Filed 8/24/26 In re B.K. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re B.K., a Person Coming B352231
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
______________________________ Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP03696F
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
E.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the orders of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Juan M. Valles, Juvenile Court Referee.
Dismissed.
E.S., in pro per; and Donna Balderston Kaiser, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________________________
Mother E.S. appeals juvenile court orders denying her
petition under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 388 and
terminating her parental rights to minor son B.K.
Mother’s counsel, following the procedure outlined in In re
Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, submitted an appellate brief
identifying no colorable arguments for reversal. In Phoenix H.,
the Supreme Court explained that when appointed counsel for a
parent in a dependency appeal has determined there are no
arguable issues for challenging a juvenile court order or
judgment, a reviewing court is not required to allow full briefing
by the parent “unless the parent can establish good cause by
showing that an arguable issue does, in fact, exist. The Court of
Appeal is not required to permit the parent to pursue an appeal
that has no arguable merit. (Id. at p. 845.) Where good cause is
not shown, the reviewing court may dismiss the appeal. (Id. at
p. 846.)
Mother’s counsel informed her she could file a
supplemental brief, noting our obligation to allow briefing if a
parent can show good cause that an arguable issue does, in fact,
exist. Mother submitted a supplemental brief asserting that the
juvenile court erred in denying her section 388 petition and in
terminating her parental rights. Neither issue is arguable.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 26, 2023, the Los Angeles Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS or the Department) filed a
petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) on behalf of
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare &
Institutions Code.
2
Mother’s six children, including B.K. It alleges B.K. was born on
October 13, 2023, with a positive toxicology screen for
amphetamine and marijuana. The petition also alleged Mother
has a history of substance abuse and is a current abuser of
amphetamines, methamphetamine, and marijuana rendering her
incapable of providing regular care for the children; Mother’s
male companion and father of B.K., Christian K., has a history of
substance abuse and is a current abuser of marijuana, rendering
him incapable of providing regular care of the children; and each
parent failed to protect the children from the other’s substance
abuse.
Two days before the petition was filed, the juvenile court
issued a removal order for all six children. The five older
children were released to their father, Shawn Smith. B.K. was
released to father Christian K.
DCFS prepared a detention report for the detention
hearing of November 9, 2023. It reported B.K. was released to
Christian K. who arranged to have the child reside with paternal
grandmother (PGM). Although B.K. tested positive at birth for
amphetamine and marijuana, the baby suffered no withdrawal
symptoms, suffered from elevated bilirubin and jaundice, and had
an APGAR score of 9/9.
Mother admitted to ongoing substance abuse of marijuana
during her pregnancy. She stated she smoked marijuana in the
early stages of her pregnancy and the weeks prior to delivery due
to nausea. Mother reported marijuana is legal in California and
she did not see a problem smoking it. She was open to enrolling
in a drug rehab program, only if the court ordered it.
On November 9, 2023, the juvenile court held a detention
hearing. It found that continued placement with the parents
3
presented a substantial danger to the physical and emotional
health of the child and that no reasonable means were available
by which the child’s health could be protected without removal.
The juvenile court ordered B.K. removed from Mother and
released to Christian K.
On January 3, 2024, DCFS prepared a
jurisdiction/disposition report. Mother denied ever using any
drugs other than marijuana which she stated is legal. Father
Christian K. denied knowing anything about Mother using drugs
other than marijuana. Christian K. admitted to his own
marijuana use and that he used it with Mother while she was
pregnant. On December 13, 2023, he was a “no show” for a drug
test. DCFS reported that since the detention hearing on
November 9, 2023, “Mother has failed to maintain consistent
contact with DCFS. Significantly, Mother has not submitted to
drug testing and has not received proper service delivery.”
(Italics omitted.) DCFS opined that Christian K.’s “ability to
ensure the basic needs of the child to be marginal. Father
[Christian K.] has failed to comply with requested/routine
medical appointments for the child. Father has required
constant reminders by the Department and heavily relies on
PGM to ensure the safety of the child. Moreover, PGM has
identified the need for parenting education for the father as he is
a young, first time parent.”
On January 16, 2024, Mother was interviewed. She denied
abuse of methamphetamine. She stated she used marijuana
prior to becoming pregnant. And she had an edible two days
before she delivered the baby. She stated Christian K. smokes
marijuana “[s]ocially” and not openly around the children.
