Filed 9/11/26 In re J.O. CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re J.O., a Person Coming B349951
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 25CCJP02460B)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.O.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.
Owen P. Martikan, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, Courtney Fisher, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Father challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings and order declaring his son J.O. a dependent of the court
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a)
and (b)(1),1 due to his domestic violence against mother and
alcohol abuse, and the dispositional order removing the child
from his custody. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father and mother are the parents of J.O. (born April
2022). J.O. has a half-sibling, S.A (born August 2012). Mother
and Dan A. share custody of S.A. Before these proceedings,
father, mother, and J.O. were living together. S.A. was staying
in their home on Sundays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays. Mother,
S.A., and Dan A. are not part of this appeal.
1. Events Leading to Jurisdiction Over the Minors
The incident that brought the parties to the attention of the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) for the instant dependency petition occurred on July 13,
2025. On this date, Sheriff’s deputies responded to a call that
father, who was apparently intoxicated, had attacked mother.
Yelling could be heard in the background during the call.
According to the incident report, mother was home with
J.O. and S.A. when father arrived home around 10:50 p.m.; he
appeared drunk, was stumbling and having trouble walking
straight. Father became upset with mother because she had not
prepared food for him. They argued and mother took the children
to their bedroom to put them to bed. She told father “to go to
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless noted otherwise.
2
bed.” Father went to the breaker box and turned off the
electricity to half of the house. Father then followed mother to
the children’s room and pushed mother into the room. Mother
tried to close the door on father, but he “punched the door” open
and mother pushed him away. The children left their bedroom
and went into the living room. Father entered the living room,
saw J.O. on the couch, said he was going to take him, and picked
him up. Mother walked up to father and told him to give her J.O.
When she grabbed J.O. by the arm, father pulled away from her,
and J.O. “call[ed] out for his mommy” and cried in pain. J.O.
ended up on the floor and was taken out of the house by S.A.
Mother said she went back to the kitchen, and father
followed and attacked her. While mother was standing, father
pushed her head down and wrapped his arm around her neck
“in an attempt to choke her.” Mother then walked to her
bedroom. Father followed her and pushed her into the room.
Mother tried to get up, but father pushed her into the wall. The
back of mother’s head hit the wall, causing her pain. Mother said
she tried to defend herself and struck father’s body several times
with her fists. When she called out for her son to call 911, father
punched her, striking her in the stomach. When officers arrived,
they observed an approximately 3-inch scratch on mother’s
right arm, and the report noted that there had been “a history
of domestic violence in the home [with] the last reported case . . .
reported in 2023.”
Deputies also spoke to S.A. and J.O. According to the
report, S.A. said father had come home “drunk and stumbling,”
and had followed mother into the children’s room, pushing her
into it. S.A. said father punched the door twice when it closed
on him, and pushed mother around the house. S.A. said that,
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during the altercation, he took J.O. into the living room. S.A.
saw his mother pulling J.O.’s arm while father held J.O. around
his body. Father “was not releasing [J.O.] as he kept pulling
him away from [mother].” S.A. feared J.O’s “arm would be
dislocated.” J.O., who was only three years old, told officers his
“arm had gotten stuck on his mommy’s arm and that his mommy
had grabbed his right arm.” J.O. did not complain of pain to
the deputies.
The deputies arrested father for domestic violence and
willful cruelty to a child.
2. DCFS’s investigation
DCFS received the referral the day after the incident.
A social worker interviewed the family in July and August,
as reflected in the Detention Report dated September 3, 2025.
A Dependency Investigator (DI) interviewed the family in
September, with their statements reflected in the Jurisdiction/
Disposition report dated October 16, 2025. The interviews
examined the July 13, 2025 incident, two prior domestic violence
incidents that occurred in 2023, allegations that father abused
alcohol, and the impact of mother’s medical conditions. Father
did not speak to the DCFS investigators regarding the July 13,
2025 incident, upon advice of his attorney, due to his pending
criminal case. At the request of father’s counsel, the dependency
court also ordered DCFS not to interview father about the
petition’s domestic violence allegations.
a. July 13, 2025 incident
In mother’s interviews, she admitted to difficulty with
her memory and her recollection of specific details due to ongoing
medical issues, including having undergone two brain surgeries
and endured six weeks of radiation treatment.
4
She stated that the conflict arose when father arrived home
late, stumbling and apparently intoxicated, and complained that
mother had not prepared him a plate for dinner. Mother was in
the boys’ room, and he was behind her. After he made a sarcastic
comment, she pushed him to get out of the room. She stated that
“ ‘[t]hat’s when the whole pushing and shoving went on.’ ” She
also acknowledged that at some point, father pushed her, causing
her to hit her head on the wall and fall; she denied that father
ever hit her in the head. She also admitted that father had
his arm around her head, but said that “everything happened
so quickly” she was not able to recall all the details. She also
stated that father punched her during this altercation, but
recalled that it was in her side, not her stomach as reflected in
the incident report, and she showed the social worker a purple
bruise on the left side of her “stomach/side area.” Mother
generally described the incident as “ ‘a lot of pushing and
shoving,’ ” and acknowledged that her shirt was torn during
the altercation.
With respect to whether this incident occurred in the
presence of the children, she said the altercation took place in
her bedroom and the kitchen, but mother was not sure where
the children were during the altercation due to the darkness in
the home. By the time that she and father moved to the kitchen,
however, she recalled that S.A. had already picked up J.O., who
was crying, and taken him outside.
