Filed 9/8/26 In re Chris W. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re Chris W., a Person Coming B344418 (Consol. w/B348446)
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP05573D)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Morris W.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Pete R. Navarro and Dash Talbot, Commissioners.
Dismissed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded with
directions.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
 INTRODUCTION
In these consolidated appeals, Morris W. (Father)
challenges the juvenile court’s orders at two Welfare and
Institutions Code section 3641 review hearings (1) denying
Father’s request for custody of his son, Chris W., and
(2) terminating jurisdiction and granting sole physical custody of
the child to his mother. On appeal, Father argues the juvenile
court should have placed Chris in his custody at a February 2025
review hearing, and should have granted joint physical custody to
both parents when it terminated jurisdiction at a July 2025
review hearing. Father also asserts the juvenile court’s written
exit orders conflict with its oral ruling regarding visitation.
We conclude Father’s appeal from the February 2025 order
denying his request for custody is moot. We further conclude the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the July
2025 custody and visitation exit orders, but the visitation order
contains a clerical error that requires correction. We accordingly
dismiss Father’s appeal from the February 2025 order, affirm the
July 2025 custody and visitation exits orders, and remand the
matter to the juvenile court to correct the visitation exit order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Child welfare history
Father and Tania J. (Mother) are the parents of Chris, a
boy born in September 2014. Mother also has an older child,
Aryanna J., who is not a subject of this appeal. At all relevant
times, Mother resided in Los Angeles County, and Father resided
in the greater Chicago area in Illinois. In 2022, the juvenile court

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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asserted dependency jurisdiction over Chris based on Mother’s
physical abuse of Aryanna, mental health issues, and unsanitary
home, in addition to the history of domestic violence between
Mother and Father. In August 2023, the court terminated
jurisdiction with a custody exit order granting Mother sole legal
and physical custody of Chris, and granting Father unmonitored
visitation consisting of virtual contact at least one day per week
and in-person day visits twice per month in Los Angeles County.
2. Section 300 petition
On March 11, 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a section 300 petition
for Chris. Among other counts, the petition alleged that Mother
had a limited ability to provide Chris with appropriate care and
supervision due to the child’s behavioral, mental, and emotional
problems. As described by Mother, Chris often engaged in violent
and aggressive conduct toward her and Aryanna, had been
diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and
posttraumatic stress disorder, and had been placed on
involuntary psychiatric holds on several recent occasions. While
Father had limited contact with Chris, he blamed Mother for the
child’s behavioral problems and believed that Chris did not need
medication to treat his issues.
In a May 2024 interview with DCFS, Chris was asked
about his interactions with Father. The social worker observed
that the child had difficulty talking about his relationship with
Father and took deep breaths when the subject was raised. Chris
stated that he did not have a lot of in-person contact with Father,
but that Father sometimes yelled at him during their virtual
calls. He also disclosed that Father instructed him not to take
his prescribed medication and instead “pretend to take it and spit

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it out.” Chris further expressed that he did not want any
overnight visits with Father. When asked if there was anything
else he wanted to share, Chris replied, “I am tired of this. This
whole thing with my dad is a custody battle. I’m safe here with
my mom. This is a war and it doesn’t have to be.”
At a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing held
on June 11, 2024, the juvenile court sustained the count in the
petition pertaining to Mother’s limited ability to provide Chris
with appropriate care and supervision. The court declared Chris
a dependent of the court under section 300, subdivision (b), and
ordered that the child remain placed with Mother under the
supervision of DCFS. The court granted Father the same
visitation rights that he received when jurisdiction was
terminated in the prior case.
Over the next several months, Father did not maintain
regular contact with Chris or participate in DCFS’s meetings
about the child. At an interim hearing held in December 2024,
the juvenile court ordered DCFS to facilitate an in-person visit
between Chris and Father during an upcoming weekend when
Father would be in Los Angeles County. Prior to the visit, Chris
stated that he wanted to visit Father for one day only, and that
Father was “always trying to turn him against [Mother].” After
the visit, Father told the social worker that he believed Chris did
not have any mental health issues, that Mother put the child on
medication to control him, and that he had come to Los Angeles
to “take [Chris] back with him since [M]other left the child.”
3. Section 387 petition
On December 17, 2024, DCFS filed a section 387 petition
based on allegations that Mother refused to pick up Chris from
the hospital and was unable to provide the child with appropriate

