Filed 9/10/26 Lettini v. Cherry Bekaert Advisory CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
NICOLIE LETTINI, B350508
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24STCV33806)
CHERRY BEKAERT
ADVISORY LLC,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Rupert A. Byrdsong, Judge. Reversed and
remanded for further proceedings.
LOIA and Ilya Alekseyeff for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Littler Mendelson, Derek S. Hecht, and James A. Becerra
for Defendant and Respondent.
******
For 20 years, attorney Ilya Alekseyeff has been
representing private clients in civil matters while employed as a
deputy alternate public defender in Los Angeles County. In so
doing, he has persistently violated the law. Worse yet, he has
repeatedly lied about it, reporting to the Alternate Public
Defender’s Office that he was not engaged in outside
employment. In this matter, Alekseyeff represents a private
client in a civil case against her former employer. Upon
discovering Alekseyeff’s legally prohibited dual employment, the
former employer applied ex parte to disqualify Alekseyeff as the
client’s counsel. The trial court “[g]ranted” the application, but
did not purport to exercise its authority to disqualify counsel on
its own motion. We conclude that the employer lacked standing
to seek Alekseyeff’s disqualification. We nevertheless recognize
that Alekseyeff’s violation of the per se prohibition against
representing civil clients provides a basis for the trial court to
disqualify him even without an application or motion, and
remand for the trial court to determine whether to exercise that
authority should it determine that Alekseyeff’s subsequent
resignation as a deputy alternate public defender does not render
the issue moot.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Alekseyeff Violates the Law and Lies to Conceal That
Violation
Since 2006, Alekseyeff has been employed by Los Angeles
County (the County) as either a deputy public defender (between
2006 and 2008) or a deputy alternate public defender (between
2008 and the date of the disqualification order challenged in this
appeal). The County’s Charter provides that the Public Defender
and their deputies “shall not engage in any private law practice,
and they shall devote all their time and attention during business
hours, to the duties of their respective offices.” (L.A. County
Charter, § 55; see also Gov. Code, § 27705.) The County’s Code
further provides that the Alternate Public Defender shall “serve
in the same manner as the public defender,” and that its deputies
“shall have the same qualifications required by law for
comparable deputy public defenders.” (L.A. County Mun. Code,
§ 2.11.020.)
Notwithstanding these restrictions, Alekseyeff has since
2006 also been representing private clients in a variety of civil
matters, and has actively concealed those representations by
repeatedly certifying to his public employer, in documents titled
“Employee Report on Outside Employment Activities,” that he
was “not presently engaged . . . in outside employment.”
(Capitalization and underscoring omitted, italics added.) He
executed two of those documents in February 2024 and
September 2025—the latter of which was executed while
representing a party in this civil case.
II. Alekseyeff Represents Nicolie Lettini in This Case
On December 20, 2024, Nicolie Lettini sued her former
employer, Cherry Bekaert Advisory LLC (Cherry Bekaert), for
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fraud and unfair business practices.1 At all times, Lettini has
been represented by Alekseyeff and his law corporation, LOIA,
Inc.
III. Cherry Bekaert Files an Ex Parte Application to
Disqualify Alekseyeff
On October 15, 2025, Cherry Bekaert filed an ex parte
application to disqualify Alekseyeff on the ground that his
employment as a deputy alternate public defender disqualified
him from simultaneously representing civil clients. Cherry
Bekaert argued that Alekseyeff had repeatedly cited the needs of
his criminal clients when delaying litigation of this case.2
Lettini filed an opposition the same day,3 arguing, among
other things, that the bar on outside employment did not apply to
1 Lettini also sued Cherry Bekaert’s partners, Christian
Fuellgraf and Collin Hill, neither of whom are parties to this
appeal. Cherry Bekaert cross complained against Lettini and
several others, including Alekseyeff’s domestic partner Artur
Elizarov as well as Elizarov’s company Capital Accounting
Partners, LLC, neither of whom are parties to this appeal.
2 Cherry Bekaert also observed that the suspension of
Alekseyeff’s law corporation by the Franchise Tax Board for
failing to pay its taxes “highlight[ed]” the “impropriety” of his
continued representation of Lettini in this case.
