Filed 9/3/26 Bluth v. Blue Hill Specialty Insurance CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
RICHARD BLUTH, B344921
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24VECV06317)
BLUE HILL SPECIALTY
INSURANCE/PROGRESSIVE
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Valerie Salkin, Judge. Affirmed.
Saeedian Law Group, Michael Saeedian, Daniella
Saeedian; Esner, Chang, Boyer & Murphy and Stuart B. Esner
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Lagasse Branch Bell + Kinkead, Thomas P. Gmelich,
Darren P. Salute, Peter H. Crossin, and Erik E. Millan for
Defendant and Respondent.
Richard Bluth (Bluth) was injured by an uninsured driver
in an automobile accident. Bluth had uninsured motorist
coverage under an insurance policy provided by his employer—
Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber)—and he ultimately filed a petition
for uninsured motorist arbitration. The trial court denied that
petition on untimeliness grounds because Bluth did not make a
demand for arbitration within two years of the accident according
to procedures provided by Insurance Code section 11580.2
(requiring notice by certified mail to an insurer’s agent for service
of process).1 Bluth undisputedly did not timely comply with the
statutory notice requirement, but he asks us to decide whether
“substantial compliance” with the statute is enough.
I. BACKGROUND
At approximately 2:30 a.m. on August 14, 2022, while
driving his Toyota Camry on the Ventura Freeway, Bluth collided
with a BMW series 5 sedan driven by a 16-year-old. Dash
camera footage from Bluth’s vehicle showed the BMW merged
directly in front of Bluth, who had been traveling in an adjacent
lane. The California Highway Patrol determined the accident
was caused by an unsafe lane change by the driver of the BMW.
At the time of the accident, Bluth was a rideshare driver for Uber
and he was covered under an insurance policy provided by Uber.
A month after the accident, Bluth’s attorneys received a letter
from the insurer for the BMW’s driver stating there was no
coverage for Bluth’s claims.
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Insurance Code.
2
A. Bluth’s Demand for Arbitration
About two weeks’ shy of the two-year anniversary of the
accident, one of Bluth’s attorneys sent a written demand for
uninsured motorist arbitration to Uber’s insurance carrier,
defendant Blue Hill Specialty Insurance/Progressive (Blue Hill).2
The record indicates the letter was sent via email and certified
mail. The typewritten letter was addressed to “Kaylie Heideman,
Progressive Claims, 747 Alpha Drive, Highland Heights, OH
44143.” The handwritten address on the letter’s envelope,
however, was not identical to this address; it had a different and
seemingly misspelled addressee (Kaylie Heidman) and city
(Highlend Heights).3
Three days later, the United States Postal Service (USPS)
marked the envelope containing the demand letter as “[n]ot
[d]eliverable” and returned it to Bluth’s attorneys. The record
indicates the returned mail arrived back in the law firm’s office
on August 8, 2024 (still within two years of the accident).
Additional time passed, and after the two-year anniversary of the
accident, Bluth’s counsel sent an identical arbitration demand
letter to Blue Hill via certified mail on August 26, 2024. The city
2
Approximately two weeks earlier, on July 11, 2024, Bluth’s
attorneys made a policy limits settlement demand. That letter
was addressed as follows: “Kaylie Heideman, Progressive Claims,
P.O. Box 94621, Cleveland, OH 44101.” Blue Hill did not accept
the settlement demand.
3
The accompanying certified mail return receipt was
addressed the same as the letter except for missing the
“Progressive Claims” notation.
3
on the envelope was correctly addressed this time, and the
envelope with the demand was delivered on August 29, 2024.
B. Bluth’s Motion to Compel Arbitration
Several months after receipt of the demand for uninsured
motorist arbitration, Blue Hill notified Bluth that it would not be
moving forward with arbitration because the arbitration demand
“was not timely made within the 2-year statute of limitations.”
