Filed 9/10/26 P. v. Torres CA4/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G065181

v. (Super. Ct. No. 97NF3169)

CHRISTIAN GUILLERMO OPINION
TORRES,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Andre Manssourian, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, A. Natasha Cortina and Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 In 2000, a jury convicted defendant Christian Guillermo Torres of
first degree murder. In 2020, Torres filed a petition for resentencing under
Penal Code former section 1170.95.1 Following an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court denied the petition, finding Torres “acted as an aider and abettor
with the specific intent to kill in the commission of the murder of Jose Marin
on October 24, 1997.” On appeal, Torres contends the evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction for aiding and abetting murder. We
disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
THE ORIGINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
In a 1998 information, Torres was charged with the murder of
Marin on or about October 24, 1997. The information also alleged Torres was
vicariously armed with a firearm and the offense was committed for the
benefit of the Jeffrey Street gang. (§§ 12022, subd. (a)(1), 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)
The case proceeded to a jury trial. Among other things, evidence at trial
showed the following:
Torres was a member of the Jeffrey Street gang. On October 24,
1997, Torres drove two other people into territory that was claimed by a rival
gang called Boyz from the Hood.2 Torres drove slowly down the middle of the

1
“Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text.” (People v. Saavedra
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444, 446, fn. 1; see Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For ease
of reference, this opinion refers to the current Penal Code section. All
undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
The name of this gang is inconsistently spelled in the record as
“Boyz” or “Boys.” Torres’s opening brief on appeal uses the spelling “Boyz,”
which is the spelling used in this opinion.

2
street before stopping by the area where Marin was walking, and one of the
passengers got out of the car and moved toward Marin. There was one
gunshot followed by another gunshot several seconds later.
Marin was shot twice. He died from a gunshot wound to his head
that was consistent with the end of the barrel being in contact with his skin,
and he also had been shot in the back upper portion of his leg. A shell casing
was found more than 40 feet from a pool of blood where Marin had been.
Marin was not a member of the Boyz from the Hood gang; he was a member
of a different gang called Jungle City.
One witness said that, after hearing the gunshots, he saw one
person standing by the passenger side door of the car and another man
running to the car. The witness said the man running to the car was wearing
white gloves.3 A different witness told a police officer, Charles Sullivan, she
had heard arguing followed by two gunshots, but at trial, she denied hearing
anything prior to the first gunshot. After the shooter returned to the car,
Torres drove quickly away, but he was followed for some time by a security
guard who was able to determine the license plate of the car.
The jury found Torres guilty of first degree murder and found the
two enhancement allegations true. The trial court sentenced Torres to 25
years to life imprisonment, plus three years. Torres appealed, and a panel of
this court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Torres (Oct. 28, 2002, G028608)
[nonpub. opn.].)

3
Another witness also saw a person getting into the car wearing
gloves.

3
 II.
THE SECTION 1172.6 PETITION PROCEEDINGS
In October 2020, Torres filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The district attorney conceded Torres had made a prima facie
showing but asserted Torres was ineligible for relief.
In April 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the
petition. The district attorney relied on the record from the trial and did not
call any new witnesses. Torres called to testify Sullivan, who was one of the
investigating officers and had testified at the original trial, including as a
gang expert. Among other things, Sullivan testified regarding a hypothetical
posed to him by Torres’s counsel that was similar to the facts here. He opined
no hit up occurred prior to the shooting.4 Sullivan testified that the gang
members went into the rival territory to kill a Boyz from the Hood member
and there was no need for a hit up because, if gang members are in a rival
gang’s territory and they see a gang member, they will assume he is from
that rival gang.5 Sullivan also testified that because it is dangerous for a
group of gang members to enter the territory of a rival gang, at least one of
them would be carrying a gun, and everyone in the car would know there is a
gun. Sullivan explained that the gang member with the gun would inform the
other gang members about the gun because, if something were to happen to
him, the other gang members would know about the gun and potentially be
able to use it. Sullivan also said that, at the time of the shooting, the Jeffrey

4
Sullivan said a hit up occurs when a gang member asks another
gang member where that gang member is from, and hit ups can lead to
violence.

5
Sullivan said Marin had the appearance of a gang member
based on how he was dressed.

4
Street gang was very brazen and violent, the Jeffrey Street and Boyz from
the Hood gangs had been “feuding for years,” and there had “been murders
all over the place involving these two.”
Torres also called his own gang expert, Adam Mortera, to testify.
When given the same hypothetical set of facts that had earlier been given to
Sullivan, Mortera opined that a hit up had occurred before the shooting. One
of Torres’s arguments at the evidentiary hearing was that, after Marin was
hit up and identified himself as belonging to Jungle City, not Boyz from the
Hood, the shooter acted on his own in deciding to kill a member of a gang
other than Boyz from the Hood.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Torres’s
petition. It found beyond a reasonable doubt that Torres “acted as an aider
and abettor with the specific intent to kill in the commission of the murder of
Jose Marin on October 24, 1997.” Torres appeals the denial of his section
1172.6 petition.
DISCUSSION
Under section 1172.6, subdivision (a), “[a] person convicted of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime . . . may file a petition with the
court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s
murder . . . conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts” when certain conditions apply, including that “[t]he petitioner could
not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes
to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).) “At
the hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the
burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable

