication through “its church partner email list . . . ‘signs of spiritual
abuse resulting from Bymaster’s leadership.’ ” While Huang was disappointed that the
church did not find that Bymaster had engaged in sexual misconduct and did not warn those
who might come into contact with him in the future of that misconduct, the church’s failure
in this regard did not punish Huang and thus did not constitute an adverse employment
action or retaliation. As noted above, “ ‘the mere fact that an employee is displeased by an
employer’s act or omission does not elevate that act or omission to the level of a materially
adverse employment action.’ ” (Thomas, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 511.)
This conclusion is consistent with the adverse employment action requirement’s
long-recognized goal of guarding against “ ‘ “ ‘ “judicial micromanagement of business
practices.” ’ ” ’ ” (Francis, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 541; see McRae, supra, 142
Cal.App.4th at p. 387; Akers, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1455.) To assess Huang’s
contention that River Church retaliated against her by refusing to recognize and broadly

11
disclose alleged sexual misconduct by Bymaster, the trial court would have to examine the
investigation that River Church conducted, the conclusions reached by this investigation,
and the actions that River Church decided to take in light of those conclusions. Moreover,
unlike cases involving disability accommodations or employment discrimination, the trial
court would have had no legal standard against which to evaluate the River Church’s actions
and therefore would have been forced to engage in precisely the kind of second- guessing of
business practices that the adverse employment action requirement was intended to avoid.
(See Akers, at p. 1455 [noting that absent the adverse employment action requirement,
“courts will be thrust into the role of personnel officers, becoming entangled in every
conceivable form of employee job dissatisfaction”].)
In addition to objecting to defendants’ failure to take more extensive action
concerning Bymaster, Huang contends on appeal that defendants responded to her reports of
the accusations of sexual abuse against Bymaster with “hostility and dismissiveness.”
However, Huang does not allege that she suffered any physical or even verbal abuse.
Instead, she alleges that River Church officials questioned whether the accusations reported
by Huang were accurate; suggested that she should put aside her personal dislike for
Bymaster; questioned her decision to file a second report with Child Protective Services;
admonished her to trust leadership; largely ignored her in the investigation into Bymaster’s
conduct; and told her not to go around management and contact the media.
Although Huang’s frustration with these actions is understandable, she does not
explain how “hostility and dismissiveness” of this sort constitute adverse employment
action. As the Supreme Court has noted, “a mere offensive utterance or even a pattern of
social slights . . . cannot properly be viewed as materially affecting the terms, conditions or
privileges of employment.” (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1054.) “ ‘[W]ork places are
rarely idyllic retreats’ ” (Thomas, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 511), and employment laws
prohibiting discrimination and retaliation are neither “ ‘ “ ‘a shield against harsh treatment
in the workplace’ ” ’ ” or a guarantee of “ ‘ “ ‘a stress-free environment.’ ” ’ ” (Doe, supra,

12
43 Cal.App.5th at p. 735.) We therefore conclude that neither defendants’ alleged
skepticism about the accusations reported by Huang, their questioning of her motives and
judgment, nor the restrictions they imposed on disclosures to church members and the
public—individually or collectively—constituted adverse employment action.
Noting that constructive termination is an adverse employment action (see Turner v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238 (Turner)), Huang asserts that she was
constructively terminated. Here again, we disagree.
“A constructive discharge is the practical and legal equivalent of a dismissal” and
“must be employer-coerced.” (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1248; see also St. Myers v.
Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301, 314-318 [considering whether plaintiff claiming
retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 was constructively discharged].) In particular,
an employee must show that working conditions were “ ‘so intolerable that any reasonable
employee would resign rather than endure such conditions.’ ” (Turner, at p. 1247.)
Moreover, to be deemed intolerable, working conditions must be “so unusually adverse that
a reasonable employee in plaintiff’s position ‘ “ ‘would have felt compelled to resign.’ ” ’
[Citations.].” (Ibid.)
Although Huang asserts that defendants’ alleged treatment of her created “intolerable
working conditions that no reasonable employee would continue to endure,” even liberally
construing the complaint in favor of Huang’s claims, she does not sufficiently plead
constructive termination. Huang does not explain how the conditions alleged in her third
amended complaint were unusually adverse or unendurable. She points to the allegations
concerning her repeated reporting of church youths’ accusations of sexual abuse by
Bymaster, defendants’ refusal to acknowledge the sexual nature of the reported abuse, and
hostility to her efforts to disclose that sexual abuse. However, Huang does not explain why
the church’s hostility to those efforts and failure to take greater action concerning Bymaster
were so intolerable that no reasonable employee could endure it and would be compelled to
resign. Similarly, while Huang asserts that defendants’ hostility “created a specter of

