Filed 8/31/26 In re R.R. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re R.R., a Person Coming Under B351691
the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP03688)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CHRISTINA V.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Tara L. Newman, Judge. Affirmed.
Carolyn S. Hurley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel and Tracey Dodds, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services.
Christina V. (Mother) appeals from a juvenile court
judgment terminating her parental rights. She contends notice
of the selection and implementation hearing was faulty and the
court should have continued the hearing. We disagree with both
contentions and affirm.
BACKGROUND
The family is comprised of Mother, Rudy R. (Father), who
is not a party to this appeal, and R.R., age five. Mother resides in
an assisted living facility.
The juvenile court found R.R. was a person described by
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and
(g).1 After a year and a half of hearings and family reunification
services, the court terminated services and set the matter
for a hearing on October 23, 2025, to select and implement
a permanent plan (the October hearing). Mother personally
received notice of the hearing.
In its report for the October hearing, DCFS recommended
that parental rights be terminated.
Mother failed to appear at the October hearing. The court
continued the hearing to December 18, 2025, so that Father could
be served notice (the December hearing).
On November 21, 2025, DCFS mailed notice of the
December hearing to Mother. The notice advised that
permanency planning would occur at the hearing and DCFS
recommended that parental rights continue.
Mother failed to appear at the December hearing as well.
Staff at Mother’s assisted living facility appeared telephonically
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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and stated that Mother knew about the hearing but was not
responding to text messages or telephone calls.
Mother’s counsel stated, “Your Honor, I don’t have more
information as to Mother’s whereabouts. So in an abundance
of caution, I would request a brief continuance to ensure her
appearance.” The court denied counsel’s request.
Finding that R.R. was adoptable, the court terminated
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.
Mother appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Notice
Mother contends she received inadequate notice of the
December hearing because the notice falsely stated that DCFS
recommended continuation of parental rights. We disagree.
The state must afford adequate notice and an opportunity
to be heard before depriving a parent of the companionship, care,
custody, and management of her child. (In re B.G. (1974) 11
Cal.3d 679, 688–689.) Such notice must advise the parent of the
nature of the hearing, including what will be decided therein.
(In re Mia M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 792, 807.) “ ‘ “Only with
adequate advisement can one choose to appear or not, to prepare
or not, and to defend or not.” [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid.)
DCFS’s notice correctly advised Mother that the December
hearing was for permanency planning. This adequately apprised
Mother of the nature of the hearing and what would be decided,
and thus satisfied due process.
Mother argues the notice was inadequate because
it incorrectly stated that DCFS recommended continuation
of Mother’s parental rights, when in fact DCFS recommended
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termination of those rights. This inaccuracy did not vitiate the
notice. Although we do not condone misrepresenting DCFS’s
position, the essence of the notice was that an important decision
regarding parental rights would be made at the hearing. That
sufficed. Indeed, a reasonable person in Mother’s position would
understand that the court was not bound by DCFS’s
recommendation and that her input would be important.
B. Continuance
Mother contends the court abused its discretion when it
denied her request for a continuance. We disagree.
Continuances are discouraged in dependency cases,
must be supported by a showing of good cause, and may not be
contrary to the interest of the minor. (In re Giovanni F. (2010)
184 Cal.App.4th 594, 604.) “ ‘In considering the minor’s interests,
the court shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for
prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to
provide children with stable environments, and the damage to
a minor of prolonged temporary placements.” (Ibid.) We review
denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. (In re Elijah V.
(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 585.)
Mother’s counsel requested a continuance orally during
the disposition hearing, waited more than a month after the
hearing had been set, and gave no explanation for the need of
a continuance other than to give Mother a third opportunity to
appear at the hearing. Any of these three factors standing alone
justified denial of the continuance. R.R. was entitled to a prompt
resolution of his custody status. (In re Ninfa S. (1998) 62
Cal.App.4th 808, 811.) The court did not abuse its discretion
by denying the continuance request.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
WEINGART, J.
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