4
On January 30, 2024, DCFS received a referral alleging
domestic violence the day before between Mother and Christian
K. in the presence of the children. Christian K. took B.K. to
Mother’s home where he and Mother engaged in domestic
violence in the presence of B.K. and a minor half-sibling.
Christian K. was arrested by responding officers.
The court had previously ordered Christian K. not to be
present during any visits between B.K. and Mother, yet he took
B.K. to Mother’s home where B.K. spent the night. Christian K.
also failed to submit to drug testing ordered by the court. He
missed testing on January 4 and January 17, 2024. Because the
parents failed to follow the court’s orders and engaged in
domestic violence in the minor’s presence during an unauthorized
visit between Mother and B.K., the juvenile court removed B.K.
from Christian K. on February 6, 2024. The juvenile court also
ordered DCFS to assess Mother for placement of B.K. if Mother
was residing in an inpatient facility.
As of January 31, 2024, four months into the proceedings,
Christian K. declined all services. Mother had not followed court
orders, had not participated in drug testing, and missed all five
drug tests scheduled for January.
On February 14, 2024, DCFS filed a first amended petition
adding a count based on the domestic violence that occurred on
January 29, 2024. On February 15, 2024, B.K. was detained in
shelter care pending the next hearing. On February 21, 2024, the
juvenile court issued a temporary restraining order against
Christian K. at Mother’s request. On February 12, 2024, Mother
had failed to appear for a drug test. On February 23, 2024, she
was provided three referrals for residential drug treatment. As of
5
March 4, 2024, Mother had not participated in any in-person
visits and had only requested to see B.K. virtually.
Adjudication occurred on March 12, 2024. The court
interlineated the first amended petition to which Mother entered
a no contest plea. The juvenile court also signed a permanent
restraining order against Christian K. The court-ordered case
plan for Mother, dated March 12, 2024, included random and on-
demand drug/alcohol testing weekly for a minimum of six
months, parenting classes, domestic violence support group for
victims, individual counseling to address case issues, monitored
visitation, unannounced home calls by DCFS, and family
reunification services.
As of April 30, Mother had failed to appear for meetings
with DCFS on April 8 and April 25, 2024, to discuss case plan
compliance. DCFS had no evidence of Mother’s enrollment or
participation in services. Mother failed to appear for scheduled
drug tests on February 23, 26, March 8, 11, 15, 20, 26, April 1, 9,
and 15, 2024. B.K. was currently placed with his paternal uncle
and the uncle’s partner. Mother had participated in three to four
in-person and virtual visits with B.K.
On May 7, 2024, the juvenile court ordered a DNA test
which showed Christian K. was not B.K.’s biological father. The
juvenile court left in place its finding that Christian K. was B.K.’s
presumed father. On August 29, 2024, Mother reported that she
knew the identity of B.K.’s father and would provide his contact
information after speaking with him.
On March 11, April 8, 9, 25, May 15, August 27 and 29,
2024, Mother failed to appear at meetings scheduled with DCFS
to discuss her case plan. She failed to appear at all scheduled
drug tests on February 26, March 8, 11, 15, 20, 26, April 1, 9, 15,
6
25, 30, May 14, 30, June 3, 21, 28, July 2, 11, 15, and 22, 2024.
As of August 29, 2024, Mother had not enrolled in any services
and acknowledged that she did not communicate with DCFS
after B.K. was taken from her care. She said she did not need to
enroll in an inpatient program and wanted more time to complete
her case plan. As of the September 2024 filing of DCFS’s status
review report, Mother had not provided any documentation of
participation or enrollment in or completion of court-ordered
parenting and domestic violence victim support classes.
With respect to visiting B.K., since March 12, 2024, Mother
had visited B.K. one to two times and appeared bonded and
engaged. Mother’s last visit with B.K. was at the end of July
2024. Visits were sometimes very short and consisted of Mother
just meeting the caregiver to see and hold B.K. for a brief minute.
As of the September 2024 status report, Mother’s whereabouts
were unknown.
As of October 15, 2024 (now a year into the proceedings),
Mother had still not provided proof of enrollment in any services
and court-ordered classes. On October 18, 2024, Mother provided
an enrollment letter from Jenesse Center, Inc. (Jenesse Center)
for substance abuse, anger management, parenting, and domestic
violence victim support classes.
