Filed 9/1/26 Choy v. Ribeiro Development, Inc. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(El Dorado)

SEAN CHOY et al., C100831
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
(Super. Ct. No. PC20120295)
v.

RIBEIRO DEVELOPMENT, INC., et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

Sean Choy and Joseph Oloriz are former employees of Ribeiro Development, Inc.
(RDI), an entity that develops and manages commercial real estate. (Choy v. Ribeiro
(Nov. 3, 2020, C080715) [nonpub. opn.] (Choy v. Ribeiro).) Choy and Oloriz sued RDI
for severance pay under the terms of their employment agreements. (Ibid.) They also
sued RDI’s president, Johnny R. Ribeiro, and the Johnny R. Ribeiro Separate Property
Trust (the Trust), which owns RDI. (Ibid.) Following a bench trial, the trial court found
in favor of Choy and Oloriz and entered judgment against RDI, Ribeiro, and the Trust,
holding them jointly and severally liable for severance payments of $466,856 to Choy
and $350,142 to Oloriz. (Ibid.) Ribeiro and the Trust appealed the imposition of joint
and several liability, and another panel of this court reversed. (Ibid.) The trial court

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subsequently entered judgment in favor of Ribeiro and the Trust; however, the judgment
against RDI remained unchanged.
That brings us to the present dispute. Ribeiro and the Trust moved for attorney
fees in the amount of $233,594 pursuant to an attorney fee provision in the subject
employment agreements. Choy and Oloriz opposed the motion. Following argument, the
trial court entered an interim order finding Ribeiro and the Trust were prevailing parties
within the meaning of Civil Code section 1717, but the court would award only those fees
reasonably necessary to their defense, as opposed to the defense of losing party RDI. The
trial court directed Ribeiro and the Trust to submit a revised fee request with sufficient
information to determine apportionment of fees. That task was easier said than done. By
then, Ribeiro and the Trust’s original lead counsel had unfortunately passed away.
Another law firm was retained, but new counsel was unable to attest to the
reasonableness of the first firm’s fees or allocate them between compensable and
uncompensable tasks. Accordingly, the trial court independently assessed both firms’
billing statements and determined Ribeiro and the Trust were entitled to attorney fees in
the amount of $64,150, approximately 27 percent of the amount requested. Ribeiro and
the Trust appeal, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in declining to award the
entire amount sought. Finding no error, we will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Initial Trial Court Proceedings
Choy and Oloriz were employed by RDI. They were terminated in November
2010. They commenced the instant action against RDI, Ribeiro, and the Trust in May
2012. (Choy v. Ribeiro, supra, C080715.) The matter was tried to the court (Judge
Stracener) over the course of four days in December 2014 and January 2015. The trial
court entered judgment in favor of Choy and Oloriz in August 2015. As noted, the trial
court found RDI, Ribeiro, and the Trust were jointly and severally liable to pay severance
in the amount of $466,856 to Choy and $350,142 to Oloriz.

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RDI, Ribeiro, and the Trust were represented in the trial court proceedings by the late
attorney Nancy Sheehan of Porter Scott.
B. The Prior Appeal
Ribeiro and the Trust appealed the judgment, arguing the trial court erred in
making them jointly and severally liable for the severance payments. (Choy v. Ribeiro,
supra, C080715.) Agreeing, this court reversed the imposition of joint and several
liability and remanded with directions to the trial court to enter judgment in Ribeiro’s
favor and determine whether the Trust was liable for the severance payments. (Ibid.)
Sheehan passed away while the appeal was pending.
C. Post-Appellate Proceedings
The parties returned to the trial court, with RDI, Ribeiro, and the Trust now
represented by Boutin Jones Inc. (Boutin Jones). The trial court (Judge Sullivan)
received supplemental briefing and conducted a limited evidentiary hearing on the
question of the Trust’s liability. At the conclusion of those proceedings, the trial court
found Ribeiro mistakenly signed one of the employment agreements in his capacity as
trustee for the Trust, and the Trust should not be liable for the severance payments.
Accordingly, the trial court vacated the previous judgment as to Ribeiro and the Trust and
entered a new judgment in their favor. Thus, Ribeiro and the Trust were now prevailing
parties, and RDI was the sole nonprevailing party.
D. The Motion for Attorney Fees
Ribeiro and the Trust moved for $233,594 in contractual attorney fees in
September 2022. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1032; Civ. Code, § 1717.) The motion was
supported by declarations from Carl J. Calnero, an attorney from Porter Scott, and
Michael G. Cross, an attorney from Boutin Jones.
Calnero averred that Sheehan had been the Porter Scott attorney primarily
responsible for representing RDI, Ribeiro, and the Trust. Calnero’s declaration attached
copies of Porter Scott’s billing statements for the matter, which reflect attorney fees of

