Filed 8/31/26 Marriage of Mayo CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re Marriage of MELISSA B343971, B349327
JACQUELINE and SAUL JASON
MAYO. (Los Angeles County
_________________________________ Super. Ct. No. 23STFL00497)

MELISSA JACQUELINE MAYO,

Respondent,

v.

SAUL JASON MAYO,

Appellant.

Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Michelle L. Kazadi, Judge. Affirmed with a modification.
Saul Jason Mayo, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Melissa Jacqueline Mayo, in pro. per., for Respondent.

______________________________
 This consolidated appeal arises from the parties’ competing
requests for domestic violence restraining orders (DVROs) under
the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code1, § 6200 et seq.)
(DVPA) and a related attorney fee award.
In January 2023, after 20 years of marriage, Melissa Mayo
filed for divorce from her husband, Saul Mayo.2 Ten months into
the dissolution proceedings, Saul filed a request for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) against Melissa pursuant to the DVPA.
In support of his request, Saul submitted a declaration in which
he attested that Melissa had a “long history” of engaging in abuse
by “getting too intoxicated, threatening violence, [and] breaking
personal property.” He alleged, among other things, that Melissa
had threatened their only child—20-year-old Jade Mayo—with a
knife at the family’s home in Italy and had harassed Jade at her
college dormitory by showing up unannounced. Saul further alleged
that, following the parties’ separation, Melissa sent threatening
messages to him and his then-pregnant girlfriend, 37-year-old
Mary Rosolowski. And he attested that, when Melissa dropped
off his truck at Rosolowski’s house, Melissa “threw the keys [to the
truck] at [Rosolowski]” and called her a “ ‘whore’ in front of [her]
neighbors.” Saul also submitted declarations from Jade and
Rosolowski concerning Melissa’s alleged abuse. On November 3,
2023, the trial court granted Saul’s request for a TRO prohibiting
Melissa from contacting him, Jade, or Rosolowski.
Two months later, Melissa filed her own request for a
TRO against Saul. In support of the request, Melissa attested
that she had filed for divorce “after discovering Saul was having

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Family Code.

2 For clarity, we refer to the parties and their daughter—all of
whom share a surname—by their first names.

2
an affair with . . . Rosolowski . . . , the younger sister of a long-time
friend.” She further attested that, during the last 10 years of the
parties’ marriage, Saul had belittled her career, criticized her
appearance, and isolated her from friends and family. In addition,
she alleged that Saul had pushed her into a wall during a family
outing at a shopping mall, causing her to develop a black eye.
Finally, Melissa alleged that Saul continued to abuse her after she
filed for divorce: She attested that Saul repeatedly hacked into her
social media accounts and posted child pornography, arranged for
her car to be repossessed the morning of Rosolowski’s deposition in
the dissolution action (a deposition Melissa had planned to attend),
and used his remote access to Melissa’s home security and internet
systems to harass her by, inter alia, ringing her doorbell and
triggering her home alarm. The court denied Melissa’s request
for a TRO pending an evidentiary hearing.
Over the course of eight days between February and
November 2024, the court conducted a combined evidentiary
hearing on the competing DVRO requests. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the court granted Melissa’s request and denied Saul’s
request. In addition, the court granted Melissa’s later request for
approximately $200,000 in prevailing party attorney fees.
Representing himself on appeal, Saul now asks us to reverse
the DVRO rulings and the attorney fee award. With respect to
the rulings on the competing DVRO requests, he contends that
(1) insufficient evidence supports the rulings, (2) three evidentiary
errors compel reversal, (3) Melissa’s DVRO is “invalid” for lack
of supporting findings, (4) the court’s delay in issuing a statement
of decision mandates reversal, (5) the rulings are “void” because
the trial judge improperly ruled on her own disqualification, and
(6) Melissa’s failure to address all of Saul’s arguments requires us
to rule in his favor. We, however, conclude that Saul has failed to

3
provide an adequate record to allow us to evaluate the sufficiency
of the evidence and the alleged evidentiary errors. And we conclude
that neither the record nor pertinent legal authority supports Saul’s
remaining arguments.
As to the attorney fee award, Saul contends that the court
(1) lacked jurisdiction to consider Melissa’s fee request, (2) failed
to consider Saul’s opposition to the request, (3) improperly adopted
a proposed order concerning the fee award drafted by Melissa’s
counsel, (4) applied the wrong legal standard in awarding certain of
the fees, and (5) ignored that the billing records do not adequately
support the requested fees. We agree with Saul that a handful
of the billing entries appear related to work on matters other than
the DVRO proceedings, but we conclude that his other arguments
are meritless.
Accordingly, we order the court on remand to reduce the
attorney fee award by $8,355 and otherwise affirm.

FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant
to our resolution of this appeal.

A. DVRO Proceedings
1. The Combined Evidentiary Hearing
Saul, Jade, Rosolowski, and Melissa each testified at
the evidentiary hearing on the DVRO requests. They provided
competing accounts of the incidents described in the declarations
supporting the requests. And Jade in particular provided testimony
at odds with some of the statements in her declaration.
With respect to the knife incident, for example, Jade attested
in her declaration that Melissa had “chased [her] and charged
at [her]” with the knife. But at the hearing, Jade testified that

4
Melissa had “charged past [her]” with the knife before threatening
to kill herself. Melissa confirmed this latter description of the
incident in her own testimony: “I . . . was so isolated . . . from
everything that I truly believed that Saul and Jade were my world,
and if they left, I really didn’t have anything to live for. So I went
upstairs . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . to my kitchen[,] and I pulled out a giant
chef’s knife . . . [.] Jade saw me with the knife and visibly jumped
back in fright. And I immediately said to her, ‘Are you mad? I
have never so much as laid a finger on you in my whole life[.] [D]o
you really think that I would touch you?’ [¶] And I went into my
bedroom, went into the bathroom, locked the door[,] and I tried [to
kill myself].”
Jade likewise provided testimony inconsistent with a
statement in her declaration concerning the college dormitory
incident. Jade attested in her declaration that Melissa had
appeared at her dormitory unannounced after Jade had “made
it clear [she] didn’t want to see or speak to [Melissa] again.” At
the evidentiary hearing, however, Jade testified that she had
never expressly told Melissa to stop contacting her: “I didn’t
fe[el] like [Melissa] needed to know. It was my decision.”
The parties also introduced various documents, photographs,
and videos in support of their versions of the pertinent events.
Many of these exhibits, however, are missing from our appellate
record. For example, Saul claimed that Melissa ignored a February
2023 cease-and-desist letter from his attorneys. But the letter
does not appear in Saul’s appellant’s appendix. Nor do we have
the photographs of Rosolowski’s house that Saul introduced to
rebut Melissa’s testimony that she placed the keys to Saul’s truck in
Rosolowski’s mailbox, rather than throwing the keys at Rosolowski.
We likewise lack the video exhibits Melissa introduced supporting
her allegation that Saul hacked into her home security system,

5
including a video purportedly depicting her front door lock moving
on its own.
Finally, the parties offered additional evidence bearing
on each other’s credibility, untethered to the specific incidents
detailed in their declarations. Melissa’s counsel, for example,
questioned Saul about a message in which he instructed Jade
to “just lie” in order to qualify for a COVID-19 vaccination. And
Saul introduced evidence that Melissa had violated the terms of the
November 3, 2023 TRO by copying him on an email to an attorney
and by sending Jade a holiday card.

2. The Trial Court’s DVRO Rulings
On November 26, 2024, following closing arguments from
counsel, the court granted Melissa’s DVRO request and denied
Saul’s competing request. The court explained, in pertinent part:
“So I want to start first with [Saul’s] request for [a] restraining
order against [Melissa]. The court finds that [Saul] has failed to
meet his burden by [a] preponderance of evidence that [Melissa]
has committed acts of domestic violence . . . .
“It appears to the court that [Melissa’s] behavior was a
reaction to unsettling news regarding [Saul’s] relationship with
someone else. Her reactions were inappropriate, but I don’t find
that they rise to the level of domestic violence in this case. And
I’m—specifically that’s with respect to the emails.
“I don’t find that [Melissa] dropping off the keys to [Saul’s]
truck at [Rosolowski’s] house was an act of domestic violence.
There was no threat or attempt to intimidate [Rosolowski] by
dropping off keys to [Saul’s] car, regardless of where they were
left . . . . Again, the language may have been inappropriate, but
it doesn’t rise to the level of domestic violence.

