Filed 8/31/26 Laguna Beach Historic Preservation Coalition v. City of Laguna Beach CA4/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

LAGUNA BEACH HISTORIC
PRESERVATION COALITION et
al., G065723

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-
01178477)
v.
OPINION
CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
William D. Claster, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Brandt-Hawley Law Group and Susan Brandt-Hawley for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Megan K. Garibaldi, City Attorney; Best Best & Krieger, Hannah
S. Park, Tiffany M. Michou, and Antoinette Ranit-Mauro, for Defendants and
Respondents.
 Plaintiffs Laguna Beach Historic Preservation Coalition,
Preserve Orange County, and Village Laguna petitioned for a writ of
mandamus challenging the City of Laguna Beach’s amendment of its Historic
Resources Element to eliminate any reference to its 1981 Inventory of
historic properties. The trial court denied their petition.
We agree with the trial court that the properties on the Inventory
qualify as presumptive historical resources under the California
Environmental Quality Act1 and are thus entitled to certain protections.
However, we conclude rebutting that presumption requires more than
showing the Inventory as a whole is outdated, overbroad, or underinclusive;
instead, the City was required to find that each and every property on the
Inventory is not in fact historically significant.
Because the City failed to conduct that analysis before amending
its Historic Resources Element, because the amendment removed CEQA
protections afforded to the Inventory properties, and because that will likely
have a significant adverse effect on the environment, the amendment is
invalid. We therefore reverse.
FACTS
From July 1980 to July 1981, at the City’s direction, a
preservation planning firm performed a historic survey of Laguna Beach,
identifying over 700 pre-1940 homes and structures that had retained their
original appearance and architectural integrity. The resulting Inventory,
which categorized each building as exceptional, key, or contributive based on

1 See Pub. Res. Code § 21000 et seq. All further statutory

references are to this code.

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its historical significance and condition, was used to develop the City’s
General Plan’s Historic Resources Element in fall 1981.
In 1982, in order to secure a grant to fund a historic preservation
and housing rehabilitation program, the City Council passed a resolution
formally recognizing the Inventory as “a listing of the best representative
examples of historically significant architecture within the City of Laguna
Beach.”
In 1989, as part of its historic preservation program, the City
established a voluntary historic property Register that was “independent of”
the Inventory. The City gave Inventory property owners the option to list
their property on the Register. Participation was entirely voluntary and came
with various incentives.
Over the next several decades, the Inventory allegedly became
outdated. According to the City, it was simultaneously underinclusive and
overinclusive: it did not include all the properties listed on the Register, yet it
did include properties that had been demolished or altered.
In the early 2010’s, the City hired a consultant to evaluate the
Inventory properties and determine if they retained enough historic integrity
to remain eligible for listing. According to the City, although the consultant
took “preliminary steps” to update the Inventory in 2014 by performing a
field survey of Inventory structures, the City “never finalized,” “adopted,” or
“received” any update to the Inventory.
Rather than update the Inventory, the City instead decided to
update its historic preservation program. This involved amending the
Municipal Code and Historic Resources Element to eliminate references to

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the Inventory, clarify that owner consent is a criterion for Register eligibility,
and expand historic preservation incentives.
In 2020, a consultant for the City Council conducted an initial
study concerning these updates and prepared a negative declaration2
concluding the changes would not have a significant adverse impact on
historic properties. The negative declaration noted the Inventory would be
eliminated because it was “more than 36−37 years old,” and explained that
inventories “that do not meet the requirements of . . . section 5024(g), such as
being updated every five years, do not create a presumption that identified
properties are historic resources.”3 Later that year, the City Council approved
the negative declaration, adopted the ordinance amending the Municipal
Code, and approved the amended Historic Resources Element.
In 2021, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandamus under
CEQA to set aside the City’s approval of the updated program. They later
narrowed their challenge to only the amended Historic Resources Element.4

2 A negative declaration is “a written statement briefly describing

the reasons that a proposed project will not have a significant effect on the
environment and does not require the preparation of an environmental
impact report.” (§ 21064.)
3 The negative declaration did not discuss section 5020.1,

subdivision (k), which sets forth another path to presumed historical
significance, which we discuss below. (§ 21084.1.)
4 The other program amendments, which were certified by the

Coastal Commission in 2022, are being separately litigated in San Diego
County Superior Court.

