Filed 9/10/26 In re Violet R.L. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re VIOLET R.L., a Person Coming B351645
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_____________________________________
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND Super. Ct. No. 24LJJP00295A)
FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
S.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jennifer Baronoff, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jane Kwon, Principal Deputy
County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
S.L. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order
terminating parental rights to her daughter, Violet R.L. Mother
contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by concluding
that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption
did not apply. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Petition; reunification period.
Mother tested positive for amphetamines and marijuana at
Violet’s birth in September 2024.2 Mother reported that she had
been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and said she used marijuana to
manage her mental health symptoms. She admitted smoking
methamphetamines the day she went into labor with Violet.
Mother and Alfredo R. (father) had lived in their truck
1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 Mother has an older child, Vida T., who was detained
during an earlier dependency case and is living with the
maternal grandmother under a legal guardianship. Vida is not a
subject of this appeal.
2
throughout her pregnancy. Father denied drug use but said he
abused alcohol.
Violet was small for her gestational age and had difficulty
feeding. She was placed in foster care upon her discharge from
the hospital.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) filed a juvenile dependency petition in
September 2024. As subsequently amended, the petition alleged
that mother had a history of substance abuse, used marijuana
and methamphetamines during her pregnancy, and had a
positive toxicology screen the day she gave birth to Violet
(count b-1); father had a history of substance abuse and currently
abused alcohol (count b-2); mother had a history of mental and
emotional problems, including diagnoses of depression, bipolar
disorder, schizophrenia, anxiety, and PTSD (count b-3); and
mother and father had a history of domestic violence (count b-4).
The juvenile court ordered Violet detained.
Between September and November 2024, mother tested
positive for marijuana once, had one negative drug test, and
missed 10 other tests. She had a visit with Violet in October.
In November 2024, Violet was placed with a new foster
parent, Ms. R. Violet subsequently was diagnosed with
hypertonia (muscle rigidity) and plagiocephaly (flat head
syndrome) and was referred to the Regional Center for physical
and occupational therapy.
At a December 2024 jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
the juvenile court sustained the allegations of the petition and
ordered Violet removed from both parents. The court ordered
mother to participate in a drug and alcohol treatment program, a
parenting program, a domestic violence victims support group,
3
and mental health counseling; to drug test; to submit to a
psychiatric evaluation; and to take all prescribed psychiatric
medications. Mother was permitted three monitored visits with
Violet each week.
In June 2025, DCFS reported that Violet was “strongly
bonded” with her caregiver and appeared to enjoy her visits with
mother. Mother had visits on Wednesdays and Fridays
supervised by her friend, Jaimmy J., but declined visits on
Mondays supervised by a DCFS worker. Mother was not drug
testing and had not enrolled in any court-ordered services.
In August 2025, the juvenile court found both parents’
progress insubstantial and terminated their reunification
services.
II. Termination of parental rights.
In September 2025, Ms. R. said she would like to adopt
Violet. Violet appeared happy and at ease with Ms. R. and was
strongly bonded to her.
DCFS reported that between June 2025 and January 2026,
mother had attended 29 visits monitored by her friend, Jaimmy.
Visits reportedly went well. Mother cancelled or failed to confirm
13 visits during this period, and Jaimmy cancelled four other
visits.
At the January 8, 2026 section 366.26 hearing, Jaimmy
testified that she had monitored mother’s visits with Violet since
November 2024. Visits were on Mondays for three-and-a-half
hours, and on Wednesdays for two hours. Jaimmy never had
safety concerns during visits or suspected mother was under the
influence. She described a significant bond between mother and
Violet, saying Violet got excited when she saw mother, smiling
and reaching for her. Mother was very loving and interactive
4
with Violet. Mother and Violet painted, sang, and talked
together. When Violet saw mother after a two week break
because Jaimmy had been ill, Violet started crying and reached
for mother to pick her up, and then leaned her head against
mother’s chest. Violet had just started speaking some words, and
could say “hi” and “mama.” Jaimmy did not believe terminating
parental rights was in Violet’s best interests because “she knows
. . . her mother. She knows the relationship she has with her.
That’s going to be traumatizing.” Jaimmy said the bond between
mother and Violet was “really strong” and Violet became upset if
she missed visits with mother. Jaimmy said, however, that
Violet did not cry at the end of visits and seemed happy to see her
caregiver.
