Filed 9/4/26 Walter N. v. Sandra C. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

WALTER N., H052459
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 23CV428101)

v.

SANDRA C. et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

Walter N. sued his sister, Sandra C., and her husband, Bryan C., claiming that
Sandra, with Bryan’s assistance, was seeking to control the finances of their mother,
K.N., by removing Walter from K.N.’s life.1 What Walter alleged as the mechanism of
his removal was Sandra’s malicious prosecution of a 2019 domestic violence restraining
order petition and her defamatory statements in that proceeding and in public YouTube
videos. The trial court granted defendants’ special motion to strike under Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16.2 We conclude that Walter’s claims for prosecution of and
statements in the 2019 suit were properly stricken, but his claims based on the public

1
We refer to the parties and the siblings’ mother by their first names or initials
because personal privacy interests support not using Walter’s full name and because
using other family members’ names would defeat the objective of anonymity. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10) & (11).)
2
Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
YouTube videos were not. Accordingly, we will reverse the order and remand with
directions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Complaint
In support of a handful of tort claims, Walter alleged as follows.
Sandra has “spent a lifetime attempting to obtain money” from Walter and their
mother, K.N. Sandra and her husband, Bryan, have “engaged in … tortious … activities
… to secure money … by raising false claims against [Walter] and engaging in abusive
behavior.”
In 1995, Sandra physically attacked K.N. in K.N.’s home when K.N. tried to stop
Sandra from taking K.N.’s valuables and financial information. K.N. did not press
charges.
In 2016, Sandra took jewelry, financial records, and legal documents from K.N.’s
home. Walter and K.N. unsuccessfully tried to stop Sandra, and Walter warned Sandra
not to return uninvited.
Sandra continued to return to K.N.’s home, including an episode in which Sandra
brought private investigators and tried to open the front door. After K.N. told Walter
about the “years of abuse” she had suffered at Sandra’s hands, Walter relocated K.N. to
his residence in New York. At the same time, Sandra and Bryan were developing a claim
that K.N. was mentally compromised and that they should control her money and assets.
While under Walter’s protection, K.N. sent Sandra a letter asking Sandra to stay
away. K.N.’s letter was accompanied by a cover letter from her attorney, warning that
K.N. would seek a restraining order if Sandra did not cease contact. Sandra responded to
these letters by “attack[ing]” Walter to try to prevent him from protecting their mother.
In 2019, Sandra, aided by Bryan, filed a preemptive lawsuit against Walter in
Santa Clara County Superior Court. Sandra and Bryan falsely claimed and published
statements that Walter: (1) raped Sandra and other women; (2) entered illegal business

2
transactions and committed real estate fraud; (3) took indirect steps to kill K.N. and take
her assets; (4) made false statements about K.N.’s estate; (5) unduly influenced K.N.;
(6) surveilled Sandra and Bryan’s residence and traveled there to torment Sandra; (7) sent
people to harm Sandra and Bryan; (8) put children in peril; (9) compulsively gambled;
(10) unlawfully served legal process; and (11) engaged in unspecified other conduct that
warranted police intervention. Through the suit, Sandra tormented Walter “for about
[three] years in the judicial system.” Sandra wanted to extract $2.5 million from Walter.
At unspecified times, Sandra and Bryan published similar defamatory statements
about Walter to a large audience using YouTube.
In 2020, K.N. petitioned for a restraining order in the Santa Clara County Superior
Court. K.N.’s petition generated a posttrial statement of decision that December, in
which the court recounted K.N.’s testimony that she “does not ever want to see Sandra
again.” (Italics omitted.)
Based on these allegations, Walter sued in December 2023. Walter pleaded nine
causes of action.
First, Walter claimed that the 2019 suit was a malicious prosecution. Second,
Walter claimed that defendants had committed abuses of process by filing the same suit,
procuring and submitting false declarations, dissuading witnesses from attending
depositions, and attempting to intimidate a process server. Third, Walter claimed that
defendants defamed him by publishing videos containing false statements about him on
YouTube, damaging his business. Fourth, through an assortment of tort claims and
requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, Walter claimed that defendants damaged his
business and inflicted emotional distress through the course of conduct underpinning his
malicious prosecution and defamation claims.
B. Anti-SLAPP Motion
Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion supported by their own declarations and a
request for judicial notice.