Bluth responded by moving to compel uninsured motorist
arbitration in January 2025. Bluth acknowledged his lawyers’
initial attempt at serving the arbitration demand was not
successful, but he argued the demand was nonetheless proper
under the “‘mailbox rule’” (as he put it: “a letter correctly
addressed and properly mailed is presumed to have been received
in the ordinary course of mail”). Bluth also maintained his
attorneys’ second demand letter did not represent an
“unreasonable delay.”
Blue Hill opposed the motion to compel arbitration. The
company argued Bluth could not compel arbitration because his
demand for arbitration was not made within the statutory two-
year period. In that vein, Blue Hill explained Bluth had six days
after the first demand letter was returned undelivered to Bluth’s
attorneys to send a correctly addressed letter before the two-year
period expired—but he nonetheless delayed until 12 days after
the two-year period expired to serve a proper arbitration demand.
Blue Hill also emphasized that Bluth had not provided any
explanation or justification for this delay in sending a corrected
demand notice.
In reply, Bluth disputed the misspellings on the envelope
for the first demand letter had any impact on the USPS’s ability
4
to deliver the letter because the zip code, which is the main
identifier used by the USPS in sorting and delivering mail, was
identical on the envelopes for both the first and second letters.4
Bluth also disputed the envelope for the first letter misspelled
the name of the city; according to the paralegal who addressed
the envelope, “[w]hat [d]efendant claims is an ‘e’ in Highl(a)nd
Heights is actually an ‘a.’” Bluth also maintained Blue Hill had
not established any prejudice from the 12-day delay in serving
the second demand letter.
In February 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Bluth’s
motion to compel arbitration. Because the first demand letter
was not delivered and the second letter was “clearly untimely,”
the court denied the motion. For the trial court, the “bottom line”
was the failure of Bluth’s counsel to timely serve Blue Hill with
an arbitration demand: “You had two years to do this, and you
didn’t do it. And you waited until the last minute, and it wasn’t
done correctly. And this is the consequence . . . .”
II. DISCUSSION
Section 11580.2, in pertinent part, provides as follows: “No
cause of action shall accrue to the insured under any policy or
endorsement provision issued pursuant to this section unless one
of the following actions have been taken within two years from
4
Bluth’s argument was based on a document apparently
downloaded from the USPS website, a copy of which was
attached to a declaration by one of Bluth’s attorneys. Blue Hill
raised a number of evidentiary objections to the purported USPS
document. The record does not show that the trial court ever
ruled on those objections.
5
the date of the accident: [¶] . . . [¶] (C) The insured has formally
instituted arbitration proceedings by notifying the insurer in
writing sent by certified mail, return receipt requested. Notice
shall be sent to the insurer or to the agent for process designated
by the insurer filed with the department.” (§ 11580.2, subd.
(i)(1).)
Bluth’s arbitration demand was not served within this two-
year time period. As we will explain, section 11580.2 does make
exceptions for the two-year deadline in some circumstances, but
none of those circumstances are involved in this case. Instead,
Bluth asks that we make another exception not specified in the
statute: excusing noncompliance with the two-year deadline
where there is “substantial compliance” with that deadline. We
hold substantial compliance (whatever that precisely means—
Bluth does not say) is not enough and the trial court’s ruling was
accordingly correct.
We are not the first reviewing court to consider the
meaning of subdivision (i) of section 11580.2. Our Supreme
Court has explained the two-year period to make a demand for
arbitration “‘is, in effect, a statute of limitations. Such statutes
are intended to set controversies at rest by foreclosing
consideration thereafter as to the merits of the claim. To reject a
strict application of the law in favor of “broad principles of justice
and equity” would make a statute of limitation meaningless.’