6
 “With respect to the incident in Italy[,] . . . the knife
incident, I don’t find that [Melissa] chased Jade around the house
with a knife. It was clear from testimony that [Melissa] was in an
emotional state as she was dangerous to herself, not to anyone else.
“Similarly, with any attempts to contact [Rosolowski]
on social media, I just don’t find that they rise to the level
of threatening or domestic—any sort of domestic violence on
[Melissa’s] behalf[.] [S]o that [TRO] is dissolved, and the case
is dismissed.
“So with respect to [Melissa’s] request for [a] restraining
order against [Saul], so this request and the incidents described
were disturbing.
“I will start with the cyber incidents. The change or the
controlling of the internet, the smart devices in the house, the
internet in the Italy property, the laptop. [Saul’s] counsel had
mentioned there was no report from the cyber security firm. So
the only evidence . . . really was the testimony of the parties, and
to be honest, it came down to a credibility assessment. And the
court found [Melissa] to be more credible than [Saul] with respect
to detailing these acts.
“What was disturbing mostly were the acts described by
[Melissa], specifically the knife incident in Italy, and the lack
of empathy and cruelty that [Saul] had . . . in videotaping her on
the floor, in the pool of blood, or telling her to cut her wrist with
a razor blade down the vein as opposed to across. Those were from
my notes from his testimony, and that’s disturbing.
“The incident at the [shopping] mall, I believe [Melissa], and
I’m going to find that [she] has met her burden by a preponderance
of evidence to show that [Saul] has engaged in a pattern of conduct
that disturbed [her] peace over years. So that [DVRO] will be
granted for a period of three years.” The court further ordered that

7
Saul was prohibited from owning or possessing any firearms or
ammunition.
The court then entered a written DVRO in favor of Melissa
and against Saul on mandatory Judicial Council of California form
DV-130 (form DV-130).3

3. Saul’s Request for a Statement of Decision
On December 2, 2024, Saul filed a request pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 632 for a statement of decision concerning
the court’s DVRO rulings. On April 30, 2025, the court issued a
minute order in which it stated in pertinent part: “The court
has recently discovered that a request for a proposed statement
of decision has been filed. The court was not made aware, prior to
today’s date, that the request was filed. [¶] The court will order
and review the transcripts of the hearings and prepare its proposed
statement of decision within thirty days.” (Capitalization omitted.)
On May 19, 2025, the court issued a statement of decision. Our
appellate record contains only the first page of that decision.

B. Attorney Fee Proceedings
On February 6, 2025, Melissa filed a request seeking
$202,257.75 in attorney fees incurred in connection with the
DVRO proceedings. On April 16, Saul filed an opposition to the
fee request. In the opposition, he referenced his then-pending

3 Section 6221, subdivision (c) provides that “[a]ny order
issued by a court to which [division 10 of the Family Code, titled
Prevention of Domestic Violence,] applies shall be issued on forms
adopted by the Judicial Council of California.” (§ 6221, subd. (c).)
Division 10 includes the provisions governing the DVRO requests in
this case. (See § 6300 et seq.)

8
December 2, 2024 request for a statement of decision. On April 29,
the court held a hearing on the fee request.
At the hearing, the court granted Melissa’s fee request in
full. The award included both mandatory prevailing petitioner
fees under section 6344, subdivision (a) and discretionary prevailing
respondent fees under section 6344, subdivision (b). The court
awarded the discretionary fees based on its finding that Saul filed
his request for a DVRO in order to abuse and intimidate Melissa.
The court ordered orally on the record that the award “be paid
at the time that there is a sale of the Italy residence or the [former
marital] residence [in Los Angeles]. [¶] . . . [¶] And then also if
the parties liquidate the crypto[currency] stick [discussed during
the DVRO proceedings], any balance due on this fee award may be
payable from that source as well.”
The minute order the court issued following the hearing
directed that the fee award “be charged against [Saul’s] share
of [the] profits” from the sale of the residences or the liquidation
of the cryptocurrency stick. In addition, the minute order
directed Melissa’s counsel to “prepare an order after hearing.”
(Capitalization omitted.) After Melissa’s counsel filed the requested
proposed order after hearing, Saul filed an objection to the proposed
order. He objected to, inter alia, language in the proposed order
obligating him to pay the fee award from the “net proceeds” of the
sales of the specified assets because “[the] [j]udge[’s] minute order
clearly state[d]” he must pay the award from the “PROFITS” of
such sales. (Boldface omitted.)
On August 19, 2025, notwithstanding Saul’s objections, the
court adopted and entered the proposed order on the fee award
prepared by Melissa’s counsel.

