Filed 8/26/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

SCHURMAN FAMILY COMPANY
TIC,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ALAMEDA COUNTY, A174194
Respondent;
(Alameda County Super. Ct.
PHUOKHAO BOUNXAYSANA et al., No. 22CV008723)
Real Parties in Interest.

Known as the Privette doctrine, a person or entity that hires an
independent contractor “is not liable for injuries sustained by the contractor
or its workers while on the job” because the “hirer generally delegates to an
independent contractor all responsibility for workplace safety.” (Gonzalez v.
Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 40 (Gonzalez); see also Privette v. Superior Court
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 702 (Privette).) The Privette doctrine extends not just to
the party that directly hired the independent contractor but also to those in
the “chain of delegation,” such as where “the hirer contracts with another
contractor who then subcontracts the work to the independent contractor.”
(Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 518, 528–529
(Tverberg).)

1
 The plaintiff in this case, Phuokhao Bounxaysana, worked for an
independent contractor hired by the tenant of a warehouse owned by
Schurman Family Company TIC (Schurman). Bounxaysana was seriously
injured when he fell through a skylight on the roof of the warehouse while
performing work for the hiring tenant.
Bounxaysana sued Schurman, which moved for summary judgment
based on the Privette doctrine. The trial court denied Schurman’s motion,
reasoning that the Privette doctrine was “inapplicable” to Schurman because
it was not a hiring party; rather, Schurman was the tenant’s landlord and
thus “not entitled to the protections of the Privette doctrine.” We disagree.
The weight of appellate authority, including that of the California
Supreme Court, dictates that Schurman falls within the chain of delegation.
Because it is undisputed that the Privette doctrine applied to protect the
direct hirer in this case, we conclude that same doctrine also protects
Schurman from liability for Bounxaysana’s on the job injuries. Therefore, we
reverse the denial of summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
Schurman owns a warehouse in Oakland, California. Schurman leased
a 12-foot by 12-foot portion of the warehouse’s roof to GTE Mobilnet of
California Limited Partnership (Verizon) “for the installation, operation and
maintenance of communications equipment” and “antennas.” In addition to
the roof space, Verizon also leased a 12-foot by 20-foot portion of the property
inside the warehouse and “such additional space” as needed “for the
installation, operation and maintenance of wires, cables, conduits and pipes
. . . running between and among the Floor Space, Rooftop Space and Antenna
Space.”

2
 The lease provided Verizon (or the local utility provider) with “the right
to install such utilities on, over and/or under the Property [as] necessary for
[Verizon] to operate its communications facility,” including “the non-exclusive
right of ingress and egress . . . over the Property and in and through the
Building, on to, over and across the Building rooftop . . . for the purpose of
installation, operation and maintenance” of the communications equipment.
During the term of the lease, Schurman would be responsible for
maintenance of “the structural elements of the Building and the Premises,”
such as the foundation, exterior walls, interior load-bearing walls, and
common areas, while Verizon would “maintain the non-structural portions of
the Premises.”
In March 2018, Verizon (through its affiliate Verizon Sourcing LLC)
entered into a “Cell Site Construction Agreement” with independent
contractor L.D. Strobel (Strobel) to act as the general contractor for the cell
site installation project at the warehouse. Per the terms of the construction
agreement, Strobel would have “ ‘sole and exclusive’ ” control over its
workers, including responsibility for their “health and safety,” and would be
“solely responsible” for the “means [and] methods” of construction.
On June 22, 2021, Strobel sent Bounxaysana to the warehouse to work
on Verizon’s equipment located on the ground floor. At some point, a Verizon
technician asked Bounxaysana and his coworker to go onto the roof and check
the serial numbers on the radios housed in Verizon’s roof enclosure.
Verizon’s roof enclosure had one access door that was reached by
walking along a steel walkway with a handrail on one side and a cable tray
(through which cable wires were run) on the other side. The access door was
closed with screws and required a screwdriver to open. However, on June 22,
Bounxaysana did not bring a screwdriver with him onto the roof. Instead of

