Filed 9/16/26 Regan v. California Highway Patrol CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
RUSSELL REGAN, 2d Civ. No. B343808
(Super. Ct. No. 56-2022-
Plaintiff and Respondent, 00564391-CU-WT-VTA)
(Ventura County)
v.
CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY
PATROL,
Defendant and Appellant;
JAMES FROST et al.,
Defendants;
ROB BONTA, as Attorney
General, etc.,
Objector and Appellant.
Russell Regan filed an employment lawsuit against his
former employer the California Highway Patrol (CHP). Regan
served discovery requests and the Attorney General, representing
the CHP, objected to producing certain documents contending
they were confidential police officer personnel records1 requiring
an in camera review before disclosure under Pitchess v. Superior
Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531. (Pen. Code, §§ 832.7, 832.8; Evid.
Code, §§ 1043, 1045.) After several motions and hearings,
including two motions to compel in favor of Regan, the trial court
imposed $11,250 in monetary sanctions against the CHP and its
attorneys of record (collectively Appellants). Appellants contend
this discovery sanctions order should be reversed. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
Regan was employed by the CHP from 1994 until his
retirement in November 2021. Regan alleged he reported two
officers stealing ammunition in 2019. In 2020, when Captain
James Frost transferred to the Ventura area, Regan alleged he
immediately “expressed hostility” towards him. Regan perceived
1 Personnel records are defined in Penal Code section 832.8
as “any file maintained under that individual’s name by his or
her employing agency and containing records relating to any of
the following: [¶] (1) Personal data, including marital status,
family members, educational and employment history, home
addresses, or similar information. [¶] (2) Medical history. [¶]
(3) Election of employee benefits. [¶] (4) Employee advancement,
appraisal, or discipline. [¶] (5) Complaints or investigations of
complaints concerning an event or transaction in which he or she
participated, or which he or she perceived, and pertaining to the
manner in which he or she performed his or her duties. [¶]
(6) Any other information the disclosure of which would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” (See
Zanone v. City of Whittier (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 174, 188.)
2 We grant Regan’s motion to augment the record filed
December 5, 2025.
2
the hostility stemmed from him reporting the stolen ammunition.
Regan also alleged Captain Frost targeted sergeants, like Regan,
who were over 50 years old.
Regan filed an internal complaint with the CHP, alleging
Captain Frost harassed and discriminated against him because of
his age. The CHP conducted an internal Equal Employment
Opportunity (EEO) investigation of Captain Frost. The
investigation encompassed 15 witness interviews. After the EEO
investigation, Regan alleged that Lieutenant Patrick Etchebarne
began retaliating against him.
In 2022, Regan filed an employment lawsuit against the
CHP and his former supervisors Captain Frost and Lieutenant
Etchebarne. He alleged violations of the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code for age discrimination,
harassment, and retaliation.
In March 2023, Regan served a request for production of
documents seeking, among other things, Regan’s personnel file
and performance evaluations and documents related to
complaints involving Captain Frost. Most relevant here, demand
for production Nos. 21 and 22 sought all documents related to the
“[CHP]’s investigation into Sergeant Regan’s EEO complaint” and
“any and all DOCUMENTS RELATED TO all interviews [the
CHP] conducted as part of its investigation into Sergeant Regan’s
EEO complaint.”
In July 2023, the CHP served a response in which it
objected to several requests on the ground that they “violate[d]
privacy rights” and sought documents protected from disclosure.
The CHP also included a privilege log identifying confidential
documents that it withheld, including the EEO investigation
documents, and indicated that a Pitchess hearing was required
3
for disclosure. It produced “non-privileged” documents
responsive to the requests.
In October 2023, after the parties met and conferred, the
CHP served a “Further Response to Plaintiff’s Request for
Production of Documents” and produced additional
“non-privileged” documents. The CHP again refused to produce
the EEO investigation documents, asserting that “[a]ll documents
found are confidential information that require a Pitchess motion
to determine access.”
In November 2023, Regan moved to compel further
responses to his document production requests and sought
$11,070 in monetary sanctions. Regan asserted he had not
received the EEO investigation documents despite several meet
and confer attempts.
Regan also filed a Pitchess motion seeking 20 “items of
information from [his own] police personnel file.” The items
included the release of all “[d]ocuments related to the EEO
[i]nvestigation into Sergeant Regan’s [c]omplaint against Captain
Frost,” the investigator’s notes in the EEO investigation, the
names of the investigators, investigative reports excluding
“ ‘conclusions,’ ” and statements of officers obtained during the
EEO investigation (item Nos. 3, 5–7, 9).
