Filed 8/31/26 Ran v. Stockton Unified School Dist. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)

QIJUN RAN, C103385
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No.
v. STKCVUNPI20212673)

STOCKTON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et
al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

Qijun Ran (Ran) is a former employee of the Stockton Unified School District (the
district). In 2019, Ran attempted to privately mediate online harassment of a district
student and her family. District police officers arrested Ran on suspicion of harassing the
student but later discover he was not the harasser. In 2020, the district terminated Ran’s
employment for failing to report the harassment and other unprofessional conduct.
Ran sued the district and district police officers (collectively, defendants) for false
arrest and violation of the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983; section 1983). He
also sued the district for retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act
(Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.; FEHA) and California’s whistleblower statutes. The trial
court granted defendants’ summary judgment motion.
On appeal, Ran contends the trial court erred in: (1) failing to supplement the
arrest warrant affidavit with omitted material facts; (2) finding no triable issues of

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material fact as to the district’s section 1983 liability based on failure to train and
ratification; (3) resolving the prima facie requirement under FEHA as a matter of law;
and (4) failing to consider an unpled whistleblower statute and dismissing the case
without leave to amend. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The 2019 Incident
Ran was a concert music assistant at the district. In 2019, a high school student at
the district (student) contacted Ran on Instagram, asking him to talk to her parents
because they planned to move her to a different school. Student claimed her parents’
decision stemmed from her boyfriend’s conduct. She also asked Ran to speak to
boyfriend.
Boyfriend reached out to Ran on Instagram and they exchanged messages for a
few weeks. At first, boyfriend asked Ran to tell student’s family he was sorry and he
would stay away from student if her family let her stay at the same school. But the
conversation got “really weird really quickly.” Boyfriend claimed student was suicidal
and sent nude photos to a different boy named W. Ran knew student was a minor and
boyfriend was 18 years old.
Ran messaged student’s brother on Facebook and asked to speak to student’s
family. Student’s mother soon texted Ran, stating someone had been harassing the
family and asked Ran if he actually sent the Facebook message. Ran confirmed the
Facebook message was from him. Ran later spoke to mother on the phone, telling her his
concerns about student’s online activities, relationship, and suicidal tendency. He also
relayed boyfriend’s message that boyfriend would stay away from student if she could
stay at the same school. But Ran did not tell mother that student sent nude photos
because that conversation would be “uncomfortable.”
Shortly after Ran told mother he would connect her with boyfriend, boyfriend
texted mother but claimed he could not speak on the phone.

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 Ran knew mother was a district administrator, but she was not his direct
supervisor and Ran did not know her job title or duties. Other than mother, Ran did not
contact anyone at the district, law enforcement, or Child Protective Services about
student’s situation or boyfriend.
Mother told district police officers that boyfriend sent her lewd photos of student.
Boyfriend threatened to post those photos online unless mother promised to keep student
at her current school, keep student away from W., and ensure student did not commit
suicide. Mother stated she received the same demands from Ran. Mother believed Ran
was boyfriend because Ran knew details about the situation that no one else would know
and seemed overly concerned about boyfriend. And she found Ran’s involvement
suspicious because the family was never close to him.
In July 2019, a district police officer searched the district’s student records system
but was unable to locate boyfriend. In August 2019, Ran was placed on paid
administrative leave following mother’s report to the district’s human resources
department. He returned to work on September 6, 2019. During Ran’s leave, the text
messages from boyfriend to student’s family stopped.
On September 11, 2019, district police officers obtained over 300 sexually explicit
videos of student that she sent to boyfriend on Instagram, as well as boyfriend’s text
messages to student threatening to send these videos and nude photos of student to her
parents.
Concluding Ran was boyfriend, district police officers obtained an arrest warrant
for Ran on September 19, 2019 and arrested him the next day.
On September 25, 2019, district police officers obtained a warrant to request
account information from Google, Apple, and Instagram. They found no initial
correlation between Ran’s accounts and boyfriend’s accounts; instead, they discovered
the internet provider address used to access boyfriend’s Gmail and Instagram accounts
was also used to access the Google account of a different individual. In November 2019,

