Filed 9/17/26 Campana v. East Bay Municipal Utility Dist. CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
JAYNIE CAMPANA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A170150
v.
EAST BAY MUNICIPAL UTILITY (Alameda County
DISTRICT, Super. Ct. No. RG21115040)
Defendant and Respondent.
Jaynie Campana is nothing if not persistent in her efforts to have the
water rates established by the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD)
declared illegal. Her first effort failed when Division Four of this District
concluded it was procedurally defective as time-barred. (Campana v. East
Bay Municipal Utility District. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 494 (Campana I).)
This is Campana’s second effort. After protracted preliminary
proceedings, the trial court eventually granted EBMUD’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the action was moot. We have
determined not only that that conclusion is correct, but that it is also
applicable to plaintiff’s appeal, and thus we dismiss it.
1
BACKGROUND
Our colleagues in Division Four stated the nature of the issue
presented in Campana I in these terms:
“Plaintiffs Jaynie Campana and John Evilsizor appeal a judgment
entered in favor of defendant East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD)
on their purported class action complaint alleging that the tiered-rate water
structure used by EBMUD to determine the cost of residential and
commercial water service in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties violates
article XIIID, section 6, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution. They
contend the trial court erred in sustaining without leave to amend EBMUD’s
demurrer to their first amended complaint. We agree with the trial court’s
finding that plaintiffs’ claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations
and accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment.” (Campana I, at p. 496.)
The operative details were that Campana had filed her complaint
together with the “first amended complaint . . . . in January 2021 and
EBMUD . . . filed a demurrer to the amended complaint on the ground that
the complaint was untimely under Public Utilities Code section 14402. The
court took judicial notice of resolutions showing that in July 2017, EBMUD
adopted the water rates for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 and in July 2019,
EBUMD adopted the water rates for fiscal years 2020 and 2021 and
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Judgment was entered and
plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal.” (Id. at pp. 498―499.)
Campana I, like the present appeal (see discussion infra), was a
demurrer case based on the statute of limitations, and the initial point was
how to characterize the gravamen of the complaint found inadequate. Our
colleagues were not impressed with Campana’s attempts to characterize her
complaint in terms of the relief sought:
2
“ ‘[A]ny judicial action or proceeding to attack, review, set aside, void,
or annul an ordinance, resolution or motion’ fixing or changing rates or
charges (such as a resolution setting EBMUD’s water rates) is subject to the
120-day statute of limitations in Public Utilities Code section 14402. This
limitations period runs from ‘the effective date of the ordinance, resolution, or
motion’ being challenged. A cause of action asserting that the
implementation of a resolution is unlawful accrues, and the limitations
period begins to run, on the effective date of the resolution, even if the
allegedly invalid charge or assessment is imposed much later.” (Campana I,
at p. 501, citing Regents of University of California v. City & County of San
Francisco (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1115; Utility Cost Management v.
East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1252.)
“Plaintiffs cannot avoid the applicable statute of limitations by
characterizing their claim as merely seeking a refund of the excess fees that
were paid. The operative complaint itself frames plaintiffs’ claims as an
attack on the resolution’s ‘tiered-rate pricing’ or ‘disproportionate rate
structure,’ alleging that it is the constitutional infirmities of this structure
that give rise to their partial refund claims. The claim for declaratory relief
is premised upon charges imposed ‘under an unconstitutional structure or
method,’ including an ‘above-cost pricing scheme’ and ‘all but assures the
revenues’ defendants receive are higher than those required to cover their
costs of service. It strains credulity to argue that these allegations do not
seek to ‘attack, review, set aside, void or annul’ the subject resolutions
[within the meaning of section 14402].
“Even without these overt challenges to the validity of the resolutions,
the inevitable effect of plaintiff’s allegations (if true) would be to invalidate
them. This is precisely what plaintiffs’ complaint seeks, ‘to address the
3
constitutional violation through declaratory relief establishing that the
continued imposition of water fees under the water-rate structure currently
in effect is in violation of Proposition 218; [and] injunctive relief and a writ of
mandate prohibiting EBMUD from continuing to use the constitutionally
defective water-rate structure, requiring the EBMUD to modify its rates to
conform to the requirements of Proposition 218 . . . .’ ” (Campana I, at pp.
501―502, fn. omitted.)
