Filed 8/24/26 De Leon v. Leon CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

KEVIN DE LEON, B341428

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCV24461)
v.

SANTOS LEON et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephen P. Pfahler, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Pflaster & Berman, Martin R. Berman; LA
SuperLawyers and William W. Bloch for Defendant and
Appellant Santos Leon.
McCoy Leavitt Laskey and Manuel S. Boxler for Defendant
and Appellant Karla Vasquez.
Geragos & Geragos, Mark Geragos and Kimberly Casper
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
 Plaintiff Kevin de Leon brought this action against Santos
Leon, Karla Vasquez, and a number of Doe Defendants
(collectively, Defendants) for invasion of privacy and negligence
after a recording was published online of an October 2021
meeting Plaintiff attended with other prominent Los Angeles
political figures. Leon and Vasquez appeal the trial court’s order
denying their Code of Civil Procedure section 425.161 special
motions to strike the complaint. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We take our facts from Plaintiff’s complaint and the
declarations of Leon and Vasquez. Plaintiff was a Los Angeles
City Councilmember when, in October 2021, he attended a
meeting in a private conference room at the headquarters of the
Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, with the
President of the Federation, the Council President, and another
Council member. An audio recording of the meeting was made
without the knowledge of any of the four attendees. Plaintiff
alleges Defendants surreptitiously recorded the meeting. Leon
and Vasquez, a married couple employed at the Federation, deny
doing so.
According to Plaintiff, the meeting attendees discussed how
to redraw Los Angeles political boundaries after the 2020 census
to represent the city’s evolving demographics, including its
Latino and African-American populations.
According to Vasquez and Leon, the meeting attendees
“were trying to illegally rig the redistricting process” and
“engag[ed] in racial stereotyping.” Some of the attendees made

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

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“highly offensive” comments, including “racist attacks on other
members of the City Council.”
Plaintiff did not learn of the recording until a year later,
when a Twitter account alerted reporters to its presence on
Reddit, “a social news aggregator and discussion website where
users can anonymously upload content for other users to
comment on.” According to Plaintiff, the publication of the
recording in October 2022 was timed “to kneecap [his] political
integrity and character and inflict maximum damage on his
reputation.”
The recording generated national news and became “a very
significant issue of public interest.” Plaintiff alleged Defendants
uploaded the recording. Leon denied recording the meeting or
uploading “the original recording.” Vasquez denied recording the
meeting and claimed she first learned of it when her boss told her
to read the news about it. Her opening brief says she
“emphatically denied all . . . accusations” that she recorded the
meeting or publicly released it on Reddit. However, Leon and
Vasquez both admitted having “many communications” about the
recording after it became public.
The Los Angeles Police Department initiated a criminal
investigation. (See Pen. Code, § 632, subd. (a).) Some employees
of the Federation, including Defendant Leon, were required to
turn over their employer-issued cell phones and laptops. Police
executed a search warrant at the home of Leon and Vasquez and
seized Vasquez’s cell phone, laptop computer, and other electronic
equipment. Police uncovered “some evidence that a computer at
[Leon and Vasquez’s] residence . . . may have had a record of
posting a copy of the recording . . . in September 2022 and

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October 2022.” Leon and Vasquez were not charged with any
crime.
Defendant Leon was fired by the Federation because there
was a copy of the recording on his computer and he “discuss[ed] it
with other people.” Vasquez resigned.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed this complaint in October 2023. He alleged
Defendants surreptitiously recorded the October 2021 meeting in
violation of Penal Code sections 632 and 637.2. He asserted
three causes of action: invasion of privacy; negligence; and
negligence per se.
In May 2024, Leon and Vasquez each moved to strike the
complaint pursuant to section 425.16—widely known as an “anti-
SLAPP motion.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055.)
They argued the complaint arose from their “discussions and
written communications” about the October 2021 meeting, which
was activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. They also
argued that while the complaint alleged Defendants engaged in
“illegal activity in secretly recording” the October 2021 meeting,
that allegation is “mixed in with allegations that [Defendants]
engaged in clearly protected petitioning activity, participating in
discussions and sharing of information on a matter of public
interest.” Finally, they argued Plaintiff could not show a
probability of success on his claims because he had insufficient
evidence either one of them had made the recording.
After hearing argument, the trial court denied both anti-
SLAPP motions. The court first determined the complaint
“categorically and undisputably arises from” unprotected
activity–to wit, “the alleged illegal recording of the meeting
between [Plaintiff] and the other[s].” While the court