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that individual admitted she was behind the boyfriend account and district police officers
arrested her. No criminal charges were filed against Ran.
II. The Termination
In November 2020, the district’s human resources department issued Ran a Notice
of Proposed Recommendation for Termination and Statement of Charges, signed by an
interim assistant superintendent (the termination notice). According to the termination
notice, the interim assistant superintendent intended to recommend Ran’s dismissal,
citing Ran’s failure to report the situation between student and boyfriend despite being a
mandated reporter, as well as his unprofessional and inappropriate conduct towards other
students.
Ran’s counsel sent a response to the termination notice in December 2020. The
response claimed the district had no evidence that Ran knew or reasonably suspected
student was a victim of child abuse or neglect or that Ran acted inappropriately towards
other district students. Ran also objected to the Skelly1 hearing officer and the lack of an
opportunity to select an arbitrator. In 2021, following the Skelly hearing, the district
terminated Ran’s employment.
III. The Lawsuits and Summary Judgment
Ran sued defendants for violation of section 1983 and false arrest with warrant
(Gov. Code, § 820.4), alleging they obtained the arrest warrant without probable cause.
He later filed another lawsuit against the district for retaliation in violation of FEHA and
California’s whistleblower statutes (Lab. Code, §§ 98.6, 1102.5, 6310, Gov. Code,
§ 8547), alleging the district retaliated against him for complaining to mother, a district
employee, about student’s suicidal tendency and the danger student posed to his
workplace safety. The trial court consolidated the cases.

1 Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194.

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 The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and entered
judgment in their favor. Ran timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Framework and Standard of Review
A defendant may move for summary judgment if it contends the action has no
merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court must grant the motion “if
all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (c).) The defendant meets its burden of showing a cause of action has no merit by
showing that “one or more elements of the cause of action … cannot be established.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To do so, a moving defendant “ ‘need not
support his motion with affirmative evidence negating an essential element of the
responding party’s case. Instead, the moving defendant may … point to the absence of
evidence to support the plaintiff’s case. When that is done, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to present evidence showing there is a triable issue of material fact. If the
plaintiff is unable to meet her burden of proof regarding an essential element of her case,
all other facts are rendered immaterial.’ ” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001)
25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781.) “To be ‘material’ for purposes of a summary judgment
proceeding, a fact must relate to some claim or defense in issue under the pleadings
[citation], and it must also be essential to the judgment in some way.” (Kelly v. First
Astri Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 462, 470.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if,
and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact
in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of
proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
We review the trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo.
(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.) In doing so, “we take the
facts from the record that was before the trial court when it ruled on that motion” and

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consider “ ‘all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to
which objections were made and sustained.’ ” (Ibid.) “We liberally construe the
evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Ibid.) But “[w]hen opposition to a
motion for summary judgment is based on inferences, those inferences must be
reasonably deducible from the evidence, and not such as are derived from speculation,
conjecture, imagination, or guesswork.” (Joseph E. Di Loreto, Inc. v. O’Neill (1991)
1 Cal.App.4th 149, 161.)
“We must affirm a summary judgment if it is correct on any of the grounds
asserted in the trial court, regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons. [Citation.] Even
if the grounds entitling the moving party to a summary judgment were not asserted in the
trial court, we must affirm if the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address
those grounds on appeal.” (Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 173, 181.)
II. Section 1983 Claims
Ran contends district police officers are liable under section 1983 for judicial
deception because the affidavit included mother’s false suspicion of Ran being boyfriend
and omitted material exculpatory facts. He further contends triable issues of material fact
exist as to the district’s section 1983 liability because (1) the jury may infer from the
falsehood and omission that the district failed to adequately train the police officers; and
(2) the district ratified its police officers’ unconstitutional conduct by terminating Ran
based on the affidavit. We disagree.
A. False statement and omission
State courts “must look to federal law to determine the conduct which gives rise to
an action” under section 1983. (Greene v. Zank (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 497, 503.) But
“[n]othing in section 1983 imposes federal procedural law upon state courts trying civil
rights actions.” (Chavez v. Keat (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1414.)