Regarding J.O., mother told the social worker that father
picked up J.O. to take him to the bedroom, and she grabbed J.O.
and asked father to let him go. She denied that father was trying
to leave the home with J.O. Mother said she was pulling J.O.’s
arm to try to hold onto him and that she “may have pulled a
5
little too hard.” Mother said that neither child was injured
during this incident, but acknowledged that S.A. could have
been injured if he had physically intervened.
S.A.’s description of the July 13, 2025 incident was
consistent with mother’s and with what he previously told to
law enforcement. S.A. said that he observed that father appeared
drunk when he arrived home, was stumbling and “ ‘was all
aggressive’ ” as mother went into the boys’ bedroom to put them
to bed. He observed father punch or kick the door, and also
push mother; he also observed mother push father. He said
in his statement to the social worker that the parents went into
the other bedroom, and in his statement to the DI he stated that
mother took J.O. into the living room while S.A. followed. In
both retellings, S.A. stated that mother, S.A., and J.O were in
the living room when father came out of the bedroom and said
he “was going to take” J.O. S.A. said father “usually gets [J.O.]
and goes to the room with him and locks the door.” That day,
however, S.A. said father “ ‘[g]rabbed’ ” J.O.—who was standing
on the couch next to mother—“ ‘from like his chest.’ ” Mother
“ ‘[t]ried to grab [J.O.] but she was only able to grab his arm.’ ”
S.A. said J.O. began crying, and mother and father “then went
to the hallway area.” J.O. “somehow . . . ended up on the floor.”
S.A. told the DI he did not know if father had dropped J.O.
S.A. observed J.O. on the floor crying, and mother and father
“ ‘pushing each other’s shoulders. ’ ” S.A. picked up J.O. and
went outside.
From outside, S.A. heard arguing and pushing, and then
heard mother “ ‘hit the wall.’ ” He also stated that he heard the
utensil drawer fall. When S.A. took J.O. outside, he called his
grandparents, and then—when mother yelled to call 911—he did.
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Dan A. arrived at S.A.’s home, and took S.A. and J.O.—who
was wearing only underwear—into his car to wait for law
enforcement. S.A. was afraid his brother “ ‘might be injured.’ ”
When asked how he felt about the incident, S.A. said, “ ‘Sad.
I wanted to go back and defend my mom, but my main priority
was [J.O.].’ ”
Dan A. spoke with the social worker and DI regarding
his observations of the July 13, 2025 incident. He stated that
he was alerted to the incident when he received a call from S.A.’s
paternal grandfather, who told Dan A. that S.A. had called him
about something going on at S.A.’s home; Dan A. drove straight
to S.A.’s house. Dan A. reported that S.A. told him that he saw
mother get pushed and that mother and father “had fought over
child [J.O.] and one of them pulled on his arm a little too hard.”
He also overheard mother talking to law enforcement, stating
that father “ ‘[p]unched her on the stomach.’ ” Dan A. observed
that “ ‘it looked like she had gotten into a fight. Her shirt looked
like it was pulled loose.’ ”
The day after this incident, Dan A. went to mother’s home
for a conversation. He stated that this was the second incident
and he would not continue to allow S.A. to be at mother’s home
if father was there. Mother told Dan A. that “she loves [father]
and that she wants to try to work it out.” Mother also told
Dan A. that he was “ ‘making her choose between her son and
the man she loves.’ ”
The social worker also spoke to paternal grandfather,
who stated that he had seen father the night of the July 13
incident at about 8:00 p.m. at the restaurant where father was
with his friends. According to paternal grandfather, father
“appeared fine.” Paternal grandfather left and later received
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a call from paternal grandmother that father had been arrested.
After father’s release, paternal grandfather said father told him
that he had had a few drinks, but “ ‘was not buzzed.’ ” Father
told him the argument started when he “jokingly” asked mother,
“ ‘where is my plate of food and why is the house not cleaned.’ ”
Apparently from what father described, paternal grandfather
thought the incident appeared to have been “more of a ‘[s]hoving
match.’ ”
b. August 2023 incident
Dan A. stated that in August 2023, he and S.A. were
celebrating S.A.’s birthday, and visited with mother, who was
recuperating from having two brain tumors removed. While he
was there, father “ ‘[c]ame home drunk and punched [Dan A.’s]
truck.’ ” Dan A. stepped outside. He recognized father was
intoxicated because “he was slurring.” Father then began
arguing with mother. Dan A. stated that he stepped back inside
and heard one of father’s brothers say “ ‘ “[i]f you wanna hit
someone, hit me.” ’ ” He saw the brother “ ‘charge in the
hallway,’ ” and took both S.A. and J.O. outside. When Dan A.
stepped back inside, father and his brother “ ‘were in a lock.’ ”
Dan A. stated that, while he was outside, he heard a “ ‘[s]mack’ ”
and that mother “ ‘came outside saying that [father] slapped her,
and that his brother had attacked [father] for hitting [mother].’ ”
Dan A. told mother he would help her leave father. Mother
stayed with Dan A.’s parents for “about a week, but then she
decided to go back.”
S.A. provided statements regarding the August 2023
incident that were consistent with Dan A.’s statements. S.A.
stated that, on his birthday, while S.A. and Dan A. were visiting
with mother, father came home and started arguing with mother.