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care and supervision due to his mental health issues. At a
detention hearing held the following day, Chris was detained
from Mother and placed in foster care.
Over the next month, Chris was again hospitalized due to
physically aggressive and threatening behavior while in foster
care. He was diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder and
depression, and his medications were adjusted. In January 2025,
DCFS separately interviewed Mother, Father, and Chris. Mother
explained that she did not pick up Chris from the hospital
because she believed he needed a psychiatric evaluation and
monitoring before he could safely return home. However, Mother
wanted Chris in her care and understood that he needed services.
Father reported that his visitation rights were not being
respected, and that he wanted DCFS to start a process to place
Chris in his physical custody. Chris indicated that he had a good
relationship with Mother and wanted to return to her home.
Chris did not want to talk about his relationship with Father and
appeared upset when asked about Father.
On January 22, 2025, DCFS filed a section 385 application
requesting that the juvenile court change its prior detention
order and release Chris to Mother. In response, the court ordered
that Chris be released to Mother pending the adjudication of the
section 387 petition. Prior to the adjudication hearing, DCFS
also recommended that the court dismiss the section 387 petition
and grant Mother additional family maintenance services to
assist with Chris’s transition back into Mother’s care.
On January 28, 2025, Father filed a petition under
sections 385 and 388 requesting the release of Chris to his
custody, or in the alternative, overnight visits or unmonitored
day visits with the child. On January 29, 2025, the juvenile court

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granted Father’s request for unmonitored day visits, but not his
request for custody.
4. February 5, 2025 review hearing
On February 5, 2025, the juvenile court held an
adjudication hearing on the section 387 petition and a review
hearing under section 364. The court dismissed the section 387
petition without prejudice. The court found that continued
jurisdiction over Chris was necessary and granted Mother
additional family maintenance services. The court also set a
further status review hearing in three months.
During the February 5, 2025 hearing, Father’s counsel
asked the court to grant Father “full custody” of Chris, or in the
alternative, to issue a “home of parents order” that would allow
Father “to exercise some form of custody.” Counsel for Chris,
counsel for DCFS, and counsel for Mother each objected to
Father’s request. Chris’s counsel explained: “Chris never lived
with his father. He … wants to visit with his father in California.
He doesn’t want to even have overnight visits with [F]ather at
this point. So that would be removing Chris from his entire life
in California.” Chris’s counsel also noted that there were “recent
issues with [F]ather … advising Chris not to take his
medication,” and that when Chris visited Father in the past,
“those visits did not go well.” After hearing the argument, the
court denied Father’s request, but ordered DCFS to assess
Father’s circumstances in the event that Chris needed to be
removed from Mother in the future.
On February 19, 2025, Father filed a notice of appeal from
the juvenile court’s February 5, 2025 order denying his request
for custody.

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5. July 1, 2025 review hearing
In a status review report filed in May 2025, DCFS updated
the family’s circumstances. Chris was hospitalized for a one-
month period between February and March 2025, and following
his discharge, the child continued to reside with Mother while
receiving services for his mental health issues. Since his most
recent hospitalization, Chris had been compliant with his
prescribed medication and demonstrated improved behavior.
In February 2025, DCFS asked Chris if he wanted to live
with Father. The child replied that he wanted to live with
Mother and not with Father, though he was willing to have
phone calls with Father once he was discharged from the
hospital. However, following his discharge in March 2025, Chris
repeatedly told the social worker that he did not want in-person
or phone visits with Father, and that he knew he could call
Father whenever he wanted.
During this period of supervision, DCFS made multiple
attempts to contact Father to assess his circumstances and to
arrange for him to attend a child and family team meeting
regarding Chris. However, Father was not responsive to these
efforts. In addition, Chris’s Wraparound service team reported
that Father was verbally aggressive during a phone call with one
team member and sent an inappropriate video to another team
member. The staff at the hospital where Chris was receiving
psychiatric care also reported that Father appeared to be
inebriated on two occasions. Chris’s psychiatrist further noted
that “there were ‘concerns with [Father] not respecting
boundaries involving Chris[’s] care,’ ” and that Father needed to
“abandon his ‘antagonistic approach’ for the betterment of
Chris’[s] mental health.”

