Filed 8/31/26 P. v. Fernandez CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B342691
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XSONA117216
v.
RICKY DELAROSA FERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel J. Lowenthal, Judge. Affirmed.
Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, David E. Madeo and David A. Voet, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
Defendant Ricky Delarosa Fernandez was convicted by a
jury of second degree murder for the killing of Ricardo Guerrero
(Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, 189, subd. (b)).
Fernandez now appeals on the sole basis that the trial
court erred in permitting testimony identifying him by his
moniker, or nickname, “Joker.”
We find no abuse of discretion in allowing the limited
testimony, which was necessary to describe the process by which
law enforcement identified Fernandez. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Fernandez fatally stabbed Guerrero early one evening in
April 2021. The stabbing took place on a service road near a
Target store in Long Beach. At the time, both men lived in
homeless encampments nearby.
A trucker making a delivery to a neighboring store
observed Fernandez chasing Guerrero while Guerrero walked
backwards as the two screamed at one another. Guerrero, who
the trucker believed was defending himself against Fernandez,
backed into a pole and fell. When Guerrero got up, Fernandez
repeatedly stabbed him with a knife. Guerrero fell again, but
then got back up and ran towards the Target store. Fernandez
turned and ran in the opposite direction while covering his face so
the trucker could not identify him.
Guerrero approached a Target employee and then collapsed
again. Another employee called 911 and paramedics and police
responded. They found Guerrero unresponsive with multiple
injuries, including a stab wound to the chest. Guerrero was
transported to a hospital where he was pronounced dead.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Police investigating the scene immediately after the
stabbing found no suspects in the area. However, Target
employees provided them with store surveillance video which
showed Guerrero falling and Fernandez running away. Police
obtained surveillance videos from the neighboring business and a
nearby waste disposal company. These showed interactions
between Fernandez and Guerrero prior to the stabbing. Also
present in some of the videos was a female associate of
Fernandez’s named Reba H.
Detectives showed images from these videos to another
homeless individual who identified Fernandez as “Joker.” A
homicide detective then shared a photo of Fernandez and the
nickname “Joker” with Sergeant2 Tera Frudakis of the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. She recognized Fernandez
and gave the homicide detective Fernandez’s legal name.
Based on this information, police located and apprehended
Fernandez.
Fernandez was charged with a single count of murder. He
pled not guilty.
His case was first tried to a jury in 2023. Before the trial
began, defense counsel moved to exclude any evidence of
Fernandez’s gang association and his use of the nickname
“Joker.” The trial court granted the motion to the extent of his
gang activity but allowed the prosecutor to refer to his moniker to
establish how they identified him. When called as a witness,
Reba identified or referred to Fernandez as “Joker” on numerous
occasions.
2 Frudakis was a sheriff’s deputy at the time but has since
been promoted to sergeant.
3
Fernandez also testified at his first trial. He admitted to
stabbing Guerrero but claimed it was in self-defense after
Guerrero became aggressive towards Fernandez and Reba. He
testified on direct that he did not report the incident to police
because he was afraid of, among other things, police gangs. The
court ruled this opened the door to questioning about Fernandez’s
involvement with gangs. His counsel then elicited testimony from
Fernandez that he had been a gang member in his teenage years
but “grew out of that” when he was 20. The prosecutor then
inquired further about his former gang affiliation, including the
name of the gang, his gang-related tattoos, his gang moniker,
“Joker,” a “joker face” tattoo visible on his forehead, and graffiti
police documented around his encampment referencing his
former gang and “Joker.”
The jury in the first trial deadlocked, with 10 voting guilty
of second degree murder and two voting guilty of manslaughter.
The trial court declared a mistrial and set the matter for retrial.
In advance of the retrial, defense counsel again moved to
exclude evidence of Fernandez’s gang affiliation and his
nickname “Joker.” The court agreed to the former, and
encouraged the parties to reach a stipulation as to the latter.
They did not, and the court ruled, based on the prosecutor’s
representations as to how law enforcement identified Fernandez,
that the People could make their identification based on the
nickname “Joker.”
On the second day of the retrial, one of the jurors asked to
be excused. Outside the presence of the other jurors, he explained
seeing Fernandez’s tattoos led him to believe Fernandez was a
gang member. Based on this, the prospective juror was afraid he
could not be impartial due to his deep-seated antipathy towards
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gangs. This antipathy stemmed from being forced into a gang
“when [he] was small.” That juror was excused.
Later that day, the People called Sergeant Frudakis to
testify about how she identified Fernandez. The prosecutor asked
her what material the homicide detective provided her, and she
responded, “[t]hey provided me with a still picture and a moniker,
or a nickname, of somebody.” After Sergeant Frudakis identified
the photograph she received, the prosecutor asked, “What was
the nickname that you were given by the homicide detective?”
Sergeant Frudakis responded, “I was given the nickname Joker.”
She further explained that she recognized the person in the
photograph from “numerous” prior contacts and conversations
with him, she knew he went by the nickname “Joker,” she knew
his true name to be Ricky Fernandez, and he was the defendant
present in the courtroom. There were no further references to
“Joker” or Fernandez’s gang affiliation in the retrial.
Fernandez again testified in the retrial, again claiming he
stabbed Guerrero in self-defense.
The jury in the retrial found Fernandez not guilty of first
degree murder but convicted him of second degree murder. The
trial court sentenced him to 15 years to life.
Fernandez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Law and Standard of Review
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant
evidence is admissible.” (Evid. Code, § 351.) Evidence is relevant
if it tends to “prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code,
§ 210.)