Nor were our colleagues impressed by the argument that each new
monthly assessment amounted to a continuing violation that extended the
limitations period of section 14402. (Campana I, at pp. 503―506.) Thus, and
in conclusion, “[b]ecause the gravamen of the complaint is a challenge to the
tiered-rate structure adopted by EBMUD’s 2017 and 2019 resolutions, the
validation statute’s shorter statute [i.e., section 14402] of limitations governs.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court correctly sustained the demurrer.”
(Campana I, at p. 507.)
The Campana I opinion was filed on May 23, 2023, and the Supreme
Court denied review on September 13 of that year. (Campana I, at pp. 594,
605.)
Meanwhile, shortly after her complaint in Campana I, plaintiff
commenced this action with the filing of her original complaint on October 6,
2021. The gravamen of this pleading was the same as already asserted in the
Campana I litigation, namely EDMUD’s noncompliance with the cited
applicable provisions of the California Constitution. The complaint was
framed as a class action, and sought various forms of relief, including “refund
of water charges paid . . . on or after July 17, 2018.”
4
Plaintiff filed her “First Amended Complaint” on May 4, 2022, now
seeking refund of charges paid “on or after October 5, 2020.” Plaintiff filed
her “Second Amended Complaint” on July 1 of 2022.
Each of the amended versions evoked spirited opposition by EBMUD
with general demurrers and motions to strike. EBMUD repeatedly urged
that the litigation should be terminated because plaintiff had not acted
within the time period specified by Public Utilities Code section 14402
(hereafter section 14402).
This is an appropriate time to note a specific feature of this dispute:
the rates or charges for water supplied by EBMUD, and challenged by
plaintiff, are fixed by the EBMUD Board in the form of a “Resolution”
adopted every two years, starting in 2017. Given the limited lifespan of each
resolution, determining precisely which one was the focus of plaintiff’s
attention presented something of a moving target. Given the somewhat
overlapping chronologies of the litigation, the trial court here took the
unusual step of noting that it was construing the “First Amended Complaint
as challenging EBMUD’s current rate schedule that was adopted on June 8,
2021.”
Thereafter, attention shifted to plaintiff’s unsuccessful effort to have
the litigation certified as a class action. Once that was completed, on
December 20, 2023, EBMUD moved for judgment on the pleadings. The
gravamen of the motion was that plaintiff’s complaint was made moot by the
fact that the 2021 rate structure had been “repealed” by adoption of a new
Board Resolution on June 13, 2023. EBMUD, noting that the trial court had
already stricken plaintiff’s allegations seeking refund―or “money damages,”
as EBMUD termed it― reasoned as follows: “Plaintiff challenges Repealed
Rates, which are no longer in effect. Plaintiff has taken no steps to amend
5
this Complaint to include allegations relating to the New Rates, and the
statute of limitations [i.e., section 14402] expired more than two months ago.
The New Rates are based on new facts and evidence, and any ruling on the
Repealed Rates would have no impact on the New Rates. There is no longer
any actual controversy between the parties, and there is no effectual relief
that this Court can grant to Plaintiff.”
The trial court (Hon. Frank Roesch) filed a detailed order explaining
the reasons for granting EBMUD’s motion. After granting EBMUD’s request
for judicial notice of the Board’s adoption of Resolutions Nos. 35224-21 and
35350-23, the highlights were as follows:
With respect to plaintiffs’ first cause of action, for declaratory relief:
“As [to] Resolution No. 35224-21 and the rates that it adopted (‘the Repealed
Rates’) [it] has been superseded by Resolution No. 35350-23, which adopts an
entirely different set of rates based on different calculations and procedures,
the declaratory relief sought by the SAC [Second Amended Complaint] in
connection with Resolution No. 35224-21 and the Repealed Rates is now moot
because that resolution and the Repealed rates are no longer in effect.
Because Resolution No. 35350-23 supersedes Resolution No. 35224-21, there
is no longer a present controversy over Resolution No. 35224-21 or the rates
that it adopted, as those rates are no longer in effect.”
Concerning plaintiffs’ second cause of action, for injunctive relief: “As
Resolution No. 35350-23 supersedes Resolution No. 35224-21 and by
operation [of law?] automatically stops EBMUD from charging for water
pursuant to Resolution No. 35224-21 and the . . . rate system adopted by that
resolution, the SAC’s second cause of action for injunctive relief is also moot
because there is nothing left from the SAC’s allegations to enjoin.”