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 In its report, DCFS stated that Mother complied with the
court’s orders and continued to make progress in addressing
Chris’s behavioral issues. DCFS recommended the juvenile court
terminate jurisdiction over Chris and grant joint legal custody to
both parents, sole physical custody to Mother, and unmonitored
visits to Father.
On July 1, 2025, the juvenile court held a review hearing
for Chris under section 364. In addition to admitting DCFS’s
reports, the court heard testimony from Father. According to his
testimony, Father wanted joint legal custody of Chris so that he
could be informed about child’s medical and behavioral issues.
He also wanted joint physical custody because he believed “no kid
should be absent from neither parent,” and he had been unable to
have regular in-person visits with Chris since the start of the
case. Father stated that he had no issues with Chris primarily
residing with Mother as long as the child was safe. However,
Father believed Mother should not have tie-breaking authority
because the family would not be in dependency court if Mother
“did it the right way.” Father also testified that, if the court did
not grant him joint physical custody, he wanted overnight visits
and daily phone calls.
In their argument to the court, all parties agreed that
jurisdiction over Chris should be terminated. While Father
sought joint legal and physical custody, Mother asked the court to
grant her sole custody and to not allow Father overnight visits.
Counsel for Chris and counsel for DCFS asked the court to grant
sole physical custody to Mother and joint legal custody to both
parents. Chris’s counsel noted that the child did not want
increased contact with Father but instead wanted the same
visitation schedule that preceded court involvement.

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 At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court
terminated jurisdiction over Chris pending the receipt of a
custody and visitation order that granted joint legal custody to
both parents, sole physical custody to Mother, and unmonitored
visits to Father. With respect to visitation, the court initially
stated that Father would have “two overnight visits a month”
with each visit being “one night” in duration. However, the court
later stated that it was going to “amend its prior order” regarding
the duration of the visits, and “make that two consecutive nights
of overnight visits” with the parents having discretion to extend
those visits. The court also ordered that Father was allowed one
30-minute phone call with Chris per week.
On July 7, 2025, the juvenile court signed the exit order
and terminated jurisdiction over Chris. With respect to Father’s
overnight visitation, the written custody order stated that
“Father is authorized to have unmonitored visitation a minimum
of two times per month for two consecutive overnights, within Los
Angeles County.” However, the attached visitation order
provided that “Father is authorized to have unmonitored
visitation a minimum of one time per month for two consecutive
overnights, within Los Angeles County.”
On August 21, 2025, Father filed a notice of appeal from
the juvenile court’s July 7, 2025 custody and visitation orders.
DISCUSSION
1. Father’s appeal from the February 5, 2025 order
denying his request for physical custody
In his first appeal, Father challenges the juvenile court’s
order at the February 5, 2025 review hearing denying Father’s
request for sole physical custody of Chris, or in the alternative,
a home of parents placement order. We conclude Father’s first

