Filed 9/18/26 Guardianship of K.L. CA1/3
Resposting correct version
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
Guardianship of K.L. et al., Minors.
SANDRA L.,
Petitioner and Respondent, A175460
v.
(Humboldt County
MERRY L.,
Super. Ct. No. PR2500165)
Objector and Appellant.
Merry L. (mother) appeals from the probate court order granting
Sandra L.’s (grandmother) petition for legal guardianship over minors K.L.
and R.L. On appeal, mother contends the court erroneously accepted her oral
waiver of rights without ensuring that her waiver was knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily given in violation of the Indian Child Welfare
Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA). We affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
The minors, their deceased father, and their paternal grandfather are
registered members of the Susanville Indian Rancheria. Grandmother is a
member of the Yurok Tribe. Neither party disputes that ICWA applies to
these proceedings or challenges the ICWA notice provided to the tribes.
1
Mother and the minors’ father had separated before his death, and they
shared custody of the minors. Grandmother lived with father and played a
significant role in caring for the minors during his custodial time. Although
mother initially agreed to maintain the existing equal timeshare after
father’s death, she subsequently reduced grandmother’s time with the minors
and began severing their relationship with their paternal family. The minors
were upset by these changes and expressed anger toward mother.
The record also reflected significant concerns regarding mother’s ability
to provide a safe and stable home. Mother had documented alcohol abuse
and violence problems, including convictions for driving under the influence
and assaulting father while the minors were present.
In June 2025, grandmother petitioned to be appointed as the legal
guardian of the minors. She also sought appointment as temporary legal
guardian. The minors, then 16 and 14 years old, consented to the proposed
guardianship.
The court granted temporary legal guardianship to grandmother and
set a hearing on the petition for permanent guardianship. Mother objected to
the petition. The minors, however, submitted a declaration nominating
grandmother as their guardian and supporting her petition.
The court investigator recommended granting the petition. The
investigator interviewed the minors, who “voiced strong support for the
guardianship to be granted.” They told the investigator that grandmother “is
better suited to care for them” and described her as “calm and stable.” In
contrast, the minors described mother as “erratic,” “manipulative,” “very
unpredictable,” and having “an explosive temper.”
An ICWA qualified expert likewise supported the proposed
guardianship. The expert opined that clear and convincing evidence
2
established a causal relationship between the conditions in mother’s home
and the likelihood of serious physical, psychological, or emotional damage to
the minors. The minors told the expert they would run away if placed in
mother’s care, and the expert described mother’s conduct as “unhealthy,
unsafe, and dangerous,” citing substance abuse, erratic behavior, and
criminal activity. The expert further noted that “remedial services and
rehabilitative programs” had been offered to mother to prevent the breakup
of the family. The expert concluded that placement of the minors with
grandmother was “the most appropriate and least restrictive option.”
Against that backdrop and in advance of the hearing, the parties
reached an agreement for mother to consent to the guardianship. Mother
and her counsel, grandmother and her counsel, the minors and their counsel,
and counsel for the Susanville Indian Rancheria subsequently appeared at
the hearing to inform the court of their agreement. Minors’ counsel explained
to the court that the parties had agreed that the court would grant the
petition for permanent guardianship while preserving certain visitation
rights for mother. As part of that agreement, mother would waive her rights
under ICWA.
The court then addressed mother’s waiver. It used California Judicial
Council form JV-419 (JV-419) as a guide in discussing the rights at issue.
Mother acknowledged that she understood the matter was set for a trial and
she had a right to a trial, to have witnesses testify, to testify herself, and to
present evidence. Mother initially affirmed she was waiving those rights and
consenting to the legal guardianship.
The court then explained that, by entering into the agreement, mother
would relinquish her right to present evidence that active efforts had not
been made to provide services designed to keep the family together. Mother
3
responded, “There’s been no efforts.” The court clarified that mother was
waiving her right to challenge all issues at trial; she was not agreeing that
active efforts had been made but was instead “waiving [her] right to
challenge it” and agreeing to the guardianship. Mother responded, “I don’t
agree.”
In response, mother’s counsel requested a brief recess, which the court
granted. The court directed counsel to reference JV-419 with mother. After
the recess, mother’s counsel explained she had reviewed JV-419 with mother
and the form was “a little confusing” because it was “not a mandatory form”
and contained statements concerning giving up mother’s rights to challenge
active efforts. Mother’s counsel nevertheless represented that mother
understood the form’s purpose and was consenting to the permanent plan by
withdrawing her opposition to the guardianship. Mother’s counsel further
confirmed that mother understood “the waiver of rights to a trial includes all
issues that she’s waiving her right to.” Mother only requested that the
agreement include family counseling.