On October 22, 2024, the juvenile court found progress by
both parents unsubstantial and terminated reunification services
for both. It set a permanency planning hearing for February 18,
2025. It also designated Anthony J. as B.K.’s alleged father.
On November 22, 2024, DCFS completed an unannounced
visit at the address given on October 22, 2024 for Mother. Upon
arrival, DCFS was told the apartment had been empty for about
one month. Mother’s whereabouts were again unknown. As of
7
December 13, 2024, DCFS had not been able to locate Mother,
despite checking out several addresses and locations. On
December 17, 2024, the juvenile court instructed DCFS to follow
up with maternal aunt and the caregivers regarding any contact
with Mother. As of December 27, 2024, maternal aunt reported
she had not seen Mother for about six months. B.K.’s caregivers
told DCFS that they had no telephone number for Mother and
she contacted them sometimes via social media. Both sources
were asked to notify DCFS if they heard from her.
On February 13, 2025, DCFS filed a section 366.26
selection and implementation hearing report. On February 7,
2025, DCFS met with Mother and provided her notice of the
hearing to terminate parental rights. Mother stated she would
be present.
As to visitation, since March 12, 2024, Mother visited with
B.K. ranging from once a month to sometimes once every three
months. Mother attended a visit with B.K. once in October 2024,
once in December 2024, and twice in January 2025. Mother was
always appropriate and affectionate, engaged with and very
attentive to B.K.’s needs. In 2024, Mother’s “visits were
inconsistent. Mother’s visits consisted of just meeting caregivers
for a brief minute” to see B.K. or via FaceTime.
As of February 13, 2025, B.K. had been detained for over
half of his life. He was placed with the caregiver at the age of
four months and he was now 16 months old. He had had 18 face-
to-face visits with Mother during the placement. DCFS opined
that B.K. would not be negatively impacted by the loss of visits
with his Mother. On the other hand, he had a secure attachment
and bond with the caregiver who wanted to adopt him.
8
Due to problems with serving Mother, the juvenile court
continued the selection and implementation hearing for several
months. On August 5, 2025, DCFS was finally able to serve
Mother with notice of the October 20, 2025 hearing. On
September 17, 2025, the hearing was again continued to
November 4, 2025, and then to December 17, 2025.
On October 7, 2025, DCFS filed a section 366.26 report. As
to visitation, the report summarized that during the months of
April through September 2024, Mother would call and ask to see
B.K. via Facetime periodically or ask for photos. Mother would
call to meet the caregiver just to see B.K. to give him a hug and
kiss; then she would leave. In December 2024, Mother started
having visits that lasted two to three hours. These longer visits
occurred once in October 2024, once in December 2024, twice in
January 2025, and twice in February 2025. Mother was always
appropriate and affectionate. She was engaged and always very
attentive to B.K.’s needs. In May 2025, Mother attended one
visit; in June 2025, Mother attended two visits; in July 2025,
Mother attended one visit; in August 2025, Mother attended
three visits; in September 2025, Mother attended two visits.
The section 366.36 report advised the court that B.K. had
been detained when he was 13 days old and was now almost two
years old. The Department assessed that “due to the young age
of the child and the duration of the period of detention, the
quantity and duration of mother’s visits have not been conducive
to creating a significant, positive emotional attachment from
child to parent.”
On October 31, 2025, two years into the proceedings,
Mother filed a section 388 petition asking the court to either
return B.K. to her care or grant her an additional six months of
9
reunification services with unmonitored visits. Mother noted
that she had participated in 20 domestic violence classes and
14 parenting classes through the Jenesse Center, tested negative
17 times for all substances, enrolled and participated in Next
Level Up Recovery substance abuse program, and maintained
sobriety, stable housing and a strong bond with B.K. Mother
attached a letter dated January 21, 2025 from the Jenesse Center
confirming her participation in domestic violence and parenting
classes and the results of her drug testing. Mother filed an
amended section 388 petition on November 3, 2025, with an
attached declaration. She advised the court that she had enrolled
in the domestic violence, parenting and anger management
program and residential drug program on October 18 and 22,
2024. The juvenile court calendared the petition for a hearing on
December 17, 2025.