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$182,880 for 669.4 hours of work from July 2012 through August 2020. The billing
statements identify the client as RDI, and do not differentiate between time spent on tasks
for prevailing parties Ribeiro and the Trust, as opposed to time spent on tasks for
nonprevailing party, RDI.
Cross averred he was the attorney responsible for handling day-to-day tasks on the
case at Boutin Jones. Cross further averred that Ribeiro and the Trust had incurred
$50,714 in attorney fees with Boutin Jones from the beginning of the firm’s
representation (during the pendency of the prior appeal) through August 2022.
Choy and Oloriz opposed the motion. Among other things, they argued Ribeiro
and the Trust sought compensation for “duplicate entries, redundant work, excessive
work on several tasks, and unnecessary investigation of additional affirmative defenses
for an answer and cross-complaint that [d]efendants[] never filed,” and thus could not
satisfy their burden of showing the amount requested was reasonable. Choy and Oloriz
also argued Ribeiro and the Trust unreasonably sought compensation for attorney fees
incurred by losing party RDI.
Ribeiro and the Trust conceded some of the issues raised by Choy and Oloriz in
their reply and reduced their request from $233,594 to $226,510.
E. The Interim Ruling
A hearing on Ribeiro and the Trust’s motion for attorney fees was held in January
2023. The trial court (Judge Slossberg) issued a ruling on submitted matter in April 2023
(the interim ruling). The interim ruling determined that Ribeiro and the Trust were
prevailing parties within the meaning of Civil Code section 1717. However, the trial
court found apportionment would be appropriate “to avoid what would otherwise be an
unjust outcome of awarding fees to Ribeiro and the Trust which should properly be
charged to the losing [d]efendant, RDI.” Reasoning by analogy to Zintel Holdings, LLC
v. McLean (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 431 (Zintel), the trial court concluded Ribeiro and the
Trust should only recover those fees expended on the issue of their specific liability, as

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opposed to the more general question of whether the employment agreements had been
breached. (See generally Zintel, supra, at p. 443 [“Huth may recover only reasonable
attorney fees incurred in his defense of the action by Zintel. To the extent his shared
counsel engaged in litigation activity on behalf of McLean for which fees are not
recoverable, the court has broad discretion to apportion fees”].) The trial court posited
that such fees could include: (1) fees billed for activities related to discovery propounded
by or directed to Ribeiro and the Trust; (2) fees billed for activities specifically related to
the liability of Ribeiro and the Trust through trial, such as drafting portions of the trial
brief or pretrial motions regarding the proper parties in the suit; and (3) fees billed for
activities relating to the prior appeal.
The trial court observed that Porter Scott’s billing statements did not differentiate
between work for Ribeiro and the Trust, on the one hand, and work for RDI, on the other.
As a result, the trial court lacked the information necessary to allocate fees. To address
that problem, the trial court directed Ribeiro and the Trust to submit a revised fee request
that would “more particularly identify the activities related to each [d]efendant … to
arrive at an attorney’s fees request that reasonably reflects the work conducted to defend
Ribeiro and the Trust.”
The trial court acknowledged that the task of segregating fees incurred on behalf
of Ribeiro and the Trust and fees incurred on behalf of RDI would be challenging, “given
the passage of time, the voluminous number of billing entries, and the unfortunate
passing of [d]efendants’ primary trial counsel, who would have been most knowledgeable
about the majority [of] the activities on behalf of [d]efendants in this case.”
Nevertheless, the trial court observed that Porter Scott “could have segregated the charges
in its billing statements, rather than lumping them all together,” and the court was
unwilling to grant an award that was “unreasonable and excessive as a result of prior
counsel’s failure to do so.”