Mother testified that she declined a DCFS monitor because
she was just getting to know Violet and thought the process
would be easier with someone she knew. During visits, mother
hugged Violet, helped her learn to walk, introduced her to new
foods, and taught her Spanish. Mother said she would like to
attend Violet’s doctor’s appointments but couldn’t because she
didn’t have a car. Mother believed Violet liked spending time
with her because Violet reached for mother and was “happy,
smiling” with her. Once, when Violet was sick, she “just wanted
to lay on my [mother’s] chest and, you know, be laying down with
me the whole time. Sometimes that’s what she does at our . . .
visits. Just regularly she wants to sleep and just hear my
heartbeat.” Mother believed Violet knew she was her mother
because she “laid on my chest and she looked at me and then she
put her head back on my chest. And I was like, yeah. . . . We
shared a body for nine months, so I know my heartbeat is
something she knows very well.” Mother continued: “The whole
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time, . . . she’s just mom, mom, mom, and she’s just like my
mom’s here, my mom’s here.” Mother said she had feared Violet
didn’t know who she was, but “that moment it—I knew that she
knew who I was.”
Mother believed terminating parental rights was not in
Violet’s best interests because “she has a family. She has her
mother. I have my—my mental health issues that unfortunately
are varying right now, but I don’t feel like forever should be, you
know, opposed [sic] to me or her, if anything.” Mother believed it
would be in Violet’s best interests ultimately to “get[ ] to be with
her family.”
DCFS’s counsel argued the parent-child bond was not
sufficiently substantial to prevent Violet’s adoption. Counsel did
not believe that mother’s visits were consistent or that Violet’s
relationship with her mother was emotionally significant. In
contrast, Violet was closely bonded to her caregiver, who wished
to adopt her. Minor’s counsel agreed, noting that because of
Violet’s young age and the fact that she had never lived with
mother, the relationship between mother and child was limited,
and Violet was not affected by a separation from mother.
Further, the alternative mother proposed—a legal guardianship
with Ms. R.—would keep Violet in perpetual limbo.
Mother’s counsel asked the court to order legal
guardianship with Ms. R. Counsel argued that mother visited
regularly and Violet was always happy around mother. Counsel
thus contended that ending visits would be detrimental to Violet.
Counsel noted, moreover, that the caregiver was over 60 years old
and might not be able to care for Violet as she got older.
The juvenile court concluded that mother’s visits were
“relatively consistent” and there was a substantial positive
6
attachment between mother and child. It found, however, that
the detriment of terminating Violet’s relationship with her
parents was outweighed by the benefits of adoption, and it
therefore terminated parental rights. The court explained:
“I have to look at Violet’s age. I have to look at the fact
that she has been with this caregiver since she was a newborn.
She has been raised by a caregiver who is taking wonderful care
of her, and has ensured all of her services and appointments and
is making sure that Violet is a healthy happy baby.
“These are the things that I have to factor. But I think for
purposes of argument . . . this court can find that there is some
substantial positive emotional attachment, even if the visits are
only two days a week.
“I think where the law is very clear is that third prong. I
have to weigh the detriment of the severance of parental rights
with the benefits of adoption. And it is clear based on, again, the
Legislature and case law—we just had a case out of this court
that was affirmed where I had to terminate parental rights and
the court was really relying on Celine R. where it stated that the
adoption is Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the
best chance at a full emotional commitment from a responsible
caretaker. Guardianship is a less preferable option. It falls short
of the secure and permanent future the Legislature had in mind
for the dependent child. And further, Celine R. says once a minor
is adoptable, the court must order adoption . . . , [unless] of course
unless a parent can demonstrate the parental bond exception.
“So regardless of, again, this court’s personal feelings or
concerns, it is very clear what I am supposed to do, what the
Legislature and the Court of Appeal expects. And because Violet
is so young, because Violet has been in her caregiver’s care since
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she was a newborn, realistically I can’t find that . . . the
detriment of terminating parenting rights would outweigh the
benefits of adoption when Violet is in a secure home [where] the
caregiver has been taking excellent care of her.
“We can’t speculate as to what the future will hold for any
caregiver and for any child. And so with that, the court finds
that the parental bond exception does not exist based on the
evidence.”
Mother timely appealed from the order terminating
parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by concluding
that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption
did not apply. This contention lacks merit, as we discuss.
I. Legal standards.
If the court cannot safely return a dependent child to a
parent’s custody within statutory time limits, the court must set
a hearing under section 366.26 to select a permanent plan for the
child. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).) To
guide the juvenile court, “the statute lists plans in order of
preference and provides a detailed procedure for choosing among
them. (See § 366.26, subd. (b) [‘In choosing among the
alternatives in this subdivision, the court shall proceed pursuant
to subdivision (c)’].) According to that procedure, the court must
first determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the
child is likely to be adopted. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If so,
and if the court finds that there has been a previous
determination that reunification services be terminated, then the
8
court shall terminate parental rights to allow for adoption.”
(Ibid.)