8
S.A. said Dan A. took him, and eventually J.O., outside. While
outside, S.A. “heard someone get slapped.” He believed it was
father’s brother, but he did not see anything. S.A. told the DI
he heard father’s brother—who was inside the house—say,
“ ‘ “You can’t slap me while I’m holding [J.O.],” ’ ” and he then
heard “ ‘a thud, and [J.O.] was crying.’ ” S.A. also said father
had been drinking at a bar before he came home that day. When
asked how he knew, S.A. said he had overheard the background
noise when mother had called father earlier. S.A. could also tell
father had been drinking that day because “he was stumbling.”
The DI asked mother about father slapping either her or
his brother on S.A.’s birthday in 2023. Mother stated that she
did not recall this incident, and said that she had gone to the
hospital that day so it “ ‘was pretty blurry . . . [and] “[n]one of
that sounds familiar at all.” ’ ” That said, the social worker also
located police call logs, indicating that mother had gone to the
police station on the day after S.A.’s birthday and “reported
that ‘Boyfriend’ pushed her while holding one year old son.”
c. March 2023 incident
DCFS previously had contact with the family after an
incident that occurred in March 2023.2 It received a report that
law enforcement had gone to the family’s home after father had
come home under the influence of alcohol, “ ‘threw’ ” then-one-
year-old J.O. onto mother—who was lying on her bed with J.O.—
and then straddled mother, punched her on the forehead, and
2 The March 2023 incident is referenced in the DCFS reports
related to the court’s current jurisdiction over the minors, but
the original reports from that incident, if any, were not included
as part of the record.
9
choked her. Paternal grandfather told father to get off mother,
but he refused. Mother fought back. Paternal grandfather
“grabbed” J.O. and took him into the living room.
DCFS investigated this incident and determined the
children did not have any signs of physical abuse or general
neglect. The parents voluntarily agreed to participate in
“DCFS[-]sponsored service intervention programs to strengthen
family dynamics, increase parenting skills, and assist mother
in developing self[-]sufficiency.” DCFS advised the parents that,
if it received another referral based on the same allegations, it
would “look into more intensive services for the family.” DCFS
also counseled both mother and father “at length” on the “risks/
dangers associated with exposing their children to any domestic
violence.” Because there was no immediate child safety threat,
and the incident did not “meet [the] criteria for emotional abuse
or general neglect,” DCFS deemed the referral “[i]nconclusive.”
d. Father’s alcohol use
In addition to the above statements regarding father’s
drinking prior to each incident, the interviewees also provided
information about their assessment of father’s alcohol use.
S.A. reported that father came home after “being at a bar”
on most of the days S.A. was at the home. S.A. further stated
that while he was only at mother’s house three days a week,
father was “usually intoxicated one of those days weekly.” S.A.
told the social worker he knew when father had been to a bar,
as he could smell alcohol on father’s breath and clothes. S.A.
said father “ ‘normally’ ” was “ ‘not super aggressive’ ” when
he came home. Father would get food, “ ‘argue a little’ ” with
mother, and go to his room, and that mother and father usually
argued when father came home “ ‘really late.’ ” S.A. stated that
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he could hear cursing and father arguing and yelling. S.A.
believed father became “more aggressive” when he drank, and
that he “consume[d] alcohol prior to 80% of their arguments.”
Mother stated that she did not believe father had a
drinking problem “[a]t this point.” She said she had not seen
him intoxicated like he was on July 13 “since the first reported
incident.” She denied that father ever would drive the children
after drinking. Mother said father drank “ ‘[m]aybe once a
week’ ” when he was out with friends, and then came home
and slept. The DI told mother that S.A. had reported that
father was “constantly drinking alcohol” and would come home
“stumbling and acting aggressive.” Mother said she was unaware
of father constantly drinking, and, if that was accurate, “she was
blinded to it.” Mother said father “has an obnoxious personality,
and that he is just loud,” and claimed that this observed behavior
was not a result of being intoxicated.
The DI spoke to paternal grandmother on October 1, 2025.3
Paternal grandmother said father called her when he got home
on July 13, 2025. He and paternal grandfather had been having
food and drinks and watching the game at a restaurant. She said
he didn’t “ ‘sound drunk.’ ” Paternal grandmother said father
attended a year of “ ‘rehab’ ” ordered by the court after he “ ‘got
a DUI,’ ” and then “ ‘went cold turkey for a few years with
no alcohol.’ ” She did not view father’s current alcohol use as
a problem. She denied that mother ever had mentioned any
concerns about it.
3 Paternal grandparents were not in a relationship.
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Dan A. had no personal knowledge about father abusing
alcohol. He told the DI, however, that after the birthday
incident, “mother told him that she was angry with . . . father
and mentioned ‘all this damn drinking.’ ”
On September 26, the DI interviewed father at a DCFS
office about the alcohol abuse allegations only. Father generally
denied that his alcohol use was a problem. He described himself
as a social drinker and said he did not drink at home—only with
friends or in a social environment—and he did not drink “to the
point where he is incoherent or not able to respond to his family’s
needs.” He told the DI he “monitors what he drinks” and “will
usually have one or two drinks when he eats.” Father said he
would “request assistance from rideshare or family,” if he felt
he could not drive. Father said he drank alcohol two to three
times a week, but was not drinking at that specific time due to
work, lack of financial resources, and because he was caring
for paternal grandfather.