9
appeal has been rendered moot by the juvenile court’s subsequent
custody and visitation exit orders.
“A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible
for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the
appellant], to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) A reviewing court must “ ‘ “decide on
a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile
dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision
would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.” ’ ” (Id. at
p. 276.) Even where a case is moot, the court has discretion to
reach the merits if the challenged order “ ‘could be prejudicial to
the appellant or could potentially impact the current or future
dependency proceedings,’ or ‘ “could have other consequences for
[the appellant], beyond jurisdiction.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 285.)
Here, Father’s appeal from the denial of custody request at
the February 5, 2025 review hearing is moot because the juvenile
court’s July 7, 2025 exit orders superseded any interim custody
and visitation orders. Accordingly, “reversing an earlier order on
custody and/or visitation could not deliver the desired relief—
namely, a change in custody and/or visitation. Even after such
reversal, the more recent custody and visitation terms contained
in the exit order would govern.” (In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
654, 666–667; see also Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th
1150, 1165 [juvenile court’s “exit order ‘determining custody of, or
visitation with, the child’ ” is “ ‘a final judgment and shall remain
in effect after [the juvenile court’s] jurisdiction is terminated’ ”].)
Father also has filed an appeal from the juvenile court’s
exit orders, and we address the merits of this second appeal
below. However, Father has not shown how the earlier denial of
his request to have Chris placed with him prejudiced him with

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respect to the subsequent exit orders, nor has he demonstrated
how an interim ruling regarding custody or visitation could
adversely impact him in any future dependency proceedings.
Because we cannot provide effective relief from an order that is
no longer in effect, Father’s challenge to the February 5, 2025
denial of his custody request is moot.
2. Father’s appeal from the July 7, 2025 exit orders
granting Mother sole physical custody
In his second appeal, Father contends the juvenile court
erred in issuing its custody and visitation exit orders because the
court should have granted Father joint physical custody of Chris
rather than unmonitored visitation. Father also claims the
court’s written exit order regarding visitation conflicts with its
oral ruling at the July 1, 2025 review hearing. We conclude the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting Mother sole
physical custody of Chris in its exit orders, but the written
visitation order contains a clerical error that requires correction.
2.1. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
in granting sole physical custody to Mother
When terminating jurisdiction over a dependent child,
section 362.4 authorizes the juvenile court to issue “an order
determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child.” (Id.,
subd. (a).) Section 362.4 further provides that the order “shall
continue until modified or terminated by a subsequent order of
the superior court,” and directs that the order be filed in a
pending family court proceeding (id., subd. (b)) or, if there is
none, as part of a new family court file (id., subd. (c)). When the
juvenile court issues a custody or visitation order under
section 362.4, “[t]he order shall not be modified” in a family court
proceeding “unless the court finds that there has been a
significant change of circumstances since the juvenile court

11
issued the order and modification of the order is in the best
interests of the child.” (§ 302, subd. (d).)
In making a custody or visitation order under section 362.4
(commonly referred to as an “exit order”), the court’s “ ‘focus and
primary consideration must always be the best interests of the
child.’ ” (In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513.) The juvenile
court is not restrained by any preferences or presumptions that
ordinarily apply in family court. (In re Nicholas H. (2003)
112 Cal.App.4th 251, 268.) We review a juvenile court’s exit
order for abuse of discretion. (In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th
886, 902.)
In this case, the juvenile court acted well within its
discretion in issuing exit orders for Chris that granted sole
physical custody to Mother and unmonitored visitation to Father.
At the start of these dependency proceedings in March 2024,
Father did not have any custodial rights with respect to Chris.
Rather, Mother, who resided in Los Angeles with the child, had
sole physical and legal custody, and Father, who lived in Chicago,
had limited visitation rights. Over the course of the case, Father
had occasional in-person visits and phone calls with Chris, but he
did not maintain contact with the child consistently. In addition,
when Father did have contact with Chris early in the case, he
directed the child not to take his prescribed psychotropic
medication. Father also repeatedly declined to attend meetings
to address Chris’s serious behavioral issues because he did not
believe the child needed mental health services or medication.
Further, Chris’s Wraparound service team as well as the staff at
the hospital where the child was being treated reported to DCFS
that Father engaged in inappropriate conduct to staff when
contacting those providers about Chris. The child’s treating