9
 C. Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.1
Disqualification Proceedings
On May 7 and June 25, 2025, Saul filed statements of
disqualification against the trial court judge pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 170.1. The judge struck the May 7
statement under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4,
subdivision (b). The court found the statement was untimely and
did not disclose any legal grounds for disqualification because it was
based on Saul’s disagreement with the court’s rulings on the DVRO
and attorney fee requests. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 170.4, subd. (b)
[“if a statement of disqualification is untimely filed or if on its
face it discloses no legal grounds for disqualification, the trial
judge against whom it was filed may order it stricken”]; § 170.3,
subd. (c)(1) [“[t]he statement shall be presented at the earliest
practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting
the ground for disqualification”].)
The judge likewise struck the June 25 statement pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4, subdivision (b), concluding
the statement largely was duplicative of the prior statement,
was untimely, and again failed to state any legal grounds for
disqualification.4
Saul challenged the order striking the May 7, 2025 statement
of disqualification via a petition for a writ of mandate. (See

4 Neither the June 25, 2025 statement, nor the court’s
June 26 order striking the statement appears in our appellate
record. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, we take judicial
notice of the court’s June 26 order striking the June 25 statement of
disqualification. The June 26 order appears as part of the appellate
record for a second writ petition filed by Saul in October 2025
concerning his failed peremptory challenge to the trial court judge.

10
Mayo, v. Superior Court (June 20, 2025, B346321) [nonpub. order].)
On June 20, 2025, we denied the petition. (See ibid.)

D. The Instant Appeals
Saul timely appealed the DVRO rulings and the attorney fee
award. We consolidated the appeals for purposes of oral argument5
and decision.

DISCUSSION

A. Saul’s Challenges to the DVRO Rulings Fail
1. Overview of the DVPA and Standard of
Review
“The DVPA is intended ‘to prevent acts of domestic violence,
abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the
persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient
to enable [those] persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the
violence.’ ” (R.M. v. A.G. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 384, 395 (R.M.),
quoting § 6220.) Courts may issue a restraining order to achieve
this purpose upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.”
(§ 6300, subd. (a).)
For purposes of the DVPA, “abuse” means “(1) To
intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury.
[¶] (2) Sexual assault. [¶] (3) To place a person in reasonable
apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or
to another. [¶] (4) To engage in any behavior that has been or could
be enjoined pursuant to [s]ection 6320.” (§ 6203, subd. (a).)
Section 6320, in turn, provides that a court may enjoin a
party from “molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening,
sexually assaulting, battering, credibly impersonating . . . , falsely

5 The parties waived oral argument.

11
personating . . . , harassing, telephoning, . . . destroying personal
property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or
otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the
peace of the other party.” (Id., subd. (a).) “ ‘[D]isturbing the peace
of the other party’ refers to conduct that, based on the totality of
the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the
other party. This conduct may be committed directly or indirectly,
including through the use of a third party, and by any method or
through any means including . . . [any] electronic technologies.”
(§ 6320, subd. (c).) “Courts do not ‘apply an objective, reasonable
person standard when deciding whether a person has “disturb[ed]
the peace of the other party” within the meaning of section 6320.
Instead, the relevant inquiry is simply whether the person against
whom the DVRO is sought engaged in “conduct that, based
on the totality of the circumstances, destroy[ed] the mental or
emotional calm of the other party.” ’ [Citation.]” (R.M., supra,
121 Cal.App.5th at pp. 395–396.)
“ ‘The DVPA requires a showing of past abuse by a
preponderance of the evidence.’ [Citation.] The party seeking
the DVRO need not show a likelihood of future abuse. [Citation.]
‘The length of time since the most recent act of abuse is not, by
itself, determinative. The court shall consider the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether to grant or deny a petition
for relief.’ [Citation.]” (R.M., supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 396.)
“ ‘We review the trial court’s grant or denial of a DVPA
restraining order request for an abuse of discretion.’ [Citation.]”
(R.M., supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 394.) “[T]o the extent we
are called upon to review the court’s factual findings, we apply the
substantial evidence standard of review. [Citation.] In reviewing
the evidence, we examine the entire record to determine whether
there is any substantial evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—

12
to support the trial court’s findings. [Citation.] We must
accept as true all evidence supporting the trial court’s findings,
resolving every conflict in favor of the [order]. [Citation.] We
do not determine credibility or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.]
If substantial evidence supports the [order], reversal is not
warranted even if facts exist that would support a contrary finding.
[Citation.]” (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 12 (Curcio).)