3
 Sandra declared that her 2019 suit was a petition for a restraining order against
Walter. Sandra explained that she had uploaded three YouTube videos about Walter—
two in April 2022 and one in August 2022—so that she could share them with the court
in connection with the 2019 suit. Sandra filed documents with links to the two April
videos, but, although there was a September 2022 hearing on Walter’s fee motion, elected
not to file a link to the August video with the court. Sandra posted three additional
videos to YouTube on August 20, 2022, all of which she explains were prepared to
support a complaint to the police. Sandra professed her belief that the videos were
private—she took the videos down immediately after Walter’s attorney informed her that
the public could access them in September 2022.
Bryan declared that Sandra “created and posted various videos to her YouTube
Channel documenting her fears of” Walter “[d]uring the course of litigation.” Bryan
denied uploading any videos himself.
Defendants attached three documents to their request for judicial notice—Walter’s
complaint in this case and two April 2022 filings in which Sandra included YouTube
links as evidentiary citations.3 In both April 2022 filings, Sandra called the videos
“confidential” and said they were only to be used for the hearings associated with her
filings.
Opposing the motion, Walter submitted declarations from himself, his attorney,
and three other people.
Walter declared that Sandra’s most recent YouTube videos were posted to an open
channel, visited by over 1,000 people, on August 20, 2022, four months after Sandra had
dismissed her case—a “ ‘Malicious DVRO’ ”—against Walter with prejudice and with

3
Defendants also requested judicial notice of a 2019 temporary restraining order.
Because defendants did not attach a copy of the document, the trial court denied the
request.

4
“no open case” between them.4 Walter explained that the August 20, 2022 videos
included Sandra’s false statements that (1) she had a restraining order against Walter,
(2) she was going to file a supplemental declaration, (3) Walter had raped her, (4) Walter
wanted to kill K.N., (5) Walter used his power of attorney to cause K.N. to petition for a
restraining order against Sandra, (6) Walter was surveilling Sandra and her children,
(7) Sandra was going to file a supplemental declaration, and (8) Walter was harassing
Sandra by filing documents seeking attorney fees. Notably, Walter did not deny having
filed documents seeking attorney fees but explained that he needed to serve her a second
time because the documents were changed. Walter added that Sandra asked the police to
arrest him.
One of Walter’s business associates submitted a declaration on Walter’s behalf.
While the business associate did not believe Sandra’s claims, he decided he could no
longer jointly pursue a business opportunity with Walter after learning that Sandra had
posted a YouTube video for the world to see. So in October 2022, Walter returned
$750,000 the business associate had advanced for a pending transaction. The associate
estimated that the lost opportunity could have generated about $5 million in profit.
Two other witnesses described using the internet to view YouTube videos in
which Sandra “made outrageous and false claims about” Walter. Both described their
favorable views of Walter’s character, their unfavorable views of Sandra’s character, and
their belief that Walter had never hurt Sandra.
Walter’s trial counsel declared that he had known Walter for 30 years. Counsel
described and requested judicial notice of the December 2020 statement of decision on
K.N.’s request for a restraining order against Sandra. Similarly, counsel described and
requested judicial notice of a July 2022 declaration another attorney had filed on Walter’s
4
In apparent conflict with his declaration, Walter represented in his opposition
brief that the court heard his motion to recover attorney fees from Sandra in September
2022.