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides an
exception to adoption where terminating parental rights would be
detrimental to the child because “[t]he parents have maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship.” Our Supreme Court
has explained that to establish the parental-benefit exception, a
parent must prove three elements—“(1) regular visitation and
contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would
benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 631.) The parent asserting the parental-benefit exception
must prove each of these three elements by a preponderance of
the evidence. If the parent meets that burden, “the parental-
benefit exception applies such that it would not be in the best
interest of the child to terminate parental rights, and the court
should select a permanent plan other than adoption.” (Id. at
pp. 636–637.)
The first element, regular visitation and contact, “is
straightforward. The question is just whether ‘parents visit
consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court
orders.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The second
element requires the court to “assess whether ‘the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship’ ” in light of various
factors, “such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s
life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative”
effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s
particular needs.’ ” (Ibid.)
9
The third element—whether termination would be
detrimental to the child due to the relationship—requires the
court to decide whether it would be harmful to the child to sever
the relationship and choose adoption. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) In making this determination, a court must
determine “how the child would be affected by losing the parental
relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the child in an
adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Ibid.) In
doing so, courts “should not look to whether the parent can
provide a home for the child; the question is just whether losing
the relationship with the parent would harm the child to an
extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new,
adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 634.) In each case, then, “the court
acts in the child’s best interest in a specific way: it decides
whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the
security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’
[Citation.] ‘If severing the natural parent/child relationship
would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional
attachment such that,’ even considering the benefits of a new
adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[ ]’ the child, the court
should not terminate parental rights. [Citation.] That subtle,
case-specific inquiry is what the statute asks courts to perform:
does the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh
‘the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a]
significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent?]’ ”
(Id. at pp. 633–634.)
Because the first two elements—whether the parent has
visited the child consistently, and whether the relationship is
such that the child would benefit from continuing it—are factual
determinations, we review them for substantial evidence.
10
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 639.) Because the parent bears
the burden of establishing these elements, the juvenile court’s
findings may be reversed only if the evidence compels a finding in
favor of the parent on these issues as a matter of law (In re
Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 647, disapproved of on
other grounds in Caden C., at p. 637, fn. 6), or the court applied
the wrong legal standard and the evidence would support a
finding for the parent (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 865;
In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 526, 533). The third element—
whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child—requires the court to engage in a “delicate balancing”
and assess “the likely course of a future situation that’s
inherently uncertain.” (Caden C., at p. 640.) This determination
is inherently discretionary, and thus we review it for abuse of
discretion. (Ibid.)
II. Analysis.
We assume without deciding that mother established the
first two elements of the Caden C. analysis—that is, that mother
visited Violet regularly, and Violet benefitted from her
relationship with mother. We therefore consider whether the
juvenile court abused its discretion by concluding that the benefit
to Violet of adoption outweighed the harm of severing her
relationship with mother.
We find no abuse of discretion. Violet was detained two
days after her birth and has lived with her caregiver since
infancy. In contrast, Violet has never lived with mother or had
an unsupervised visit with her, and the two have never spent
more than four hours together at any visit. Although Violet was
happy to see mother at the beginning of visits, she had no
difficulty separating from mother when visits ended and there is
11
no evidence that she asked for mother between visits. Nor did
Violet in any way suggest by her behavior that she missed
mother. In short, although Violet enjoyed visits with mother,
there was no evidence that Violet had a sufficiently emotionally
significant relationship with her that outweighed the benefits of
adoption.
Notwithstanding this evidence, mother suggests the
juvenile court erred relying on just three factors—Violet’s young
age, placement since birth, and caregiver stability—to conclude
that terminating parental rights would not be detrimental to
Violet. Mother contends that if those three factors could be
dispositive of the parental-benefit exception, then the exception
would be unavailable to any parent whose child was removed at
or near birth and placed early in a stable home. Adopting such a
“ ‘rule of thumb’ ” approach, mother suggests, would be
inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent and the Supreme
Court’s analysis in Caden C.
We do not agree. While it is undoubtedly true that the
parental-benefit exception will rarely be available where children
have never lived with their parents and thus have formed
primary bonds with other adults, that does not suggest that the
juvenile court erred in its application of the exception here. To
the contrary, under Caden C. the juvenile court was required to
consider “ ‘the age of the child’ ” and “ ‘the portion of the child’s
life spent in the parents’ custody,’ ” as well as the “benefits of a
new adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 632–
633.) Based on those facts and the additional evidence before it,
the juvenile court concluded that the parental bond exception did
not apply.
12
In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803 is instructive.
There, the child tested positive for methadone at birth and was
placed in the home of a foster family, where he thrived. (Id. at
p. 808.) The child saw his parents only during visits, most of
which were monitored. He enjoyed his time with his parents and
was affectionate towards them, but he showed little distress
when he was separated from them, and there was no evidence of
any ill effects on him when his parents were late to visits, cut
visits short, or missed visits entirely. The juvenile court
nonetheless concluded that the parental benefit exception applied
and declined to terminate parental rights. (Id. at pp. 808–809.)