13
discipline and the end of her career as a Pastor,” she fails to explain how the allegations in
the third amended complaint—which do not assert that she suffered any discipline or even a
threat of discipline—created such a “specter.” Indeed, the only support that Huang offers
for the asserted “specter of discipline” is an instruction not to defame the church and its
leadership made to her after she submitted her resignation.
Rather than attempting to explain why her treatment was so intolerable that no
reasonable employee would be able to endure it, Huang relies on two decisions—Vasquez v.
Frankling Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819 (Vasquez) and
Brome v. California Highway Patrol (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 786 (Brome)—which she
asserts hold that “[t]he intolerable working conditions required for constructive termination
exist where an employee repeatedly reports unlawful conduct and employer refuses to do
anything about it.” Huang reads too much into these decisions.
In Vasquez, a former maintenance technician for a real estate management company
sued the company for, among other things, constructive discharge in violation of public
policy. (Vasquez, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 823.) The plaintiff alleged that, although he
was paid only $10 per hour, he was required to drive his own vehicle at least 30 miles per
day for work-related errands and not reimbursed for either gasoline or vehicle maintenance.
(Id. at pp. 823-824.) The plaintiff also asserted that, due to these gasoline and maintenance
expenses, he effectively was being paid less than the minimum wage and, as a result, was
“unable to pay basic living expenses.” (Id. at p. 828.) Although the Vasquez court observed
that “deprivations of salary or other economic benefits generally [do not] support a
constructive discharge claim” (ibid.), it held that, if the plaintiff substantiated his
allegations, a jury could find that these working conditions were so intolerable that he was
constructively discharged. (Id. at p. 829.)
As Huang admits, there are no allegations here of such “financially dire
circumstances.” To the contrary, Huang alleged that she received multiple pay raises, which
increased her salary by more than 85 percent. Thus, Vasquez is plainly distinguishable.

14
Brome, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th 786 likewise provides no support for Huang’s
position. In Brome, a former highway patrol officer sued the California Highway Patrol for
discrimination and harassment based on sexual orientation. (Id. at p. 793.) The plaintiff
alleged that other officers frequently refused to provide him with backup assistance during
law enforcement stops. (Id. at p. 791.) As a result, the plaintiff allegedly was forced “to
handle high-risk situations that generally should be handled by at least two officers, such as
high-speed vehicle pursuits, impounding vehicles or hit-and-run accidents, on his own”
(ibid.), which put him in “ ‘very precarious’ ” situations (id. at p. 792) and “led him to fear
for his life” (id. at p. 791). Because the plaintiff allegedly had been “placing his life in
danger” on a “daily” basis, the Brome court held that “the record could support a conclusion
that Brome’s working conditions became objectively intolerable over time and would have
forced a reasonable employee to resign.” (Id. at p. 802.)
As Huang also admits, she does not allege that she was placed in similarly
“physically risky working conditions.” Although Huang alleges that Bymaster had
unwanted sexual conversations with her, those occurred in late 2017 and 2018, at least three
years before Huang resigned. By that time, Huang had requested and received a new
supervisor, and Bymaster had been forced to resign. As a consequence, Huang did not face
any personal danger from Bymaster, much less the mortal danger faced by the plaintiff in
Brome. Thus, like Vasquez, Brome is plainly distinguishable and fails to show that Huang
faced conditions so intolerable that they constituted a constructive discharge and can support
a retaliation claim.
In concluding that Huang has failed to allege adequately constructive discharge, we
do not mean to minimize the seriousness of the accusations of Bymaster’s sexual abuse of
church youth members that she alleges. And we accept, as we must on a demurrer, the
distress that Huang allegedly suffered at defendants’ failure to take more action to prevent
similar abuse in the future, as well as the physical suffering that Huang allegedly
experienced from that distress. Indeed, giving due consideration to Huang’s allegations, we

15
commend her passionate commitment to both the children and young adults to whom she
ministered and others that she feared might be subject to future abuse. However, it is not
the role of Labor Code section 1102.5 to ensure that employers take affirmative action to
protect the vulnerable, even where, as here, a committed employee feels morally and
physically compelled to resign in response to the failure to do so. Labor Code
section 1102.5 serves the more limited role of preventing employers from punishing
employees for reporting legal violations, and Huang has not sufficiently alleged such
punishment.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly sustained the demurrers to
Huang’s retaliation claim. In light of that conclusion, we need not consider whether Huang
adequately alleged causation or whether Covenant Church and the Southwest Pacific
Conference were joint employers. Moreover, as Huang has not argued that she could amend
her claims to address the defects identified, we need not consider whether the trial court
abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend. (See, e.g., Palm
Springs Villas II Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to reasonable costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

16
____________________________________
BROMBERG, J.

WE CONCUR:

__________________________
LIE, ACTING P. J.

__________________________
WILSON, J.

Huang v. The New River Church Community, Inc., et al.
H053764





Description Dana Huang is a former youth minister at The New River Church Community, Inc. (River Church). Over the course of several months in 2021, many youth members disclosed to Huang alleged sexual abuse and other misconduct by Brett Bymaster, the church’s former youth pastor, who had resigned in 2019 due to earlier accusations by Huang and others of sexual harassment and misconduct. Huang reported the youth members’ new accusations to both chu
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