6
Next, “[t]he SAC’s third cause of action for a writ of mandate seeks
restitution in the form of a refund of charges paid under Resolution No.
35224-21 and the . . . rate system that it adopted, in excess of the amounts
permitted under Proposition 218 and the California Constitution (if any).
“Of note, this Court in its June 17, 2022 Order struck all claims for
restitution or reimbursement for any fees and charges that were unlawfully
collected because Plaintiff failed to comply with the Government Claims [Act]
requirements prior to filing the present lawsuit. [Citations.] Plaintiff did not
wait the requisite 45 days prior to filing the lawsuit but instead filed this
action two days after sending her government claim. [Citation.]
“As any monetary claims for restitution/refund were stricken by this
Court’s June 17, 2022 Order, the only viable portion of the SAC’s third cause
of action . . . that this Court permitted was a determination of whether the
rate structure adopted under Resolution No. 35224-21 was constitutional.
[Citation.]
“However, such a determination would only have been relevant to the
extent that Resolution No. 35224-21 remained in effect.
“As Resolution No. 35224-21 is no longer in effect and has now been
superseded by Resolution No. 35350-23 (this not the subject of this litigation),
deciding whether Resolution No. 35224-21 were constitutional would be moot
because it would not have any practical impact or provide the parties with
any effectual relief. (Committee for Sound Water & Land Development v. City
of Seaside (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 389, 405.)
“Here, no relief can be afforded by determining whether Resolution No.
35224-21 or the rates that it adopted . . . are constitutional. Therefore, the
SAC’s third cause of action for writ of mandate is now moot . . . .”
7
Finally, “leave to amend is denied because Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that the mootness of her claims is curable.”
Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal from the formal judgment
entered in due course.
DISCUSSION
Following the completion of briefing, EBMUD filed a request for
judicial notice of Resolution No. 35453-25, adopted by its Board on June 10,
2025. Like the predecessor version described in Judge Roesch’s order, this
measure superseded all prior resolutions and adopted new water rates
effective July 1, 2025, for the Fiscal Years 2026 and 2027. The resolution
recites in effect that the new rates are based on new and different
information than used for prior resolutions. No opposition was filed by
plaintiff.
Paralleling argument in its respondent’s brief, EBMUD also filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that, like the underlying action, it
was moot.
We advised the parties that the request and the motion would be
considered with the merits of the appeal. Having thoroughly considered
those merits, we grant both the request for judicial notice and the motion to
dismiss.
On its face, the trial court’s reasoning that plaintiff is and has been
chasing a disappearing target seems irrefutable. First, 2019, then 2021, then
2023. It is hard to conceive how mandate and injunctive relief can be
directed against a measure that has been repealed. What is the point of
declaratory relief pointing to defects of a superseded set of charges that are
no longer being charged, and, as EBMUD points out, “have not been charged
to ratepayers for [more than three] years”?
8
In addition, as already mentioned, Judge Roesch concluded—and
plaintiff does not challenge that conclusion in her briefs—that monetary
claims were removed from the case because plaintiff did not file a timely
administrative claim with EBMUD.
Plaintiff ripostes that it is not so much the actual rates—the amounts
actually charged to consumers for water—but the underlying formula for
computing those charges that is her genuine target. This is, however,
somewhat undermined by her insistence that she can recover “restitutionary
relief” as “incidental” to mandate relief, assuming it can be obtained.
Plaintiff endlessly reiterates how she only wishes to see her
constitutional claim tried on its merits. Yet a constitutional claim is not
vested with magical immunity. Campana I proves the point: plaintiff’s
initial constitutional claim against the 2019 resolution never got off the
ground because it was untimely. There is no obvious reason why a mootness
claim cannot be equally lethal.
Plaintiff invokes the so-called public interest exception to mootness to
avoid dismissal. Plaintiff had a co-plaintiff and co-appellant in Campana I.
Plaintiff had a co-plaintiff when this litigation began, but she prosecutes this
appeal by herself. Plaintiff failed in her attempt to convert this action into
one on behalf of a class of all others “similarly situated,” a ruling she has not
chosen to contest in this appeal.1 In these circumstances, it looks like the
only member of the public interested is the plaintiff herself.
1 In the course of denying plaintiff’s class certification motion, Judge
Roesch made the following comments: “Then SAC’s allegation that
Defendant’s tiered rate system is unconstitutional relies on the presumption
that certain rates charged by Defendant under Tier 2 or Tier 3 may exceed
Defendant’s actual cost of providing that service.