Father was arrested six times for DUIs between September
2007 and March 2014, and was convicted of DUI in 2007, 2008,
and twice in 2013. After his last DUI conviction—when he
was 26—he completed a court-ordered inpatient substance abuse
treatment program, and participated in AA for a year. As he was
on probation and had to test for drugs/alcohol, he did not drink
again until he was 29. The DI asked father if he believed “he
previously had a problem with alcohol, due to the fact that he
has multiple DUI arrests and convictions, and he stated that
he does not.” Father said he “was just ‘young and irresponsible.’ ”
Father admitted he had been drinking before the July 2025,
March 2023, and August 2023 incidents.
12
On September 3, 2025, the court held an initial hearing,
at which father was provided with a referral for weekly testing
for drugs and alcohol. When the DI interviewed father on
September 26, 2025, father had not submitted to the court-
ordered drug/alcohol testing. He said he did not have time
“due to his work schedule and the location of the testing si[t]e.”
He also thought he “shouldn’t have to drug test again,” as he
had tested for DCFS in the past. On October 1, 2025, the DI
gave father a list of all testing locations in Los Angeles County.
e. Mother’s health
Throughout the interviews, mother acknowledged that
she had health issues, including “extremely painful” migraines,
that affected her memory and temperament, and that she took
medication for ongoing conditions that she also believed had
behavioral side effects. Mother expressed to the social worker
that “usually during her menstrual cycle her emotions are
heightened . . . [and had] brought up her concerns regarding
her emotions and the possible side effects of her current
medication with her treating doctor.”
Mother’s health issues were also confirmed by other
interviewees. However, Dan A., father, paternal grandfather,
and paternal grandmother all denied that mother’s health
impaired her ability to take care of the children.
Father identified mother’s health as a possible cause of
the parents’ conflict. Father stated, “ ‘[W]e had the incident in
2023 where it was kinda like a trigger mood-swing when I got
home. Then when we found out . . . that those mood swings can
be caused by a tumor pressure on the brain, we came up with
a care plan to identify what the side effects would be. . . . I had
to monitor whatever medication they gave her, because of side
13
effects. Unfortunately, after the first surgery, she had mood
swings.’ ” Father also said that after mother’s brain surgery
in July 2023 her medical condition and medication caused her
“to have a bad memory, mood swings, and aggressiveness,” and
she has times “where she ‘[c]ould have irritability, doesn’t want
to talk, or small things can trigger her to get upset.’ ” Father also
stated his belief that these conditions fluctuate with mother’s
menstrual cycle and said, in reference to the July 13, 2025
incident, “ ‘I saw on Thursday that she was starting her monthly
cycle. Saturday . . . I understand that there was a sense of
irritation. Sunday [July 13], I left to go hang out with friends,’ ”
and because mother was “ ‘acting weird,’ ” he “had to get out
of the house.”
3. Criminal and family court proceedings
On July 15, 2025, the criminal court issued a domestic
violence criminal protective order protecting mother, S.A., and
J.O. from father. The order specified that father was allowed
to have “peaceful contact” for “the safe exchange of children
and court-ordered visitation” provided in any family, juvenile,
or court order issued after that date. On July 21, 2025, father
was charged with misdemeanor spousal abuse and child abuse/
endangerment. On August 13, 2025, the criminal court set
father’s pretrial hearing for September 12, 2025.
On August 14, 2025, father filed a request in family court
for joint legal and physical custody of J.O., and unmonitored
“[o]nsite visitations.” Father alleged mother had “been
experiencing mood swings . . . following her two brain surgeries,
the most recent of which took place in August 2023.” Father said
he was mother’s “primary caregiver.” He stated that, due to the
protective order, “[t]he only way” he could see his child was to
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file “a motion in family court to request visitation.” The hearing
on father’s request was set for September 29, 2025.4
4. Jurisdiction/disposition report
In its Jurisdiction/Disposition report dated October 16,
2025, DCFS reported it was “evident that the children’s safety
and wellbeing can’t be ensured without continued supervision
of DCFS and Dependency Court. Mother and . . . father have
a history of engaging in physical altercations in the presence
of the children, that have resulted in 2 DCFS investigations,
. . . father’s arrest and a restraining order.” DCFS noted the
altercations had “even physically involved [J.O.].” DCFS stated
it appeared father was trying to “put blame of the domestic
violence incident on mother’s medical condition and medication
side effects. Although it is true that these can cause mother
to act out more aggressively and become more easily irritable,
it does not mitigate . . . father’s actions of striking mother with
his fists, wrapping his arm around mother’s neck and pushing
mother into a wall.”
DCFS also was concerned about father’s alcohol abuse.
DCFS noted father had “a history of multiple DUI arrests/
convictions,” and had completed an inpatient substance abuse
program, yet he “continued to consume alcohol despite the fact
that it appears to be a factor in multiple altercations that have
occurred between him and mother.” DCFS also noted that
father said he continued “to consume alcohol,” but was not
at the moment because he didn’t “have the means.” DCFS
4 There is nothing in the record to reflect whether this
hearing took place.
15
recommended mother receive family maintenance services
and father receive family reunification services. It believed
continued jurisdiction was “necessary to help ensure that the
mother and . . . father appropriately address the underlying
issues that have [led] to their multiple incidents of domestic
violence, and has caused . . . father to continue to consume
alcohol, so that they no longer place the children at risk of harm.”
5. Adjudication
The dependency court held a combined jurisdiction/
disposition hearing on October 16, 2025. The petition included
three counts: a-1, b-1, and b-2. The a-1 count was filed pursuant
to section 300, subdivision (a) and was only against father.
