Filed 8/24/26 P. v. Dixon CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172079
v.
CHRISTOPHER DIXON, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. SC049585A)
Defendant and Appellant.
I. MEMORANDUM OPINION1
In 2002, a jury convicted Christopher Dixon of the following offenses:
(1) residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a)2), with special allegations
that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a))
and that the offense was a violent felony (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)); (2) false
imprisonment (§ 236); (3) robbery of an inhabited residence (§ 212.5,
subd. (a)), with a special allegation that defendant personally inflicted great
bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); (4) battery resulting in serious bodily
injury (§ 243, subd. (d)), with a special allegation that defendant personally
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.) We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is
unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and
its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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inflicted great bodily injury (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)); and (5) receiving stolen
property (§ 496, subd. (a)). The trial court found Dixon had suffered a
number of prior convictions and had served prior prison terms. The court
sentenced Dixon to 62 years to life in state prison, imposing two consecutive
25-year-to-life terms for the burglary and robbery counts under the “Three
Strikes” law3 (while staying the sentences on the remaining counts), plus
three years for the special allegation under section 12022.7, subdivision (a),
as to the robbery count, five years for a prior serious felony conviction under
section 667, subdivision (a), and two years each for prior prison terms under
former section 667.5, subdivision (b). On appeal, this court reduced Dixon’s
sentence by two years because former section 667.5, subdivision (b)
authorized only a one-year enhancement for each prior prison term.
In 2023, Dixon sought resentencing under sections 1172.75 and 1385.
The trial court struck his two enhancements for prior prison terms, but
declined to strike his prior strike convictions or his remaining enhancements,
or to impose his two 25-year-to-life terms concurrently instead of
consecutively. Dixon argues the court abused its discretion by applying the
wrong standard to its analysis and failing to give due weight to three
mitigating facts: his sentence included multiple enhancements, his offenses
were connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma, and an
enhancement was based on a prior conviction that was over five years old.
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B), (E), & (H).) We disagree.
3 “The ‘Three Strikes’ law provides that for a defendant convicted of a
felony who has sustained two or more qualifying prior felony convictions—
commonly known as strikes—‘the term for the current felony conviction shall
be an indeterminate term of life imprisonment,’ with the ‘minimum term
[. . .]’ being the greatest of three options” (People v. Acosta (2002)
29 Cal.4th 105, 108), one of which is 25 years (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(ii),
1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)(ii)).
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In exercising its discretion under section 1385, the trial court “ ‘shall
consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to
prove’ certain enumerated mitigating circumstances,’ ” proof of which
“ ‘weighs greatly in favor of dismissing [an] enhancement, unless the court
finds that [doing so] would endanger public safety.’ ” (People v. Walker (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1024, 1028 (Walker); § 1385, subd. (c)(2).) But as Dixon agrees,
even where a mitigating circumstance is present and the court finds no
danger to public safety, the court retains its discretion to impose an
enhancement based on various factors, including the presence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. (Walker, at p. 1033.) The statute does not
create a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement when
a mitigating circumstance is present. (Id. at p. 1034.) Rather, the court
“must ‘engage[ ] in a holistic balancing with special emphasis on the
enumerated mitigating factors,’ in which the mitigating factors weigh
‘strongly in favor of . . . dismissal.’ ” (Id. at p. 1036.) We review the trial
court’s decision for abuse of discretion. (People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th
1087, 1093.)
Dixon argues that the trial court’s failure to recite particular language
in Walker shows it misunderstood the great weight it was to assign to
mitigating factors. But we may not presume error from the court’s silence.
(People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527.) “ ‘ “A judgment or
order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is
silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” ’ ” (People v. Nitschmann
(2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 705, 708–709.) Here the court discussed Walker and
said nothing contrary to it. In fact, when referencing its discretion under
section 1385, the court expressly recognized that “[a] finding of one of the
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factors weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement unless”
dismissal “would endanger public safety.” We presume the court applied the
correct standard.