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According to plaintiffs, the City was required to prepare an environmental
impact report5 (EIR) before it could approve the amended element.
After a hearing on the merits, the trial court found the Inventory
properties are presumptively protected under CEQA because they are listed
on the Inventory. However, it further concluded the City had shown the
Inventory was “no longer effective” because it miscategorized certain
properties, included structures that had been demolished or altered, and
omitted historical properties that should have been included. The court
therefore entered a judgment denying the petition in its entirety.
DISCUSSION
I.
CEQA PROTECTIONS FOR HISTORICAL RESOURCES
CEQA is a comprehensive legislative scheme designed to provide
long-term protection to the environment. (Historic Architecture Alliance v.
City of Laguna Beach (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 186, 201 (Laguna Beach).)
Before a public agency can undertake a “project”—that is, an agency activity
that may cause either a direct or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical
change in the environment (see § 21065, subd. (a))—CEQA requires the
agency to determine if the project may have a significant effect on the
environment; depending on the answer to that question, CEQA then requires
the agency to prepare either an EIR, a negative declaration, or a mitigated

5 “An EIR is viewed as the ‘heart’ of CEQA.” (Georgetown

Preservation Society v. County of El Dorado (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 358, 368.)
“The purpose of an EIR is to inform the agency and the public, in detail,
about the effect the project is likely to have on the environment and the ways
available to minimize that impact.” (Friends of Sierra Madre v. City of Sierra
Madre (2001) 25 Cal.4th 165, 184–185 (Sierra Madre).)

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negative declaration.6 (Sierra Madre, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 184–185;
Protect Tustin Ranch v. City of Tustin (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 951, 959.)
Although CEQA is “directed primarily to ecological concerns and
preservation of the environment,” it also aims to “‘preserve . . . examples of
the major periods of California history.’” (Sierra Madre, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
pp. 183–184; see § 21001, subd. (c).) Its protections thus also extend to
historical resources, such as certain historic structures, sites, and objects.
(Sierra Madre, at p. 186.)
If a project may cause a “substantial adverse change”7 in a
historical resource’s significance, the project may have a significant effect on
the environment and warrant the preparation of an EIR or a mitigated
negative declaration. (§§ 21084.1, 21080, subd. (d), 21151; see Laguna Beach,
supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 195.)
“A structure’s status as a historical resource for purposes of
CEQA is either mandatory, presumptive, or discretionary, depending on
whether it has been or could be listed on various registers of historical

6 A mitigated negative declaration is “a negative declaration

prepared for a project when the initial study has identified potentially
significant effects on the environment, but (1) [certain] revisions . . . would
avoid the effects or mitigate the effects to a point where clearly no significant
effect on the environment would occur, and (2) there is no substantial
evidence in light of the whole record before the public agency that the project,
as revised, may have a significant effect on the environment.” (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 14, § 15369.5.)
7 “‘Substantial adverse change in the significance of an historical

resource means physical demolition’ or other adverse effects, such that the
significance of the historic resource ‘would be materially impaired.’”
(Architectural Heritage Assn. v. County of Monterey (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th
1095, 1118.)

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resources.” (Laguna Beach, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 203, fn. 5; see §
21084.1.) Plaintiffs contend the Inventory properties are presumptively
historical, so we focus on that category alone.
A property is “presumed to be” historically significant under
CEQA if it meets either one of two criteria: (1) it is “included in a local
register of historical resources, as defined in subdivision (k) of Section
5020.1”, or (2) it is “deemed significant pursuant to criteria set forth in
subdivision (g) of Section 5024.1.” (§ 21084.1.) The trial court correctly found
that section 5024.1, subdivision (g), is inapplicable, and the parties rightly
concede as much.8 We therefore limit our focus to section 5020.1, subdivision
(k).
This provision defines a “‘[l]ocal register of historical resources”’
as “a list of properties officially designated or recognized as historically
significant by a local government pursuant to a local ordinance or resolution.”
(§ 5020.1, subd. (k), italics added.) “The use of the disjunctive ‘or’ has been
interpreted to mean that a building is [a presumed] historic resource if it is
either ‘designated’ to a local register or ‘recognized’ as historically significant

8 Section 5024.1, subdivision (g), provides that a “resource

identified as significant in an historical resource survey may be listed in the
California Register if the survey meets [four] criteria,” one of which is: “(4) If
the survey is five or more years old at the time of its nomination for inclusion
in the California Register, the survey is updated to identify historical
resources which have become eligible or ineligible due to changed
circumstances or further documentation and those which have been
demolished or altered in a manner that substantially diminishes the
significance of the resource.” Because the Inventory has not been updated, its
properties are not deemed historically significant under section 5024.1,
subdivision (g).

