Filed 8/24/26 In re M.K. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re M.K., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY E087315
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
(Super.Ct.No. J300744)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
OPINION
v.
A.K.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cara D. Hutson,
Judge. Affirmed.
Panda Kroll, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Laura Feingold, County Counsel, and Helena C. Rho, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
A.K. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s summary denial of his petition
under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 388 to modify the order bypassing family
reunification services as to his son, M.K. We find that the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Father’s petition based on it finding the petition did not make a
prima facie showing of changed circumstances or new evidence and that the proposed
modification may promote the child’s best interest thereby warranting an evidentiary
hearing. Finding no error, we affirm the juvenile court’s summary denial.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Initial Proceedings and Reunification Period
In April 2024, the San Bernardino County Department of Children and Family
Services (CFS) received a referral from a reporting party with safety concerns for M.K., a
10-day-old baby, due to his parents appearing to be under the influence while in a
vehicle. The San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department (Sheriff’s Department)
performed a welfare check observing an infant who “appeared to be pre-mature and in
poor health” and, upon examination, was reported to be “in poor health, malnourished
and lacked proper hygiene.”
M.K.’s mother (Mother)2 reported that she gave birth to the infant in the vehicle,
Father severed the umbilical cord with a pocketknife, and they sought no medical
attention for the infant. Father confirmed that no medical treatment was sought for M.K.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.
2 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
2
because he appeared “perfectly fine” but Father stated that they would eventually “get to
it.” Sheriff’s Department reported the vehicle emitted “a strong foul odor” described as
“rotting food, cigarette smoke and poor hygiene” and contained drug paraphernalia and
suspected narcotics.
Sheriff’s Department requested medical aide to respond and evaluate M.K., both
Mother and M.K. were transported to the hospital, and M.K. was admitted to the neonatal
intensive care unit (NICU). Medical staff reported to Sheriff’s Department that M.K.
“displayed severe signs of neglect” and shared photographs that “depicted severe rashes
to [M.K.’s] penis, anus and buttocks” and showed “signs of prolonged exposure to urine
and other injuries caused by general neglect.”
Sheriff’s Department arrested Father and both parents were charged with felony
child endangerment under Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a). Father’s drug screen
from the date of arrest was positive for fentanyl, amphetamines, and cannabinoids, and
Mother’s drug screen was positive for amphetamines, fentanyl, and 4-ANPP. Sheriff’s
Department confirmed the crystalline substance found in the vehicle contained
methamphetamine.
2. Detention Report and Hearing
Shortly after the initial referral, M.K. was detained pursuant to a protective
custody warrant and CFS filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g),
alleging substantial risk of serious physical harm, abuse and/or neglect, and no provision
for support.
3
In April 2024, CFS filed its detention report. CFS reported that during the
investigation, Father’s mother, Nancy K., stated Mother and Father “are on drugs and she
kicked them out of her home because they did not want to straighten up.” Nancy K.
reported Father had a “drug problem for about 10 years or more” and his drugs of choice
are fentanyl and methamphetamine. Mother’s older son D.R. reported that Mother and
Father used methamphetamine in his presence and that Father punched Mother in front of
Mother’s children.
According to the detention report, M.K. was under observation in the NICU with
no discharge date. Father reported to CFS that M.K. was born approximately a week
prior in a parking lot, he used clips and a pocketknife to cut the umbilical cord, and he did
not seek medical care for M.K. Father denied substance or alcohol use and reported that
the “baggie” found in the vehicle belonged to someone else. Father denied knowledge of
substance or alcohol use by Mother. Mother reported using drugs since the prior year.
At the detention hearing, after a prima facie finding, the court detained M.K. from
Mother and Father. The court set a jurisdiction and disposition (JD) hearing for May
2024.
3. Jurisdiction/Disposition Report
CFS filed a JD Report advising that M.K. underwent a pediatric forensics
consultation with findings of malnutrition, dehydration, severe diaper rash with
excoriations of rectum. M.K. was very small for stated gestational age (three pounds, 12
ounces on admission), “cachectic” in his appearance, and was without subcutaneous fat.
4
M.K. presented “in a significant state of malnutrition and dehydration” inconsistent with
the history provided. The doctor advised that M.K. had an “excoriated diaper rash,
consistent with being left in a soiled diaper for prolonged period of time” and that “[h]is
presentation was consistent with severe neglect.” The doctor opined that if M.K. “not
been brought in for medical attention, he would have been at high risk for further neglect
which could have been fatal.” M.K. was subject to “intrauterine drug exposure.”