5
behalf in connection with Sandra’s 2019 suit to support Walter’s request for attorney
fees. Counsel highlighted assertions that Sandra had caused Walter to incur attorney fees
by maliciously prosecuting a claim for a domestic violence restraining order.
C. Ruling and Appeal
The trial court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, reasoning that Walter’s
claims arose out of protected activity and Walter had no probability of prevailing on the
merits. Walter timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Section 425.16, “commonly known as the anti-SLAPP statute, allows defendants
to request early judicial screening of legal claims targeting free speech or petitioning
activities.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 880–881.)
“Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step process. First, ‘the moving
defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims
“aris[e] from” protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.’ [Citation.]
Second, for each claim that does arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show the
claim has ‘at least “minimal merit.” ’ ” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021)
11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni).) Whether in the trial court or in our de novo review (Park
v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067), the
analysis “is not confined to evaluating whether an entire cause of action, as pleaded by
the plaintiff, arises from protected activity or has merit. Instead, courts … analyze each
claim for relief—each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be
several in a single pleaded cause of action—to determine whether the acts are protected
and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to has the requisite degree of merit to survive
the motion.” (Bonni, at p. 1010.)
In our independent judgment, we conclude that the claims based on the 2019 suit
were properly stricken but the claims based on the unrestricted publication of YouTube
videos were not.

6
A. Step One—Protected Activity
At the first step, we “ ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what
actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for
liability.’ [Citation.] The defendant’s burden is to identify what acts each challenged
claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined
category.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.)
Defendants invoke two of the statute’s four categories of protected activity.
Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) protects “any written or oral statement or writing made
before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law.” Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) protects “any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law.”
Walter’s various causes of action reduce to a claim that defendants injured him by
(1) prosecuting the 2019 suit and (2) publicly posting several YouTube videos. The
former is protected activity. The latter is not.
1. Identification of Walter’s Claims
Walter’s complaint includes nine causes of action. Of these, six are common-law
torts: (1) malicious prosecution; (2) abuse of process; (3) defamation; (4) interference
with business relationships; (5) infliction of emotional distress; and (6) negligence.5
Each of these causes of action rests on one of two core groups of acts that supply the
elements of Walter’s claims: (1) prosecuting the 2019 suit; and (2) posting public

5
The remaining causes of action do not espouse additional theories of liability:
Two are requests for declaratory relief concerning Bryan’s responsibility as a conspirator
or aider and abettor and the third is a request for injunctive relief based on the same
“wrongful acts” underpinning the other claims.

7
YouTube videos.6 (See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012 [requiring courts to
“determine whether particular acts alleged within the cause of action supply the elements
of the claim [citation] or instead are incidental background”].)
Although malicious prosecution and abuse of process are distinct torts (see S.A. v.
Maiden (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 27, 41 (S.A.)), Walter’s claims under both theories derive
from Sandra’s prosecution of the 2019 suit.
A claim for malicious prosecution requires Walter to show that he was “sued on a
claim initiated or continued … without probable cause and with malice, and pursued to a
termination in his favor.” (S.A., supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 36.) In contrast, the
essence of a claim for abuse of process is a misuse of the tools of litigation. (Bidna v.
Rosen (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 27, 40 (Bidna).) It is “ ‘ “misuse of the power of the court;
it is an act done in the name of the court and under its authority for the purpose of
perpetrating an injustice.” ’ ” (S.A., at p. 41.) A claim for abuse of process requires
Walter to show “ ‘that the defendant (1) contemplated an ulterior motive in using the
process, and (2) committed a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular
conduct of the proceedings.’ ” (Ibid.)
Walter’s malicious prosecution claim is based exclusively on the 2019 suit, which
he alleges that Sandra prosecuted with Bryan’s assistance. Walter’s abuse of process
claim is also based on “filing malicious an[d] abusive lawsuits,” the only lawsuit
identified in the complaint being the 2019 suit.
While malicious prosecution does not supply a proper foundation for an abuse of
process claim (see S.A., supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at pp. 41–42), Walter also alleges three
other acts: (1) intimidating a process server; (2) dissuading unspecified witnesses from
appearing at depositions in the 2019 suit; and (3) procuring unspecified false
6
At oral argument, Walter denied that his claims were based on the prosecution of
the 2019 suit, asserting instead that they arose exclusively from the public posting of
YouTube videos. We cannot reconcile that argument with his complaint.