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 “A judicial deception claim ‘rests on the assertion that [an] affidavit misled the
court into issuing a [] warrant.’ ” (Zilinskas v. County of Monterey (N.D. Cal. 2026)
819 F.Supp.3d 1026, 1033.) For a section 1983 claim based on judicial deception to
survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must: (1) make a substantial showing of the
officers’ deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth and (2) establish that the
alleged false statements or omissions were material to the finding of probable cause.
(Chism v. Washington State (9th Cir. 2011) 661 F.3d 380, 386, 389.) An alleged false
statement or omission is material if the affidavit, once corrected and supplemented,
would not have provided a substantial basis for probable cause. (Id. at p. 389.)
Materiality is a question for the court at the summary judgment stage. (Casey N. v.
County of Orange (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1168-1169.)
Here, Ran contends district police officers omitted the following material facts in
obtaining the arrest warrant: (1) the existence of a different suspect; (2) they found no
initial correlations between boyfriend’s accounts and Ran’s accounts; (3) they were
uncertain about boyfriend’s identity; and (4) they had not completed review of data from
Ran’s cell phone service provider. The first two facts have no bearing on district police
officers’ section 1983 liability because they occurred after Ran’s arrest. (Maryland v.
Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 85.)
The third and fourth facts, as well as mother’s suspicion that Ran was boyfriend,
were immaterial. At the time, district police officers obtained numerous Instagram
messages between boyfriend and student containing sexually explicit videos of student
and knew boyfriend sent lewd photos of student to mother. They confirmed boyfriend
was not in the district’s student records. Ran had knowledge of intimate details about the
situation and acted as a middleman for student even though he was not close with the
family. He and boyfriend also conveyed the same demands regarding student to mother.
Shortly after mother requested Ran connect her with boyfriend, boyfriend reached out to

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mother but refused to speak on the phone. Moreover, boyfriend stopped sending
student’s family messages around the time Ran was placed on paid administrative leave.
Excluding mother’s suspicion, these facts provided a substantial basis for probable
cause to arrest Ran at the time, even when supplemented with ongoing investigation of
boyfriend’s true identity and review of Ran’s cell phone data. (U.S. v. Brooks (9th Cir.
2004) 367 F.3d 1128, 1134 [probable cause does not require a certainty, only a fair
probability or a substantial chance that criminal activity took place].)
Accordingly, summary judgment on Ran’s section 1983 judicial deception claim is
proper because he fails to demonstrate the arrest warrant was issued based on a
misleading affidavit or otherwise unsupported by probable cause. As such, we need not
consider whether district police officers deliberately or recklessly omitted the facts or
reach Ran’s qualified immunity claim. (See Chism v. Washington State, supra, 661 F.3d
at p. 393, fn. 15 [in judicial deception cases, our qualified immunity analysis at the
summary judgment stage is swallowed by the question of reckless or intentional disregard
for the truth].) Ran’s false arrest claim also fails because he cannot establish the element
that the arrest was made without a warrant. (Carcamo v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Dept. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 608, 616.)
B. Failure to train
A public entity cannot be held liable under section 1983 for acts of its employees
based solely on a respondeat superior theory. (Monell v. Department of Social Services
of City of New York (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 691.) In cases concerning a public entity’s
failure to train its police officers, “the inadequacy of police training may serve as the
basis for [section] 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” (City of
Canton, Ohio v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378, 388.) “[F]or liability to attach in this
circumstance the identified deficiency in a [public entity’s] training program must be
closely related to the ultimate injury.” (Id. at p. 391.) In other words, the plaintiff must