The trial court took the Pitchess motion and motion to
compel under submission. It ruled that because the CHP “have
claimed that the documents being requested are subject to a legal
privilege, the only approach to this that makes any sense, is to
order their production in the context of a Pitchess review where
the Court can evaluate their relevance, and whatever restrictions
to their production may exist by virtue of Pitchess.” The court
ordered the CHP to appear and bring documents responsive to
4
the 20 items enumerated in Regan’s Pitchess motion for an in
camera review.
In February 2024, the CHP brought all documents
responsive to Regan’s Pitchess motion, including the EEO
investigation file, to the in camera review. Following its review,
the trial court ordered the production of the following documents:
the transcripts of 11 witness interviews in the EEO investigation,
a “Report of Inquiry” in the EEO investigation, the
“[p]erformance [a]ppraisal” of Captain Frost in 2019, and
summaries of Regan’s interview related to an ammunition
shortage investigation (titled the “M Investigation” and “C
Investigation”). The court also ordered the CHP to provide all
the names of the 15 people interviewed in the investigation of
Regan’s complaint and the names of the investigators. The court
scheduled Regan’s motion to compel on a future date.
In mid-April 2024, Regan appeared at the motion to compel
hearing. The Attorney General did not appear. Regan
acknowledged that the CHP produced documents the court
ordered disclosed after the in camera hearing, including a
“thousand pages.” But Regan asserted there were 19 requested
categories of documents the CHP still had not produced. Regan
stated he did not receive all the documents related to the EEO
investigation or his entire personnel file including his monthly
evaluations. The court granted the motion and ordered the CHP
to produce additional documents, including those responsive to
demand Nos. 21 and 22 (i.e., documents and interviews related to
the EEO investigation). Per the court’s order, Regan wrote a
demand letter to the Attorney General which stated that the trial
court ordered “all of the items in Plaintiff’s motion to compel were
to be produced.” Regan listed the specific documents the court
5
ordered produced, including audio and digital recordings from the
EEO investigation interviews, interview summaries, and exhibits
from the EEO investigation.
Regan also filed two additional Pitchess motions seeking
information in Captain Frost and Lieutenant Etchebarne’s
personnel files. As to Captain Frost, Regan sought “all
documents in the personnel records of Captain James Frost that
record any complaint, including but not limited to . . . EEO
Complaint filed by Russell Regan.” In late April 2024, the court
conducted an in camera review of the personnel files. The court
ordered the CHP to produce Captain Frost’s performance reviews
and a discrimination complaint that was filed by another
sergeant. After the in camera portion of the hearing concluded,
the trial court ordered production of the audio recording of the
EEO investigation interviews.
At the same hearing, the parties discussed Regan’s
discovery requests and the April 2024 order on the motion to
compel. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court stated,
“But just in sitting here listening to it, [Regan]’s asked for a lot
which would not normally be included in a Pitchess motion, and
that I’m inclined to think he’s entitled to get and [the CHP is]
entitled to produce.” The court compared Regan’s discovery
requests to those sought in “generic employment litigation” and
observed, “ ‘It shouldn’t be terribly different from a government
agency except you get the protection of Pitchess.’ ” The Attorney
General replied, “Well, the only thing that makes it not, Your
Honor, is that the entire EEO investigation is regarding Frost as
a peace officer, and that’s what put that entire thing into
Pitchess.” The court replied, “I can understand that, but there is
material that he’s asked for that exists beyond the boundaries of
6
Pitchess.” The Attorney General responded, “Correct.” The court
replied, “That, I would like to get narrowed down before you come
back.”
The trial court cautioned the parties that it did not want to
get into “something where the fight ends up being over discovery
sanctions.” It stated, “I hate making those orders because in a lot
of cases, it means somebody is sitting at the kitchen table at 10
o’clock at night writing a check to pay off discovery
sanctions. . . . [¶] If necessary, I make those orders, but my
inclination is to try and find ways to get counsel to agree to
things that avoid tabling that issue.”
On May 23, 2024, the CHP served verified augmented
responses to Regan’s demand for production of documents and
produced additional documents. But, as to demand for
production Nos. 21 and 22 (the EEO investigation documents and
interviews), the CHP stated that it “has produced all such
documents in its custody or control deemed responsive and
material by the court after the Pitchess in camera review.”
After meeting and conferring, in July 2024 the parties sent
a joint letter to the trial court requesting clarification regarding
the ruling on Regan’s motion to compel. The letter explained that
Regan believed he was entitled to four additional interviews and
exhibits in the EEO investigation file that were not produced.