8
declarations. But these vague allegations of out-of-court conduct fail to articulate any
misuse of the court’s power. (Cf. ibid.) Nor does Walter allege any injury beyond the
defamatory impact of the malicious prosecution: The only injury he specifies in the
abuse of process cause of action is a loss of business opportunities from defendants’ 2019
suit and underlying allegations, not from any abuse of process in the prosecution of that
suit. (Cf. Yee v. Superior Court (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 26, 37 [“A cause of action for
abuse of process cannot be viable absent some harm to the plaintiff caused by the abuse
of process”]; CACI No. 1520.) So we must interpret these allegations as “incidental
background” rather than as elements of Walter’s tort claims. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 1012.)
Walter’s remaining causes of action are based on defendants’ publication of false
information about him. The complaint identifies two potential methods of publication as
the causes of Walter’s alleged injuries: the 2019 suit and public YouTube videos.
Defamation “ ‘involves (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and
(d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special
damage.’ ” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720.) A tort claim for interference
with prospective economic advantage requires an economic relationship between the
plaintiff and a third party of which the defendant has actual or constructive knowledge,
the defendant’s actual interference with that relationship, and economic harm. (See Roy
Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 505, 512 (Roy
Allan); Nelson v. Tucker Ellis LLP (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 827, 844, fn. 5 (Nelson).)7
Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires extreme and outrageous conduct with
the intention of causing—or with reckless disregard for the probability of causing—
emotional distress, which actually and proximately causes severe emotional distress.
7
An interference claim may be based on intentional or negligent conduct. (See
Roy Allan, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 512; Nelson, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 844, fn. 5.)
Walter pleaded both theories in the alternative.

9
(See Crouch v. Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995,
1007.) Negligent infliction of emotional distress is not a separate tort, but one variety of
a standard negligence claim. (See Sandoval v. Pali Institute, Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th
616, 628.) Under each of these causes of action, the alleged act by defendants from
which the claim arises is either the prosecution of the 2019 suit—including the assertion
of claims in that suit—or the publication of false statements in YouTube videos. (See
Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012.)
Walter’s overarching contention that “the gravamen” of his suit is a “scheme to
control … K.N.’s money and assets by extorting, harassing and interfering with
[Walter’s] life and businesses” does not alter this threshold determination that the acts
supplying the basis for the relief sought are the 2019 suit and the public dissemination of
the YouTube videos. These are the grounds for liability disclosed in Walter’s complaint;
defendants’ alleged motive for engaging in these acts is incidental background.
Walter’s reliance on White v. Davis (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 270 (White) and Greco
v. Greco (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 810 (Greco) is inapt.
In White, seeking elder abuse restraining orders, White alleged that defendants had
abused and unduly influenced her elderly father—“isolating, agitating, and confusing
[him] to effectuate a change in his estate plan.” (White, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 289;
see also id. at pp. 275, 288.) The court acknowledged that defendants had engaged in
protected litigation activities, but those litigation activities were merely evidence
supporting the claim that defendants had unduly influenced the father to change his estate
plan. (Id. at pp. 289–290.)
In Greco, one sibling sued another for allegedly wrongful takings from their
parents’ trust and estates.8 (Greco, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 814–815.) These takings,
8
Greco also included a claim for constructive fraud, which did arise from
protected activity because the fraud arose out of a statement in connection with litigation.
(Greco, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 815, 825–826.)

10
framed as claims for elder abuse and breach of fiduciary duty, were not protected activity.
(Id. at pp. 821–825.) That the motive for the taking was to fund litigation was
immaterial: The basis for liability was for the act of wrongfully taking funds, not for the
litigation the funds might enable. (Id. at pp. 822–824.)
Here, what Walter seeks by his complaint is not relief for K.N.—the injunctive
relief of an elder abuse restraining order to protect K.N. or the replevin of funds taken
from her estate. Instead, he seeks damages to compensate for injuries he alleges he
suffered from Sandra’s prosecution of the 2019 suit and from her public statements—
made in the 2019 suit or in public YouTube videos. So those are the acts we will
analyze.
2. Prosecuting the 2019 Suit
The prosecution of the 2019 suit, including written or oral statements made in that
proceeding and written or oral statements made in connection with it (see § 425.16,
subd. (e)(1)–(2)), is protected activity. “A malicious prosecution action arises from
protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute because it involves the filing and
prosecution of an underlying lawsuit, or petition to the judicial branch, that allegedly was
malicious. [Citation.] … ‘The plain language of the anti-SLAPP statute dictates that
every claim of malicious prosecution is a cause of action arising from protected activity
because every such claim necessarily depends upon written and oral statements in a prior
judicial proceeding.’ ” (S.A., supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 35.) While Walter packages
his claims associated with the 2019 suit in multiple causes of action based on the
prosecution of that action and claims Sandra made therein, each claim arising from the
2019 suit similarly rests on written and oral statements in that suit.
Relying on Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 (Flatley), Walter contends that
the 2019 suit is unprotected because it was an illegal act of extortion. What the Supreme
Court in Flatley deemed “criminal extortion as a matter of law” were express
prelitigation “threats to publicly accuse Flatley of rape and … other unspecified