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by local ordinance or resolution.” (Valley Advocates v. City of Fresno (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1054 (Valley Advocates).)
This presumption of historical significance is rebutted if “the
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the resource is not
historically . . . significant.” (§ 21084.1; see, e.g., Coalition for Historical
Integrity v. City of San Buenaventura (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 430, 434–435
(Coalition) [consultant’s report that statue is not historical constituted
substantial evidence supporting city’s decision to remove statue’s historic
status and relocate it]; Valley Advocates, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1065–
1066 [architect’s statements on lack of historical significance of apartment
buildings constituted substantial evidence supporting city’s decision to not
list them in local register]; contrast League for Protection of Oakland’s etc.
Historic Resources v. City of Oakland (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 896, 908 [“the
presumption of historic status has not been rebutted by any evidence in the
record”].) This standard is not onerous. (See, e.g., Coalition, at p. 435
[consultant’s report rebutted presumption, even without evidence its author
was qualified as an expert; “municipal agencies can properly consider and
base decisions on evidence that would not be admissible in a court of law”].)
Indeed, sometimes “attitudes and values change,” and a place or object that
once was deemed a historical resource might later be found to have no
historical significance. (Id. at pp. 432–433, 435–436 [affirming city’s decision
to relocate statue of historical figure that was subject of protests].)
We review an agency’s finding that a property is not a historical
resource for substantial evidence. (Coalition, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 435;
Friends of Willow Glen Trestle v. City of San Jose (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 457,
467–468, 473 (Willow Glen).) But if “‘the resource has been determined to be

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an historical resource, then the fair argument standard applies to the
question whether the proposed project “may cause a substantial adverse
change in the significance of an historical resource” (§ 21084.1) and thereby
have a significant effect on the environment.’” (Willow Glen, at p. 472.) That
standard is met if the initial study “produces substantial evidence supporting
a fair argument that the proposed project may have a significant adverse
effect on the environment.” (Citizens for the Restoration of L Street v. City of
Fresno (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 340, 364, italics removed; see § 21080, subd.
(d).)
II.
THE CITY’S AMENDMENT TO ITS HISTORIC RESOURCES ELEMENT
IS INVALID
We agree with the trial court that the Inventory properties each
qualify as presumptive historical resources under CEQA.9 Properties on a
“local register”—that is, properties appearing on “a list of properties officially
designated or recognized as historically significant by a local government

9 We also conclude the amendment to the City’s Historic

Resources Element qualifies as a “project.” The amendment eliminated
CEQA protections for Inventory properties, making it reasonably foreseeable
at least some of them will be physically altered in the future. (Black Property
Owners Assn. v. City of Berkeley (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 974, 985 [“the
adoption and amendment of general plans and their elements are projects
within the meaning of CEQA”]; see Friends of the Sierra Railroad v.
Tuolumne Park & Recreation Dist. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 643, 653–654
[“project” is broad; examples include amending building regulations,
approving regional transportation plan, and increasing bus fare]; accord,
Sierra Madre, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 171, fn. 1, 181 [assuming without
deciding that delisting buildings from list of historic properties constitutes a
“project” under CEQA].)