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acknowledged Leon and Vasquez denied any involvement in the
recording, that “in no way alters the finding of . . . illegal conduct
for purposes of considering the application of the special motion
to strike.” The court thus determined Leon and Vasquez failed to
carry their burden at the first step of the anti-SLAPP test. In the
alternative, even assuming Leon and Vasquez had succeeded in
the first step of the test, the court further concluded Plaintiff had
demonstrated a sufficient probability of success on the merits of
his claims.
Leon and Vasquez timely appealed.2 (See § 904.1,
subd. (a)(13); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(B).)
DISCUSSION
The anti-SLAPP statute “provides a procedure for weeding
out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected
activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384, italics
omitted (Baral); see also § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) A court’s analysis
of an anti-SLAPP motion proceeds in two steps. (Baral, at p. 384.)
“First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim
arises from activity protected by section 425.16.” (Ibid.) “[T]he
moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the
challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in
which the defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park);
see also § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

2 Footnotes in Leon’s and Vasquez’s opening briefs ask us to
judicially notice election records, copies of which have not been
provided. Because the requests do not comply with the California
Rules of Court, we deny them. (See Kao v. Joy Holiday (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 199, 204, fn. 3 [denying request for judicial notice
made in a brief]; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a).)

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 The first step of that test is dispositive of this appeal. As we
explain, Leon and Vasquez did not meet their burden of showing
Plaintiff’s claims arose from their protected activity. Thus, we
need not and do not consider the second step of the anti-SLAPP
analysis. (See Verceles v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 776, 792, fn. 8.)
I. General Principles and Standard of Review
The first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis requires the
defendant to make “two related showings.” (Wilson v. Cable News
Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 887 (Wilson).) First,
“[c]omparing [the defendant’s] statements and conduct against
the [anti-SLAPP] statute, [the defendant] must demonstrate
activity qualifying for protection.” (Ibid.) The type of activity
protected “include[s] a specified range of statements, writings,
and conduct in connection with official proceedings and matters
of public interest.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062; see also
§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
Second, “comparing that protected activity against the
complaint, [the defendant] must also demonstrate that the
activity supplies one or more elements of a plaintiff’s claims.”
(Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 887; see also Park, supra,
2 Cal.5th at pp. 1060, 1063.)
Plaintiff’s complaint defines the contours of the claims at
the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. (See Abir Cohen
Treyzon Salo, LLP v. Lahiji (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 882, 888
(Abir).) Thus, a defendant’s denial of engaging in protected
activity does not make the activity unprotected under the anti-
SLAPP law. (Abir, at p. 888.)
“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP
motion.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.) “In addition to the

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pleadings, we may consider affidavits concerning the facts upon
which liability is based,” but “[w]e do not . . . weigh the evidence.”
(Ibid.) Instead, we “accept plaintiff’s submissions as true and
consider only whether any contrary evidence from the defendant
establishes its entitlement to prevail as a matter of law.” (Ibid.)
II. Leon and Vasquez Failed to Meet Their Burden of
Showing Plaintiff’s Claims Arise From Protected Activity
Leon and Vasquez bear the burden at the first step of the
anti-SLAPP analysis to demonstrate Plaintiff’s claims “arise[]
from activity protected by section 425.16.” (Baral, supra,
1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) That requires a defendant “to identify what
acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts
are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected
activity.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th
995, 1009 (Bonni); see § 425.16, subd. (e)(1)–(4).)
In the trial court, as on appeal, Leon and Vasquez sought to
strike the entire complaint on the ground it arose from their
conduct in participating in discussions and written
communications on matters of public interest protected by the
First Amendment.
In Bonni, the court addressed the proper approach when a
single cause of action rests on multiple factual bases, some of
which may constitute protected activity and some of which may
not, and the motion seeks to strike the entire cause of action:
“[T]o the extent [the plaintiff] has alleged various acts as a basis
for relief and not merely as background, each act or set of acts
must be analyzed separately under the usual two-step anti-
SLAPP framework. The [defendants] bear the burden of showing
that each allegation supporting [the plaintiff’s] claim of recovery
is one that rests on protected activity. If the [defendants] carry