3
returning to ground level to retrieve one, Bounxaysana attempted to find
another way into the enclosure. Bounxaysana left the steel walkway and
stepped onto the sloped part of the roof outside the Verizon enclosure where
he fell through a skylight and suffered serious injuries as a result. It is
uncontested that the portion of the roof that contained the skylight was not
part of the section of the roof leased to Verizon.
II. Procedural Background
In March 2022, Bounxaysana filed a personal injury action against
Verizon and Schurman asserting claims for negligence and premises liability.
In April 2025, Schurman moved for summary judgment, asserting that the
Privette doctrine precluded any liability against it. The trial court denied the
motion in July 2025, ruling the Privette doctrine did not extend to protect
landlords like Schurman.1
In September 2025, Schurman filed a petition for writ relief in this
court. We requested informal briefing and issued a notice that a writ may
issue in the first instance. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; Palma v. U.S.
Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180.) After receiving the
briefing, we issued an order to show cause, and the parties elected to deem

1 In the same order, the court granted summary judgment in favor of

Verizon based on the Privette doctrine. Bounxaysana did not appeal from
that decision/judgment and does not challenge that determination in this writ
proceeding. (See Rogness v. English Moss Joint Venturers (1987)
194 Cal.App.3d 190, 192, fn. 2 [judgment from order granting motion for
summary judgment is appealable]; see also Valentine v. Plum Healthcare
Group, LLC (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1090, fn. 4 [without a timely notice
of appeal, the trial court’s ruling “is the state of the record in this matter and
we decide the remaining issues in accordance with that ruling”].)

4
their previously filed briefs as their respective return and reply.2 (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.487(b).)
DISCUSSION
In this case, the parties dispute whether the Privette doctrine applies to
shield Schurman from liability for Bounxaysana’s personal injury claims.
Schurman argues the Privette doctrine applies because it was “within the
chain of delegation.” Bounxaysana asserts the doctrine is inapplicable absent
a hiring relationship and, in this case, “[i]t is undisputed that Schurman did
not hire Verizon or Strobel.” Because this petition comes to us after a ruling
on a summary judgment motion and presents a pure question of law, we
decide the parties’ dispute de novo. (Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th
35, 60 [denial of summary judgment motion reviewed de novo]; Collins v.
Diamond Generating Corp. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1162, 1173, fn. 5 (Collins)
[“arguments concerning the applicability of the Privette doctrine raise a legal
issue, so our review . . . is de novo”].)
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all California state courts are bound
to follow opinions of the California Supreme Court (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455) and, although Court of Appeal
decisions are binding only upon trial courts, “ ‘we ordinarily follow the
decisions of other districts without good reason to disagree.’ ” (Wolfe v.
Dublin Unified School Dist. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 126, 137; see also Winns v.
Postmates Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 803, 815.) Here, the trial court relied
on Ramirez v. PK I Plaza 580 SC LP (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 252, 265
(Ramirez), which, it concluded, “expressly holds that the Privette doctrine

2 Before we issued the order to show cause, counsel for Schurman filed

a notice of new authority, and we permitted letter briefs on the new
authority: Andrews v. Wagner (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 766 (Andrews).

5
does not apply to landlords.” Because Schurman did not hire Strobel, the
trial court understandably determined that “stare decisis dictates that
Schurman is not entitled to the protections of the Privette doctrine.” A review
of additional authority leads us to disagree with this interpretation.
In Ramirez, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pages 257–258, the majority
reversed summary judgment entered in favor of the owner and operator of a
shopping center (Kimco). The plaintiff (Ramirez) was a self-employed
independent contractor who was hired by a shopping center tenant to remove
an exterior sign from the building. (Id. at p. 257.) Ramirez was injured when
he fell through an opening on the roof and sued Kimco under various tort
theories. (Id. at p. 259.) The trial court granted summary judgment for
Kimco, concluding that Kimco owned no duty of care to Ramirez under the
Privette doctrine. (Ramirez, at pp. 259, 265–270.)
Two of our colleagues in Division One of this appellate district
disagreed with the trial court, holding that a “bedrock presumption of the
Privette doctrine [was] absent” because “Kimco did not hire . . . Ramirez.”
(Ramirez, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 265.) One of our colleagues, however,
dissented, reasoning that the Privette doctrine should apply “where, as here,
a lease requires the lessee to do work on the property that the parties
contemplate will be done by an independent contractor” and the lessee hires
an independent contractor to do the work contemplated. (Ramirez, at p. 280
(dis. opn. of Banke, J.).) The Ramirez dissent explained that a non-hiring
landlord should be entitled to protection under the Privette doctrine where it
“is the first link in a ‘contracting chain’ that contemplates, and results in, the
hiring of an independent contractor to do the work.” (Ramirez, at p. 280.)
With all due respect to our colleagues in the Ramirez majority, in the
absence of California Supreme Court authority limiting the chain of