Tribal counsel agreed with mother’s counsel that JV-419 was not
mandatory but emphasized the importance of ensuring that mother
understood both her basic parental rights and the additional rights afforded
by ICWA. The tribe agreed to the settlement if ICWA was satisfied and
mother understood that her consent would result in the issuance of letters of
guardianship.
The court then asked mother whether she “understand[s] all that?”
Mother answered in the affirmative. The court then expressly confirmed
that, with respect to the rights discussed in open court and reviewed between
mother and her counsel, mother wished to “waive and give up [her] rights
4
and withdraw any objection to the guardianship” under the agreed-upon
terms. Mother again answered in the affirmative.
The court accepted mother’s waiver, granted the petition, and issued
letters of guardianship for K.L. and R.L. Mother subsequently appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the probate court erroneously granted the legal
guardianship petition because her consent was not knowing or intelligent,
and her waiver of ICWA rights was not in writing or recorded by the court.
We disagree.
I. ICWA
“Congress enacted ICWA over 40 years ago to address ‘ “abusive child
welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian
children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care
placement, usually in non-Indian homes.” ’ ” (In re K.T. (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 732, 740.) Its express purpose is “ ‘to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families’ ” by establishing federal standards governing the removal and
placement of Indian children. (Ibid.) In short, ICWA seeks, where possible,
to keep an Indian child within the Indian community. (In re W.B. (2012) 55
Cal.4th 30, 48.)
When ICWA applies, a state court may not place an Indian child or
terminate parental rights unless the court is satisfied “that active efforts
have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs
designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts
have proved unsuccessful.” (25 U.S.C. § 1912(d); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.7,
subd. (a); see In re K.B. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1288.) But California
Rules of Court, rule 5.485(a)(2) (undesignated rule references are to these
5
rules) permits a parent to waive the requirement of producing such evidence
where the court is satisfied the parent or tribe “has been fully advised of the
requirements of [ICWA] and has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived them.” Rule 5.485(a)(2) also requires that such a stipulation be in
writing.
II. Mother Waived Her ICWA Rights
Mother identifies two purported defects in her waiver. First, she
contends the probate court did not adequately advise her of her ICWA rights
because it did not identify each specific right she was waiving or ask whether
she understood the waiver. Second, she contends the waiver was ineffective
because it was not executed in writing and certified by a judge. Neither
contention warrants reversal.
A. The Record Establishes a Knowing, Intelligent, and
Voluntary Waiver
Mother argues ICWA requires the court to advise parents of each
specific right being waived and obtain an express acknowledgement that the
parent understands those rights. But mother identifies no authority
imposing such a requirement. More importantly, her position is inconsistent
with the plain language of rule 5.485(a)(2). (In re William M.W. (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 573, 583 [“We independently review interpretations of California
Rules of Court, applying the usual rules of statutory construction.”].)
Rule 5.485(a)(2) does not require the probate court to enumerate each
specific ICWA right being waived. It requires only that the court be “satisfied
that the person or tribe has been fully advised of the requirements of
[ICWA].” (Rule 5.485(a)(2).) This language contrasts with rules that
expressly require the court to advise a parent of specified rights. (See, e.g.,
rule 5.682(a) [“the court must advise the parent or guardian of the following
6
rights: [¶] (1) The right to a hearing by the court on the issues raised by the
petition; and [¶] (2) The right, if the child has been removed, to have the child
returned to the parent or guardian within two working days after a finding
by the court that the child does not come within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court”]; see also In re Monique T. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1377
[court erred by failing to explain rights under former rule 1449 (renumbered
as rule 5.682) to the parent and instead relying on counsel’s
representations].) Nothing in rule 5.485(a)(2), therefore, required the court to
recite each individual ICWA protection on the record.
Here, the record demonstrates that mother was fully advised of the
relevant requirements before she waived them. First, both mother and the
tribe were present and represented by counsel. All parties and counsel were
aware of the need for ICWA compliance, and counsel repeatedly addressed
that issue during the hearing. Second, mother agreed to execute JV-419—
which contained all the ICWA waivers at issue—as part of the parties’
stipulation. Presumably mother would not have agreed to execute JV-419 if
she had not first reviewed that form, including the waivers. Third, when
mother’s counsel requested a recess to confer with mother regarding her
waiver, the court directed counsel to refer to JV-419. After that recess,
mother’s counsel represented that she had spoken with mother and reviewed
the form with her. Counsel then expressly represented that mother
“understands that with the waiver of rights to a trial includes all issues that
she’s waiving her right to.” Counsel further confirmed that mother consented
to the legal guardianship.
