Filed 9/8/26 Moore v. Bd. of Civil Service Commissioners CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

IVAN M. MOORE, B343850

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCP00706)
v.

BOARD OF CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSIONERS, CITY OF LOS
ANGELES,

Defendant and Respondent;

LOS ANGELES WORLD
AIRPORTS, CITY OF LOS
ANGELES,

Real Party in Interest and
Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
 Ivan M. Moore, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, James E. Oldendorph and
David. A. Urban for Real Party in Interest and Respondent Los
Angeles World Airports, City of Los Angeles.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent Board of
Civil Service Commissioners, City of Los Angeles
________________________

INTRODUCTION

Ivan M. Moore filed a petition for writ of mandate
challenging his discharge from employment with Los Angeles
World Airports (LAWA), a department of the City of Los Angeles.
He appeals the superior court’s judgment for respondent LAWA
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.1 The superior court
determined Moore did not exhaust his administrative remedies
under Los Angeles City Charter section 1017 because he did not
file a demand for reinstatement with the City of Los Angeles
Board of Civil Service Commissioners (Board).2 Moore argues he
substantially complied with the filing requirement because he
served the director of the Board with a petition for writ of
mandate that attached his demand for reinstatement as an
exhibit. We reverse the superior court’s order denying Moore’s
petition because the court resolved factual disputes regarding
service of the demand and proof of filing, which was improper on

1 Undesignated statutory references in this opinion are to
the Code of Civil Procedure.
2 Undesignated city charter provisions are to the Los Angeles
City Charter.

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a section 1094 motion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Moore’s Discharge and Subsequent Administrative
Proceedings
Moore worked for LAWA as a custodian supervisor and was
discharged for cause effective July 5, 2022. Moore appealed his
discharge to the Board. On June 20, 2023, after a two-day
hearing, a hearing examiner issued a report, decision, and
recommendation to reinstate Moore. The Board considered the
hearing examiner’s report, and on December 14, 2023, it adopted
different findings and conclusions and sustained LAWA’s decision
to discharge Moore.
On January 8, 2024, the Board sent a letter to Moore
notifying him of its decision. The letter advised Moore that under
charter section 1017, any “claim for compensation and demand
for reinstatement must be filed within 90 days from the date of
the decision of the Board.”

B. Writ Proceedings
Proceeding in propria persona, Moore filed a section 1094.6
petition for writ of mandate in superior court in March 2024,
which he amended in April 2024. Moore’s amended petition
alleged the Board’s decision was “not supported by either the
administrative findings or the weight of the evidence” and it was
“arbitrary, capricious[,] and/or contrary to established law.”
Moore asserted he had exhausted his administrative remedies by
appealing to the Board, and that “[p]ursuant to the City’s
Charter Section 1017, [he] has filed a Demand for Reinstatement

3
(attachment Exhibit 2) with the Commission and a Claim for
Compensation with the City’s Clerk (attachment Exhibit 3).”
Moore asked the superior court to reverse the Board’s decision
sustaining his discharge and order his reinstatement with full
benefits and backpay.
Attached to Moore’s writ petition as Exhibit 1 was the
letter from the Board notifying Moore of its final decision.
Exhibit 2 to the petition was Moore’s demand for reinstatement
directed to the Board and dated February 25, 2024. Exhibit 3
was a claim for compensation dated February 25, 2024, and
addressed to the clerk of the City of Los Angeles. Neither the
demand for reinstatement nor the claim for compensation had a
dated file stamp.
LAWA answered the petition in June 2024. Among other
grounds, LAWA argued that Moore failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, namely, that he failed to file a demand
for reinstatement with the Board and a claim for compensation
with the City clerk pursuant to charter section 1017.
Moore responded with a personal declaration attesting:
“Prior to filing the Verified Petition, I went with my wife
(Ronique Moore) where she filed with the City of Los Angeles a
Claim for Compensation, which I attached to the Verified
Petition. I also went with my wife where she filed with the Board
of Civil Service Commissioners a Demand for Reinstatement,
which I also attached to the Verified Petition.”
LAWA moved for judgment under section 1094 on the basis
that Moore did not exhaust his administrative remedies under
charter section 1017. LAWA argued the superior court lacked
jurisdiction over Moore’s petition, the Board did not receive due
process, and that Moore’s attachment of the demand for