“However, Plaintiff has provided no calculation showing how much it
costs Defendant to provide a single unit of water to a given parcel that it
9
During our examination of this matter, we were also considering Toy v.
City and County of San Francisco (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 1292 and Division
One’s opinion in Hiller v. Marin Municipal Water District (2026) 120
Cal.App.5th 1147. They underscore that this kind of litigation is both
inefficient and time consuming. They remind us there is a procedure that is
well-established, easy to administer, and with non-negotiable deadlines.
That procedure is the validation action (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 860―870), to be
serves, thus there is no way for an individual to know with certainty whether
the class (as defined by the SAC) includes them.”
“Plaintiff has provided no calculation to indicate how much it actually
costs Defendant to provide one unit of water to any given parcel. Without
this information, there is no way to determine which parcels are being
charged more than Defendant’s cost of providing water service, and therefore
no way to determine which proposed class members (if any) are being
harmed . . . [¶]. . . by the customer uses (and is therefore charged), but also
Defendant’s cost of serving their parcel.
“Defendant’s evidence establishes that each of the water district’s
331,000 residential ratepayers has a unique pattern water use. Some may
have lawns and gardens while others do not. Some residences may support
multiple residents, while others consist of single individuals. These factors
make each rate-payer unique and affect not only how much each customer
uses (and is therefore charged), but also Defendant’s cost of serving their
parcel.”
“Defendant’s unrefuted evidence demonstrates that the residence in
which Plaintiff resides uses water at an atypically high volume compared to
others in the putative class. There are at least 120,000 customers who use
water from Tier 2 but not from Tier 3. These customers therefore pay
substantially less and may in fact benefit from the current rate system. . . .
“Finally, Plaintiff herself is not a registered customer, but lives in a
home serviced by the district. The SAC defines the class as ‘All residential
customers who receive and pay for water use under the higher tiers of
Defendant’s tiered-rate structure . . .’ It follows that either Plaintiff is not
part of the putative class (making her an inappropriate representative) or
that the class itself extends to non-registered water users, thus making it
impossible to ascertain the class by any meaningful or objective criteria.”
10
initiated by government entities, or what has come to be known as a reverse
validation action, which may be commenced by individuals. (See Toy v. City
and County of San Francisco, supra, at pp. 1297―1298.) The point was
recently underscored by the Legislature when it directed that actions
challenging “a fee or charge for water” shall be governed by the statutory
validation procedures. (Gov. Code, § 53759, subd. (b), added by Stats. 2021,
ch. 216, § 1.)
Our examination also revealed that the validation deadlines were
virtually always treated as jurisdictional. Citing several reported decisions
to this effect (e.g., Golden Gate Hill Development Co., Inc. v. County of
Alameda (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 760, 771; Katz v. Campbell Union High
School Dist. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1032), we asked the parties for
letter briefs on (1) whether either the 2021 or 2023 resolutions had ever been
the subject of either a validation or reverse validation action, and (2) what
impact this might have on the issue of mootness.
Both plaintiff and EBMUD replied that neither resolution had been the
subject of a validation or reverse validation proceeding. As to our latter
question, the parties’ disagreement was predictable: EBMUD reiterated its
position that the appeal was moot and should therefore be dismissed, while
plaintiff asserted that “construing the validation statutes to require dismissal
of this timely constitutional enforcement action would impermissibly burden
and modify the substantive and procedural rights guaranteed by Proposition
218.”
Although it appears that no statutory language makes the validation
procedure exclusive, there are legitimate reasons for such a conclusion,
especially as our Supreme Court has noted that when the validation statutes
apply, “they supersede other mechanisms by which an interested private
11
party might seek to challenge” the agency matter. (Davis v. Fresno Unified
School District (2023) 14 Cal.5th 671, 685; Toy v. City and County of San
Francisco, supra, at pp. 1297―1298.) The issue was never mentioned until
our request for the letter briefs, so a definitive conclusion is not required at
this time. However, we do note that it was strongly intimated in Campana I.
(See Campana I, at pp. 504―505 [“EBMUD’s adoption of water rates by
resolution. . . is . . . subject to the validation statutes.”].) Nevertheless, we
strongly commend the procedure to the parties’ future attention.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
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RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.
We concur.
MILLER, J.
DESAUTELS, J.
(A170150N)
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