On December 3, 2025, DCFS filed a supplemental report in
advance of the December 17, 2025 hearing. It updated the report
on Mother’s visitation. In October 2025, Mother attended five to
six visits; in November 2025, Mother attended two in-person
visits and one video visit. Mother also saw B.K. on Thanksgiving
for several hours. DCFS viewed this visitation as “inconsistent.”
On December 16, 2025, DCFS filed a response to Mother’s
amended section 388 petition. DCFS reported that Mother had
not made herself available to the Department “during this period
of review.” The Department made several attempts to locate and
contact her to be assessed in response to the section 388 petition.
It reported: “Based on the Department’s assessment of mother
not making herself available to the Department, and her
inconsistent visits with the child throughout the duration of the
case, mother has not demonstrated a meaningful behavioral
10
change that would be conductive to creating a significant sense of
stability and attachment that would be in the best interest of the
child.” In a last minute information report filed on December 16,
2025, the Department advised that Mother made telephone
contact with DCFS on December 8, 2025, but the Department’s
attempts to schedule an interview and home assessment were
unsuccessful. The assessment was finally scheduled for
December 11, 2025, but on that day, Mother tried to reschedule
and then cancelled the appointment approximately one hour
before the scheduled time. Ultimately the appointment was
rescheduled for later that same day. DCFS requested a 30-day
continuance of the hearing date on the petition to conduct a
thorough assessment. The juvenile court continued the hearing
on the amended section 388 petition to February 4, 2026.
However, the court held a permanency planning review hearing
on December 17, 2025, at which time it found the permanent plan
of adoption appropriate and ordered adoption as the permanent
plan.
DCFS filed a response to the section 388 petition on
January 28, 2026. DCFS inspected Mother’s residence on
December 8, 2025. It was neat and tidy, although suffering from
a cockroach infestation. Mother explained she now understood
that exposing her child to substances put the child in danger.
She did not see it at the time of B.K.’s birth because she “was
under the influence of substances.” She avoided contact with
DCFS because “ ‘I didn’t have a good experience in the past. . . . I
try and block out all the social workers because it’s traumatic
what happened. They came and took the kids away.’ ” Mother
stated, “ ‘I know it hurts me by not showing up to do my part with
making myself available to you guys (the Department) and
11
accepting services. I run from it. The anxiety of it all. But my
baby is the most important thing to me. I have to face my
fears.’ ” (Boldface omitted.) She did not reunify with B.K.
previously because “ ‘I was homeless before, I went through a
really dark time mentally and it took me time to adjust. But I’m
overcoming all of that.’ ” Mother reported she was working as a
Lyft/Uber driver until her car was recently towed and
impounded. She had applied four months ago for a program that
would assist with a down payment and was approved for $6,700
for a car. She received $300 monthly from CALFresh and $220
from General Relief. She paid a subsidized rent of $224 monthly.
Her total income was about $1,500 monthly. She was looking
into childcare programs and her alternative plan was to rely on
her two sisters for childcare. Her other five children were in the
care of their father.
B.K.’s caregivers reported Mother had visits with B.K. on
Fridays and Saturdays in January 2026. The Jenesse Center
letter dated October 18, 2024 stated Mother enrolled in the
program on August 30, 2022 and reenrolled on October 18, 2024.
She had not yet obtained her certificate of completion. She was a
no-show for an on-demand drug test on January 23, 2025. The
Department was unable to make contact with her to schedule
another drug test. DCFS repeated its December 2024
recommendation to the court, concluding the “Based on the
Department’s assessment of mother not making herself available
to the Department, and her inconsistent visits with the child
throughout the duration of the case, mother’s pattern of
appearing to avoid addressing her own responsibilities, mother
has not demonstrated a meaningful behavioral change that would
be conducive to creating a significant sense of stability and
12
attachment that would be in the best interest of the child. [¶] It is
the Department’s assessment, based on inability to communicate
consistently and meet with the mother, mother’s missed drug
tests and non-compliance with previously ordered services,
further Family Reunification Services provided to mother . . .
would not be in the best interest to the child at this time. As
such, the Department respectfully recommends that the [section]
388 Petition be denied and No Family Reunification Services
continues for Mother.” Mother’s “interaction has not been
consistent; therefore, it is the Department’s assessment that
termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.”