2. The Incomplete Record Is Fatal to Saul’s
Claims of Insufficient Evidence
Saul contends that insufficient evidence supports the court’s
rulings on the competing DVROs and the firearm restriction the
court imposed against him. He insists that (1) a video admitted at
the evidentiary hearing refutes Melissa’s claim that she suffered a
black eye following the shopping mall incident, (2) the evidence
demonstrates that Melissa ignored Saul’s February 2023 cease-and-
desist letter, (3) the knife incident, truck drop-off incident, college
dormitory incident, and Melissa’s purported violations of the
TRO all constituted abuse, (4) the “cumulative effect of [Melissa’s]
conduct” constituted abuse, and (5) evidence discovered after
the conclusion of the DVRO proceedings purportedly establishes
that Melissa hacked into Saul’s accounts—evidence Saul contends
defeats Melissa’s credibility.
Saul has forfeited his challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the DVRO rulings by failing to provide an
adequate appellate record. It is well-settled that “[a]ppealed
judgments and orders are presumed correct, and error must be
affirmatively shown.” (Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical
Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502.) As the party challenging
the court’s presumably correct findings and rulings, Saul is
required “to provide an adequate record to assess error.” (Maria P.
v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295; see Barak v. The Quisenberry

13
Law Firm (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 654, 660 [“[f]ailure to provide
an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved
against [the] appellant”].) And here, Saul has not done so: As
noted, ante, many trial exhibits are missing from our appellate
record. We therefore have no means of “examin[ing] the entire
record” to determine if substantial evidence supports the court’s
DVRO rulings. (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.) Further,
Saul asks us to consider evidence never presented to the trial court
at the evidentiary hearing and to reweigh the evidence, which we
cannot do. (See ibid.) We therefore reject Saul’s challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the rulings on the competing
DVRO requests.

3. The Incomplete Record Likewise Defeats
Saul’s Claims that Purported Evidentiary
Errors Resulted in Prejudice
Saul argues the court made three errors in admitting and
summarizing evidence during the DVRO proceedings—namely,
that the court (1) permitted Melissa to authenticate photographs
she took of her black eye with her own “self-serving testimony,”
(2) misattributed to Saul testimony by Melissa that Saul told her
to “use [her] razor blade [to] cut down” her wrist the “next time” she
attempted suicide, and (3) “blocked access” to findings purportedly
made by a cybersecurity firm Melissa hired. Saul urges that these
errors “skewed the court’s credibility finding[s]” and “necessitat[e]
reversal” of the rulings on the competing DVRO requests.
Preliminarily, we note that Saul’s authentication argument
clearly fails on the merits. (See People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59
Cal.4th 258, 267–268 [“A photograph . . . is typically authenticated
by showing it is a fair and accurate representation of the scene
depicted. [Citations.] This foundation may . . . be . . . supplied by
the person taking the photograph”].) But even if Saul were able

14
to demonstrate that the court made any of the alleged errors, the
incomplete record prevents us from assessing whether the errors
prejudicially affected the court’s view of the parties’ credibility, as
Saul contends. The exhibits missing from our appellate record—
which include Melissa’s video exhibits—bear directly on the
veracity of the parties’ competing descriptions of the alleged
incidents of domestic violence. The missing exhibits thus
necessarily are relevant to assessing the parties’ credibility. As a
result, without the missing exhibits, we cannot determine whether
the purported evidentiary errors prejudicially impacted the court’s
credibility assessments. (See Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994)
8 Cal.4th 548, 579–580 [an appellate court may reverse only if,
after an examination of the entire record, the court concludes it is
reasonably probable that the appellant suffered actual harm from
the alleged errors].) We therefore must reject Saul’s claims. (See
Barak, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 660.)

4. Melissa’s DVRO Is Not Invalid for Lack
of Supporting Findings
Saul contends that Melissa’s DVRO is “facially invalid”
because the Judicial Council of California form DV-130 on
which the DVRO issued “contains no findings required by . . .
section 6300.” He urges that “the defect here is not the brevity
of the Judicial Council form, but the court’s total failure to provide
findings in any form—no attachment, no Box-16 incorporation[6],
and no specific oral findings.” In addition, Saul contends the court
applied the wrong legal standard in making its findings because it

6 Item 16 on the form DV-130 contains an empty checkbox
next to the phrase “other orders.” (Boldface & capitalization
omitted.)