The Court of Appeal reversed. It assumed the evidence was
sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding of a substantial,
positive emotional attachment between the child and his parents,
but found the third element “critically lacking, even given the
deferential standard of review.” (Id. at p. 817.) The court
explained: “Even assuming a substantial emotional attachment
between Andrew and the parents, the relationship between them
cannot be deemed strong for purposes of the detriment analysis.
[Citation.] As discussed, Andrew was very young and never lived
with the parents. Throughout his life, his only interactions with
them were during hours-long visits, almost all of which were
monitored. Although he shared an affectionate connection with
the parents during visits and sometimes indicated reluctance to
leave—through a tight hug or reaching out from his car seat—
there is no evidence that he ever showed distress or was upset
when separating from them. [¶] . . . [¶] There is no question that
there are benefits in continued visits with loving parents to which
the child has some substantial attachment. Yet to justify
withholding the ‘security,’ ‘stability,’ and ‘ “sense of belonging a
13
new family would confer” ’ [citation], the parents must prove
more than ‘ “some benefit” ’ [citation]. We do not suggest the
parents must prove that any particular kind of harm would flow
from the termination of parental rights. But they must prove
some type of harm beyond the fact that their loving visits would
cease.” (Id. at pp. 819–820.)
The present case is analogous to Andrew M. There is no
question in this case that mother loves Violet and Violet enjoys
visits with mother. Nonetheless, as in Andrew M., there is no
evidence here that terminating Violet’s relationship with mother
would be emotionally destabilizing or would otherwise outweigh
the benefit to Violet of adoption.
Mother suggests that the juvenile court erred by concluding
that severing the parent-child was not detrimental to Violet
merely because she did not show outward symptoms of emotional
harm. According to mother, such observable symptoms are “not
available” in cases involving preverbal children and thus “cannot
reasonably be treated as exclusive indicators of detriment.”
Mother offers no support for this assertion, and thus we do not
consider it. In any event, we note that while emotional upset
undoubtedly looks different in young children than it does in
older children or teens, toddlers and babies can express lack of
emotional regulation in a variety of ways, including through
crying or tantruming. No such expressions of upset or distress
were present here.
Mother cites three cases—In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
833, In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, and In re M.V. (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 1155—for the proposition that a reviewing court
should reverse an order terminating parental rights where a
juvenile court “fail[s] to weigh, with the required specificity, the
14
strength of the existing attachment against the benefits of
adoption.” None of these cases is relevant to our analysis. The
first two cases concerned termination orders entered before the
Supreme Court decided Caden C.; in both cases, therefore, the
Courts of Appeal reversed for new hearings based on the legal
standards articulated in Caden C. (In re J.D., at p. 839; In re
B.D., at p. 1231.) In the third case, the juvenile court relied on
improper factors, and thus the Court of Appeal reversed for the
juvenile court to conduct a proper analysis under the Caden C.
framework. (In re M.V., at p. 1186.) In each case, moreover, the
children were significantly older than Violet and had lived with
their parents before being detained. (In re J.D., at p. 855 [five-
and-a-half year old child had lived with mother until age three];
In re B.D., at p. 1222 [child removed from parents at six years];
In re M.V., at pp. 1160, 1184 [child removed from parents at four
years and wanted to remain in contact with her parents].)
Finally, mother contends the juvenile court erred because it
failed to address Jaimmy’s testimony or to acknowledge Ms. R.’s
stated intention not to maintain communication with mother
after adoption. We do not agree. The court plainly considered
Jaimmy’s testimony, concluding on the basis of that testimony
that mother’s visits with Violet had been “relatively consistent.”
The court was not required to adopt Jaimmy’s opinion that there
was a strong bond between mother and Violet or that terminating
parental rights was in Violet’s best interests. Nor was the court
required to address Ms. R.’s statement that she did not intend to
maintain communication with mother after adoption. To the
contrary, under Caden C., the juvenile court “must assume that
terminating parental rights terminates the relationship.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633, italics added.)
15
It is apparent to this court that mother loves Violet. It is
also apparent that Violet is comfortable in mother’s presence and
enjoys visits with her. But “[a] biological parent who has failed to
reunify with an adoptable child may not derail an adoption
merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from
continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation
with the parent.” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466.)
Instead, the parent must demonstrate that the child would, on
balance, benefit from continuing the relationship. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636–637.) The juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion by concluding that mother failed to make
that showing here, and thus that the parental-benefit exception
did not apply.
16
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ASHWORTH, J.*
We concur:
ADAMS, P. J.
HANASONO, J.
* Retired judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
17