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Even if relevant, a trial court has broad discretion to
“exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)
“A trial court’s discretionary ruling under [Evidence Code
section 352] ‘ “must not be disturbed on appeal except on a
showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th
584, 634–635.)
II. Analysis
Fernandez argues “the admission of [his] ‘moniker’
especially combined with [Sergeant Frudakis’s] ‘numerous prior
contacts’ comment virtually screamed gang member and since
identity was not even in issue, there was no probative value in
the fact [he] had a moniker much less that he had numerous law
enforcement contacts.” We disagree.
Fernandez is incorrect that “identity was not . . . in issue.”
By entering a plea of not guilty to the charge of murder, he put
every element of that offense into dispute “until it was resolved
. . . by the jury’s adverse verdicts.” (People v. Waidla (2000)
22 Cal.4th 690, 723.) The People bore the burden of proving these
elements, including identity, beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.,
citing § 1096.) This burden was not affected by Fernandez’s
defense strategy or even by his offer of a stipulation. (Waidla, at
p. 723 & fn. 5.) As explained in Waidla, “[t]hat [an element of a
crime] might have been proved other than by the [challenged
testimony, including by stipulation], is . . . without effect. A fact’s
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relevance does not depend on the means of its proof.” (Id. at
p. 723, fn. omitted.)
Evidence Code section 352 does provide an exception to the
general rule that a criminal defendant cannot “stipulate away
evidence by stipulating away issues” if it would “ ‘ “deprive the
state’s case of its persuasiveness and forcefulness.” ’ ” (People v.
Thornton (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 44, 49.) But we see no abuse of
discretion in allowing the testimony at issue here.
Sergeant Frudakis’s testimony was highly probative of
Fernandez’s identity. She testified she knew he went by “Joker”
and recognized his face based on numerous prior contacts and
conversations with him. The nickname “Joker” was central to her
connecting the information detectives had to his true name. And
the extensiveness of her past interactions with Fernandez went
to the reliability of her identification.
Beyond identification, the process by which law
enforcement located Fernandez was relevant to rebut his claim
he stabbed Guerrero in self-defense. Fernandez did not remain at
the scene until police arrived. He did not contact authorities to
report any assault by Guerrero or obtain aid for him. Instead,
Fernandez covered his face and fled, forcing law enforcement to
track him down. This suggests he acted with criminal intent
incompatible with justifiable homicide. (See People v. Beltran
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 957 [“Defendant’s departure from the
scene, disposal of the knife, and flight to a foreign country, where
he was arrested six years later, all reflected consciousness of
guilt”].)
Furthermore, we do not share Fernandez’s concern that
admission of his “nickname” or “moniker” “Joker” created a
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substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
misleading the jury.
Fernandez seems particularly concerned that Sergeant
Frudakis used the word “moniker” at one point in her testimony,
because he considers the word tantamount to a declaration of
gang membership. The definition of “moniker” is a “name,
nickname.” (
at
a gang name. Moreover, Sergeant Frudakis only used the word
once, and did so in conjunction with the word “nickname,”
clarifying that the words meant the same thing. She did not
testify that “Joker” was the “moniker” at that time. She only gave
the name “Joker” in responses to questions about Fernandez’s
“nickname.” Our Supreme Court upheld admission of the
nickname “BamBam” to facilitate identification of the defendant
in People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 551 (Brown) where the
references “were brief, mild and factual” and therefore “could not
have been prejudicial.”
Fernandez does not claim the nickname “Joker” implies a
propensity for violence, gang membership, or other negative
connotation. The Brown court observed in affirming admission of
the “BamBam” nickname that it was “not particularly
inflammatory.” (Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 551, fn. 12.)
Fernandez discusses the California Racial Justice Act of
2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1) at length but does not claim any
violation of that Act occurred here. The Act has no bearing on the
admission of a racially neutral nickname or any implication of
gang membership. As Fernandez observes, the purpose of the Act
8
“is to eradicate racial bias in all forms in criminal proceedings.”
(Italics added.)
Fernandez also cites cases warning of the risk of bias
resulting from the admission of gang evidence. (Citing People v.
Pineda (2022) 13 Cal.5th 186, 233–234 and cases cited therein.)
The trial court was clearly sensitive to this risk when it forbade
the People from inquiring into Fernandez’s gang affiliation unless
raised by the defense. Allowing mention of his moniker or
nickname without any mention of the word “gang” is a far cry
from eliciting testimony about his gang association or activities.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court
acted in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner in
concluding Fernandez’s nickname or moniker was admissible
notwithstanding Evidence Code section 352.
In any event, whatever the applicable standard for
prejudicial error, there is no indication the outcome of the trial
would have been any different if the challenged testimony had
not been allowed. Fernandez had a “joker face” tattoo on his
forehead. It would therefore come as little surprise to anyone that
he might be known as “Joker.” His tattoos were also recognizable
to people familiar with gang culture—such as the excused juror—
as indicating gang association. Thus, to the extent any juror did
have an understanding of gang culture, knowing that he had a
“moniker” or “nickname” and prior contacts with law enforcement
is at most cumulative of these visual cues. Indeed, Fernandez
himself contends the challenged testimony “could only have
reinforced any preexisting notions [jurors] may have formed from
[his] appearance including viewing his tattoos.” (Italics added.)
Consistent with the conclusion that Fernandez was not
prejudiced by the challenged testimony he claims implied gang
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involvement, we observe Fernandez actually fared better in his
first trial where he admitted to being a former gang member. In
spite of this, two jurors were persuaded by his claim of self-
defense and refused to convict him of second degree murder.
Though no similar gang testimony was elicited in the retrial, all
jurors there agreed he was guilty of second degree murder.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.
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