6
delegation to an unbroken sequence of hiring relationships, we will not read
such a requirement into the Privette doctrine. Instead, Supreme Court
precedent holds that the Privette doctrine’s presumptive delegation of
authority occurs not because of a hiring relationship, but rather because
independent contractors, unlike traditional employees, control the means and
manner in which their work is performed. (Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th at
p. 528 [“unlike a mere employee, [the independent contractor] receives
authority to determine how the work is to be performed”]; Sandoval v.
Qualcomm Incorporated (2021) 12 Cal.5th 256, 269 (Sandoval) [“independent
contractors by definition ordinarily control the manner of their own work”
(italics added)].) Accordingly, once the delegation occurs through the hiring
of an independent contractor, we can identify no basis for requiring a hiring
relationship through every link in the “chain of delegation.” (Tverberg, at
p. 529.)
Here, it is undisputed that Verizon hired Strobel as an independent
contractor. It is also undisputed that “Strobel was aware of the skylights
[i.e., the alleged hazard] prior to the subject incident.”3 Thus, as a matter of
law, the duty of workplace safety had been “presumptively delegate[d]” to

3 The parties dispute whether Bounxaysana knew of the hazard (i.e.,

the skylights on the roof), but the relevant inquiry is whether the contractor
knew of the hazard, not whether the employee of the independent contractor
knew. (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 45 [“A landowner does not fail to
delegate responsibility to the contractor for workplace safety simply because
there exists a known hazard on the premises that cannot be readily
addressed by the contractor”]; id. at p. 50 [“once the hazard is known to the
contractor, the contractor has at its disposal all of the information necessary
to determine whether or how the work can be performed safely”]; id. at p. 53
[“a landowner will generally not be liable for an injury to an independent
contractor or its workers resulting from a known hazard on the property”]; cf.
Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675 (Kinsman) [landowner
may be liable for undisclosed, concealed hazard].)

7
Strobel.4 (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 269; Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th
at p. 38.) Indeed, as the trial court found, the Privette doctrine freed Verizon
(the hiring party) from any duty of care potentially owed to Bounxaysana.5
The question before us thus becomes whether Schurman falls within
Privette’s “chain of delegation” even though it is not a “hirer.” (Tverberg,
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 529.) As we discuss, our Supreme Court precedent
does not require a hiring-based relationship to maintain the chain of
delegation, and the majority of our sister courts have held that Privette
doctrine protection can extend to non-hiring entities.
I. California Supreme Court Opinions on the Privette Doctrine
The Supreme Court of California first articulated what has become
known as the Privette doctrine in 1993, holding that the employee of an
independent contractor could not sue the property owner who had hired the
independent contractor for work-related injuries under the peculiar risk
doctrine. (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 692, 696.) Basing its decision on

4 Bounxaysana’s briefing to us suggests that Schurman was required

“to make a prima facie case for delegation.” However, as we discuss, our
Supreme Court has held that a presumption of delegation arises from the
hiring of an independent contractor. (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 269;
Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 528.) Thus, the undisputed fact that
Verizon hired Strobel triggers the presumption of delegation sufficient to
shift the burden to Bounxaysana to raise a triable issue of fact. (Alvarez v.
Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 644
[evidence that plaintiff’s employer was independent contractor and that
plaintiff was injured on the job “was sufficient to establish that the Privette
presumption applied and, therefore, shifted the burden to plaintiff to raise a
triable issue of fact”].)
5 As noted above, the trial court’s ruling on Verizon’s motion for

summary judgment is part of the same order as its ruling on Schurman’s
motion. Accordingly, it “is the state of the record in this matter and we
decide the remaining issues in accordance with that ruling.” (Valentine v.
Plum Healthcare Group, LLC, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1090, fn. 4.)