CFS interviewed Father, who reported “using substances off and on throughout his
life,” using crystal methamphetamine daily for approximately a year, and prior use of
heroin. Father also stated, “his drug of choice is fentanyl.” Father reported he was
feeding M.K. formula because he could not breastfeed due to Mother’s fentanyl use.
Father reported M.K. was “kicking the fentanyl” and stated “When I am sober, I am not
hungry or don’t eat much . . . [m]aybe that is why baby was not eating much.” When
asked why M.K. was not taken to the hospital when he was born, Father replied that “he
was waiting for 10 to 14 days to seek medical care by then the fentanyl would be out of
[M.K.’s] system.” Father stated, “[w]hat kind of parents we would be taking the baby
positive for drugs to a hospital.”
CFS’s assessment was the parents’ prognosis is “poor” given they “either lack
insight or are unwilling to provide rational insight into how their actions placed the child
in conditions that could have been fatal.” CFS recommended M.K. be placed in out of
home care with no family reunification services offered to Mother and Father under
5
section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5) and (6).3 CFS also reported a criminal protective order
was issued to protect M.K. from his Mother. A criminal protective order was later issued
to protect M.K. from Father.
CFS filed a first amended petition including additional allegations against Father
under section 300, subdivision (e), for severe physical abuse of a child under five years
old.
4. Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearings
The court continued the May 2024 JD hearing to provide notice of the first
amended petition. CFS reported in its June 2024 addendum report that M.K. continues to
be closely monitored by a public health nurse because of his “extremely low weight,
currently at the 0.1% percentile” and ongoing medical appointments. Father had still not
contacted CFS or taken steps to be referred to pre-disposition services. The court
continued the JD hearing for due diligence to be completed.
At the June 2024 hearing, Father appeared through counsel and continuance was
requested so counsel could further investigate the case. The court gave Father notice that
reunification services may be bypassed and continued the hearing.
3 Section 361.5, subdivision (b) provides that reunification services need not be
provided to a parent when the court finds, clear and convincing evidence “(5) That the
child was brought within the jurisdiction of the court under subdivision (e) of Section 300
[severe physical abuse of a child under five years of age] because of the conduct of that
parent” or “(6)(A) That the child has been adjudicated a dependent . . . as a result of . . .
the infliction of severe physical harm to the child . . . by a parent . . . and the court makes
a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with
the offending parent or guardian.”
6
In advance of the continued JD hearing, CFS reported it had been unable to
contact Father to complete a jurisdiction interview. Despite lack of contact with Father,
he participated in drug and alcohol testing with negative results in June and July 2024.
The court set a contested JD hearing for September 12, 2024.
By the time of the contested JD hearing, Father reportedly was attending Narcotics
Anonymous (NA) meeting three times per week, denied any substance use since May
2024, and participated in drug and alcohol testing with four negative results between June
and August 2024. Father also attended three sessions of a parenting class, and the
provider reported “[Mother and Father] are cooperative and eager to get their children
back.”
At the contested JD hearing, the court sustained the section 300, subdivisions (b),
(e), and (g) allegations against Father, declared M.K. a dependent, and removed him from
his parents’ custody. The court denied reunification services under section 361.5,
subdivisions (b)(5) and (6), finding clear and convincing evidence it would not benefit
M.K. to pursue reunification services with his offending parents. The court also found
“very little likelihood” that M.K. would reunify with his parents within the six months
allowed by statute and authorized CFS to remove M.K. if a concurrent planning home
was located. Father was provided with services under the permanency planning program
and authorized visitation one time per month subject to the criminal protective order. The
court set a permanency planning review (PPR) hearing for March 2025.
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5. Permanency Planning Review Hearings
CFS filed a status review report in advance of the PPR hearing recommending the
permanent plan of adoption for M.K. CFS submitted a “child available” on behalf of
M.K. to place him in a concurrent planning home and reported that a matching meeting
would be scheduled.
At the March 2025 PPR hearing, the court ordered a permanent plan of placement
in foster care with a permanent plan of adoption and authorized CFS to place M.K. in a
concurrent planning home. The court set a continued hearing for September 5, 2025,
indicating this is the likely date by which M.K.’s permanent plan will be achieved.
Prior to the hearing, the court gave notice that M.K. was placed in a concurrent
planning home, the court issued an order limiting the parents’ right to make educational
decisions and appointed M.K.’s caregivers as his educational representatives.