Dixon also contends the trial court failed to recognize that the
mitigating factor of multiple enhancements applied in his case, because the
court observed after reciting this factor that he had been sentenced under the
Three Strikes law. But this observation does not demonstrate the court’s
misunderstanding or misapplication of the statute. The court said nothing to
suggest it did not understand that Dixon was subject to multiple
enhancements. And its statement was also relevant to the next factor,
whether applying an enhancement would result in a sentence of over 20
years. The court went on to clarify that this mitigating factor did not apply
because it was Dixon’s core sentence under the Three Strikes law, not an
enhancement, that caused his sentence to exceed 20 years.
Dixon claims the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply the
mitigating factor that his offenses were connected to prior victimization or
childhood trauma, evidenced by its remark when discussing this factor that
Dixon was 31 years old at the time he was sentenced. Assuming the court did
find this factor was inapplicable as Dixon argues, it was within its discretion
to do so. Dixon’s evidence concerning causation was not compelling, and the
court was not bound to accept it. (See People v. Anderson (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 577, 601 [court was not bound to accept even uncontroverted
expert evidence on this point].)
Lastly, Dixon notes that the trial court acknowledged his sentence
included an enhancement for a conviction that was over five years old, and
then observed he had received a 9-year sentence on that conviction. Dixon
interprets these comments to mean the court did not consider this factor to
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apply because he “was not out of custody for the five years” preceding the
offenses at issue. But he “does not contest” that the court “had a substantial,
credible reason not to apply the factor in this case.” Dixon thus appears to
concede that the court did not abuse its discretion as to this factor.
Regardless, the record shows the court understood this factor did apply. Its
comment recognizing additional context to Dixon’s prior offense does not
suggest it assigned this factor improper weight.
In sum, Dixon fails to show the trial court applied the wrong standard
to its determination. In rendering its decision, the court discussed the
unnecessarily violent nature of the crimes at issue and other disturbing
aspects of Dixon’s criminal history. We infer the court found there was
“ ‘substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors’ ” that
“ ‘neutralize[d]’ ” the great weight assigned to the mitigating circumstances
present, such that—as the court expressly found—any further reduction to
Dixon’s sentence was not in the interest of justice. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 1036.) Finding no abuse of discretion in this decision, we will affirm the
judgment.
Finally, the People urge that certain corrections to the amended
abstract of judgment are required, which Dixon does not contest. First, the
amended abstract of judgment fails to reflect that the trial court sentenced
Dixon to two consecutive 25-year to life terms for burglary and robbery, plus
a three-year enhancement on the robbery count under section 12022.7,
a stayed, three-year enhancement on the burglary count under section
12022.7, and concurrent five-year enhancements under section 667,
subdivision (a) on both the robbery and burglary counts. We will direct the
trial court to correct this error. (See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181,
185 [“Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts
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(including this one) that have properly assumed jurisdiction of cases have
ordered correction of abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect the
oral judgments of sentencing courts.”]) The trial court also failed to
recalculate Dixon’s actual custody credits from the date of his arrest to the
date of resentencing. (See § 2900.1; People v. Buckhalter (2001)
26 Cal.4th 20, 41 [“under section 2900.1, the trial court, having modified
defendant’s sentence, should have determined all actual days defendant had
spent in custody . . . and awarded such credits in the new abstract of
judgment”]; People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673 [applying
Buckhalter].) A court that modifies a defendant’s sentence “must recalculate
and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has
already served, . . . whether before or since he was originally committed and
delivered to prison custody.” (Buckhalter, at p. 29.) “The court must also
calculate conduct credits for the period before the original sentencing
hearing.” (Sek, at p. 673.)
II. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court to
correct the amended abstract of judgment to accurately reflect the oral
judgment of sentencing and to update the sentencing credit calculation as
directed above. The court shall forward a certified copy of the corrected
abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
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_________________________
SMILEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
BANKE, Acting P. J.
_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
People v. Dixon / A172079
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