3 Lettini’s opposition is file-stamped October 15, 2025, but
Lettini submits a request asking us to judicially notice a printout
showing that the payment of fees for the opposition was not
processed until October 21, 2025. As discussed below, we reject
both parties’ requests to expand the record by which we evaluate
the propriety of the disqualification order. More to the point,
because we conclude that the disqualification order must be
reversed on its merits, any procedural defect is of no consequence.
4
Alekseyeff, and that Cherry Bekaert lacked standing to seek his
disqualification.
IV. The Trial Court Grants the Application, and
Alekseyeff Appeals
On October 20, 2025, the trial court “[g]ranted” the
application, and Alekseyeff filed a notice of appeal. The text of
the court’s minute order referred solely to Cherry Bekaert’s
application, and made no mention of the court exercising its own
authority to disqualify counsel.
V. Alekseyeff Resigns from the Alternate Public
Defender’s Office
Nine days later, Alekseyeff filed a declaration in the trial
court stating that he had resigned from the Alternate Public
Defender’s Office, effective October 31, 2025. The trial court
stayed the proceedings below pending this appeal.4
DISCUSSION
Lettini appeals the trial court’s order disqualifying
Alekseyeff as her attorney. “[O]rders granting . . . attorney
disqualification motions are immediately appealable in California
state courts.” (URS Corp. v. Atkinson/Walsh Joint Venture
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 872, 878.) We review such orders for an
abuse of discretion (People ex rel. Depart. of Corporations v.
SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1143
(SpeeDee Oil)), reviewing for substantial evidence any subsidiary
factual findings (ibid.), but reviewing de novo any subsidiary
4 On March 12, 2026, Lettini filed an unopposed motion to
augment the record in this appeal with Alekseyeff’s October 29,
2025 declaration, as well as a minute order and reporter’s
transcript from the October 29, 2025 hearing. That motion is
granted. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1).)
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legal issues, such as whether a party has standing to seek
disqualification (Great Lakes Construction, Inc. v. Burman (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1354 (Great Lakes)). Because our focus is
on the propriety of the trial court’s ruling at the time it was made
(People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 176), we reject
the parties’ efforts to have us evaluate the disqualification ruling
in this case in the light of additional evidence never presented to
the trial court; we accordingly deny the parties’ competing
requests for judicial notice.
Trial courts may disqualify an attorney as part of their
inherent and statutory authority to control the proceedings before
them. (Moreci v. Scaffold Solutions, Inc. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
425, 432 (Moreci); Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(5).) In so
doing, courts must weigh the competing interests of clients’ right
to counsel of their choice against the need “to preserve public
trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity
of the bar.” (SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1145.) The
latter concern is “paramount” and takes precedence. (Ibid.)
Counsel may be disqualified in response to a party’s noticed
motion or ex parte application to disqualify counsel or in the
exercise of the court’s own motion. The requirements of each
differ.
I. Disqualification in Response to a Motion or Ex Parte
Application
Because disqualification “is a drastic course of action”
(Roush v. Seagate Technology, LLC (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 210,
219), and because disqualification motions and ex parte
applications have the potential to become a strategic tool to
harass opposing counsel or delay litigation, a party seeking
disqualification must establish both a basis for disqualification
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and standing to move for disqualification (Great Lakes, supra,
186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1358).
A party seeking disqualification has standing if they have a
“legally protected” or otherwise “sufficient” interest that would be
adversely affected if the attorney at issue was not disqualified.
(Great Lakes, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356, citing Angelucci
v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 175.) Case law
identifies four general situations in which a party has the
requisite “legally protected” interest to seek disqualification—
namely, (1)where the party has a past or present attorney-client
relationship with the attorney to be disqualified (Moreci, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 432; Great Lakes, at p. 1356); (2) where the
attorney to be disqualified owes the party a duty of
confidentiality, even if that duty does not arise from a past or
present attorney-client relationship (DCH Health Services Corp.
v. Waite (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 829, 832); (3) where the party has
a “‘personal stake’ in the motion” because they would suffer
“cognizable injury” if the attorney continued his representation in
the case (Great Lakes, at pp. 1357-1358; Colyer v. Smith (C.D.Cal.