8
“policy reasons,” the Supreme Court explained that the employee’s
“ ‘exclusive remedy’ ” for the injuries was workers’ compensation, which
precluded the employee from holding the independent contractor liable for
the same injury. (Id. at pp. 701, 696–698 [workers’ compensation provides
the “ ‘exclusive remedy’ ” for the injured worker and “shields the contractor
from further liability for the injury”].) Thus, it would be “anomalous” to hold
the “nonnegligent” hirer liable “for the . . . injury-causing conduct of the
contractor” itself. (Id. at p. 698.) Moreover, permitting additional recovery
for injuries covered by workers’ compensation would result in “an
unwarranted windfall” to the injured employee. (Id. at pp. 700, 702.)
In Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 253, 256–
257 (Toland), the California Supreme Court subsequently clarified that the
Privette doctrine barred all forms of liability based on the peculiar risk
doctrine, including where “a person . . . hires an independent contractor to do
inherently dangerous work, but . . . fails to provide in the contract or in some
other manner that special precautions be taken to avert the peculiar risks of
that work.”6 The Supreme Court explained, it would be “illogical and unfair
that a landowner or other person who hires an independent contractor should
have greater liability for the independent contractor’s negligence towards the

6 In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Werdegar agreed with

Toland’s expansion of Privette’s protection but disagreed with “much of [the
majority’s] rationale” and would have created an exception that recognized an
unprotected duty of care where “the hirer’s knowledge or control is superior
to that of the contractor”—a view that Justice Werdegar reiterated in
subsequent opinions. (Toland supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 270–271 (conc. & dis.
opn. of Werdegar, J.); see also Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy (2001) 25 Cal.4th
1235, 1245–1246 (conc. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [“concur[ring] under the
compulsion of Toland” but reiterating concerns with “the majority’s blanket
approach”].) Because here we consider the distinct concept of delegation, we
limit our discussion of Supreme Court cases to the majority opinions.

9
contractor’s employees than the independent contractor whose liability is
limited to providing workers’ compensation coverage.” (Id. at p. 270.) “For
the same reasons,” the Supreme Court next expanded the Privette doctrine to
“bar an employee of an independent contractor from bringing a negligent
hiring action against the hirer of the contractor.” (Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 1238, 1244.)
And since Toland, the Supreme Court has recognized only two
exceptions to the Privette doctrine. (Hooker v. Department of Transportation
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 202 (Hooker); Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 664,
671; see also Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 54 [declining to find “a broad
third exception to the Privette doctrine”].)
First, in Hooker, the Supreme Court held “that a hirer is liable to an
employee of a contractor insofar as a hirer’s exercise of retained control
affirmatively contributed to the employee’s injuries.” (Hooker, supra,
27 Cal.4th at p. 202.) The majority reaffirmed that “ ‘[A] general contractor
owes no duty of care to an employee of a subcontractor to prevent or correct
unsafe procedures or practices.’ ” (Id. at p. 209.) But the majority recognized
that an independent duty arose “when the hirer’s conduct has affirmatively
contributed to the injuries of the contractor’s employee.” (Id. at pp. 211–212,
fn. omitted.)7

7 In a companion case to Hooker, the Supreme Court similarly held

“that a hirer is liable to an employee of an independent contractor insofar as
the hirer’s provision of unsafe equipment affirmatively contributes to the
employee’s injury.” (McKown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 219,
222 (McKown).) For the same reasons discussed in Hooker, a hirer who
“negligently furnish[es] unsafe equipment to the contractor[] affirmatively
contributes to the injury of an employee of the contractor” and “should be
liable to the employee for the consequences of the hirer’s own negligence.”
(McKown, at p. 225 [affirming jury verdict against Wal-Mart, which
“requested” the contractor use its unsafe forklift].)

10
 In Kinsman, the California Supreme Court expressed a second
exception to the Privette doctrine, permitting premises liability claims
against hiring landowners where (1) “the landowner[8] knew, or should have
known, of a latent or concealed preexisting hazardous condition on its
property,” (2) “the contractor did not know and could not have reasonably
discovered this hazardous condition,” and (3) “the landowner failed to warn
the contractor about this condition.” (Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 664,
671.)
The Privette doctrine continued to evolve, and, in the previously cited
case of Tverberg, the Supreme Court coined the phrase the “chain of
delegation” to describe its scope of protection. (Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th at
p. 529.) In Tverberg, the employee of an independent contractor hired by a
subcontractor attempted to hold the general contractor liable for workplace
injuries. (Id. at p. 521.) Our Supreme Court determined that the Privette
doctrine shielded the general contractor from liability for the injured
employee’s claims. (Tverberg, at pp. 528–529.) “[U]nlike a mere employee,”
the Supreme Court reasoned, an independent contractor “receives authority
to determine how the work is to be performed and assumes a corresponding
responsibility to see that the work is performed safely.” (Id. at p. 528.)
“Having assumed responsibility for workplace safety, an independent
contractor may not hold a hiring party vicariously liable for injuries resulting
from the contractor’s own failure to effectively guard against risks inherent in
the contracted work.” (Id. at p. 522.)