5
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by the changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
“[A] defendant may still be liable for murder as a direct aider and
abettor because a direct aider and abettor must possess malice aforethought.”
(People v. Lopez (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1248.) “Malice may be express or
implied. [Citation.] ‘Malice is express when a defendant intends to kill . . . .’
[Citation.] ‘“A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or
she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and
with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or encouraging
commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or
instigates the commission of the crime.” [Citations.] “‘[U]nder direct aiding
and abetting principles, an accomplice is guilty of an offense perpetrated by
another [e.g., murder] if the accomplice aids the commission of that offense
with ‘knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an
intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends.”’”’” (People v. Diaz (2026)
118 Cal.App.5th 545, 557.)
We review the denial of a “section 1172.6 petition, following an
evidentiary hearing, for substantial evidence.” (People v. Emanuel (2025) 17
Cal.5th 867, 885.) “Under this standard, we review the record ‘“‘in the light
most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”’” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
988 (Reyes).) “‘“We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts;
we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]” [Citation.] A reversal for
insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no

6
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’” the
[fact finder]’s verdict.’” (People v. Davis (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 500, 510.)
“‘“Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable
inferences drawn from that evidence.”’” (Ibid.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
determination that Torres is liable for murder under the theory he was a
direct aider and abettor who acted with express malice. Torres does not
dispute that he drove two other members of his gang into territory claimed by
Boyz from the Hood, a rival gang. Evidence further supports that Torres
drove the car slowly down the street until they saw Marin6; the shooter, who
was wearing gloves,7 exited the vehicle, initially shot Marin from some
distance away and, several seconds later, fired a close range gunshot at
Marin’s head; and the shooter then ran back to the car, and Torres drove
them quickly away. The trial court could reasonably conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Torres aided and abetted the murder by driving the
shooter slowly through rival gang territory with the knowledge and intent the
shooter would kill a perceived rival gang member.

6
At the original trial, in response to a question about a
hypothetical, Sullivan testified that the vehicle with the shooter driving
slowly behind the intended target showed that they were looking for a Boyz
from the Hood member to kill. At the evidentiary hearing, Sullivan agreed
that when one gang is “hunting” in a rival gang’s territory it is common to
drive slowly through the rival gang neighborhood.

7
The use of gloves supports an inference that the shooter was
attempting to avoid leaving fingerprints on the gun. Sullivan noted the
presence of the gloves worn by the shooter would indicate he was prepared to
shoot.

7
 Torres concedes that, “taking the evidence in light of the order
denying [his] petition, the group went to Boyz territory to do a shooting of a
rival Boyz member.” But he argues he had no intention to shoot or kill a
member of a different gang. Torres argues, “after seeing Marin, one of
[Torres’s] passengers got out of the car, got into a verbal argument with
Marin, and shot him twice.” According to Torres, “[t]he only evidence was
that [he] waited in the car when his passenger confronted Marin, an
unintended and unanticipated target, and killed him after a ‘hit up.’” Torres
further asserts, “[t]here is no substantial evidence that [he] was aware of who
Marin was or knew or even could have known that the shooter would shoot
an individual who was not a Boyz member.” Thus, Torres argues the trial
court’s finding is based on a disguised natural and probable consequences
theory and he should not be liable for murder because the shooter
independently made the decision to kill someone who was not an intended
target—i.e., someone who was not a member of the Boyz from the Hood gang.
Torres’s argument is unavailing, particularly given the
substantial evidence standard of review. Torres’s argument presumes the
shooter engaged in a hit up with Marin, learned that Marin belonged to a
gang other than Boyz from the Hood, and then independently decided to kill
Marin anyway. But there was conflicting evidence on this. Notably, the two
experts at the evidentiary hearing disagreed as to whether a hit up occurred.
Although there was some evidence in the record that there was arguing and
yelling,8 the record does not contain testimony from a percipient witness that

8
At the original trial, Sullivan testified a witness had told him
she heard arguing followed by two gunshots. At the evidentiary hearing,
Sullivan said that witness had told him that she heard yelling as part of the
argument that she heard.

8
Marin was asked to and did in fact identify his gang. Moreover, Sullivan
explained a hit up would have been unnecessary because gang members who
are in a rival gang’s territory will assume any gang member in that territory
is from that rival gang. The trial court could reasonably find there was no hit
up during which Marin identified himself as a member of the Jungle City
gang, and Torres and the shooter intended to kill Marin because they
perceived him to be a member of Boyz from the Hood. Additionally, even if
Marin was killed because he was mistakenly thought to be a Boyz from the
Hood gang member, that does not mean Torres had no intent to kill. (See
People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 684 [“when a defendant intends to
kill one particular person, but kills someone else mistakenly believing the
person killed to be the intended victim, the defendant has the requisite intent
for first degree murder”]; People v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389, 396 [“‘the
“intent to kill need not be directed at a specific person”’”].)9
Torres also asserts an “expert’s testimony cannot serve as the
sole evidence of guilt” and, other than Sullivan’s testimony, “there was no
substantial evidence that [Torres] knew the shooter had a gun and intended
to use it on anyone found in the Boyz territory.” Although Sullivan’s
testimony supports the trial court’s finding, it was not the only evidence that
does so. As noted above, Torres concedes that, viewed most favorably to the
trial court’s ruling, the evidence shows Torres and his fellow gang members
“went to Boyz territory to do a shooting of a rival Boyz member.” (Italics