It alleged that mother and father “have a history of engaging
in violent altercations in the children’s presence and in the
children’s home.” The count included facts from the July 13,
2025 incident and referenced a domestic violence incident on
“a prior occasion in 2023” in support of the allegations. The
a-1 count alleged that “[s]uch violent conduct on the part of
. . . father endangers the children’s physical health and safety,
. . . and places the children at risk of serious physical harm.”
The b-1 count, filed against both parents pursuant
to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), included the same factual
recitations as the a-1 count, and alleged that “[s]uch violent
conduct on the part of . . . father and the mother’s failure to
protect the children endangers the children’s physical health
and safety, . . . and places the children at risk of serious physical
harm.” The b-2 count, which was also filed against both parents
pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), stated that father
“has a history of substance abuse including alcohol and is
a current abuser of alcohol, which renders [him] incapable
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of providing regular care for [J.O.] . . . [and mother] knew,
or reasonably should have known of the . . . father’s substance
abuse and failed to protect the children by allowing [him] to
reside in the children’s home and have unlimited access to the
children. Such substance abuse by . . . father and the mother’s
failure to protect the children endangers the children’s physical
health and safety and places the children at risk of serious
physical harm.”
At the hearing, mother pleaded no contest to the
allegations against her. The children’s counsel asked the court
to sustain the petition as pled against father. Counsel noted
father was under the influence of alcohol during all of the
reported altercations, and that two of the incidents involved
father choking mother and J.O. being thrown or pulled.
Father’s counsel asked the court to dismiss the petition.
The juvenile court sustained the petition as pleaded.
To the extent that mother’s statements to DCFS minimized
father’s conduct, the court noted mother’s statements changed
from what she told law enforcement and the social worker. The
court noted that was “a common phenomenon where the victim
of the domestic violence admits the domestic violence and then
later, to protect the perpetrator, changes the statement.” The
court found mother’s statements to law enforcement were “the
more reliable statements” because she made them “right after
the domestic violence ha[d] occurred.” The court noted mother
told law enforcement: father pushed her; he turned off the
electricity to the house; she tried to close the door, and he
punched it; he followed her; and he pushed her head down and
wrapped his arm around her neck “in an attempt to choke her.”
The court noted S.A. described the incident similarly. The court
17
also noted that, in 2023, mother had described domestic violence
to DCFS, and parents went through services to address
that referral. The court found “[t]he ongoing risk is that
[father] denies the domestic violence. Mother has changed her
statements, which is part of the domestic violence psychology,
and she has told [Dan A.] that she loves [father] and essentially
wants to be with him, and it shows that both parents need some
work on understanding the psychology of domestic violence,
why it occurs and is a cycle.”
The court found “there is an abundance of evidence” as to
father’s alcohol use. The court noted father was drunk for the
July 2025 incident, and S.A. “is now skilled at identifying when
. . . father is drunk.” The court noted father also was drunk
during the 2023 incident.5 The court stated, “[t]he alcohol
leads to the domestic violence.” The court further found that,
“[a]though the DUI convictions for [father] were from 2008
through 2013, he again has a problem with alcohol and it
feeds into the domestic violence.”
The court declared J.O. a dependent of the court and
ordered him placed in mother’s home under DCFS’s supervision.
The court removed J.O. from father, finding “[t]here is clear and
convincing evidence that there is or would be a substantial risk
to [J.O.] if released” to father’s home “and no reasonable means
by which to protect [J.O.] . . . from [father].” The court found
father’s denial of the domestic violence and of an alcohol problem,
5 The court did not specify which incident it was referring to
that occurred in 2023, but the record includes evidence that he
was intoxicated during both the March and August incidents.
18
and the fact that he had “not fully addressed these issues in
services,” demonstrated an ongoing risk to J.O. The court found
father’s alcohol problem “is a chronic one.”
The court ordered father to complete a full drug/alcohol
program with aftercare, submit to random and on-demand
drug/alcohol testing, and participate in a domestic violence
program for perpetrators, conjoint counseling, parenting classes,
and individual counseling to address case issues, anger
management, domestic violence and its effect on children,
substance abuse, relapse prevention, and child protection.
The court ordered father to have monitored visits with J.O. and
gave DCFS discretion to liberalize the visits. Father appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Applicable law and standard of review
“ ‘Dependency proceedings span up to four stages:
jurisdiction, disposition, reunification, and permanency.
[Citations.] At the jurisdictional stage, the juvenile court
determines whether to declare a child a dependent of the court
because the child is suffering, or at risk of suffering, significant
harm.’ [Citation] ‘ “A dependency adjudication is a preliminary
step that allows the juvenile court, within specified limits, to
assert supervision over the endangered child’s care.” [Citation.]
After the juvenile court takes that preliminary step, the court
may impose limitations on parental authority as necessary to
protect the child. [Citations.] It may also order that the child
be removed from a parent’s physical custody if there is clear
and convincing evidence that removal is necessary to protect
the child from a substantial risk of harm. [Citations.]’ ”
(In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 537 (N.R.).)
19
At the jurisdictional stage, section 300, subdivision (a)
authorizes dependency jurisdiction where a child has suffered or
there is a substantial risk the child will suffer serious physical
harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by a parent.
(§ 300, subd. (a).) “[U]nder section 300, subdivision (b), a child
may be subject to dependency jurisdiction if the child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness as a result of a parent’s failure
or inability to adequately supervise the child, or as a result of a
parent’s inability to provide regular care for the child due to the
parent’s substance abuse. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (D).)” (In re
B.D. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 315, 324 (B.D.).) “Although section
300 generally requires proof the child is subject to the defined
risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the
court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to
assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.