1999) 50 F.Supp.2d 966, 971; Kennedy v. Eldridge (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205 (Kennedy)); and (4) where the attorney’s
continued participation in the case “would undermine the
integrity of the judicial process” because that participation would
permit an “‘ethical breach’” so “‘“‘manifest and glaring’”’” that it
would “‘“impact[] the [] party’s interest in a just and lawful
determination”’” of the action (Kennedy, at pp. 1204-1205;
Conservatorship of Lee C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 1072, 1083).
We need not address the avalanche of attacks Lettini levels
against the trial court’s disqualification order, including Lettini’s
contention that it was improper to order disqualification on an ex
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parte basis without holding a hearing, because Cherry Bekaert
lacked standing to seek disqualification of Alekseyeff.
It is undisputed that Cherry Bekaert and Alekseyeff have
never had an attorney-client relationship (the first scenario).
It is also undisputed that Alekseyeff did not otherwise owe
Cherry Bekaert a duty of confidentiality (the second scenario).
Cherry Bekaert has also failed to establish how Alekseyeff’s
continued representation of Lettini—in violation of the statutory
bar against dual representation—would cause Cherry Bekaert to
suffer a “cognizable injury” or “impact” its interest “in a just and
lawful determination” of the action (the last two scenarios).
Cherry Bekaert articulates two alleged impacts or injuries.
First, it argues that Alekseyeff has in the past cited his
criminal caseload as the reason why he has failed to deliver
discovery on time, why he has asked to continue hearings, and
why he has “rush[ed]” hearings; Cherry Bekaert asserts that
allowing the dual caseload to continue will “caus[e further] delay
and additional expense.” The delay and expense to one party
that arises when the opposing party’s counsel is overly busy is
not a cognizable injury sufficient to confer standing to disqualify
that counsel; if it were, disqualification motions would be a dime
a dozen.
Second, Cherry Bekaert argues Alekseyeff’s simultaneous
handling of civil cases while working as a deputy alternate public
defender undermines the integrity of the judicial process. We
agree that Alekseyeff’s outside representation and concerted
efforts to conceal that prohibited representation from the
alternate public defender’s office was inconsistent with the
statutory requirements of his oath of office. In so concluding, we
necessarily reject, as bordering on frivolous, Alekseyeff’s
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statutory construction-based assertion that the limitations on
outside representation do not apply to deputy alternate public
defenders because one section of the County’s Code provides that
the “alternate public defender” “serve[s] in the same manner as
the public defender” but does not impose the identical “same
manner” requirement for the alternate public defender’s deputies
(L.A. County Mun. Code, § 2.11.020); given that the public
defender, deputy public defenders, and the alternate public
defender are all subject to the bar on outside practice, we see no
reason in logic or linguistics to exempt deputy alternate public
defenders from that bar, particularly when those deputy
alternate public defenders must share the “same qualifications”
as their fellow deputy public defenders (ibid.). We also
necessarily reject Alekseyeff’s fact-based argument that, even if
the prohibition on outside employment applied to him, he never
violated it because he only took on civil cases in which his
spouse’s (and, by extension, his own) interests were at stake. The
prohibition contains no such personal interest exception, and
even if it did, Alekseyeff surely violated it in this case when
Lettini sued Cherry Bekaert. Although Alekseyeff’s conduct in
violating the statutory prohibition and then lying about it
impugns the judicial process, standing exists only if that
besmirchment impacts the movant’s interests—and Cherry
Bekaert has shown no adverse impact beyond the dismay felt by
any other member of the legal profession upon learning of
Alekseyeff’s brazen conduct.
Cherry Bekaert makes two further arguments in support of
its assertion that it has standing to seek disqualification of
Alekseyeff.