Thereafter, in its September 5, 2025 status review report, CFS recommended the
court set a section 366.26 hearing for adoption of M.K. who was placed in a matched
adoptive home and reported its assessment that it is in M.K.’s best interest to consider the
termination of parental rights. CFS reported Father attended an outpatient substance
abuse program and advised that he and Mother are no longer in a relationship because he
“was told to focus on myself during my rehabilitation so I am doing that.” Father’s
visitation had been limited by the criminal protective order; however, Father was allowed
to visit M.K. on April 8, 2025, May 19, 2025, June 9, 2025, and July 21, 2025. The
8
social worker reported that M.K. cried throughout the April visit and that during the May
visit M.K. ran to social worker when she entered the room.
At the further PPR hearing, Father’s counsel objected to the setting of the section
366.26 hearing and requested a lesser plan of legal guardianship. Counsel advised that
Father enrolled and completed programs on his own, provided counsel with certificates of
completed programs, and has been testing clean. Minor’s counsel agreed with the
recommendation to set the section 366.26 hearing. Minor’s counsel argued that the
statutory preference is for adoption and stated there is no specific legal reason not to set
the section 366.26 hearing. After hearing argument, the court set a section 366.26
hearing for January 2026 to make a permanent plan for M.K. The court found it was in
M.K.’s best interest to consider termination of parental rights at that hearing.
6. Father’s Petition Under Section 388
Six days later, Father filed a petition under section 388 seeking a change to the
order denying Father reunification services with M.K. that was issued a year prior in
September 2024. Father alleged that since that order he “enrolled and completed
Parenting program, Substance Abuse Outpatient, Substance abuse testing, 12-Steps and
AA meeting.” Father alleged his substance abuse test results were negative. Father also
alleged “consistently” visiting with M.K. Father completed a professional development
workshop and was employed. Based on this alleged new evidence or change of
circumstances, Father requested “resumption of services under [M.K’s] permanent plan,
liberalization of visits and a transition plan of returning [M.K.] under my care.” Father
9
argued that modification of the September 2024 order would be better for M.K. because it
would “promote stability and also preserve the natural parent-child bond.”
Father’s petition was supported by several documents including certificates of
completion for his parenting and outpatient treatment program, verification of attendance
at Alcoholic Anonymous (AA) and NA meetings, completion of a professional
development workshop and forklift trust operator training and safety course, and a
payroll history report verifying employment. Father also provided a character reference
from his mother, Nancy K., and a personal letter to the court.
The court summarily denied Father’s petition under section 388 finding that “the
request does not state new evidence or a change of circumstances.” The court also denied
the petition based on “other” that “all documents precede setting of 26 hearing.” Father
filed a notice of appeal from the summary denial of his petition under section 388.
DISCUSSION
Father contends that his petition, liberally construed, made a prima facie showing
of new evidence or changed circumstances. Father also contends that his petition made a
prima facie showing that the proposed modification may promote the child’s best
interests. Father further contends the juvenile court erred by summarily denying his
petition under section 388 and committed reversible error by applying a non-statutory
categorical timing rule that supporting documentation must postdate the section 366.26
setting. Finally, Father contends that the summary denial of his petition deprived him of
due process. Finding no error, we affirm.
10
1. Relevant Law
Under section 388, a parent may petition the juvenile court for modification of any
previous order “upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence.” (§ 388, subd.
(a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570.) “Section 388 provides for modification of juvenile
court orders when the moving party (1) presents new evidence or a change of
circumstance and (2) demonstrates modification of the previous order is in the child’s
best interest.” (In re Matthew M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1194 (Matthew M.);
§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) “ ‘ “The petitioner has the burden of showing by a preponderance of
the evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a change of circumstances and (2) that the
proposed modification would be in the best interests of the child.” [Citation.] “[T]he
change in circumstances must be substantial.” ’ ” (Ibid; In re Stephanie M. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (Stephanie M.).)
To obtain a hearing on a section 388 petition, the petitioner must make prima facie
showing as to both elements. (In re Samuel A. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1, 7 (Samuel A.);
In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 188-189 (Justice P.); Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.570(d).) “If the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not show changed
circumstances such that the child’s best interests will be promoted by the proposed
change of order, the dependency court need not order a hearing.” (In re Anthony W.
(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250 (Anthony W.); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d)(1),
(2).) “The prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by
evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.”