In a last minute information report filed February 3, 2026,
DCFS advised the court that it had spoken with a representative
of the Jenesse Center about a letter dated January 21, 2025
stating that Mother had completed 20 domestic violence classes
and 14 parenting classes. The Jenesse Center representative
stated those numbers “were not accurate” according to their
records. The representative stated: “ ‘I don’t know where that
came from. Mother requested a progress letter and that is not
the number of classes that were sent to her. I don’t know where
she got that from.’ ” The correct number of classes since
reenrolling in the program in 2024 was three domestic violence
classes (not 20) and one parenting class (not 14). The total
number of classes Mother completed since starting the program
in 2022, exiting the program, and then returning was six
domestic violence classes and three parenting classes. The
representative also stated, “ ‘[Mother] re-enrolled in 2024 and the
program is on the verge of exiting her out of the program again
due to her lack of participation and non-activity in services.
13
[Mother] has not been attending consistently, and we cannot get
a hold of her.’ ”
On February 4, 2026, the juvenile court held a hearing on
the section 388 petition, which it denied. It also held a
permanency planning hearing and found by clear and convincing
evidence that B.K. was adoptable and that Mother had not
maintained regular visitation with B.K. and not established a
bond with him. It found any benefit accruing to the child from
his relationship with Mother and any risk of loss of ongoing
contact with his siblings were outweighed by the physical and
emotional benefit B.K. would receive through the permanency
and stability of adoption and that adoption was in his best
interest. Finally the court found it would be detrimental to B.K.
to be returned to Mother. The court terminated Mother’s
parental rights and designated the current caretakers as B.K.’s
prospective adoptive parents.
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
A parent filing a section 388 petition must show changed
circumstances or new evidence to justify modifying prior orders.
The parent must also show that such modification would be in
the child’s best interest. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295,
309; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) While the
petition must be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency, the
allegations must “describe specifically” how the petition will
advance the child’s best interests. (In re G.B. (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157; In re Anthony W. (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.) In determining whether the petition
14
makes the necessary showing, the court may consider the entire
factual and procedural history of the case. (In re R.A. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 826, 837.) A section 388 ruling is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M., at p. 318.)
The juvenile court may decline to terminate parental rights
if it finds that a parent has established the parental-benefit
exception to termination. This exception applies where the
parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with the
child, the child would benefit from continuing the relationship,
and termination of that relationship would impose a detriment on
the child. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 629.) The parent bears the burden to show the
statutory exception applies. (In re Derek W. (1999)
73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826.) We review the juvenile court’s findings
using a hybrid approach: for the first two elements, we apply the
substantial evidence standard of review; and for the court’s
weighing of the relative harms and benefits of terminating
parental rights, we use the abuse of discretion standard. (In re
Caden C., at pp. 639–640.)
B. Analysis
In denying the section 388 petition, the juvenile court
found: “The court is reviewing the case plan that was ordered on
March 12, 2024. [Mother] was ordered to engage in a full drug
and alcohol program with aftercare, weekly random and on-
demand testing, a 26-week domestic violence support group, a
parenting course, as well as individual counseling. The court on
October 22nd, 2024, terminated [Mother’s] reunification services
and set a [section 366.26] hearing having found that Mother was
not in compliance with the case plan. [¶] In order for the court to
grant the [section 388 petition] the court must find changed
15
circumstances, not simply changing circumstances. The court
has reviewed very closely Mother’s JV-180 filed on November 3rd,
2025. The court has compared the information contained therein,
one in particular information contained in the interim review
report of the [section 388 petition] response filed January 28 of
this year, as well as the last-minute [information report] filed
February 3rd, 2026. [¶] It causes the court some pause to be told,
be informed that [Mother] may have altered the documents that
were proffered to the Department. The staff at the Jenesse
program . . . reported to the Department their absolute confusion
as to where the original information came from, but did provide
the Department with more accurate reporting that since 2024,
[Mother] has completed only three domestic violence classes and
one parenting class. Since 2022 has been six DV classes and
three parenting classes. [¶] The court does acknowledge that
Mother has provided some evidence of having engaged in a
substance abuse program, but she has not provided the
Department or the court with any certificate of completion.