4
reinstatement to his writ petition did not substantially comply
with the filing requirements of charter section 1017. LAWA’s
motion included two supporting declarations.
Bruce Whidden, Executive Director of the Board, declared:
“After conducting a diligent search of Board records and
reasonable inquiry into locating a demand for reinstatement filed
or served by or on behalf of Mr. Moore I did not locate any such
demand for reinstatement in connection with his discharge.”
Whidden stated the only documents Moore filed with the Board
were copies of his petition for writ of mandate and amended
petition. Whidden explained, “I do not generally review court
filed writ petitions filed or served on the Board office by
employees or former employees who had an administrative case
before the Board. If/when my office receives writ petitions, they
are forwarded to the City Attorney’s Office for handling. [¶] I
reviewed only the first page of the writ petitions that Mr. Moore
filed with our office for the purpose of forwarding them to [the]
City Attorney. They were immediately forwarded to the City
Attorney’s Office. . . . The Board did not receive, review, or vote
on the demand for reinstatement attached to any of Mr. Moore’s
writ petitions.”
Melinda Novoa, Deputy City Clerk for the City of Los
Angeles, declared that after “a diligent search and reasonable
inquiry of the City of Los Angeles, City Clerk’s records . . . I did
not locate any claim for compensation or claim for damages
relative to Ivan M. Moore.” Novoa was able to locate “a writ
petition entitled, Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate, served on
the City on February 28, 2024” and an amended writ petition
served April 16, 2024. (Italics omitted.) Novoa declared, “The
City Clerk’s Office generally only reviews the title or cover pages

5
(e.g., civil case cover sheet, notice of case assignment, etc.) of
legal complaints and other similar legal documents like writs of
administrative mandate petitions served on the City Clerk and
then sends them to the City Attorney’s Office. This was done
with Mr. Moore’s petitions, and they were then sent to the City
Attorney’s Office.”
Based on these declarations, LAWA argued “Mr. Whidden
and Ms. Novoa only received legal complaints (writ petitions)
from [Moore], replete with all of the indicia that the document
presented is a lawsuit, i.e., the first page is a caption page,
contains a civil case cover sheet, contains a notice of case
assignment, etc. . . . Neither Mr. Whidden nor Ms. Nov[o]a took
the complaint to constitute the demand for reinstatement or
claim for compensation, respectively . . . .”
Moore opposed LAWA’s section 1094 motion for judgment.
Moore argued that the Board “acknowledges having received the
demand for reinstatement that was attached to the [a]mended
writ petition however maintains that the demand for
reinstatement was never received.” Moore asserted it was
“unrealistic and unfair . . . to assert that because the
representatives for the [Board] and the City Clerk’s office did not
read the documents which they accepted as being given to them.”
For this reason, Moore asserted he “did not fail to exhaust
administrative remedies” and “he complied with the charter.”
Moore provided a sworn affidavit from his wife, Ronique.3
The affidavit stated:

3 For clarity, and without intending disrespect, we refer to
Moore’s wife by her first name, Ronique.

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I, Ronique Moore, swear that I served the Demand
for Reinstatement on behalf of the petitioner Ivan
Moore to Mr. Bruce Whidden for the City of Los
Angeles Board of Civil Service Commissioners.

On February 28, 2024, I went to the Board of Civil
Service Commissioners located at 700 E. Temple
Street Los Angeles, C[A] 90012 where I waited for
someone from the Commission to meet me in the
lobby.

I was told they were in a meeting, and it would be a
while.

Mr. Whidden eventually came to the lobby,
accompanied by a woman, and spoke to me. I
informed him I was there to provide him with a
request for reinstatement and a copy of the petition
which would be filed with the court. Mr. Whidden
indicated they do not typically accept those, and I
informed him it was a request for reinstatement. He
asked for whom at which time I responded for Ivan
Moore.

Mr. Whidden repeated “yes Ivan Moore” and said
“ok,” as he extended his hand to retrieve the
paperwork from me. I handed him the document,
which was in fact the document entitled Verified
Petition for Writ of Mandate Reversing
Administrative Decision and a Demand for

7
 Reinstatement Letter. I verbally informed him I was
providing him with a demand for reinstatement and
a copy of the documents which would be filed in
court.

Mr. Whidden accepted the documents and stated they
would deny it and then we could file a lawsuit or
whatever we did at that point. I thanked him and
walked away as he continued to speak with the
woman who walked to the lobby with him.