15
commented that Melissa was not “dangerous to others” and because
the court made no “finding of future risk.”
Saul, however, simultaneously ignores and mischaracterizes
the detailed oral findings the court made supporting Melissa’s
DVRO at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing. He insists
the court “identifie[d] no act of abuse by [him],” but the hearing
transcript squarely refutes that claim. The court called out both
the “cyber incidents” and the shopping mall incident as specific
examples of abuse by Saul. Further, read in the context of the
full hearing transcript, the court’s comment about Melissa does not
support that it applied the wrong legal standard. And a finding of
future abuse is not a prerequisite to the issuance of an initial (as
opposed to a renewed) DVRO. (See Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 774, 783 [“the trial court was not required to find a
probability that [the restrained party] would commit future abuse
before issuing a restraining order”].)
We therefore reject Saul’s claim that Melissa’s DVRO is
invalid for lack of supporting findings made under the pertinent
legal standard.

5. The Court’s Delay in Issuing the Statement
of Decision Was Harmless
We likewise reject Saul’s argument that we must reverse
the DVRO rulings because the trial court failed to issue a timely
statement of decision. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(f) [“[i]f
a party requests a statement of decision . . . the court must, within
30 days of announcement or service of the tentative decision,
prepare and serve a proposed statement of decision and a proposed
judgment on all parties that appeared at the trial, unless the court
has ordered a party to prepare the statement”].) A court’s “failure
to issue a requested statement of decision is not reversible per se,
but instead is subject to harmless error analysis.” (Alafi v. Cohen

16
(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 46, 63–64, citing F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3
Cal.5th 1099.)
Here, Saul fails to demonstrate any prejudice resulting
from the court’s delay in issuing the statement. He contends “[t]he
statement of decision was critical here because the [form] DV-130
contained no findings” supporting Melissa’s DVRO. He insists the
delay thus has “prevented appellate review.” But as set forth, ante,
the court made detailed oral findings supporting its rulings on the
DVRO requests. And Saul fails to explain how the delay could have
affected his ability to pursue appellate relief, given that he filed
his opening brief in this appeal nearly five months after the court
issued the statement of decision. We therefore conclude that the
court’s delay in issuing the statement was harmless.7

6. Saul’s Argument Concerning the Statements
of Disqualification Is Meritless
Saul contends the DVRO rulings (and the attorney fee
award) are void because the trial judge improperly ruled on her
own disqualification. We disagree.
Saul notes, correctly, that Code of Civil Procedure
section 170.3, subdivision (c)(5) provides, in pertinent part, that
“[a] judge who refuses to recuse himself or herself shall not pass
upon his or her own disqualification or upon the sufficiency in law,
fact, or otherwise, of the statement of disqualification filed by a
party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (c)(5).) But he ignores

7 In light of our conclusion, we need not address Saul’s
claim that the trial court made a misrepresentation concerning
the date it first learned of the request for a statement of decision.
And because we do not rely on the contents of the statement of
decision in analyzing any of Saul’s claims, we need not address his
contention that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the statement.

17
that Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4, subdivision (b) provides:
“Notwithstanding paragraph (5) of subdivision (c) of [s]ection 170.3,
if a statement of disqualification is untimely filed or if on its face
it discloses no legal grounds for disqualification, the trial judge
against whom it was filed may order it stricken.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 170.4, subd. (b), italics added; see Magana v. Superior Court
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 840, 855–856 [trial judge against whom
statement of disqualification is filed may strike the statement
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4, subdivision (b)].)
Here, the trial judge struck Saul’s May 7 and June 25, 2025
statements of disqualification pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 170.4, subdivision (b). The judge found the statements
were untimely, and that they disclosed no legal grounds for
disqualification because they were “based on [Saul’s] disagreement”
with the court’s rulings on the restraining orders and Melissa’s
attorney fee request. Saul offers no arguments challenging
the court’s findings under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4,
subdivision (b). Indeed, he fails to discuss that subdivision at all.
We therefore reject his argument that the trial judge acted
improperly by striking the statements of disqualification.