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F. Supplemental Briefing
Ribeiro and the Trust went back to the drawing board. They submitted a
supplemental brief in September 2023, which reduced the request from $226,882 to
$146,284. The supplemental brief was supported by a supplemental declaration from
attorney Cross. Cross explained that he had reviewed the previously submitted billing
statements from Porter Scott, and highlighted entries he believed recoverable under the
interim ruling. Those entries were compiled into a separate table, which was attached as
an exhibit to the supplemental Cross declaration, and indicated Porter Scott spent 245
hours on activities related to the defense of Ribeiro and the Trust, for fees amounting to
$68,510. Another exhibit to the supplemental Cross declaration indicated Boutin Jones
spent approximately 200 hours on activities related to the defense of Ribeiro and the
Trust, for an additional $77,774 in attorney fees. Thus, Ribeiro and the Trust now sought
$146,284.
Choy and Oloriz filed a supplemental opposition brief. They argued Ribeiro and
the Trust failed to comply with the interim ruling’s instruction that they more particularly
identify activities related to their defense, as opposed to the defense of RDI.
Focusing on fees incurred through the first appeal, they observed that Ribeiro and the
Trust submitted the same uninformative billing statements from Porter Scott as before,
adding only an attestation from attorney Cross that he “ ‘believed’ ” the highlighted
entries were related to their defense. They objected to the attestation as speculative and
lacking foundation (given that Cross does not appear to have been involved in Porter
Scott’s handling of the matter), and urged the trial court to deny the motion for attorney
fees in its entirety. In the alternative, they argued fees requested were “likely inflated,”
given the minimal attention devoted to the specific question of Ribeiro and the Trust’s
liability at trial. By way of illustration, they noted that billing entries discussing contact
with “the client” were not necessarily allocable to Ribeiro, inasmuch as he was the only
natural person associated with RDI or the Trust.

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 Choy and Oloriz’s opposition was supported by a declaration from Jeffrey D.
Fulton, one of their attorneys herein. Fulton averred that Ribeiro and the Trust’s
discovery responses were identical or nearly identical to RDI’s, and “very little time” was
spent on the question of their liability at trial.
G. Final Ruling
A further hearing was held on the attorney fees motion in November 2023. The
trial court (Judge Slossberg) issued another ruling on submitted matter in February 2024
(the final ruling). The final ruling explained the trial court would continue to follow the
Zintel model of apportionment, notwithstanding Choy and Oloriz’s argument that
attorney fees should be denied entirely. To facilitate that analysis, the final ruling divided
the litigation into four phases, with separate findings for each.
For the first phase, the trial court considered the period from inception through
trial, in which RDI, Ribeiro, and the Trust were represented by Porter Scott. The trial
court found Porter Scott charged reasonable rates. At the same time, however, the trial
court agreed with Choy and Oloriz that attorney Cross was ill-positioned to attest to the
allocation of Porter Scott’s fees, and “few of the claimed items have been segregated to
indicate cost to [Ribeiro and the Trust], thereby making it difficult, if not, impossible to
determine which of these costs should be recovered.” Despite that difficulty, the trial
court independently evaluated the pleadings and highlighted billing statements and found
“the vast majority of time … was related to issues affecting all three [d]efendants and was
not solely based on the inclusion of Ribeiro and the Trust as parties.” Based upon that
independent evaluation, the trial court found the reasonable amount of attorney fees for
the first phase of the litigation was $7,100.
For the second phase, the trial court considered fees incurred in connection with
the first appeal, which was also handled by Porter Scott. It appears to have been
undisputed that fees incurred in the second phase were allocable to Ribeiro and the Trust,
and thus recoverable. All the same, the trial court again independently evaluated the