The CHP contended that the court reviewed these materials in
camera during the February 2024 Pitchess hearing and did not
order them to be produced. The CHP maintained that “[a]ll of
the EEO Investigation file not ordered to be produced is still
considered confidential unless the CHP and officer waive that
confidentiality.”
7
The CHP sent the documents at issue to the trial court for
another in camera review. After reviewing the materials, the
trial court observed that the four additional “interviews do not
appear to reflect on anybody’s prior conduct. They are more
percipient witness recollections.” The court also stated, “Frost’s
service record is probably subject to protection, but there are a lot
of CHP manuals and training materials that seem pretty
innocuous.” The court urged the parties “to meet and confer to
see if you can reach a resolution on [w]hat the CHP will produce.
If [n]o such agreement, I can sua sponte revisit the issues and
determine which documents on further consideration are not
subject to Pitchess protection.”
Between July 2024 and August 2024, the original deputy
attorney general assigned to the case retired, a supervising
deputy attorney general took over the case for about a month,
and then another deputy attorney general was reassigned. The
new deputy attorney general contacted Regan and indicated he
would need additional time to “sort things out and to confer with
the CHP regarding the additional documents” that were
requested. Thereafter, the Attorney General produced some
exhibits from the EEO investigation file, but not the entire file.
On August 26, 2024, Regan filed a second motion to compel
responses to his prior requests for document production and
sought $50,000 in sanctions. Regan again sought documents
responsive to demand Nos. 21 and 22 and referenced the court’s
April 2024 order to produce those documents.
The CHP opposed the second motion to compel on the
ground that it was untimely. It also maintained that it produced
all documents responsive to document demand Nos. 21 and 22
the court ordered it to produce after the Pitchess hearings. It
8
requested a supplemental in camera hearing to resolve the
remaining discovery dispute concerning the materials in the EEO
investigation file.
In September 2024, the trial court held a hearing on
Regan’s second motion to compel. After reviewing the disputed
interview transcripts and exhibits in camera, the court ordered
the production of interview transcripts of four additional
witnesses and four additional exhibits to the EEO investigation
file. The court also gave the parties time to prepare papers in
support of, and in opposition to, the sanctions request. In
October 2024, the Attorney General produced the witness
transcripts and exhibits as ordered by the court.
Regan filed a declaration in support of sanctions and
included billing records reflecting the time and fees incurred on
the discovery issues. The CHP opposed sanctions, arguing the
motion to compel and the related request for sanctions were
untimely. It also argued it did not misuse the discovery process.
In December 2024, the parties appeared before the trial
court to further discuss the disclosure of an additional 13 pages of
the EEO investigation report that were redacted. After
reviewing the 13 unredacted pages, the court ordered them to be
produced unredacted.
Later that same month, the trial court awarded Regan
$11,250 in monetary sanctions against the CHP and its counsel.
It made no express findings regarding its reasons for imposing
sanctions.
DISCUSSION
1. Timeliness of the motion to compel
Appellants contend the trial court lacked authority to
impose sanctions because Regan’s second motion to compel was
9
untimely pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310,
subdivision (c)3 because it was filed more than 45 days after
service of the May 23, 2024, augmented responses. Appellants
contend such untimeliness prohibits an award of sanctions. We
are not persuaded.
Because of Appellants’ purported “stall tactics” and
“refusal” to produce all documents responsive to his first motion
to compel, Regan sought sanctions pursuant to sections 2023.010,
2023.030, 2030.300, 2031.310 and 2031.320. But Appellants’
contentions only discuss a court’s authority to impose sanctions
under section 2031.310. Assuming the second motion was
untimely under section 2031.310, subdivision (c), the trial court
was not without authority to impose sanctions under the other
statutory provisions. Unlike section 2031.310 pertaining to
requests for production of documents, section 2023.030 does not
contain a 45-day notice period. Section 2031.320 likewise
contains no 45-day deadline and provides for monetary sanctions
where a party agrees to comply with a demand but “thereafter
fails to permit” inspection.
A court is empowered to “impose a monetary sanction
ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process
. . . pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees,
incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” (§ 2023.030,
subd. (a).) With section 2023.030, the “Legislature gave trial
courts a statutory basis for exercising authority to address
egregious forms of misconduct not addressed elsewhere in the
[Civil Discovery] Act.” (City of Los Angeles v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024) 17 Cal.5th 46, 74
3 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.