7
that burden, [the plaintiff] will then need to demonstrate some
merit to his claim . . . ; if he cannot, those particular allegations
will be stricken. Conversely, to the extent any acts are
unprotected, the claims based on those acts will survive.” (Bonni,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012.)
Here, Leon and Vasquez categorically deny making the
recording and instead point to numerous communications that
they had with colleagues and other members of the public after
the recording was publicly released. Their sole argument on
appeal as to protected activity is that their discussions of the
recording are protected activity under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3) and (4).
For purposes of this opinion, we will assume Leon’s and
Vasquez’s comments about the recording after its public release
would be protected activity.
Leon’s and Vasquez’s focus on their comments, however,
“overlook[s] the actual allegations” of the complaint. (Ratcliff v.
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 982, 1005.) The complaint makes no allegations
about Leon’s and Vasquez’s comments. The complaint instead
alleges “a Twitter account alerted reporters and others to the
existence and location of the recordings on Reddit,” but does not
allege Defendants were associated with that Twitter account or
participated in discussions about the recording. Nor does the
complaint allege that either Leon or Vasquez participated in
discussions about the recording. Thus, the claims in the
complaint cannot be said to arise out of those discussions,
protected or not.
What the complaint does allege is “Defendants
surreptitiously recorded” the October 2021 meeting and

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“uploaded the audio recording[] to [Reddit].” Leon’s and Vasquez’s
opening briefs never argue that conduct is protected under any of
the categories of section 425.16, subdivision (e). They have thus
essentially conceded it is not protected. (See Pfeifer v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1250,
1282 [“An appellate court ‘will not develop the appellants’
arguments for them . . . .’ ”].)
Because Leon and Vasquez have not argued the alleged
surreptitious recording and its public release on Reddit is activity
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, we need not determine if it
was illegal as a matter of law and thus per se ineligible for anti-
SLAPP protection. (See Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299,
320 (Flatley).)
To the extent Leon or Vasquez may contend they did argue
either the surreptitious recording or its public release was
protected activity (separate and apart from any subsequent
comments that were not actually alleged in the complaint), they
did not come close to making the requisite showing. “[W]hile
courts may strike less than the entirety of a complaint or pleaded
cause of action, the trial court is not required to take on the
burden of identifying the allegations susceptible to a special
motion to strike. If a defendant wants the trial court to take a
surgical approach, whether in the alternative or not, the
defendant must propose where to make the incisions. This is done
by identifying, in the initial motion, each numbered paragraph or
sentence in the complaint that comprises a challenged claim and
explaining ‘the claim’s elements, the actions alleged to establish
those elements, and wh[y] those actions are protected.’ ” (Park v.
Nazari (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1109, quoting Bonni, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 1015.) It is not the trial court’s responsibility to

9
parse the complaint on behalf of the moving party. (Park v.
Nazari, at p. 1109.)
Leon and Vasquez failed to do this. The only references
they made in the trial court or this court regarding the
surreptitious recording and its public release on Reddit are to
their vehement denials of having done so.
But just as denial of engaging in an activity is not sufficient
to show the activity is unprotected (Abir, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th
at p. 888), neither does it show the activity is protected. Rather,
whether Leon or Vasquez engaged in the surreptitious recording
is a “factual dispute go[ing] to the merits of [Plaintiff’s] claims
and is not relevant to the first [step] of the anti-SLAPP inquiry.”
(Simmons v. Bauer Media Group USA, LLC (2020)
50 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1047 (Simmons); see also Bel Air Internet,
LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 939 [“A defendant’s
declaration denying that he or she engaged in the conduct alleged
in the complaint does not foreclose the possibility that a fact
finder could later find that he or she did in fact engage in that
conduct.”].)
Defendant Leon’s reply brief argues that even though the
surreptitious recording “is potentially unprotected activity,” it
could be protected in some circumstances, such as when made in
the course of gathering information for a news report. (See
Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 156,
161–162, 164; see also Safari Club International v. Rudolph
(9th Cir. 2017) 862 F.3d 1113, 1121–1122 [gathering information
for a YouTube post about a public issue].) That argument is
forfeited since it was first raised in his reply brief. (See Tukes v.
Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1, 12, fn. 5.) Even considering it
on the merits, Leon has pointed to no evidence suggesting he

10
made or publicly released the original recording as part of a
newsgathering effort, particularly because he categorically denies
doing either. (See Simmons, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1045–
1046 [Lieberman was inapposite where the Simmons defendant
“does not contend [the conduct] was lawful; rather[, the
defendant] steadfastly denies knowing about . . . or participating
in the alleged activity”].)
At oral argument, counsel for Defendant Leon conceded
that absent the newsgathering exceptions in Lieberman and
Simmons, the surreptitious recording at issue before us is illegal
and unprotected activity. “Where a defendant moves to strike the
entire complaint and fails to identify, with reasoned argument,
specific claims for relief that are asserted to arise from protected
activity, the defendant does not carry his or her first-step burden
so long as the complaint presents at least one claim that does not
arise from protected activity.” (Park v. Nazari, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1108.)
Leon and Vasquez thus have not met their burden to show
Plaintiff’s claims are premised upon any of their protected
activity.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Plaintiff is entitled to costs on
appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)–(2).)

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J. GOORVITCH, J.

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