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“prove that the deficiency in training actually caused the police officers’ indifference” to
his rights. (Ibid.) “ ‘[W]hether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of
causation [in a section 1983 case] to defeat a motion for summary judgment is a legal
question.’ ” (Casey N. v. County of Orange, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1168-1169.)
Here, the district carried its initial burden by pointing to the absence of evidence
supporting Ran’s failure to train claim. The burden thus shifted to Ran to demonstrate a
triable issue of material fact. But Ran provided no evidence of any district training
program, let alone a faulty one, that actually caused the district police officers’ alleged
deliberate indifference to the affidavit’s accuracy.
Ran contends the jury could infer from the alleged falsehood and omission that
(1) the district failed to adequately train its police officers and (2) that inadequate training
caused the deprivation of his rights. But as we concluded above, the corrected and
supplemented affidavit would still provide probable cause for the arrest warrant. As
such, even assuming inadequate training led district police officers to include mother’s
suspicion of Ran and omit potentially exculpatory evidence from the warrant affidavit,
Ran still could not infer actual causation between such inadequacy and the issuance of his
arrest warrant.
C. Ratification
We generally do not consider an argument raised for the first time in an appeal
from a grant of summary judgment. (Noe v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 316,
335.) But we may consider a newly-raised issue if it “involves purely a legal question
which rests on an [uncontroverted] record which could not have been altered by the
presentation of additional evidence.” (In re Marriage of Broderick (1989)
209 Cal.App.3d 489, 501.)
Here, the threshold question for Ran’s ratification claim is a factual one. A public
entity may be liable for a subordinate’s decision to terminate an employee if the public
entity’s authorized policymakers have delegated policymaking power regarding the

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decision to the subordinate, or some official with policymaking power has ratified the
subordinate’s decision. (Sandoval v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Social Services
(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1183.) But the discretionary power to hire or fire an
employee is not by itself sufficient for public entity liability under section 1983. (Ibid.)
Here, the record is unclear as to whether the interim assistant superintendent had
policymaking power or whether the district’s policymaker ratified the interim assistant
superintendent’s recommendation to terminate Ran. Additional evidence of the district’s
policymaking power delegation could change the outcome of Ran’s ratification claim. So
we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal.
III. FEHA Claims
Ran contends he engaged in protected activity under FEHA because he
(1) reported workplace safety concerns to mother, a district employee, warning of
potential danger from student’s suspicious online activities and suicidal tendency; and
(2) submitted a written response to the termination notice. We disagree.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under FEHA, a plaintiff must show:
(1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer subjected him to an adverse
employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the
employer’s action. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1042.)
Protected activities include opposing any practices forbidden by FEHA. (Miller v.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 261, 285.)
“ ‘[C]ase law and FEHA’s implementing regulations are uniformly premised on the
principle that the nature of activities protected by [FEHA] demonstrate some degree of
opposition to or protest of the employer’s conduct or practices based on the employee’s
reasonable belief that the employer’s action or practice is unlawful.’ ” (Dinslage v. City
and County of San Francsico (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 382.) “ ‘For protection under
the “opposition clause,” an employee must have opposed an employment practice made
unlawful by [FEHA].’ ” (Id. at p. 381.) The adequacy of an employee’s prima facie case

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is a question of law. (Horne v. District Council 16 Internat. Union of Painters & Allied
Trades (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 524, 534.)
Here, Ran fails to show he engaged in protected activity. Neither boyfriend’s
harassment nor student’s suicidal tendency was a district employment practice. And Ran
cannot establish a causal link between the district’s decision to terminate him and his
response because the district had already initiated the termination process before Ran
submitted the response. As such, Ran fails to establish a prima facie case of retaliation
under FEHA. We therefore need not address his remaining FEHA claims that the
district’s proffered reason for his termination was pretextual, that the trial court
improperly weighed the evidence, and that the trial court applied the wrong standard of
proof.
IV. The Whistleblower Claim
Ran contends the trial court erred in: (1) dismissing his whistleblower claim
without considering whether his claim also falls under Education Code sections 44110
through 44112; and (2) failing to permit amendment of his whistleblower claim to add
violations of the Education Code. We disagree.
“The complaint limits the issues to be addressed at the motion for summary
judgment.” (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258.) If a party
wishes the trial court to consider a previously unpled issue in connection with a motion
for summary judgment, that party has the duty to request leave to amend. (Bostrom v.
County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1663-1664.) Absent such a
request, the trial court is under no obligation to inquire whether there are possible issues
not raised by the pleadings. (Lee v. Bank of America (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 197, 216.)
Here, Ran made no mention of the relevant Education Code sections in either his
first amended complaint for violation of whistleblower statutes or his opposing papers.
Nor did he make any request for leave to amend. Thus, the trial court had no duty to
consider the unpled claim or to permit amendment.

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 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)&(2).)

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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