10
(PricewaterhouseCoopers.) “A court may invoke its independent
authority to impose sanctions under sections 2023.010 and
2023.030 only when confronted with an unusual form of discovery
abuse, or a pattern of abuse, not already addressed by a relevant
sanctions provision.” (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court was authorized to impose sanctions for
conduct that had been ongoing throughout the litigation. Regan
originally propounded discovery in March 2023; the court granted
his first motion to compel in April 2024; and Regan did not
receive all responsive documents until October and December
2024. In his second motion to compel, Regan claimed, “Seventeen
months later, Plaintiff has still not received the documents to
which he is entitled, and which the Court ordered be produced.”
Regan’s declaration in support of sanctions includes fees
and costs incurred in 2023 and prior to the service of Appellants’
May 2024 augmented discovery responses. Thus, the
sanctionable conduct was not limited to conduct related to those
responses. The record supports an implied finding of a pattern of
abuse based on Appellants’ delay in producing documents beyond
the augmented May 23 responses. (PricewaterhouseCoopers,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 74.)
2. Award of sanctions
Appellants contend the sanctions award should be reversed
because they acted with substantial justification in withholding
discovery. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in awarding sanctions.
Under the Civil Discovery Act (§ 2016.010 et seq.), a misuse
of the discovery process includes, but is not limited to “[f]ailing to
respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery,”
“[m]aking, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious
11
objection to discovery,” “[m]aking an evasive response to
discovery,” “[d]isobeying a court order to provide discovery,” or
“[m]aking or opposing, unsuccessfully and without substantial
justification, a motion to compel or to limit discovery.”
(§ 2023.010.) A trial court “shall impose” monetary sanctions
“unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with
substantial justification or that other circumstances make the
imposition of the sanction unjust.” (§ 2023.030, subd. (a).)
“Substantial justification means clearly reasonable justification
that is well grounded in both law and fact.” (Padron v.
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2017) 16
Cal.App.5th 1246, 1269.)
We review the trial court’s order for discovery sanctions for
abuse of discretion. (New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1422.) “The abuse of discretion
standard affords considerable deference to the trial court,
provided that the court acted in accordance with the governing
rules of law.” (Ibid.) A trial court has broad discretion in
imposing discovery sanctions, and its order will not be reversed
in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion that exceeds the
bounds of reason. (Pratt v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2008) 168
Cal.App.4th 165, 183.)
Here, the trial court was not required to make an explicit
finding before imposing discovery sanctions. (California
Shellfish, Inc. v. United Shellfish Co. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 16,
26.) Rather, “the court was only required to make an express
finding if it did not impose monetary sanctions because it found
appellant acted with ‘substantial justification’ ” or that imposing
sanctions was unjust. (Ibid.) Thus, we “review the trial court’s
exercise of discretion based on implied findings that are
12
supported by substantial evidence.” (Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corp. v. La Conchita Ranch Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th
856, 860, italics added.) In doing so, we review the record in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s order, drawing all
reasonable inferences to support the court’s exercise of discretion.
(Ibid.)
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it awarded $11,250 in monetary sanctions against the CHP.
Notably, Regan’s request for discovery spanned almost two years,
entailed multiple meet and confers and hearings, and
necessitated two orders compelling Appellants to produce
documents. According to Regan’s billing records, counsel
incurred approximately 165 hours in attempting to obtain
responsive documents, totaling approximately $96,000 in fees.
During the course of the proceedings, the trial court made
statements regarding Appellants’ conduct. For instance, in April
2024, the court commented that it was “inclined to think [Regan
was] entitled” to documents “not normally . . . included in a
Pitchess motion” and raised the possibility of sanctions. And, at
the December 2024 hearing, the court commented that it believed
the Attorney General’s office “has played a little fast and loose
with producing the documents” and that Regan had been
“fighting tooth and nail to get what he thinks he is entitled to.”
We do not suggest that Appellants lacked substantial
justification for initially invoking the protections afforded to
police officer personnel records. But the trial court could
reasonably conclude that the justification did not extend to the
ensuing pattern of delayed production after its discovery rulings.
Substantial evidence supports an implied finding of misuse of the
discovery process. Appellants have not carried their heavy
13
burden to show reversal is warranted. (Estate of Gilkison (1998)
65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1448–1449.)4
DISPOSITION
The sanctions order is affirmed. Regan shall recover costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
CODY, P. J.
YEGAN, J.
4 We decline Regan’s request to impose sanctions on appeal.
14
Henry J. Walsh, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Jones and Kenneth K. Wang,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Appellants.
Pachowicz Goldenring, Mark Pachowicz and Christopher G.
Correa for Plaintiff and Respondent.