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First, it asserts that the fourth scenario—for situations in
which an attorney’s continued involvement in the case “would
undermine the integrity of the judicial process”—does not require
proof of adverse impact to Cherry Bekaert because language in
Kennedy, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1204-1205 states that a
trial court may sua sponte disqualify an attorney based on “‘[t]he
court[’s] independent interest in ensuring trials are conducted
within ethical standards of the profession.’” Regardless of the
Kennedy opinion’s broad language, Kennedy and the other cases
Cherry Bekaert cites for this point all arose in scenarios where
the attorney’s continued representation had a cognizable impact
on the opposing party in that case. (Kennedy, at p. 1200
[disqualifying attorney from representing his son in custody
dispute over grandchild, where he could potentially misuse
confidential information and would likely be called as a witness];
Jarvis v. Jarvis (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 113, 120-121 [disqualifying
attorney from representing limited partnership in one partner’s
action against the other partner and the partnership, based on
concerns that the attorney, whose representation was not
approved by both partners, was adverse to the partnership’s best
interests]; People v. Peoples (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1592, 1599
(Peoples) [disqualifying attorney from representing her brother in
criminal case in which brother was accused of assaulting her ex-
husband with a deadly weapon and to which her children were
percipient witnesses]; Comden v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d
906, 912 [disqualifying attorney who was potential witness at
trial], superseded by statute as stated in Eaton v. Siemens
(E.D.Cal. 2007) 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 58621.) We decline to
decouple the broad language in these cases from their facts.
Doing so would effectively eradicate the standing requirement
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anytime a court disqualifies counsel at a party’s suggestion
(whether formally by motion or application, or informally),
thereby undermining the standing requirement’s purpose of
preventing litigants from bringing disqualification motions and
applications for strategic gain.
Second, Cherry Bekaert argues that Alekseyeff’s continued
representation negatively impacts Cherry Bekaert because, if
Cherry Bekaert prevails in this case, Lettini can cite Alekseyeff’s
violation of the statutory prohibition against outside employment
as a basis to overturn Cherry Bekaert’s victory under the Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 1.7 (Rule 1.7), which precludes a
client—here, Lettini—from consenting to representation that is
“prohibited by law.” (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.7(d)(2).) It is
unclear whether Rule 1.7’s bar on consent applies here because
the rule applies when a lawyer’s representation “is directly
adverse to another client in the same or a separate matter,” and
there is no such directly adverse representation in this case. (Id.,
rule 1.7(a).) And even if Rule 1.7 applies, its violation does not
provide Lettini with a basis to collaterally attack a judgment; her
remedy might instead lie in a malpractice claim. (Accord,
Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 602,
621 [“‘the California State Bar’s Rules of Professional Conduct
govern attorney discipline; they do not create standards for
disqualification in the courts’”].)
II. Disqualification on the Court’s Own Motion
In recognition of the judiciary’s “‘independent interest in
ensuring that criminal [and civil] trials are conducted within the
ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings
appear fair to all who observe them’” (Peoples, supra, 51
Cal.App.4th at p. 1599, quoting Wheat v. United States (1988) 486
11
U.S. 153, 160), trial courts have the authority to disqualify an
attorney on their own motion (People v. Superior Court (Greer)
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 261, fn. 4, superseded on other grounds by
Pen. Code, § 1424; Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry & Berry
(1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 9, 27, fn. 6). This sua sponte authority to
disqualify is necessarily narrow; were that authority much
broader, it could swallow the standing requirement whole, for a
party lacking standing could simply ask the court to exercise its
own authority to disqualify and, if exercised, sidestep any need to
show standing. Thus, a court’s authority to disqualify may well
reach no further than those very rare situations where a positive
statutory provision erects a per se prohibition on counsel’s
representation in a case, for it is in those situations that
continued representation is an unassailable affront to the
integrity of the court. This would include the statutory bar on
practicing law without a license. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6125.) It
would also include the situation present in this case, where state
and County law together prohibit deputy alternate public
defenders from representing civil litigants.
In this case, the trial court did not purport to sua sponte
exercise its authority to disqualify Alekseyeff; the court’s order
referred solely to Cherry Bekaert’s application. We accordingly
remand for the trial court to consider whether it wishes to
exercise its inherent authority after giving the parties an
opportunity to respond, and, possibly, to consider whether
Alekseyeff’s resignation from the Alternate Public Defender’s
Office renders any basis for disqualification moot.
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DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. Each party is to bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
MOOR
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