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billing statements and pleadings, along with the briefs in the court file, and found the
number of claimed hours was “slightly inflated.” Accordingly, the trial court reduced that
number from 90 to 67, with 60 hours at the rate of $300 per hour, six hours at the rate of
$250 per hour, and one hour at the rate of $100 per hour. Combined, the trial court found
the reasonable amount of attorney fees for phase two of the litigation was $19,600.
For the third phase, the trial court considered post-appellate work performed by
Boutin Jones. That work primarily consisted of preparing and filing post-appellate briefs,
preparing for the above-described evidentiary hearing on the Trust’s liability, and
appearing at the hearing. The trial court found those activities were allocable to Ribeiro
and the Trust, but the claimed hours were “excessive, with several of the tasks of
attorneys duplicative of one another.” Accordingly, the trial court reduced the hours from
80 to 56.2, with 48 hours charged at $390 per hour, five hours at $475 per hour, and 3.2
hours at $250 per hour. Together, the trial court found the reasonable amount of attorney
fees for phase three of the litigation $21,895.
For the fourth and final phase, the trial court considered work related to the
attorney fees motion, which was performed by Boutin Jones for Ribeiro and the Trust,
and said to be more than 100 hours of billable time. The trial court acknowledged that
reviewing Porter Scott’s billing statements pursuant to the interim ruling “may have taken
substantial time,” but found “the need to do so was created by prior counsel’s failure to
segregate the time amongst the three [d]efendants at the time of legal services
themselves.” The trial court further found “it would be unreasonable to shift the cost of
this segregation now years later to [p]laintiffs.” Taking these factors into consideration,
the trial court found the claimed hours were “excessive, particularly given the limited
tasks remaining in the case.” Based on its independent evaluation of the billing
statements and pleadings, the trial court found the reasonable number of hours expended
in the fourth phase was 39 hours, with 20 hours charged at $390 per hour, 15 hours
charged at $420 per hour, two hours charged at $475 per hour, and one hour charged at

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$505 per hour. Together, the trial court found the reasonable amount of reasonable
attorney fees for the fourth phase of the litigation was $15,555.
Thus, the final ruling found the reasonable amount of attorney fees was $7,100 for
the first phase, $19,600 for the second phase, $21,895 for the third phase, and $15,555 for
the fourth phase. Adding these amounts, the trial court found reasonable attorney fees
were $64,150. Ribeiro and the Trust appeal, arguing the trial court should have awarded
the amount originally sought, $253,541.
II. DISCUSSION
Ribeiro and the Trust argue the trial court’s attorney fee award was erroneous for
three reasons. First, they argue the trial court failed to properly apportion fees between
prevailing parties Ribeiro and the Trust, on the one hand, and nonprevailing party RDI,
on the other, in the first phase of the litigation (from inception through trial). Second,
they argue the trial court acted unreasonably in reducing fees for the second phase of the
litigation (through the appeal). Third, they argue the trial court acted unreasonably in
reducing fees for the third and fourth phases of the litigation (the post-appellate
proceedings and motion for attorney fees). None of these arguments have merit.
A. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part as follows: “In
any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and
costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the
parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party
prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not,
shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs. [¶] … [¶]
Reasonable attorney’s fees shall be fixed by the court, and shall be an element of the
costs of suit.” It is undisputed that Ribeiro and the Trust are entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a). The dispute here
centers solely on the reasonableness of Ribeiro and the Trust’s request.

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 We review the trial court’s determination of the amount of reasonable attorney fees
for abuse of discretion. (PCLM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095;
Vella v. Hudgins (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 515, 522 [“The amount to be awarded as
attorney’s fees is left to the sound discretion of the trial court”].) “ ‘The “experienced
trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and
while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the
appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong” ’—meaning that it abused its
discretion.” (PCLM Group, supra, at p. 1095.)
A party requesting attorney fees bears the burden of proving the amounts
requested are reasonable. (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178
Cal.App.4th 44, 98 (Gorman).) Likewise, a party challenging the amount of an attorney
fees award on appeal bears the burden of showing the trial court abused its discretion.
(Ibid.; see also Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 743
[“We presume the fee approved by the trial court is reasonable”].) Ribeiro and the Trust
have not satisfied either burden.
B. Apportionment of Fees Incurred in the First Phase
Ribeiro and the Trust argue the trial court failed to properly apportion fees
incurred in the first phase of the litigation, from inception through trial. They argue that,
as prevailing parties, they are entitled to all fees reasonably incurred on their behalf, even
if some of those fees were incurred for work that incidentally benefited RDI. They insist
the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to further apportion fees incurred in the
first phase of the litigation for work on issues that were “inextricably intertwined” with
those affecting RDI. This argument suffers from two obvious flaws.
First, Ribeiro and the Trust failed to raise the argument in the trial court. To the
contrary, they expressly agreed that “they may not recover fees that were clearly
undertaken to defend RDI in this action.” We need not consider points on appeal that