8 The Supreme Court used the term “ ‘landowner’ ” broadly “to refer to

either an owner or a possessor of land that owes some kind of duty of care to
keep the premises safe.” (Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 664, fn. 1.)

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 The Supreme Court explained it is the independent contractor who “has
authority to determine the manner in which inherently dangerous
construction work is to be performed, and thus assumes legal responsibility
for carrying out the contracted work, including the taking of workplace safety
precautions.” (Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 522.) Therefore, it did not
matter whether the delegation of authority was “direct, when the hirer has
contracted with the independent contractor, or indirect, when the hirer
contracts with another contractor who then subcontracts the work to the
independent contractor.” (Id. at p. 528.) “Whether direct or indirect, this
delegated control over the performance of the work removes the independent
contractor from the category of ‘innocent third parties’ deserving of financial
protection under the doctrine of peculiar risk.” (Ibid.) Correspondingly,
Tverberg concluded that the Privette doctrine precluded liability “for injuries
arising from risks inherent in the nature or the location of the hired work
over which the independent contractor has, through the chain of delegation,
been granted control.” (Tverberg, at pp. 528–529, italics added.)
Our Supreme Court again reinforced the centrality of delegation to the
Privette doctrine in SeaBright Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th
590, 594 (SeaBright): “By hiring an independent contractor, the hirer
implicitly delegates to the contractor any tort law duty it owes to the
contractor’s employees to ensure the safety of the specific workplace that is
the subject of the contract.” (Id. at p. 594, italics omitted.) Rejecting the
claim that the duty of care was nondelegable, the Supreme Court held the
Privette doctrine recognized “a presumptive delegation of responsibility for
workplace safety from the hirer to the independent contractor.” (SeaBright,
at pp. 597, 600.)

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 In 2021, the Supreme Court issued two decisions further clarifying
Privette’s scope. First, in Gonzalez, the court extended Privette protection to
hiring landowners “for injuries to an independent contractor or its workers
that result from a known hazard on the premises where there were no
reasonable safety precautions it could have adopted to avoid or minimize the
hazard.” (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 38.) Again, focusing on
presumptive delegation, the Supreme Court explained that once the duty for
workplace safety is delegated to the independent contractor, “a landowner
owes no duty to the contractor or its workers to remedy a known hazard on
the premises or take other measures that might provide protection against
the hazard.” (Id. at p. 45, italics added.) Fairness principles also supported
this application of the Privette doctrine because “once the hazard is known to
the contractor, the contractor has at its disposal all of the information
necessary to determine whether or how the work can be performed safely.”
(Gonzalez, at p. 50.)
That the same year, in Sandoval, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
delegation, or the “actual transfer of control,” as the basis for the Privette
doctrine: “When a person or organization hires an independent contractor,
the hirer presumptively delegates to the contractor the responsibility to do
the work safely.” (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 269–270.) Thus, “If a
contract worker becomes injured after that delegation takes place, we
presume that the contractor alone—and not the hirer—was responsible for
any failure to take reasonable precautions.” (Id. at p. 271.)
These Supreme Court opinions elucidate the following rule: Once the
presumptive delegation of authority to an independent contractor occurs, that
contractor bears the duty of care for workplace safety, and—absent
exceptions inapplicable here, e.g., retention and exercise of control (Hooker)