[Citation.] The court may consider past events in deciding
whether a child currently needs the court’s protection. [Citation.]
A parent’s ‘ “[p]ast conduct may be probative of current
conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will
continue.’ ” (In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376,
1383–1384 (Kadence P.), disapproved on another ground in N.R.,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 560, fn. 18; see also In re I.J. (2013) 56
Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).)
Exposure to domestic violence may serve as the basis
for jurisdiction under either section 300, subdivision (a) or
subdivision (b). (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602–
603.) “[T]he application of section 300, subdivision (a), is
appropriate when, through exposure to a parent’s domestic
violence, a child suffers, or is at substantial risk of suffering,
20
serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by the parent.”
(In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 598–599
(Giovanni F.).) If acts of domestic violence “occur in the child’s
immediate presence,” such as “if a father strikes an infant’s
mother while she is holding the child or an older child intervenes
during a fight to protect her mother from her father’s abuse,
the risk of harm to the child may be properly viewed as
nonaccidental.” (Cole L., at p. 603.) Section 300, subdivision
(b) encompasses the “somewhat more common potential for
accidental injury during parents’ physically violent fights
in the presence of bystander children . . . [and] constitutes a
failure or inability to protect the child, creating the potential
for dependency jurisdiction.” (Cole L., at p. 603; see also
In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941 (R.C.).)
A separate basis for a jurisdictional finding under section
300, subdivision (b)(1)(D) exists where “substance abuse . . .
make[s] a parent unable to provide regular care, which in turn
. . . create[s] a substantial risk of serious physical harm or
illness.” (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 557.) To establish
jurisdiction under this provision DCFS must prove: “(1)
substance abuse (2) makes a parent or guardian unable to
provide regular care for a child and (3) this inability has caused
the child to suffer serious physical harm or illness or creates
a substantial risk of such harm or illness.” (Id. at p. 558.)
Once the dependency court properly establishes jurisdiction
over a child, section 361, subdivision (c) provides authority to
remove the child from the home if the statutory criteria are
satisfied. (§ 361, subd. (c).) The juvenile court may remove a
child from the physical custody of a parent with whom the child
was residing if it “finds clear and convincing evidence” that the
21
child would be at substantial risk of physical or emotional harm
if returned to the parent’s custody, and “there are no reasonable
means” to protect the child without removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1);
In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 135 (T.V.).) “The parent
need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually
harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute
is on averting harm to the child.” (T.V., at pp. 135–136.)
On an appeal of the dependency court’s order, the
reviewing court examines “ ‘the jurisdictional findings and
the disposition, [and] we look to see if substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In
making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences
from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the
dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that
issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ”
(In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633 (R.T.); I.J., supra, 56
Cal.4th at p. 773.) We neither reweigh the evidence nor exercise
independent judgment but only determine if sufficient facts
support the juvenile court’s findings. (I.J., at p. 773.) Inferences
that are the result of speculation or conjecture, however, are
insufficient to support a jurisdictional finding. (B.D., supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 324.) “ ‘The parent has the burden
on appeal of showing there is insufficient evidence to support
the juvenile court’s order.’ ” (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
402, 412.) “ ‘[A] reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s
finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory
bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is
supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (I.J., at p. 773.) “When
reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and
22
convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court
is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence
from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.)
2. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the juvenile court’s judgment, sufficient evidence supported its
finding that father’s domestic violence against mother created
a substantial risk that J.O. would suffer serious physical harm
inflicted nonaccidentally to establish jurisdiction under section
300, subdivision (a). Further, we conclude substantial evidence
in the record supported the court’s finding that J.O.’s exposure
to parents’ domestic violence put him at substantial risk of
serious physical harm under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (See
In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194 (Heather A.)
[“domestic violence in the same household where children are
living is neglect; it is a failure to protect [the children] from
the substantial risk of encountering the violence and suffering
serious physical harm or illness from it”], disapproved on another
ground in R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 628–629.)
The evidence shows the July 2025 incident was not simply
a shoving match due to a misunderstanding, or mother being
irritable, as father suggested. Father punched the boys’ bedroom
door—while they were inside—and followed mother from room
to room. He purposefully turned off the electricity before
assaulting mother, plunging the house into darkness—again,
while J.O. and S.A. were inside. He pushed mother so hard
that her head slammed into the wall—S.A. could hear mother
23
hit the wall—and then put mother into a head lock in an attempt
to choke her. The children may not have seen father choke
mother, but they saw father and mother push each other, and
father violently punch their bedroom door. Mother even yelled
out for S.A. to call 911 as he held J.O. outside. Also, in the midst
of the parents’ conflict, father picked up J.O. and attempted to
take him out of the room, and the parents fought over possession
of J.O., hurting his arm and resulting in him ending up on the
floor. J.O. had to be removed from the middle of the fray by S.A.,
and the parents continued to engage with each other physically
after the children exited the home. There was therefore
substantial evidence that mother and father engaged in
domestic violence in the children’s presence and with which
J.O. was directly involved.
Father argues he “did not involve J.O. in the domestic
violence; he picked him up, in the living room, after the domestic
violence incident in the bedroom.” The dependency court had
sufficient evidence to reject this argument. The record supports
interpreting this incident as a single conflict that started as
soon as father got home and continued until police arrived.