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pursuant to a . . . resolution”—are “presumed to be historically . . .
significant.” (§§ 21084.1, 5020.1, subd. (k).) The Inventory properties are
recognized as historically significant by the Inventory, which the City Council
formally approved by resolution in 1982. As the trial court put it, “It is hard
to imagine a more direct way to formally recognize the historical significance
of the properties on the Inventory.”
The Inventory properties are therefore presumptively historic.
Indeed, just three years ago, a different panel of our court held that a Laguna
Beach house listed on the Inventory was “considered a presumptive historical
resource under” CEQA. (Laguna Beach, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 195.) We
see no reason to reach a different conclusion here concerning all the other
properties on the Inventory.10
Because the Inventory properties each qualify as presumptive
historical resources, we must determine whether there is substantial
evidence that those properties are not in fact historically significant. (§
21084.1.) We cannot find any such evidence.
While the City does not necessarily agree that the Inventory
grants presumptive historic status,11 the City is quite clear that it believes it

10 We attach no significance to a statement in the 1982 resolution

staff report that a property’s inclusion on the Inventory will not impose any
special obligations on the property owner, or that section 21084.1 (which took
effect in 1993) did not yet exist when the City officially recognized the
resolution in 1982. The fact remains that, regardless of what the expectations
were when it was created, the Inventory is “a list of properties officially . . .
recognized as historically significant by a local government pursuant to a . . .
resolution” within the meaning of section 5020.1, subdivision (k).
11 The City acknowledged at oral argument that it did not file a

cross-appeal challenging the trial court’s decision that the Inventory
conveyed presumptive historic status.
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could revoke the entire Inventory (whatever its effect) without individually
analyzing the historical status of any property listed on it.
As the City put it in its brief, the Inventory “as a whole is no
longer a valid or trustworthy indicator of historic status”; as such, the City
need not “undertake a case-by-case reassessment of each individual structure
on the Inventory.” At oral argument, the City confirmed its position that
revoking the Inventory “doesn’t require the City to adjudicate the historical
status of hundreds of individual properties in the abstract . . . .” We thus
appropriately turn our focus to the propriety of revoking the Inventory as a
whole. (See People v. Richardson (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 360, 368 [“in both
civil and criminal cases . . . we rely on the parties to frame the issues for
decision”; “the parties know what is best for them”].)
In our view, the City’s admitted failure to conduct an
individualized analysis of Inventory properties is dispositive. Section 21084.1
extends CEQA protections to the individual properties (the “historical
resources”) on the Inventory (the “local register of historical resources”). (§§
21084.1, 5020.1, subd. (k).) To overcome the presumption that each of those
properties is historically significant, the City needed to find that a
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates all those properties are not in
fact historically significant. The City refused to consider that question and
instead focused on perceived inaccuracies in the Inventory as a whole,
engaging in a blanket delisting of hundreds of presumptively historical
resources.12

12 The City directs us to no case upholding an agency’s decision to

invalidate an entire local register of historic resources, and we have found
none.
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 What’s more, the City’s rationale for the blanket delisting is
questionable. For example, the City asserts the Inventory is outdated because
it includes properties that have been demolished or altered since the
Inventory was created in 1981. But that does not detract from any historical
significance of the hundreds of other properties on the Inventory that have
retained their structural integrity. If properties built in the 1920’s and 1930’s
were deemed historically significant in 1981, they may well be even more
historically significant in 2026.
The City similarly asserts the Inventory is underinclusive
because it does not catch all Laguna Beach properties that might be historic.
But the fact that certain historic properties are not included on the Inventory
does not detract from the historical significance of the properties that are on
the Inventory.
Finally, the record supports a fair argument that the amendment
may have a significant adverse effect on the environment. By removing the
presumed historic property status of Inventory properties, the amendment
enables the City to treat those properties as not historic for purposes of
CEQA review, leaving them less protected from modifications or demolition.
The City insists that many properties retain their presumed
historical resource status because they are listed on the Register. But the
Register is not an exhaustive list of Laguna Beach’s historically significant
properties, as confirmed by the fact that inclusion is voluntary and subject to
the owner’s consent. As there is no guaranty the owners of Inventory
properties have added or will add their homes to the Register, doing away
with the Inventory would amount to removing CEQA protections for many
Inventory properties.

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 “‘“CEQA is to be interpreted ‘to afford the fullest possible
protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory
language.”’” (Laguna Beach, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 201.) Consistent with
that mandate, we reverse the judgment. On remand, the trial court should
enter judgment for plaintiffs and issue a peremptory writ ordering the City to
set aside approvals of its revised Historic Resources Element pending the
preparation of an EIR or a mitigated negative declaration as is appropriate
under CEQA.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs
on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

SCOTT, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SERVINO, J.

SCHWARM, J.*

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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