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were not raised in the trial court. (Wood v. Santa Monica Escrow Co. (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 1186, 1192.)
Second, Ribeiro and the Trust fail to show that any further apportionment was
required here. “Apportionment is not required when the claims for relief are so
intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney’s
time into compensable and noncompensable units.” (Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist.
(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 687.) The trial court gave Ribeiro and the Trust an extra
opportunity to provide sufficient information to apportion fees incurred in the first phase
of the litigation. They were unable to do so. That failure was understandable, given the
passage of time, the volume and opacity of Porter Scott’s billing statements, and the death
of attorney Sheehan. Be that as it may, it was Ribeiro and the Trust’s burden to show
how fees should be further apportioned, not the trial court’s, and their inability to do so
confirms that apportionment was impracticable or impossible, and thus, not required.
(Ibid.)
C. Reduction of Fees Incurred in the Remaining Phases
Ribeiro and the Trust next argue the trial court erred in reducing fees incurred in
1
the second, third, and fourth phases of the litigation. They specifically take issue with
the trial court’s finding that fees incurred during the second phase of the ligation (the
prior appeal) were “slightly inflated,” and similar finding that hours claimed in the third
and fourth phases were “excessive, with several of the tasks of the attorneys duplicative
of one another.” As to both, Ribeiro and the Trust argue the trial court erred in failing to
explain its findings. No such explanation was required.

1 To reiterate, the second phase of the litigation was the prior appeal, which was handled
by Porter Scott. The third phase of the litigation was the post-appellate work handled by
Boutin Jones. The fourth phase of the litigation was the motion for attorney fees, also
handled by Boutin Jones.

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 A trial court is not required to issue a statement of decision regarding an attorney
fees award or to otherwise explain its decision in awarding attorney fees. (Ketchum v.
Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140; see also In re Tobacco Cases I (2013) 216
Cal.App.4th 570, 589 [trial court “not required to explain its rationale” for an attorney
fees award]; Gorman, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 101 [“there is no general rule
requiring trial courts to explain their decisions on motions seeking attorney fees”].) In
any event, on appeal, “ ‘ “[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support [the
judgment] on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively
shown.” ’ ” (Ketchum, supra, at p. 1140.) As a general rule, and in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, “we presume that the trial court has properly followed
established law.” (People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 567; accord, Gorman, supra, at p.
67.) Thus, “[t]he absence of an explanation of a ruling may make it more difficult for an
appellate court to uphold it as reasonable, but we will not presume error based on such an
omission.” (Gorman, supra, at p. 67; see also RiverWatch v. County of San Diego Dept.
of Environmental Health (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 768, 776 [trial court’s ruling will not be
disturbed “absent a showing that there is no reasonable basis in the record for the
award”].) And, where “the trial court severely curtails the number of compensable hours
in a fee award, we presume the court concluded the fee request was padded.” (Christian
Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1325.)
The trial court considered extensive briefing, including supplemental briefing, and
voluminous exhibits, including billing statements from two firms spanning more than 10
years. It provided interim guidance on the allocation of fees and information necessary to
demonstrate the reasonableness of the requested amounts. It heard argument; not once,
but twice. The trial court then issued a nine-page ruling dividing the litigation into
phases and evaluating the reasonableness of the requested fees in the context of each
phase. Ribeiro and the Trust do not challenge the trial court’s overall approach, and do
not suggest the court failed to consider all relevant factors in evaluating the

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reasonableness of the request. We therefore conclude the final ruling was sufficiently
detailed, and Ribeiro and the Trust fail to demonstrate error.
III. DISPOSITION
The attorney fees order is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)

/S/
RENNER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/S/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

/S/
WISEMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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