11
(In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.) “In determining whether the petition
makes the necessary showing, the court may consider the entire factual and procedural
history of the case.” (Justice P., supra, at p. 189.)
The petition may be brought “at any time after the minor has been declared a
dependent child of the juvenile court.” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.)
However, “up until the time the section 366.26 hearing is set, the parent’s interest in
reunification is given precedence over a child’s need for stability and permanency.” (In
re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310 (Marilyn H.).) “When, as in this case, a section
388 petition is filed after family reunification services have been terminated [or
bypassed], the juvenile court’s overriding concern is the child’s best interests. [Citation.]
The parent’s interests in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer
paramount; and the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.
[Citations.] Nonetheless, a parent may rebut the presumption that continued care is in the
best interest of the child after termination of reunification services by showing that
circumstances have changed and would warrant further reunification services.
[Citation.]” (In re Malick T. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1122-1123 (Malick T.).)
“We review the juvenile court’s summary denial of a section 388 petition for abuse
of discretion.” (Anthony W., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 250; In re C.J.W. (2007)
157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1079.) The decision will not be disturbed “ ‘ “unless the trial
court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd determination.” ’ ” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318.) “ ‘ “The
12
appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ”
(Id., at pp. 318-319.)
2. Changed Circumstances or New Evidence
“ ‘ “[T]he term ‘new evidence’ in section 388 means material evidence that, with
due diligence, the party could not have presented at the dependency proceeding at which
the order, sought to be modified or set aside, was entered.” ’ ” (Matthew M., supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1195; accord, In re H.S. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 103, 105, 108–
109.) Father cites as new evidence his completion of a parenting class and substance
abuse class, enrollment in aftercare program, negative substance abuse test results, and
regular attendance at AA and NA meetings. Father also cites to his completion a
professional development workshop, proof of employment, and consistent visitation with
M.K. While arguably creditable attainments, the record demonstrates that the court was
aware of them at the time it bypassed reunification services for Father.
Additionally, at the time the petition was filed and summarily denied, CFS had
advised the court that Father had attended an outpatient substance abuse program, had
reportedly ended his relationship with mother to focus on his own rehabilitation, and was
in the process of looking for employment. CFS reported that Father had begun monthly
visitation with M.K. At the September 5, 2025 PPR hearing, Father’s counsel had also
13
informed the court that Father completed the programs on his own, provided counsel with
certificates of completion, and was testing clean.
The record also supports the juvenile court’s finding that Father’s petition did not
make a prima facie showing of a change in circumstance. “Not every change in
circumstance can justify modification of a prior order. [Citation.] The change in
circumstances must relate to the purpose of the order and be such that the modification of
the prior order is appropriate. [Citations.] In other words, the problem that initially
brought the child within the dependency system must be removed or ameliorated.
[Citations.] The change in circumstances or new evidence must be of such significant
nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged order.” (In re A.A.
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.)
The petitioner must show changed, not changing, circumstances. (In re Mickel O.
(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615.) “A petition which alleges merely changing
circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to
see if a parent, who has repeatedly failed to reunify with the child, might be able to
reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child’s best
interests.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47, overruled on other grounds in
In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636, fn. 5.) The “simple completion of . . . classes
taken by the [parent] . . . does not, in and of itself, show prima facie that either the
requested modification or a hearing would be in the minor’s best interests. [Citations.]”
(In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 462-463.)
14
Recent sobriety reflects “ ‘changing,’ ” not changed, circumstances. (In re Ernesto
R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223; In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531,
fn. 9 [“It is the nature of addiction that one must be ‘clean’ for a much longer period than
120 days to show real reform”]; In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423 [“seven
months of sobriety since [the father’s last] relapse . . . , while commendable, was nothing
new”]; In re C.J.W., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1081 [three months of rehabilitation
services was insufficient based on their “extensive histories of drug use and years of
failing to reunify with their children”]; In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 206
[three months of services weighed against 23 years of drug abuse not changed
circumstances].)
In the instant case, the record reflects that Father reported abusing substances off
and on throughout his life, used crystal methamphetamine daily for approximately a year,
and previously used heroin. Father’s mother reported that Father had a drug problem for
10 years or more. We acknowledge that Father supported his petition with proof of
completion of an outpatient treatment program, enrollment in an aftercare program,
regular attendance at AA/NA meetings since January 2025, and negative drug tests twice
monthly since his enrollment on February 26, 2025. Father also had negative drug tests
in June, July, and August 2024. However, the record also reflects that Father was not
consistent with drug testing in 2024, with a cancelled test in June and two missed tests in
August and September.