As discussed, the altercation was ongoing and the children
were in the middle of it, even if part of the violence happened
in other rooms.
As for parents’ tug-of-war over J.O., it is true father was
not actively hitting mother as she tried to pull J.O. toward her
while he held onto J.O. But the parents had been in a physical
altercation before father grabbed J.O., and they continued
to push each other after J.O. ended up on the ground, crying.
Worried about the three-year-old’s safety, S.A. picked J.O. up,
took him outside, and called for help. Thankfully, J.O. was
24
uninjured, but he had cried out in pain. Had his thirteen-year-
old brother not been there, J.O. would have been left on the floor
unattended as his parents continued their physical altercation.
Accordingly, we reject father’s contention that the domestic
violence did not take place in J.O.’s presence or involve J.O.
The record before the dependency court additionally
included the prior March 2023 incident, where the domestic
violence incident also directly involved J.O., and the August 2023
incident where both children were present and observed at least
the verbal argument between their mother and father which,
the dependency court could have found, escalated into violence.
The dependency court could also consider father’s record
of alcohol abuse, which was intertwined with the domestic
violence. As the court found, father’s alcohol use fueled his
violent behavior—in all three reported incidents, witnesses
observed father was drunk. Even S.A. saw the connection
between father’s drinking and his aggression, asserting that
father drank “ ‘too much.’ ” Yet father denied that he drank
alcohol to the point of intoxication and specifically denied having
been drunk on July 13—despite mother’s and S.A.’s accounts.
S.A., whom we can infer the court found credible, said father
was drunk at least once a week. As the dependency court noted,
S.A. had seen father intoxicated enough times to be “skilled
at identifying when . . . father is drunk.” Although the DUI
convictions were old, as DCFS noted, father did not believe he
“ever had a problem with alcohol.” He attributed his past arrests
and convictions for DUI to his youth and irresponsibility. He
previously participated in a treatment program because it was
court-ordered. After he completed his probation, however, he
began to drink alcohol again. Indeed, when the DI asked father
25
why he continued to drink “after 4 DUIs, completing a substance
abuse program and paying $200,000 in fines,” father said,
“ ‘Everything was done and settled with.’ ” Although he admitted
he had been drinking before the July 2025, March 2023, and
August 2023 incidents, father “denied that alcohol causes
him problems.” (See In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293
[“ ‘[D]enial is a factor often relevant to determining whether
persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without
court supervision.’ ”]; In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188,
197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge.”].)
This record amply supports the dependency court’s
jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (a).
J.O.’s involvement in his parents’ domestic violence presented
a similar risk of nonaccidental harm to J.O. as found in prior
cases affirming jurisdiction under this provision. For instance,
in In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, the court upheld
jurisdiction on this ground where there were multiple domestic
violence incidents in which the child was present—in one incident
he was “ ‘at their feet’ ” while the parents physically fought and
in another he was held by father while the parents hit, choked,
and kicked each other. (Id. at p. 706.) And in Giovanni F.,
the court upheld jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a),
where father punched and choked mother while driving with
the child in the car and, when they arrived home, the parties
struggled over the child’s carseat with the child inside.
(Giovanni F., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 597, 600.) In both
cases, the fact that there were multiple incidents of domestic
violence during the parents’ relationship also supported the
courts’ findings that there was a substantial risk of serious
future injury. (Id. at pp. 594, 601; In re M.M., at p. 720.)
26
The same is true here. The court reasonably could find
father was likely to engage in violent conduct again without
court and DCFS intervention. Father already had participated
in counseling services after the family was referred to DCFS
following the first reported domestic violence incident in March
2023.6 Additionally, after the July 2025 incident, father said he
did not think counseling would be beneficial, as he and mother
already had completed the earlier counseling. The July 2025
incident was not isolated, nor did father take any significant
steps to meaningfully reduce the likelihood of further incidents.
Moreover, father took no responsibility for the July 2025
6 Father argues that the court could not consider the
March 2023 DCFS referral as evidence because DCFS deemed
the referral “inconclusive.” As DCFS notes, the earlier referral
was part of DCFS’s jurisdiction/disposition report admitted into
evidence at the adjudication hearing without objection. Although
a prior inconclusive finding may not provide sufficient evidence
of domestic violence in some instances, here the record reflects
that multiple witnesses, including both mother and father,
acknowledged that there was an incident in 2023, and that
mother and father previously accepted services and counseling
related to domestic violence from DCFS as a result of that
incident. Additionally, while father made statements attributing
the incident to mother’s irritability, he never denied that
the incident occurred. (Compare with In re J.N. (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 767, 776 [finding insufficient evidence of a past
domestic violence incident where the DCFS report found
“inconclusive” and there was no record of a restraining order
claimed to have been obtained against father].)
27
incident,7 and father repeatedly referenced mother’s irritability
due to her health conditions as an underlying reason for both
the March 2023 and July 2025 incidents. Father’s frequent use
of alcohol, which contributed to his aggressiveness yet was not
recognized by him as a problem, also provided evidence from
which the dependency court could find that there was a current
risk of harm to J.O.
Father argues that, because the criminal protective order
prevents contact between parents, “the chance of future domestic
violence between father and mother is minimal.” Although the
protective order was in place at the time of the jurisdictional
hearing, the court reasonably could find J.O. remained at
substantial risk of harm. Father reported that, while he had
not contacted mother due to the active restraining order, he
did “want[ ] to maintain a relationship.” Mother also admitted
she wanted to continue her relationship with father. Indeed,
when Dan A. told mother he no longer would allow S.A. to stay
at mother’s home if father were there, mother accused him of
“ ‘making her choose between her son and the man she loves.’ ”
Mother also stated that, as of September 29, 2025, she was
unable to “live independently without any financial[ ] support
from . . . father.”