13
or a concealed hazard (Kinsman)9—the Privette doctrine shields all those in
the “chain of delegation” from liability. (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
pp. 271–272; Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 41–43; Tverberg, supra,
49 Cal.4th at p. 529.)
Bounxaysana reads these Supreme Court opinions to imply that a
hiring relationship is a “prerequisite” throughout the chain of delegation.
But this interpretation fails to recognize that the California Supreme Court
has never considered the Privette doctrine outside of the hiring context. (See,
e.g., Ramirez, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 279 [“our Supreme Court has never
decided—in fact, never considered—whether Privette applies” to a non-hiring
lessor].) Thus, we cannot construe our Supreme Court’s opinions as imposing
a hiring requirement throughout the chain of delegation when our Supreme
Court has never been presented with nor decided that issue. (People v.
McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1382, 1390 [“ ‘ “It is
axiomatic that language in a judicial opinion is to be understood in
accordance with the facts and issues before the court. An opinion is not
authority for propositions not considered” ’ ”].) In fact, the Supreme Court’s
use of the phrase “chain of delegation” rather than “chain of hiring” suggests
it did not intend to create a hiring requirement. (Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th
at p. 529.) And, to the extent the Privette doctrine requires a hiring
relationship for the initial delegation of authority, such a delegation occurred
here when Verizon hired Strobel as an independent contractor.

9 In opposing Schurman’s summary judgment motion in the trial court,

Bounxaysana did not assert either exception applied, and Bounxaysana does
not make any such assertions in this writ proceeding. Accordingly, we
neither consider nor decide whether these exceptions apply. (Bains v. Moores
(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445, 455 [“ ‘ “[D]e novo review does not obligate us to
cull the record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to uncover
the requisite triable issues” ’ ”].)

14
 In the absence of direct authority from our Supreme Court, California
Courts of Appeal have come to different conclusions about whether non-
hiring people or entities can fall within the chain of delegation entitled to
protection under Privette. We agree with the majority of our fellow district
courts that the absence of a hiring relationship does not necessarily preclude
Privette’s application. Accordingly, in view of the undisputed facts here, we
conclude Schurman falls within the chain of delegation and is shielded from
liability under the Privette doctrine.
II. California Appellate Court Opinions on the Chain of Delegation
Even before our Supreme Court articulated the chain of delegation
concept in Tverberg, multiple California appellate courts had used the
Privette doctrine to shield non-hiring parties from personal injury claims
asserted by independent contractors or their employees.
For example, in Lopez v. University Partners (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th
1117, 1120–1122 (Lopez), Division One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal
applied the Privette doctrine to affirm summary judgment in favor of a
landowner (a university) and its tenant that had hired the independent
contractor whose employee was injured when a trench being excavated had
collapsed. The injured employee of the independent contractor sued both the
leasing university and the hiring tenant, but the Court of Appeal agreed with
the trial court in concluding that the employee had failed to raise a triable
issue of fact because the Privette doctrine applied to shield from liability both
the hiring tenant and the non-hiring university. (Lopez, at p. 1125.)
Similarly, in Laico v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 649,
654–655 (Laico), the Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed a jury verdict
against a landowner, holding the landowner owed no duty to protect the
employee of an affiliated company who had been injured on the job.

15
Regarding the Privette doctrine, “even though there [was] no evidence of a
hirer-contractor relationship between [the hirer] and [the landowner],” the
court determined “that Privette, Toland, and Hooker provide a useful
analogy,” because “it would be ‘illogical and unfair’ to impose liability on [the
landowner] for an injury attributable to [injured party’s hirer], whose liability
is limited by workers’ compensation insurance.” (Laico, at p. 668.)
Accordingly, the court held “the policies underlying Privette and its progeny
. . . to avoid burdening the party that did not cause the injury” “militate[]
against imposing liability on [the landowner].” (Laico, at p. 669.)
Also, in Ruiz v. Herman Weissker, Inc. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 52
(Ruiz), Division One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed
summary judgment and applied the Privette doctrine to shield from liability a
non-hiring “contract administrator” of a utility company for the injuries of an
employee of an independent contractor hired by the utility company. (Ruiz,
at pp. 55–56.) Although the contract administrator did not hire the
independent contractor, did not have a contractual relationship with the
independent contractor, and did not pay the contractor (directly, indirectly, or
otherwise), in declining to impose liability, the court found those “factual
distinction[s] . . . legally insignificant.” (Id. at p. 62.) Because the injured
employee “was engaged in work that posed a special risk of harm and his
injuries arose out of work for which [the independent contractor] bore
primary responsibility. . . . [I]t would be ‘illogical and unfair’ to impose
greater derivative liability on [the non-hiring contract administrator] than
the law would impose on [the independent contractor] for its direct
negligence.” (Ibid.)
We are not persuaded by Bounxaysana’s attempts to distinguish these
cases. Bounxaysana argues Lopez relied on workers’ compensation to deny