The circumstances thus bear little resemblance to a situation in which
a parent was simply asked to waive rights without meaningful consultation
or explanation. While mother now argues “[t]here is no proof in the record”
7
that she reviewed or signed form JV-419, neither is a requirement under rule
5.485(a)(2). And, contrary to mother’s suggestion, the record contains
affirmative evidence that the form was reviewed in connection with her
waiver. Nor was the court required to obtain a specific on-the-record showing
as to each individual right to ensure a knowing and intelligent waiver.
“ ‘ “When counsel is present, a voluntary and intelligent waiver of known
rights may properly be inferred from the record, without a specific on-the-
record showing as to each right.” ’ ” (Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48
Cal.4th 131, 153.)
The record thus demonstrates the parties were aware of ICWA, mother
was adequately informed of her ICWA rights, and mother knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily chose not to oppose the legal guardianship.
B. Any Defect in the Form of Mother’s Waiver Was Procedural
and Mother’s Objection Has Been Forfeited
Probate Code section 1500.1, subdivision (a)(1) provides that consent to
the nomination of a legal guardian requires, in part, that “[t]he consent is
executed in writing at least 10 days after the child’s birth and recorded before
a judge.” ICWA imposes similar requirements for parental consent to “foster
care placement or to termination of parental rights.” (25 U.S.C. § 1913,
subd. (a).) Mother now relies on these provisions to argue her consent was
ineffective because it was not executed in writing and recorded before a
judge.
It is undisputed that mother did not execute a writing confirming her
consent. But she did not object to that omission below. And although a
party’s failure to object does not waive substantive rights, a failure to object
to a curable procedural deficiency may result in forfeiture, including in an
ICWA case. (In re S.B. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1159–1160.) This
8
distinction is important here. Mother challenges the manner in which her
consent was memorialized. That is a procedural defect. It does not implicate
the substantive rights protected by ICWA or otherwise undermine ICWA’s
purpose of protecting the interests of Indian children and promoting the
stability of Indian tribes and families. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1902.) Mother’s
failure to object therefore forfeited any challenge based on the form of her
waiver.
The record also provides an additional reason why she cannot now rely
on the absence of a written consent: mother expressly advocated against the
very writing she now claims is required.
The court used JV-419, entitled “Guardianship (Juvenile) – Consent
and Waiver of Rights,” as the basis for confirming mother’s consent. The
form calls for the parent to initial each right being relinquished and contains
signature blocks for both the parent and counsel. At the start of the hearing,
the minors’ counsel recited the parties’ agreement concerning the
guardianship petition, including that “[m]other will agree to execute . . . the
provisions, the consent, and waivers in California Judicial Council Form JV-
419.” Grandmother’s counsel then explained that although JV-419 was
designed for guardianships in dependency proceedings, it provided “a nice
way of making sure we take a complete and accurate waiver today.” Mother’s
counsel agreed to the terms of the parties’ stipulation, subject to
modifications concerning summer custody and counseling. Counsel did not
indicate that mother was unfamiliar with JV-419 or unwilling to execute it.
After further discussions and a recess, however, mother’s counsel
stated that JV-419 was “a little confusing” and “not a mandatory form.”
Mother’s counsel also represented she had spoken with mother, reviewed the
form with her, and mother understood the rights she was waiving. Tribal
9
counsel agreed that the form was not mandatory. The court then accepted
mother’s verbal consent to the guardianship and stated that the parties could
submit their “stipulated agreement as to parameters for the guardianship for
everyone’s approval and then submit to the Court for signature.” The
appellate record does not establish whether that stipulated agreement was
ultimately submitted.
The significance of this sequence is clear. Mother initially agreed to
execute JV-419 to memorialize her consent and waiver, and that agreement
was part of the parties’ overall stipulation to resolve the pending
guardianship petition. She apparently did not do so, at least in part because
her counsel represented that the form was not mandatory. Having proceeded
on that basis in the trial court, mother cannot now obtain reversal by relying
on her failure to execute the very written consent her counsel stated was
unnecessary.
Accordingly, the record establishes a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver, and any challenge to the procedural form of that waiver
was forfeited.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order granting the petition for permanent legal
guardianship is affirmed.
10
PETROU, J.
WE CONCUR:
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
A175460 / Guardianship of K.L.
11