7. A Respondent’s Silence Does Not Compel
a Decision in the Appellant’s Favor
Finally, Saul urges us to reverse the DVRO rulings because
Melissa’s “silence” in her respondent’s brief on various issues
“is a concession” that entitles him to relief. He makes the same
argument with respect to Melissa’s failure to file a respondent’s
brief in his appeal of the attorney fee award. Saul is incorrect: A
respondent’s failure to address an appellant’s arguments “does not
absolve [an appellate court] of adjudicating the merits of [an]
appeal.” (Bustos v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th
369, 374.) And as set forth, ante, we conclude that Saul has failed

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to meet his burden of demonstrating reversible error in the trial
court’s rulings on the competing DVRO requests.8

B. The Record Supports an $8,355 Reduction to the
Attorney Fee Award, Which We Otherwise Affirm
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The court was correct in awarding Melissa attorney fees
as the prevailing party in both her DVRO petition and defending
Saul’s petition. Regarding her attorney fees as prevailing
petitioner, the court was mandated to grant those fees, and
as prevailing party in defending Saul’s petition the court had
discretionary authority.
Pursuant to subdivision (a) of section 6344, “[a]fter notice
and a hearing, a court, upon request, shall issue an order for the
payment of attorney[ ] fees and costs for a prevailing petitioner.”
(§ 6344, subd. (a).) Subdivision (b) of section 6344 authorizes,
but does not mandate, the award of fees to a prevailing respondent
“if the respondent establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that the [opposing party’s] petition or request is frivolous or solely
intended to abuse, intimidate, or cause unnecessary delay.” (Ibid.)
Finally, as to both attorney fee provisions, subdivision (c) of
section 6344 requires the court to “determine . . . that the party
ordered to pay has, or is reasonably likely to have, the ability to
pay” before making an award of attorney fees. (Ibid.)
We review “a determination of the legal basis for an award
of attorney fees independently as a question of law.” (Leamon v.
Krajkiewcz (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.) We review a

8 In light of our conclusion, we necessarily reject Saul’s
argument that we must vacate the attorney fee award because the
DVRO rulings are erroneous.

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challenge to the amount of an attorney fee award for abuse of
discretion. (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1509.)
“ ‘[A]n experienced trial judge is in a much better position than an
appellate court to assess the value of the legal services rendered in
his or her court, and the amount of a fee awarded by such a judge
will therefore not be set aside on appeal absent a showing that it is
manifestly excessive in the circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

2. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction To
Consider the Attorney Fees Request
Saul contends the trial court “lacked jurisdiction” to award
Melissa attorney fees because his “appeal of the underlying DVRO
[rulings] was pending when the fee order was entered.” This
argument fails because a court generally retains jurisdiction to
award attorney fees after the entry of judgment, notwithstanding
a pending appeal from that judgment. (See Bankes v. Lucas (1992)
9 Cal.App.4th 365, 368, superseded by statute on another ground
as stated in Lee v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1187,
1197–1198.)

3. The Record Does Not Support that the Court
Failed To Consider Saul’s Opposition Filings
Saul insists that the record establishes the court failed to
consider his opposition filings prior to ruling on the fee request
because (1) the filings mentioned his December 2, 2024 request for
a statement of decision, (2) the court stated it did not become aware
of that request until April 30, 2025 (i.e., the day after the hearing
on the fee request), and (3) “[i]f [the court] had read the opposition
[to the fee request], it would have been aware of the [pending]
request [for a statement of decision].”
The record belies Saul’s claim. The court stated expressly
during the fee hearing that it had read Saul’s opposition filings,

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and the court actively consulted the filings during the hearing.
We therefore reject Saul’s claim that the court failed to consider his
opposition to the fee request.

4. Saul Fails To Demonstrate the Court Erred
By Adopting the Proposed Order Drafted by
Melissa’s Counsel
Saul contends the court erred by adopting the proposed
order prepared by Melissa’s counsel because “[t]his drafting
process undermines confidence that the order reflects the court’s
independent findings.” We reject this argument because rule 5.125
of the California Rules of Court expressly authorizes the court
to “order one of the parties or attorneys to prepare the proposed
order.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.125.)
We likewise reject Saul’s argument that the proposed order
contains findings unsupported by the proceedings at the hearing
on Melissa’s fee request. In particular, Saul objects to the inclusion
of findings that (1) section 6344, subdivision (a) fees are mandatory,
(2) Saul’s request for a DVRO was “in line with [his] abusive
conduct” and was intended to abuse and intimidate Melissa,
(3) Saul had the ability to pay the fee award, and (4) Saul must
pay the award from the “net proceeds,” rather than from the
“profits,” of the sales of certain assets.
The court stated expressly at the hearing that it was
“required to issue an order [of] fees and cost[s] to the prevailing
party” (i.e., that doing so was mandatory). The court likewise found
expressly that Saul had “engaged in a pattern of conduct that was
meant to abuse [Melissa], and . . . that his filing of the restraining
order [request] was in line with that conduct.” In addition, the
court necessarily made the implied finding that Saul had the ability
to pay the award from the sale of the specified assets. Finally, at
the hearing, Melissa’s counsel requested that the court order Saul