16
liability instead of the delegation of authority over workplace safety, and
Laico applied the Privette doctrine by analogy. But since both cases preceded
the Supreme Court’s elucidation of the “chain of delegation” concept in
Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th at page 529, Lopez and Laico were simply
applying the legal standards articulated at the time. Notably, no Supreme
Court opinion has overturned or criticized either Lopez or Laico, and recently,
our Supreme Court favorably cited Ruiz for its explanation of the Hooker
exception. (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 47, citing Ruiz, supra,
130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 65–66.)
Turning to Bounxaysana’s reliance on Ramirez, its holding increasingly
stands alone, and more recent opinions have expressly declined to follow it.
(Collins v. Diamond Generating Corp. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1162, 1175,
fn. 6 (Collins) [Ct. App., Fourth Dist., Div. Three; “respectfully disagree[ing]”
with Ramirez’s holding “that Privette only applies to hirers”]; Andrews, supra,
116 Cal.App.5th at p. 773 [Ct. App., Second Dist., Div. Six; reliance on
Ramirez was “unavailing” because it was “factually distinguishable”].)
For example, Collins, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at pages 1166–1167,
arose from a jury verdict for the surviving family members of a worker that
was killed in a power plant explosion. The Court of Appeal reversed because
“the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the
Privette doctrine and its exceptions.” (Id. at p. 1167.) The Court of Appeal
explained it was “undisputed” that the Privette doctrine shielded the hirer
from liability, which required consideration of “whether the same is true for
. . . a partial indirect owner of [the hiring party].” (Collins, at p. 1176.)
Although Collins left the factual question of liability for the jury to decide on
remand, its reversal directed the trial court to instruct on the Privette
doctrine and the Hooker exception, because the non-hiring partial owner

17
could have delegated “any safety-related responsibilities” through the “ ‘chain
of delegation’ ” from its subsidiary to the independent contractor. (Collins, at
pp. 1176, 1178.)
Likewise, Andrews affirmed summary judgment where the trial court
applied the Privette doctrine to shield a homeowner from liability for injuries
suffered by the employee of independent contractor hired by the homeowner’s
insurance company, not the homeowner. (Andrews, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th
at p. 769.) Endorsing the trial court’s rejection of “ ‘the technicality that [the
homeowner] was not the one who hired [the independent contractor],’ ” the
Court of Appeal explained that the homeowner was the hirer “within the
meaning of the [Privette] doctrine.” (Andrews, at pp. 769, 773.) “By paying
her insurance carrier for insurance coverage,” the homeowner had “in essence
paid for the inspection,” and “by consenting to allow [the independent
contractor] to enter her property to carry out the contracted inspection, [the
homeowner] has delegated to the independent contractor the responsibility
for workplace safety” and therefore was protected from liability. (Id. at
p. 773.)
As these appellate decisions have repeatedly declined to limit Privette
protection solely to hiring parties, so do we in the absence of any Supreme
Court authority imposing such a limitation. It is undisputed that the
Verizon-Schurman lease was for the express purpose of allowing Verizon to
install, operate, and maintain communications equipment and antennas on
the roof. Equipped with access to the roof as permitted by the lease, Verizon
hired Strobel to perform the work specifically contemplated by the lease
agreement. Strobel’s employee, Bounxaysana, then exercised the discretion
afforded to independent contractors about how complete the task that Strobel
had been contracted to perform and decided to access Verizon’s roof enclosure