7 Father contends there was no evidence that he denied the
domestic violence because DCFS could not interview father about
the July 13 incident due to his pending criminal case. But the
court reasonably could infer from DCFS’s interview of paternal
grandfather that father essentially attributed the incident to
mother having been unable to take a joke, and had described
the altercation to the grandfather as merely involving a shoving
match.
28
For similar reasons, we find that there is substantial
evidence to support the dependency court’s jurisdictional finding
under section 300, subdivision (b). “Exposing children to
recurring domestic violence may be sufficient to establish
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b). . . . Domestic
violence impacts children even if they are not the ones being
physically abused, ‘because they see and hear the violence and
the screaming.’ ” (T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 134, quoting
Heather A., supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 192.) Courts have upheld
jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b) where
there is evidence of recurrent domestic violence in the home,
even if the child was not always present to see it. (See, e.g,
T.V., at pp. 134–135 [parents had “lengthy history of domestic
violence” and evidence showed child was present during at least
one prior incident]; R.C., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 943 [two
incidents of domestic violence, one occurred in the presence of
one of the children and no child was injured].) Here, there was
evidence of more than one domestic violence incident between
the parents in which the children saw and heard the violence.
Given the totality of the record—including the influence of
alcohol, father’s unwillingness to take responsibility, and the
parents’ desire to reestablish their romantic relationship—the
court could infer that these incidents were likely to continue,
and supports the jurisdictional finding under section 300,
subdivision (b). The juvenile court did not have to wait for J.O.
to become injured before exercising its jurisdiction. (Kadence P.,
supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1383–1384; I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th
at p. 773.)
With respect to the b-3 count of the petition, alleging
father’s inability to care for J.O. due to his alcohol abuse, father
29
argues there is no evidence that he could not care for or supervise
J.O. due to his drinking. The record provides substantial
evidence to support the dependency court’s conclusion to
the contrary. It reflects that father had put J.O. in harmful
situations when he was intoxicated. Not until J.O. cried out
did father realize he should stop pulling J.O. away from mother.
Father also purposefully cut the electricity to the house—
something the court could infer father would not have done
had he been sober. And father’s own father had to remove J.O.
from the situation when father came home intoxicated and
assaulted mother, resulting in the March 2023 DCFS referral
for domestic violence. The court reasonably could infer father
could not appropriately care for, or supervise, J.O.—a vulnerable
three-year-old—when he was intoxicated and prone to engage in
violence, placing J.O. at substantial risk of serious physical harm.
(See N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 559 [“a child’s youth and
maturity level can bear upon the care that the child may require
and whether a parent’s . . . substance abuse places the child at
substantial risk of serious physical harm”].) Substantial evidence
thus supported the court’s jurisdictional finding based on father’s
alcohol use under section 300, subdivision (b).
3. Substantial evidence supports the court’s disposition
order removing J.O. from father
The above also provides substantial evidence for the
dependency court’s finding, “by clear and convincing evidence,
[J.O.] would be at substantial risk of harm if returned [to father]
and there are no reasonable means by which the child can be
protected without removal.” (T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at
p. 135.) It was reasonable for the court to infer, based on father’s
past and continued conduct, including the domestic violence and
30
frequent alcohol use, that no reasonable alternatives to removal
would effectively protect J.O. Removal was therefore appropriate
under section 361, subdivision (c).
Father contends the court’s order that he test for drugs
and alcohol weekly, “provided the court with a way to ensure
J.O.’s safety.” He also contends the court did not consider that
father was living with paternal grandmother or that the criminal
protective order addressed the risk of future domestic violence
incidents with mother. The dependency court was not required
to find that any of these factors sufficiently reduced or eliminated
the risk of harm to J.O., given the totality of the record. As of
his September 26, 2025 interview with the DI, father had not
complied with the dependency court’s September 3, 2025 referral
for weekly testing. Father admitted that he was still drinking
multiple times a week, although this was dependent on his daily
responsibilities and financial resources. Further, father said he
did not have time to test due to his work schedule, but he also
told the DI he did not think he should have to test. Accordingly,
the court reasonably could find the testing order was not
sufficient to ensure J.O.’s safety in father’s care.
With respect to father currently residing with paternal
grandmother, the record reflects that paternal grandmother,
although aware of father’s drinking, did not perceive him to
have a problem with alcohol. Thus, the court could reasonably
infer that she would not provide a meaningful check on his
alcohol use or behavior. As already stated, the existence of
the criminal protective order is of little significance given the
parents’ expressed desire to repair their romantic relationship.
Further, the incident that occurred in August 2023, on S.A.’s
birthday, involved a physical altercation with father’s brother
31
as well, providing a basis for the dependency court to conclude
that father’s unabated use of alcohol would contribute to
aggression and violence around J.O., and not solely when father
was in the presence of mother. Without father’s willingness to
address the underlying cause of these conflicts—his use of alcohol
—the record supports the dependency court’s conclusion that
anything short of removal would not sufficiently protect J.O.
Substantial evidence supports the dependency court’s
dispositional order.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OCHOA, J.*
We concur:
ADAMS, P. J.
HANASONO, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
32