9
Torres argues “this was not a transferred intent prosecution”
because it is not a situation where the shooter attempted to kill a member of
Boyz from the Hood but hit an innocent bystander instead. The theory of
liability here is more aptly described as one of mistaken identity—i.e., the
shooter and Torres intended to kill Marin, who they perceived to be a
member of Boyz from the Hood but was actually a member of Jungle City.

9
added.) Since a shooting obviously would require a gun, this necessarily
means Torres knew at least one of them had a gun. The evidence also
supports that Torres slowly drove his group down the street in territory
claimed by a rival gang until they came upon Marin, at which time the
shooter, who was armed with a gun and wearing gloves, exited the vehicle
and shot Marin. Given all this evidence, the trial court could reasonably
conclude Torres knew the shooter had a gun.
Torres contends “the facts in Reyes are identical to those here.”
That case is distinguishable. In Reyes, the defendant and other members of
his gang rode “their bicycles to an area on the edge of territory belonging to a
rival gang” after one of the other gang members had shown the group a gun a
few hours earlier. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 985.) The group chased after
a car and a gunshot was fired that killed the driver. (Ibid.) Later that day,
the defendant, who was then in possession of the murder weapon, and others
assaulted someone else. (Ibid.) In charging Reyes for the death of the driver,
the prosecutor argued Reyes was liable for murder because, although
someone else in Reyes’s group fired the fatal shot, “Reyes aided and abetted
the crime of disturbing the peace or . . . he conspired with Lopez to commit
either disturbing the peace or assault, and that murder was a natural and
probable consequence of one of those target offenses,” or alternatively, “Reyes
directly aided and abetted the murder by ‘backing up fellow gang members’
during the killing.” (Ibid.) The jury convicted Reyes of second degree murder.
(Id. at p. 986.) When the defendant later sought resentencing, the trial court
“denied the petition, finding that [the defendant] was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of second degree murder” and noting it was “‘guided by the
principles that are in [CALCRIM No. 520], specifically implied malice.’” (Id.
at pp. 986–987.)

10
 On appeal, the California Supreme Court concluded there was no
substantial evidence supporting liability for second degree murder under a
direct perpetrator theory, and to the extent the trial court relied on a direct
aiding and abetting theory, it “misapprehended what is required as a matter
of law to prove aiding and abetting implied malice murder.” (Reyes, supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 988–992.) As to a direct perpetrator theory, our Supreme Court
concluded “it cannot be said that Reyes committed an act that ‘proximately
caused’ [the victim’s] death,” and the evidence was also insufficient to support
a conclusion that the defendant’s act carried a high degree of probability of
death. (Id. at pp. 988–990.) As to a theory of directly aiding and abetting
implied malice murder, our Supreme Court noted “the trial court did not
appear to recognize that implied malice murder requires, among other
elements, proof of the aider and abettor’s knowledge and intent with regard
to the direct perpetrator’s life endangering act,” and “assuming the life-
endangering act was the shooting, the trial court should have asked whether
Reyes knew that Lopez intended to shoot at the victim, intended to aid him in
the shooting, knew that the shooting was dangerous to life, and acted in
conscious disregard for life.” (Id. at pp. 991–992.) Thus, our Supreme Court
concluded the trial court’s “decision was based on an error of law insofar as
the court sustained Reyes’s murder conviction on a direct aiding and abetting
theory.” (Id. at p. 992.) Although it determined remand was appropriate, it
“express[ed] no view on the merits of Reyes’s resentencing petition under a
proper application of the elements of implied malice murder on a direct
aiding and abetting theory.” (Ibid.)
Reyes does not require reversal here for multiple reasons. As an
initial matter, Reyes discussed implied malice murder (Reyes, supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 984, 987), but the trial court here found Torres had express

11
malice. The case here also does not involve a direct perpetrator theory.
Moreover, although Reyes discussed the theory for direct aiding and abetting
implied malice murder, it concluded the trial court made a legal error and
ultimately “express[ed] no view on the merits of Reyes’s resentencing petition
under a proper application of the elements of implied malice murder on a
direct aiding and abetting theory.” (Id. at p. 992.) In any event, the facts here
are not similar to those in Reyes. As discussed, evidence here supports that
Torres drove slowly through the rival gang’s territory with two other
members of his gang, with the intention to find and kill a member of a rival
gang. One of Torres’s passengers—the shooter—was wearing gloves and, once
the group spotted the victim and Torres stopped the car, the shooter emerged
from the car and shot the victim. The evidence is sufficient to show Torres
knew his passenger was armed and that Torres was guilty under a direct
aiding and abetting theory.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying Torres’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

SCOTT, J.

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