18
through a different point than originally contemplated. As such, much like
the university’s lease to the hiring tenant in Lopez, Schurman’s lease to
Verizon places it directly in the chain of delegation protected by the Privette
doctrine that had been triggered by Verizon’s hiring of Strobel. (Lopez, supra,
54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1122–1125.)
Moreover, recognizing that Schurman falls within the chain of
delegation promotes and is consistent with the policy considerations
underlying the Privette doctrine and the weight of appellate authority. As
fairness principles dictate, it would be anomalous and inequitable to impose
greater liability for Bounxaysana’s injuries upon Schurman, the lessor with
no control over Bounxaysana’s work, than could be imposed upon either
Strobel or Verizon. (Toland, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 266.) And subjecting
Schurman to liability on top of workers’ compensation could provide
Bounxaysana with the windfall our Supreme Court has cautioned against.
(Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 51 [applying the Privette doctrine to
“avoid[] the unfair ‘tort damages windfall’ that would result from adopting a
rule that allows independent contractors and their workers to obtain tort
damages from the landowner while the landowner’s own employees are
limited to workers’ compensation”].)
The few cases that have declined to apply the Privette doctrine to non-
hirers do not change our conclusion and in fact are consistent with our
reasoning. In Gordon v. ARC Manufacturing, Inc. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 705,
a “prospective buyer” hired an independent contractor and professional roofer
(Gordon) to inspect the roof of a commercial building the buyer was
considering purchasing. (Id. at p. 708.) While inspecting the roof, Gordon fell
through a “ ‘camouflaged hole’ ” and sustained injuries. (Id. at pp. 708–709.)
Gordon sued the building’s owner and obtained a jury verdict, which was

19
affirmed on appeal because “the fundamental problem is that [the property
owner] did not hire Gordon” and thus Privette did not compel reversal.
(Gordon, at pp. 714, 718–719, 720.) In other words, there was no chain of
delegation between the injured independent contractor and the property
owner in Gordon, because in selling the property, the defendants had not
assigned the work or hired the contractor and thus remained responsible for
the building only it had control over. (Id. at p. 713 [“primary assumption of
risk does not apply in this case because defendants did not hire or engage
Gordon”].) Conversely, here, the lease to Verizon resulted in the hiring of
Strobel and Bounxaysana and created an unbroken contractual chain akin to
Collins and Andrews. (Collins, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1166, 1176–1178
[where hirer delegated authority to independent contractor, the Privette
doctrine shielded the indirect owner and parent company of the hiring party];
Andrews, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at pp. 769, 772–774 [delegation of authority
through hiring relationship between homeowner’s insurer and independent
contractor entitled non-hiring homeowner to protection under Privette].)
Similarly, in Zuniga v. Cherry Avenue Auction, Inc. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 980, 983–984, the plaintiffs, a husband and wife, rented space
from the defendants at an outdoor swap meet and were injured while setting
up their booth; the husband died. The Court of Appeal affirmed the jury
verdict for the plaintiffs because “[t]here was no hiring of an independent
contractor.” (Id. at p. 991.) Accordingly, there was no delegation of authority
to an independent contractor implicating Privette and no chain of delegation
stemming therefrom; whereas here, it is undisputed that Verizon delegated
authority for workplace safety by hiring Strobel.
In conclusion, where a lease agreement expressly contemplates the use
of an independent contractor to perform work, and the tenant subsequently

20
hires an independent contractor to perform said work, the non-hiring lessor
falls within the chain of delegation and, absent a recognized exception, the
Privette doctrine applies to shield the non-hiring lessor from liability for on-
the-job injuries sustained by the independent contractor or its employees.
Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. Because
the sole issue in dispute below was whether the Privette doctrine applied,
having now concluded that it does, we direct the trial court to enter summary
judgment in favor of Schurman.
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ issue directing the trial court to vacate its July
31, 2025 order insofar as it denied summary judgment to Schurman and
enter summary judgment in favor of Schurman. In the interests of justice,
we decline to award costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(B).)

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 DESAUTELS, J.

We concur:

STEWART, P.J.

RICHMAN, J.

Schurman Family Company TIC v. Alameda County Superior Court;
Bounxaysana et al., RPI (A174194)

22
Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Han N. Tran

Attorneys for Petitioner: Horvitz & Levy LLP
Stephen E. Norris
Jason R. Litt
John B. Sprangers

Bledsoe, Diestel, Treppa & Crane LLP
Alison M. Crane
Nichole C. Baer

Attorneys for Respondent No Appearance for Respondent

Attorneys for Real Parties
in Interest: Arns Davis Law
Jonathan E. Davis
Zachariah D. Hansen
Shounak S. Dharap
Juan C. Flores

For Phuokhao Bounxaysana

No appearance for Complete Wireless

No appearance for GTE Mobilnet
of California Limited Partnership

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