11
violations of various laws unless he ‘settled’ by paying a sum of money … of which
Mauro would receive 40 percent.” (Id. at pp. 332, 329.) Because extortion is not a
constitutionally protected form of speech, the Supreme Court held that the
communications were not protected activity under the statute. (Id. at pp. 328, 333.)
Flatley is inapposite. To support his claim of extortion, Walter declared that
Sandra’s petition for a domestic violence restraining order came with a demand for $2.5
million and K.N.’s assets. But it was not the demand that made the communications in
Flatley extortionate; it was the prelitigation threat of public accusation to induce
acquiescence to the demand. Walter does not articulate how public filing of a complaint
concurrently with a demand can constitute criminal extortion analogous to the
prelitigation threats in Flatley. Even if a publicly filed complaint might qualify as
extortion, Sandra has not conceded that her complaint was extortionate or prosecuted for
an unlawful purpose—Sandra’s declaration indicates that she prepared videos during the
pendency of the proceedings to document her “fear of Walter.”9
Walter argues that even if Sandra is protected, Bryan is not because he is liable for
noncommunicative conduct supporting Sandra but was not a party to the 2019 suit. But
Walter’s claims against Bryan are derivative of those against Sandra, and Bryan is
entitled to no less protection than Sandra. (Cf. Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048,
1056 [noting that anti-SLAPP protection extends to “qualifying acts committed by
attorneys in representing clients in litigation”].) To be sure, nothing about Bryan’s
marital relationship with Sandra entitles him to protection, but the mere fact of his
nonparty status does nothing to divest his support for her protected activity of the same
protection. Nor does Walter substantiate his contention that Bryan’s support—

9
Walter has also posited another ulterior purpose for the 2019 suit—to drive a
wedge between Walter and K.N. so Sandra could gain control of K.N.’s finances.

12
transporting banker’s boxes to court and sitting at counsel table with documents—rose to
the level of criminal conduct.
3. Publicly Posting YouTube Videos
Our conclusion that the 2019 suit amounted to protected activity encompasses
statements made to the court and other persons having some interest in the litigation.
This includes transmission of allegedly defamatory YouTube videos to those persons.
But as a distinct basis for liability, defendants’ public broadcasting of the YouTube
videos is not protected activity.10
Walter alleged that defendants released “several” YouTube videos and generally
described their content, without alleging the precise number or release dates. In her
declaration, Sandra described six YouTube videos.11 The first three, two from April 2022
and one from August 2022, she declares were prepared to be presented to the court in
litigation against Walter. Two were used for that purpose, but the third was not presented
to the court. The other three were uploaded “to file a complaint with the Hollister Police
Department against Walter.” According to Sandra’s description, these videos include
Sandra’s interaction with law enforcement officers on August 20, 2022. Sandra claimed
the public posting was unintentional.
Defendants contend that the videos are protected as statements in connection with
litigation or police reports. Not so. Defendants’ theory overlooks the different audiences
each publication of the videos targeted. That publication to the court or to law
enforcement may have been protected in some contexts does not establish that all

10
We do not read Walter’s complaint to include a claim based on using YouTube
videos to make or depict a report to the police. So we limit our assessment here to
defendants’ alleged use of YouTube to publicize allegations that Walter engaged in
criminal activity.
11
Walter has not contradicted defendants’ evidence that there were six public
YouTube videos.