[Citation.]” (Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1975) 14
Cal.3d 473, 484; see also Blankenship v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 87, 94 [section 11580.2 imposes an “obligation on
the insured to comply with its mandates or else the insured
forfeits his claim”]; Juarez v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2003) 105
Cal.App.4th 371, 377 [“the statutory language [of section
6
11580.2] clearly shows that the Legislature intended to impose
strict prerequisites and time limits for claims involving
uninsured motorists”].) Other courts have also observed section
11580.2, subdivision (i) is “clear and unambiguous” (Blankenship,
supra, at 94; Juarez, supra, at 376-377), and that too helps frame
our interpretive task in evaluating Bluth’s argument. (Lee v.
Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1232-1233 [“‘“[O]ur fundamental
task,”’” when interpreting a statute is “‘“‘to ascertain the intent of
the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the
statute.’ . . . We begin by examining the statutory language
because it generally is the most reliable indicator of legislative
intent. We give the language its usual and ordinary meaning,
and ‘[i]f there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers
meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language
governs’”’”].)
Section 11580.2, subdivision (i) expressly excuses
compliance with the two-year demand deadline in limited
circumstances, namely, where “[t]he doctrines of estoppel, waiver,
impossibility, impracticality, and futility apply.” (§ 11580.2,
subd. (i)(3).) None of these exceptions aid Bluth—it was not
impossible, impractical, or futile to comply with the two-year
deadline, and there are no facts that suggest estoppel or waiver
might apply. Instead, Bluth proposes we craft a judge-made
exception to the two-year timeframe when a party substantially
complies with the requirement to deliver a demand for
arbitration by certified mail within the two-year period. Though
Bluth may present a sympathetic case because of the minor
mistake in the envelope’s addressing that apparently prevented
delivery—delivery was still prevented and sympathy is not an
appropriate basis to make an exception to clear statutory
7
requirements, especially when the Legislature has seen fit to
specify its own equitable exceptions. (Freeman, supra, 14 Cal.3d
at 484 [“‘To reject a strict application of the law in favor of “broad
principles of justice and equity” would make a statute of
limitation meaningless’”]; see also Blankenship, supra, 186
Cal.App.4th at 96 [“The Legislature . . . knew in 1995 that
minority did not excuse noncompliance with the limitations
period of section 11580.2(i), and it chose not to include minority
in the list of circumstances it stated in the amendment would
excuse noncompliance with the limitations period”]; Juarez,
supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at 374-375.) Moreover, there was still
time to correct the mistake when the initial misaddressed
demand was returned, but no one in Bluth’s attorneys’ office
acted until it was too late.
We decline Bluth’s invitation—never extended to the trial
court—to rely on the doctrine of “substantial compliance” to
nevertheless excuse his attorneys’ delay.5 The doctrine of
substantial compliance cannot function to add an exception to the
list of exceptions the Legislature itself specified. Furthermore,
precedent explains the doctrine of substantial compliance “‘does
not allow for an excuse to literal noncompliance in every
situation’” and “does not apply at all when a statute’s
requirements are mandatory, instead of merely directory.”
(Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305,
1333.) Statutes of limitations and similar filing rules of the type
5
Naturally, our rejection of the doctrine of substantial
compliance expresses no view on whether Bluth may pursue
other remedies in connection with his attorneys’ delay in
presenting the demand for arbitration.
8
in section 11580.2, subdivision (i) are mandatory. (J.M. v.
Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 648,
653; see also Law Finance Group, LLC v. Key (2023) 14 Cal.5th
932, 950 [“mandatory procedural rules—like many statutes of
limitations or other filing deadlines—serve important policy
goals, and courts must enforce them when properly raised”]; Ard
v. County of Contra Costa (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 339, 346
[“Plaintiff directs us to no authority holding that ‘substantial
compliance’ may excuse a filing beyond the deadline of
[Government Code] section 946.6, subdivision (f), and such a rule
is obviously contrary to this rule of strict compliance with
statutes of limitations”]; Friends of Shingle Springs Interchange,
Inc. v. County of El Dorado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1490,
fn. omitted; Wagner v. City of South Pasadena (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 943, 950.)
9
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Blue Hill is awarded costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J.
KIM (D.), J.
10