Given all this, the court can only find that there exists presently
changing circumstances. Given these changing circumstances,
the court is unable to grant Mother’s [section 388 petition]. The
court, therefore, denies Mother’s [section 388 petition] over her
objection.”
Mother offers many reasons why she was prejudiced by the
proceedings—that B.K.’s detention when he was not medically
harmed by drugs per his birth toxicology screen interfered with
her ability to bond with him; that his placement with paternal
relatives was legally questionable; that the court and the
Department unreasonably rejected her less restrictive “safety
plan” to place B.K. with maternal aunt upon Mother’s promise
16
not to use illegal substances around the children; that the
Department did not use reasonable efforts to fashion a more
suitable placement for B.K.; that she did not receive timely notice
of proceedings despite her failure to keep the court and the
Department apprised of her location.
These events do not exempt Mother from complying with
her case plan after her plea of no contest to the allegations.
Instead of complying with the case plan, Mother failed to
maintain communication with the Department; cancelled home
assessment appointments; missed most of her drug tests; did not
act upon the service referrals the Department provided to her;
dropped out of sight for several months such that the Department
could not locate her, even after inquiring of maternal aunt and
B.K.’s caregivers, who also had not been contacted by her; caused
long delays in the proceedings because she could not be found to
be served with notice of the hearing dates set by the court;
presented, in support of her petition, inaccurate certificates of
completion of the classes she was ordered to attend; visited B.K.
sporadically and for extremely short periods of time until, at best,
a few months before the section 388 hearing. That the juvenile
court found changing circumstances was generous to Mother;
given what looked like, at worst, intentionally falsified
paperwork and, at best, erroneous paperwork documenting a
falsely favorable summary of her participation in the court’s case
plan. B.K. spent two years with his caregivers before Mother
expended any effort to possibly reunite with him under the
court’s terms and conditions. There are no arguable issues
arising from the court’s denial of Mother’s section 388 petition.
17
As to the parental benefit exception to termination of
Mother’s parental rights, the juvenile court made the following
findings: “[A]s to the first prong, the court must consider a
parent’s visitation in light of the visits permitted by court order
and by circumstance. The court had previously ordered a
minimum of nine hours of weekly visitation for both parents. The
Department’s reports indicate that neither parent has exercised
their full allowance, and the court agrees with [the]
characterization that the parents’ contact has been sporadic at
best. Even if the first prong has been met, the court cannot find
that the second and third prongs read together have been met.
The court acknowledges the child’s connection with the mother.
In particular, it does appear to be positive and there is some
indication that it may be a substantial relationship. However, as
to the third prong, the court has received no evidence or
testimony suggesting that severance of the parental relationship
would be contrary to the child’s welfare, especially when weighed
against the benefits conferred by a permanent home. [¶] For
these reasons the court cannot find that any exceptions to
adoption exist.”
Mother has raised no arguable issues arising from the
court’s termination of her parental rights. Mother’s sporadic
visitation is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Although Mother was described as affectionate and appropriate
during her short visits with B.K., there was no evidence in the
record that any bond between Mother and B.K., if broken, would
cause B.K. any kind of emotional or physical distress or
compromise his best interests. The court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the stability of adoption by his
18
longtime caregivers outweighed any benefit B.K. would garner
from a continued relationship with Mother.
Mother blames the court for not considering “agency
failures” and “placement trajectory” in determining whether her
parental rights should be terminated. But the record on appeal
does not show agency failures or a negative placement trajectory.
The record shows that Mother, not the Department, failed to
make efforts to put her case plan into action. She continues to
place the blame for the initiation and continuation of the
proceedings on the Department and the court. The record also
shows that B.K. thrived with his caregivers who in no way
prevented Mother from visiting B.K. and creating a bond with
him that, if broken, would cause him detriment. Mother cannot
place the blame on others for her actions. This argument raises
no arguable issues for review.
Finally Mother requests that we conduct an independent
review of compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and its California counterpart (§ 224.2,
subds. (a), (b)). In that vein, Mother does not suggest that the
court’s ICWA inquiry was incomplete. Nor does she suggest
particular individuals who should have been questioned about
ICWA, but were not. She has not carried her burden of
establishing good cause for further briefing. Independently, we
see no issues in this regard.
19
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORT
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
SCHERB, J.
20