Moore also attached a copy of Whidden’s business card and a
visitor badge with Ronique’s name dated February 28, 2024.
Ronique’s affidavit further stated that she “served the
Claim for Compensation to the . . . Clerk for the City of Los
Angeles.” According to Ronique, she visited the clerk’s office and
“informed them that I was there to provide them with a copy of a
lawsuit which was to be filed along with a Claim for
Compensation for all backpay and benefits (including retirement
benefits) for Ivan Moore. I handed the clerk a document entitled
Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate Reversing Administrative
Decision and a claim for compensation letter. I explained that
the lawsuit had not yet been filed with the Court but would be.
When the clerk stamped the copy handed to her I asked that she
also stamp my copy[.]” Moore produced a copy of the first page of
his writ petition file stamped by the city clerk on February 28 at
1:27 p.m.
On reply, LAWA argued that Moore “failed to comply with
his administrative requirements under Charter Section 1017 by
not filing/serving an independent, standalone demand for

8
reinstatement with the Board of Civil Service Commissioners.”
LAWA further asserted Ronique’s affidavit was not credible.
The court held a hearing on LAWA’s motion. At the
hearing, Moore argued that Ronique delivered the demand for
reinstatement as an attachment to the writ petition and “verbally
stated [to Whidden] that the demand letter was included.” The
court recognized Moore’s argument was “essentially [for]
substantial compliance.” But the court stated that “exhaustion
generally requires full compliance . . . . Not necessarily strict
compliance but full compliance.” The court observed there was
no proof of filing, i.e., “a received stamp on the demand for
reinstatement.”
After the hearing, the superior court granted LAWA’s
section 1094 motion for judgment. The court concluded, “Moore
was required to file a standalone demand for reinstatement with
the Board and [] attaching it as an exhibit [to the writ petition]
does not suffice to meet the requirements of City Charter
section 1017.” The court noted “ambiguity in Ronique’s affidavit”
as to “whether she filed the demand for reinstatement as a
standalone document,” but it observed “the Board and the City
Clerk, respectively, do not have a standalone demand for
reinstatement and a standalone claim for compensation in their
files. They do have the Petition and the [amended petition],
which suggests no standalone demand was filed. Moore also does
not assert that the demand for reinstatement was a standalone
document. In fact, he notes that the City argues that he did not
file a demand for reinstatement with the Board but acknowledges
that it received the demand for reinstatement that was attached
to the Amended Petition. . . . He also states that it is unfair to
him that he failed to file a demand for reinstatement simply

9
because Whidden did not read the documents he had been given. .
. . These arguments imply that no standalone document was
delivered.” The court declined to address whether Moore filed a
claim for compensation “as failure to file it is only a condition
precedent to any recovery of wages or salary claimed to be due on
account of Moore’s discharge” and “would not affect Moore’s right
to be restored to his job.”
Moore filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
“Mr. Whidden was informed that the documents he was receiving
were a Demand for Reinstatement as well as a copy of the then
unfiled petition that would be filed with the Court. Thus, the
Executive Director of the Board of Civil Service Commissioners
had the responsibility to review the document and schedule a
hearing to determine whether [Moore] would be reinstated.”
LAWA opposed, arguing Moore had not shown any new or
different facts, circumstances, or law in support of the motion.
The court agreed with LAWA, and it denied Moore’s motion.
Judgment was entered on November 14, 2024. Moore
timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“Exhaustion of administrative remedies is ‘a jurisdictional
prerequisite to resort to the courts.’ ” (Johnson v. City of Loma
Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 70, italics omitted.) “ ‘ “Under this
rule, an administrative remedy is exhausted only upon
‘termination of all available, nonduplicative administrative
review procedures.’ ” ’ ” (Hill RHF Housing Partners, L.P. v. City
of Los Angeles (2021) 12 Cal.5th 458, 477.) “ ‘The exhaustion

10
doctrine is principally grounded on concerns favoring
administrative autonomy (i.e., courts should not interfere with an
agency determination until the agency has reached a final
decision) and judicial efficiency (i.e., overworked courts should
decline to intervene in an administrative dispute unless
absolutely necessary).’ ” (Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector
Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd.
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1080.)
The Board is an administrative agency which the Los
Angeles City Charter vests with the power to review the
discharge of Los Angeles civil service employees. (See La Prade
v. Department of Water & Power (1945) 27 Cal.2d 47, 53;
Valenzuela v. Board of Civil Service Comrs. (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d
557, 560; see charter, art. X, § 1016.) As relevant, charter
section 1017 provides:

Whenever it is claimed by any person that he or she
has been unlawfully demoted, suspended, laid off or
discharged, and that person has filed an application
for a hearing [with the Board] . . . and reinstatement
or restoration to duty has been denied, the person
may file a written claim for compensation and a
demand for reinstatement. The claim and demand
must be filed within 90 days from the date of the
decision of the board following a hearing . . . . The
demand for reinstatement must be filed with the
board and the claim for compensation must be filed
with the City Clerk. Failure to file a demand for
reinstatement with proof of filing with the board,
within the time specified in this section, shall be a

11
 bar to any action to compel reinstatement. Proof of
filing with the City Clerk of the claim for
compensation within the time and in the manner
specified shall be a condition precedent to any
recovery of wages or salary claimed to be due on
account of demotion, layoff, suspension or discharge.

This demand requirement “has been described as
‘somewhat analogous to the requirement of a petition for a
rehearing addressed to the board.’ [Citation.] Filing the
demand does not compel the board of Civil Service
Commissioners to take any action. [Citation.] Rather, it
affords the board an additional opportunity to consider the
matter before the complainant resorts to litigation.
[Citation.] It also serves to ‘fix[] a time limit and
formalities necessary as a basis for court action.’ ”
Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074,
1083.)
Here, the superior court granted LAWA’s section 1094
motion for judgment, reasoning that the undisputed evidence
showed Moore did not exhaust his administrative remedies under
charter section 1017. Section 1094 provides that “[i]f a petition
for writ of mandate . . . presents no triable issue of fact or is
based solely on an administrative record, the matter may be
determined by the court by noticed motion of any party for a
judgment on the peremptory writ.” We review de novo the grant
of a motion for judgment on undisputed facts (see Rasooly v. City
of Oakley (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 348, 353; Skulason v. California
Bureau of Real Estate (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 562, 566-567),
including the court’s determination that Moore failed to exhaust

12
his administrative remedies (see Carachure v. City of Azusa
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 776, 785; Wallich’s Ranch Co. v. Kern
County Citrus Pest Control Dist. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 878, 883).
We also review the interpretation of a city charter de novo.
(City of San Diego v. Shapiro (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 756, 789;
accord, Don’t Cell Our Parks v. City of San Diego (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 338, 349-350.) “Generally, the same principles of
construction applicable to statutes apply to the interpretation of
municipal charters. [Citations.] The courts must always look
first to the express language of the [law] to ascertain its
meaning.” (United Assn. of Journeymen v. City & County of San
Francisco (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 751, 760; accord, Shapiro, at p.
789.)

B. The Superior Court Erred By Resolving Factual Disputes on
the Section 1094 Motion
Moore argues that he filed a demand for reinstatement
within the meaning of charter section 1017 and, alternatively,
that he substantially complied with charter section 1017. Citing
Ronique’s affidavit, Moore contends he served a separate demand
for reinstatement in addition to the unfiled writ petition. Moore
further argues the document was “clearly marked as [a] demand
for reinstatement . . . and w[as] hand delivered to [the] approved
entity.”
LAWA responds that Moore did not comply or substantially
comply with charter section 1017 because it is “undisputed” that
Moore only filed a “court conformed copy of his initial writ
petition . . . containing a demand for reinstatement attached as
exhibit[] 2” and he “failed to file the demand for reinstatement in
itself, as a standalone document.”