15
Although Father’s petition established several months of sobriety, the court was
within its discretion to find that recent sobriety weighed against a reported 10 years or
more of drug abuse did not evidence changed circumstances. (In re Amber M. (2002)
103 Cal.App.4th at 681, 686 [no abuse of discretion in denying § 388 petition where
mother established only a 372-day period of abstinence].) Given the evidence available
at the time Father’s petition was denied, the juvenile court could reasonably infer that
Father failed to make a prima facie showing of material new evidence or changed
circumstances to modify the order denying him reunification services. Based on this, we
do not find the juvenile court’s decision to summarily deny Father’s section 388 petition
to be arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.
Father also contends that the juvenile court denied his petition based on a non-
statutory categorical timing rule. Father argues that his petition was denied “on the sole
ground that ‘all documents precede[d the] setting of [the section 336.]26 hearing.” We
find no evidence in the record, however, to support this conclusion. Father’s argument
disregards the court’s order stating that his petition was denied because it “does not state
new evidence or a change of circumstances.”
Father also argues that reversal is required because the court applied an incorrect
legal standard in summarily denying his petition and that the summary denial deprived
him of due process. Again, we find no evidence in the record to support these
contentions. Where the record is absent a legal standard, a reviewing court presumes that
the juvenile court knew and applied the correct legal standard. (Ross v. Superior Court
16
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913-914; Evid. Code, § 664.) Even assuming, arguendo, that the
juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard, we find the record supports the denial of
Father’s petition without an evidentiary hearing based on his failure to carry his burden of
making a prima facie showing of new evidence or change of circumstances. (Malick T.,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1123 [“when the court’s denial is based on a mistake of law,
our review is de novo”].)
3. Best Interests of the Child
Father also alleges that he made a prima facie showing that the proposed
modification may promote child’s best interests.
“Although the juvenile court must liberally construe the petition in favor of its
sufficiency (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(a)), ‘the allegations must nonetheless
describe specifically how the petition will advance the child’s best interests.’ ” (In re
R.M. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 119, 137.) “ ‘If a petitioner could get by with general,
conclusory allegations, there would be no need for an initial determination by the juvenile
court about whether an evidentiary hearing was warranted. In such circumstances, the
decision to grant a hearing on a section 388 petition would be nothing more than a
pointless formality.’ ” (Ibid.)
Father’s petition does not explain with any specificity how reunification services,
liberalized visitation, and a transition plan would be in M.K.’s best interests. Father’s
petition alleged in general terms that “returning [his] child to [him] will promote stability
and also preserve the natural parent-child bond,” however, “[t]he presumption favoring
17
natural parents by itself does not satisfy the best interests prong of section 388.” (Justice
P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 192.) At the time Father filed his section 388 petition,
one year after services were bypassed and after the section 366.26 hearing was set,
M.K.’s interest in stability was the court’s foremost concern, outweighing Father’s
interest in reunification.
M.K. has been in foster care for most of his life and has been living in his matched
adoptive home since May 1, 2025, with caregivers who are committed to adopting him.
M.K. is bonded with his caregivers and reportedly cries when they leave the room.
Father’s petition reported consistent visitation with M.K. However, the record shows that
Father had four visits with M.K. since his detention in April 2024 due to a criminal
protective order. CFS reported that M.K. cried throughout the April 2025 visit with the
parents and was soothed by the social worker, and that M.K. ran to the social worker
when she entered the room during the May 2025 visit.
Although Father’s petition evidenced progress in alleviating his substance abuse
issues, the petition did not demonstrate with specificity that it would be in M.K.’s best
interest to remove him from secure placement with caregivers who intend to adopt him.
Delaying the selection of a permanent, adoptive home with committed caregivers to see if
Father might be able to reunify at some point in the future, does not promote stability for
M.K. and is not in M.K.’s best interests. (Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.)
“[T]here must be a limitation on the length of time a child has to wait for a parent to
become adequate.” (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 308.)
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Based on the entirety of the record, we find that Father’s petition does not make a
prima facie showing that a change in the contested order would be in M.K.’s best interest.
Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in denying Father’s petition without an
evidentiary hearing.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order on September 11, 2025, summarily denying Father’s
petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
LEE
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
RAPHAEL
J.
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