13
publication is protected or that the content of the videos enjoys absolute protection.
Unprotected defamatory statements broadcast to the public at large do not acquire
protection by the mere act of later publishing them to a court. To hold otherwise would
seem to doom any defamation claim.12
First, for “a statement or writing [to be] ‘made “in connection with” ’ litigation
under section 425.16[, subdivision ](e)(2),” it must both “ ‘relate[] to the substantive
issues in the litigation and [be] directed to persons having some interest in the
litigation.’ ” (Bassi v. Bassi (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1096, italics added (Bassi).)
We accept that defendants’ transmission of the YouTube videos to the court or another
person having some interest in the litigation is protected, but the posting of the videos to
the general public on a public YouTube channel is not. Nor has there been any showing
that the public has some interest in the litigation.
Our conclusion is supported by analogy to the litigation privilege.
As set forth in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), the litigation privilege
protects a “publication or broadcast” made in any “judicial proceeding.” “ ‘The usual
formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to
achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation
to the action.’ ” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th
1232, 1241.) It “ ‘bars liability in tort for the making of certain statements’ ” and
“ ‘serves broad goals of guaranteeing access to the judicial process, promoting the
zealous representation by counsel of their clients, and reinforcing the traditional function
of the trial as the engine for the determination of truth.’ ” (Bassi, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1103.)
12
Walter’s defamation, interference, emotional distress, and negligence causes of
action—as well as the derivative declaratory relief and injunctive relief causes of
action—are all predicated in part on these publications.

14
 While the litigation privilege and the anti-SLAPP statute are distinct, the litigation
privilege “may be viewed as an aid at the first step in the anti-SLAPP analysis when
deciding ‘whether a given communication falls within the ambit of subdivision (e)(1) and
(2)’ of section 425.16.” (Bassi, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 1097, fn. 9; see also Flatley,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 322–323 [“the litigation privilege and the anti-SLAPP statute are
substantively different statutes that serve quite different purposes,” but there is a
“relationship” between the two and courts have looked to the litigation privilege “to
determine whether a given communication falls within the ambit of subdivision (e)(1)
and (2)”].) The litigation privilege includes a “reasonable relevancy requirement”—
“ ‘[t]o be protected by the litigation privilege, a communication must be “in furtherance
of the objects of the litigation.” ’ ” (Bassi, at p. 1097.) So the litigation privilege
generally does not protect “republications to nonparticipants” (Silberg v. Anderson
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 219) or public dissemination through the press (Abuemeira v.
Stephens (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1299; see also Paglia & Associates Construction,
Inc. v. Hamilton (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 318, 321–322, 325 [analogizing posts on Yelp
and a blog to press releases].) Defendants’ broadcast of their YouTube videos about
Walter to the general public does nothing to further their “ ‘right of petition or free
speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public
issue.’ ” (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
For the first time at oral argument, defendants claimed that Civil Code
section 47.1, subdivision (a), which protects communications “made by an individual,
without malice, regarding an incident of sexual assault, harassment, or discrimination,”
should inform the first prong of the anti-SLAPP inquiry. But the “statutorily defined
categor[ies]” of protected activity that delimit an anti-SLAPP motion are those listed in
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.) Contrary
to defendants’ assertions, their burden at the first step is “to identify what acts each
challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected” by the anti-SLAPP

15
statute. (Ibid.) Unlike the litigation privilege codified at Civil Code section 47,
subdivision (b), Civil Code section 47.1 turns on the subject matter of a communication,
not the proceeding in which it is made. The protection supplied by Civil Code
section 47.1 is so broad and its association with litigation so loose that its scope provides
no serviceable proxy for the scope of petitioning activity protected by Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (2). That defendants may invoke Civil
Code section 47.1 to defend this suit on the merits—if defendants had “a reasonable basis
to file a complaint” based on covered “factual information” communicated in the videos
(Civ. Code, § 47.1, subds. (c) & (d))—or to pursue the remedies available to a prevailing
defendant under that statute (Civ. Code, § 47.1, subd. (b)) does not establish their
entitlement to protection under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(1) and (2) do not protect publication of YouTube videos to the general
public, even if those videos may contain accusations that might be privileged under Civil
Code section 47.1.
Second, we accept that reporting criminal activity to law enforcement may be
protected, unless willfully false or malicious. (See Kenne v. Stennis (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 953, 966–967 [distinguishing between allegedly and admittedly false
police reports in discussing the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute]; see also Civ. Code,
§§ 47, subd. (b)(5) [excluding from protection “any communication between a person and
a law enforcement agency in which the person makes a false report that another person
has committed … a criminal act … knowing that the report is false” with knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth], 47.1, subd. (a) [protecting “[a] communication
made by an individual, without malice, regarding an incident of sexual assault,
harassment, or discrimination”].) But here again, Walter’s claim rests on the public
posting of the August 20, 2022 videos, not on a report to law enforcement. Defendants’
reliance on Sandra’s professed motive for creating the videos misses the mark because
Walter’s claim arises not from the videos’ creation but from their public posting. And