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 As stated, section 1094 authorizes a court to enter
judgment on a petition for writ of mandate that “presents no
triable issue of fact.” (§ 1094.) “It is only where the [answer or]
return to the alternative writ raises solely questions of law that
the court is authorized to proceed to hear the matter upon the
pleadings” under section 1094. (English v. City of Long Beach
(1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 311, 316-317 (English) [reversing
dismissal of widow’s writ petition challenging city’s denial of
police pension under section 1094 because superior court failed to
hold a hearing on disputed factual issues raised by the petition
and city’s answer]; accord, Rodriguez v. Municipal Court (1972)
25 Cal.App.3d 521, 526 [“the hearing mentioned in . . . [section]
1094 is not one to try issues of fact but only questions of law”].)
“[W]hen a question of fact is raised by an answer to a petition for
writ of mandamus the matter is heard in the same manner as
any other trial.” (Lotus Car, Ltd. v. Municipal Court of Southern
Judicial Dist. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 264, 268; id. at p. 272
[“Ordinarily, when a question of fact is raised by a mandamus
proceeding, findings of fact are required unless waived by the
parties.”]; see also Lassen v. City of Alameda (1957)
150 Cal.App.2d 44, 48.)
Here, Moore and LAWA disputed various facts relating to
Moore’s exhaustion of his remedies under charter section 1017.
Specifically, a factual dispute exists regarding whether Ronique
served a standalone demand for reinstatement on Whidden or
whether the demand was attached to the writ petition as an
exhibit. Ronique’s affidavit stated she handed Whidden “a
request for reinstatement and a copy of the petition which would
be filed with the court.” The superior court noted an “ambiguity
in Ronique’s affidavit” as to “whether she filed the demand for

14
reinstatement as a standalone document” and that it was
“unclear from Moore’s evidence whether Ronique gave Whidden
the Petition with the demand for reinstatement attached or as a
standalone document.” Nevertheless, the court implicitly found
the demand was not delivered as a separate document because
“the Board . . . do[es] not have a standalone demand for
reinstatement . . . in [its] files.” This resolution of disputed facts
was improper on a section 1094 motion for judgment. (See
English, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at p. 316 [grant of motion for
judgment was “clearly erroneous” where the “pleadings . . .
tendered a factual issue which, if determined favorably to
appellant, required the entry of judgment in her favor, [and] she
was entitled as of right to a trial thereon”].)
Another factual dispute is whether the document (or
documents) that Ronique handed to Moore was identifiable as a
demand for reinstatement on its face. Ronique’s affidavit stated
she delivered a “document entitled Verified Petition for Writ of
Mandate Reversing Administrative Decision and a Demand for
Reinstatement Letter.” But, through Whidden’s declaration,
LAWA asserted that the “first page” of the document Whidden
received only appeared to be a writ petition. The trial court did
not appear to credit Ronique’s declaration on this point either,
implicitly making a factual determination against Moore.
The court erred because these are material disputed facts
relevant to assessing whether Moore actually complied or
substantially complied with charter section 1017.4 (See 2710

4 LAWA argues that “Charter Section 1017 does not contain
any provision allowing an employee or former employee to satisfy
it through ‘substantial compliance.’ ” However, “ ‘substantial

15
Sutter Ventures, LLC v. Millis (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 842, 860
[“Courts have applied the doctrine of substantial compliance with
statutory requirements when, as a practical matter, they can
reasonably conclude that partial compliance with a law has fully
attained the statute’s objectives.’ ”]; accord, Troyk v. Farmers
Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1332-1333.) The
superior court erred by resolving these factual disputes and
making factual determinations in ruling on a section 1094 motion
for judgment. (See English, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at p. 316;
Baumgardner v. City of Hawthorne (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 512,
517 [superior court “properly heard and decided the case on the
pleadings” under section 1094 where “[t]he material allegations
of the petition [were] not denied,” “[t]he answer raised only
questions of law,” and “[n]o evidence was required”].)
We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings
including, but not limited to, a trial or evidentiary hearing on the
facts surrounding Moore’s exhaustion of administrative remedies
and/or his entitlement to writ relief.5 (§ 1094.5.)

compliance is presumed to satisfy the intent of the [legislative
body],’ even if a statute does not expressly permit substantial
compliance.” (The Chemical Toxin Working Group, Inc. v. The
Kroger Co. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 276, 290; see Knight v. Los
Angeles (1945) 26 Cal.2d 764, 766 [substantial compliance
doctrine can apply to claim provisions of Los Angeles City
Charter].)
5 In light of our holding the court erroneously granted
LAWA’s motion for judgment, we need not reach whether Moore
also satisfied proof of filing with the Board within the meaning of
charter section 1017. At oral argument, however, LAWA
acknowledged there are unresolved factual issues as to proof of

16
 DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. On remand, the superior court
shall vacate its order granting the motion for judgment, enter a
new order denying the motion, and conduct further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:

FEUER, J. STONE, J.

filing, including whether the Board ordinarily file stamps
documents it receives, whether Whidden could file stamp the
document, and other factual issues relating to the Board’s filing
procedures. These subjects may properly be explored at an
evidentiary hearing.

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