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to pay the fees “from his share of the net proceeds” of the specified
assets. Neither party made any reference to the term “profits.” The
court’s ruling at the conclusion of the hearing directing Saul to pay
the fees “at the time that there is a sale of the [pertinent assets]”
thus is best understood as referring to the net proceeds of such
sales.
Accordingly, Saul’s arguments concerning the court’s adoption
of the proposed order fail.

5. The Record Refutes Saul’s Claim that the
Court Applied the Wrong Legal Standard
In Awarding Melissa Prevailing Respondent
Attorney Fees
Saul argues the court applied the wrong standard in
evaluating Melissa’s entitlement to attorney fees incurred in
opposing his DVRO request because the court made no express
finding that his request was “frivolous” or “solely intended to
abuse” Melissa. (See § 6344, subd. (b) [“[a]fter notice and a hearing,
the court, upon request, may issue an order for the payment of
attorney[ ] fees and costs for a prevailing respondent only if the
respondent establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
the petition or request is frivolous or solely intended to abuse,
intimidate, or cause unnecessary delay”].) He urges that, as a
result, the court should have apportioned the fees and subtracted
from the award any fees Melissa incurred in opposing his DVRO
request.
The record refutes Saul’s claim. During the hearing, the
court engaged in a colloquy with Saul’s counsel during which it
articulated—and Saul’s counsel confirmed—the showing required
under section 6344, subdivision (b). And the court ultimately found
that Melissa had “shown by a preponderance of evidence that the
act of filing a request for [a] domestic violence restraining order was

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indeed an additional attempt to abuse and intimidate [Melissa] by
[Saul]”—i.e., that Saul’s DVRO request was frivolous and intended
solely to abuse Melissa. We therefore reject Saul’s challenge to the
court’s award of prevailing respondent fees to Melissa pursuant to
section 6344, subdivision (b).

6. With the Exception of $8,355 in Fees for
Non-DVRO-Related Work, the Billing
Records Support the Fee Award
Finally, Saul contends that Melissa’s counsel produced
only inadequate “summary tables” of the fees incurred, rather than
“actual billing statements” in support of the request for attorney
fees. The record contradicts Saul’s claim: In addition to a summary
table, Melissa’s counsel provided detailed time entries supporting
the fee request. (Cf. Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 224, 254–255 [detailed billing timesheets are not
required to support an award of attorney fees], disapproved on
other grounds by Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. (2018)
4 Cal.5th 260, 269-270.)
Nor do the detailed time entries support Saul’s contention
that the court improperly awarded fees for duplicative work.
Although the billing records reflect that two attorneys from the law
firm representing Melissa prepared for and appeared at the DVRO
proceedings, our appellate record supports that this case was fact-
and document-intensive. We therefore cannot conclude the court
abused its discretion in electing to reimburse Melissa for the fees
incurred by both attorneys.
We, however, agree with Saul that the billing records support
reducing the total award. Our review shows that five billing entries
appear to relate exclusively to work other than preparing for the
DVRO proceedings. The pertinent entries are: (1) a May 20, 2024
entry for “prep re RFO; review dissomaster” ($895), (2) two May 21,

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2024 entries for “prep re RFO” ($895) and “court appearance re
RFO” ($4,475), (3) a July 29, 2024 entry for work related to a
vocational expert’s testimony concerning spousal support ($1,650),
and (4) a November 22, 2024 entry for “[p]repar[ation] for 11/26
hearing (SS)” ($440). The total amount of the reduction is thus
$8,355.00.
Accordingly, we direct the trial court to reduce the fee award
by $8,355.00 and otherwise affirm.

DISPOSITION
On remand, the trial court is directed to reduce the attorney
fee award by $8,355.00. The orders Saul challenges on appeal
otherwise are affirmed. Respondent is awarded her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.

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