16
even if Sandra’s subjective motive for posting were material, there can be no claim that
Sandra acted for a protected purpose when she declared in the trial court and argued on
appeal that her posting of the videos on her YouTube channel was only inadvertently
public.
B. Step Two—Minimal Merit
At the second step, a plaintiff “ ‘may not rely solely on its complaint.’ ” (Monster
Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.) We evaluate “whether the plaintiff
has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to
sustain a favorable judgment. [We accept] the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluate[]
the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of
law.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384–385.) “Where a defendant asserts a
privilege or other defense, the plaintiff must show that it can overcome that defense” to
demonstrate a probability of prevailing. (Doe v. California Assn. of Directors of
Activities (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 796, 811.) We do not “weigh evidence or resolve
conflicting factual claims.” (Baral, at p. 384.)
Walter’s claims based on prosecution of the 2019 suit lack minimal merit. It is
undisputed that the 2019 suit alleged in Walter’s complaint was a petition for a
restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. For policy reasons, an
unsuccessful request for a domestic violence restraining order will not support a claim for
malicious prosecution. (S.A., supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at pp. 36–37; Bidna, supra,
19 Cal.App.4th at p. 30; Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1574.)
Proceedings under this statute are often freighted with (1) “extreme bitterness between
the parties, making it difficult to distinguish a malicious [domestic violence] restraining
order request from an ordinary one”; (2) the statute already makes attorney fee awards
available as “sanctions against persons who frivolously or maliciously and without
probable cause request [domestic violence] restraining orders”; (3) permitting malicious
prosecution suits in response to unsuccessful petitions for domestic violence restraining

17
orders would chill “the ability of victims of domestic violence and other abuse to obtain
protective relief”; and (4) the costs of malpractice insurance, and legal representation,
would increase. (S.A., at p. 38.)
Walter argues that even if these policy considerations foreclose his malicious
prosecution claim, his other theories of liability should survive. Even assuming a distinct
tort claim based in some way on reputational injuries flowing from Sandra’s 2019 suit, he
has not satisfied his burden of substantiating those theories with admissible evidence.
Rather, the only reputational injuries he addressed were those flowing from the
publication of YouTube videos after Sandra’s claims had been resolved.13
Of course, our conclusion that Walter’s claims arising out of the 2019 suit lack
minimal merit does not extend to Walter’s claims based on the unprotected public
YouTube videos.14
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s June 27, 2024 order granting defendants’ special motion to strike
the complaint is reversed. On remand, the trial court is directed to enter a new order
striking only plaintiff’s claims arising out of the 2019 suit, not plaintiff’s claims arising
out of publicly posting YouTube videos. This will result in the complete removal of the
first cause of action for malicious prosecution and the third cause of action for abuse of
process, but it will not dispose of every claim included within any other cause of action.
Appellant shall recover his costs on appeal.

13
The injury Walter alleges here is not defense costs but lost investment
opportunities. Although Walter now submits evidence that he incurred costs defending
the 2019 suit, that same evidence reflects that he already sought statutory fees in that
restraining order proceeding.
14
We need not address the merit of Walter’s claims based on publicly posting the
YouTube videos. To guide the court on remand, we note that publishing the videos to the
general public is not protected by the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47,
subdivision (b). We do not comment on Walter’s remaining causes of action.

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 LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

GROVER, Acting P. J.

WILSON, J.

Walter N. v. Sandra C. et al.
H052459