12
psychiatrist likewise raised concerns about Father’s conduct,
noting that Father needed to “abandon his ‘antagonistic
approach’ for the betterment of Chris’[s] mental health.”
Moreover, throughout the dependency proceedings, Chris
expressed that he did not want to live with Father or even have
increased visitation with him. (See In re Aljamie D. (2000)
84 Cal.App.4th 424, 432 [while not determinative, child’s
testimony that she wanted to live with her mother “constitutes
powerful demonstrative evidence that it would be in her best
interest to allow her to do so”].) When DCFS interviewed Chris
in May 2024, the child had difficulty discussing his relationship
with Father, but was clear that he did not want any overnight
visits with Father. In December 2024, after the juvenile court
granted Father’s request for a weekend visit, Chris told DCFS
that he wanted to limit the visit to one day only, and that Father
was “always trying to turn him against [Mother].” In February
2025, when Chris was again hospitalized, he indicated that he
wanted to live with Mother and to have phone calls with Father
once he was discharged. However, after his discharge from the
hospital in March 2025, Chris repeatedly stated that he did not
want in-person or phone visits with Father, and he would call
Father if he changed his mind. At the July 1, 2025 review
hearing, Chris’s counsel reiterated that the child was opposed to
any change in custody or visitation, noting that Chris “wants to
remain with his mother,” and he “wants contact with his dad
twice a month as it was before.”
Based on the totality of this record, the juvenile court
reasonably could conclude that Chris’s best interests would be
served by maintaining the current custody arrangement where
Mother would have sole physical custody of the child and Father

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would have unmonitored visitation. The juvenile court therefore
did not abuse its discretion in issuing the custody and visitation
exit orders.
2.2. The juvenile court’s visitation exit order
contains a clerical error requiring correction
Father contends, and DCFS concedes, that the juvenile
court’s July 7, 2025 exit order regarding visitation conflicts with
its oral ruling at the July 1, 2025 review hearing, and that the
oral ruling should control. We agree.
Our Supreme Court has prescribed the following approach
for resolving conflicts between a clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts:
“ ‘[W]hen … the record is in conflict it will be harmonized if
possible; but where this is not possible that part of the record will
prevail, which, because of its origin and nature or otherwise, is
entitled to greater credence [citation]. Therefore whether the
recitals in the clerk’s minutes should prevail as against contrary
statements in the reporter’s transcript, must depend upon the
circumstances of each particular case.’ ” (People v. Smith (1983)
33 Cal.3d 596, 599; accord, People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th
545, 552, fn. 6; People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 226.)
At the July 1, 2025 hearing, the juvenile court ordered that
Father’s unmonitored in-person visits with Chris would consist of
“two overnight visits a month” for “two consecutive nights.”
The court made this order in response to Father’s request for two
consecutive weekend nights so that he could plan certain
activities with Chris such as camping and fishing. The court’s
July 7, 2025 written custody order accurately reflects this oral
ruling, and states that “Father is authorized to have unmonitored
visitation a minimum of two times per month for two consecutive
overnights, within Los Angeles County” (italics added). However,
the attached visitation order provides that “Father is authorized

14
to have unmonitored visitation a minimum of one time per month
for two consecutive overnights, within Los Angeles County”
(italics added).
Under these circumstances, the juvenile court’s oral ruling
is entitled to greater credence, as it appears that the reference to
“one time per month” on the written visitation order was the
result of a clerical error. The visitation exit order accordingly
must be corrected to state that “Father is authorized to have
unmonitored visitation a minimum of two times per month for
two consecutive overnights, within Los Angeles County.” The
juvenile court is directed to make this correction to the visitation
exit order on remand. (See In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796,
800 [remanding matter to juvenile court to “correct the exit order
so it is consistent with the oral order regarding visitation”].)
DISPOSITION
Father’s appeal from the juvenile court’s February 5, 2025
order is dismissed. The juvenile court’s July 7, 2025 custody and
visitation exit orders are affirmed, and the matter is remanded to
the juvenile court for correction of the visitation exit order.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

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