Filed 8/25/26 P. v. Bunn CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171934
v.
BILL BUNN, (Humboldt County
Super. Ct. No. CR024042)
Defendant and Appellant.

Over 20 years ago, we affirmed Bill Bunn’s convictions of two counts of
lewd acts upon Jane Doe, a child under 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).)1 In
the years that followed, Bunn filed a series of unsuccessful petitions for writs
of habeas corpus in this court. He now appeals from a trial court order
denying his non-statutory motion to modify his long-final sentence, which he
claims is unlawful under the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal
constitutions (U.S. Const., art. I, § 10; Cal. Const., art. I, § 9)—the same
argument he raised in several of his unsuccessful habeas petitions. Bunn
also claims that in 2022, the trial court reduced his aggregate 100-year-to-life

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The quoted
portions of the factual background come from our prior opinion, People v.
Bunn (Apr. 11, 2006, A107445) [nonpub. opn.]. We take judicial notice of the
record in that appeal. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.)

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sentence by half but failed to update his conduct and custody credits on the
amended abstract of judgment issued at that time.
Bunn is wrong on both points. We treat Bunn’s appeal as a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus and deny it on the merits. We remand the matter for
the trial court to make appropriate corrections to the abstract of judgment
clarifying that Bunn remains subject to his original, 100-year-to-life
aggregate sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2004, Bunn was charged with two counts of lewd acts upon Jane Doe
occurring between August 1994 and August 2002 (§ 288, subd. (a)), along
with misdemeanor possession of child pornography (former § 311.11,
subd. (a)). The information alleged he had a prior conviction for rape by
threat subjecting him to elevated sentencing.
A jury convicted Bunn as charged, and the trial court found his prior
conviction triggered sentencing under section 667, subdivisions (d) and (e),
part of the Three Strikes Law,2 and section 667.71, the Habitual Sexual
Offender Law.3 The court sentenced Bunn to a total of “100 years to life in

2 “Enacted ‘to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment

for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious
and/or violent felony offenses’ (Pen. Code, former § 667, subd. (b), as amended
by Stats. 1994, ch. 12, § 1, pp. 71, 72), the Three Strikes law ‘consists of two,
nearly identical statutory schemes.’ ” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646,
652.) The first, embodied in section 667, was enacted by the Legislature in
March 1994, while the second, set forth in section 1170.12, was enacted by
ballot initiative in November of the same year. (Ibid.)
3 In their initial briefing on appeal, the parties maintained Bunn was

also sentenced under the One Strike Law, section 667.61. While the trial
court found the allegations under both statutes to be true, the One Strike
Law and the Habitual Sexual Offender Law establish “alternative sentencing
schemes: a sentence may be imposed under one of the sentencing schemes,
but not both, and the decision to choose which sentencing scheme to impose is

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prison on the felony [lewd act] counts, and to time served on the
misdemeanor.” At Bunn’s original sentencing hearing, the court explained
that it was sentencing him to two consecutive 25-year-to-life terms under
section 667.71, doubled under the Three Strikes Law (§ 667, subds. (d) & (e))
to two consecutive 50-year-to-life terms, for a total commitment of 100 years
to life. Bunn appealed from the judgment.
A. We Affirm Substantial Evidence Supported Bunn’s Convictions
As we summarized in our prior opinion, Jane Doe was nine years old at
the time of trial. She testified that Bunn sexually abused her “ ‘ever since
[she] was born until he went to jail,’ ” detailing the way he touched her and
explaining that it caused her to feel “ ‘stomach burns.’ ” Jane Doe shared a
bed with Bunn and her mother and could not remember when she did not
sleep with Bunn except on trips. She testified that Bunn abused her “every
night when she was with him, ‘except for after he went to jail.’ ” Jane Doe’s
mother testified that even when she had a separate residence from Bunn, he
would stay with her and Jane Doe and sleep in bed with them. In addition to
the evidence concerning Jane Doe, three of Bunn’s relatives “testified to
having been sexually molested by [him] in incidents going back
approximately to 1982.” Bunn’s ex-wife “testified that during their marriage,
which was from 1969 until 10 to 14 years before the trial, the couple took in
children for daycare, including some overnight stays.” She expressed to Bunn
her fear that he “had molested several of the children in their care,” and
when she listed them, Bunn “nodded his head affirmatively in response to
several of the names.” Two half-siblings of one of Bunn’s children also

within the reasonable discretion of the sentencing court.” (People v. Snow
(2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 271, 282.) Here, the trial court elected at Bunn’s
original sentencing hearing to sentence him under section 667.71 rather than
under section 667.61.

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“testified that when they were eight or nine years old [Bunn] sexually
molested them.”
In his first appeal, Bunn argued and we accepted for purposes of our
analysis that the limitations period for the lewd act counts of which he was
convicted began on August 9, 1996, while the information alleged he abused
Jane Doe during a longer timeframe beginning about two years earlier. Bunn
argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions on
these counts because Jane Doe’s testimony about how he touched her
“showed nothing more than innocuous ‘snuggling[]’ ” and there was
“insufficient evidence that he had the requisite lewd intent.” Specifically,
Bunn argued that “even if there were at least two occasions when his
‘snuggling’ of Jane crossed the line and became a lewd touch, . . . it was
impossible to determine when the incidents of touching were accompanied by
lewd intent.” Therefore, “it was impossible to determine whether” Bunn
touched Jane Doe with “lewd intent only sometime outside the limitation
period” and whether she “continued to have stomach burns associated with
him touching her in bed within the limitation period based only upon her
memory of the prior touching with lewd intent.”
We rejected these arguments, explaining: “We have no difficulty finding
substantial evidence that the ‘bad touches’ Jane described were not merely
innocuous snuggling and that they were accompanied by lewd intent. Jane
described defendant touching her vaginal area and buttocks with his penis.
The jury was free to, and clearly did, reject defendant’s alternative
characterization of the contact he had with Jane as cuddling or ‘spooning.’ ”
We found the inference of Bunn’s lewd intent was “amply supported” by the
evidence at trial, including testimony that Bunn had molested other children
and possessed child pornography. We specifically rejected Bunn’s “assertion

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that Jane’s testimony was insufficient to support a finding that he committed
at least two violations of section 288, subdivision (a), within the relevant
statutory limitation period.” We explained that Jane Doe’s testimony was
sufficiently specific under People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294 and concluded
that because she testified “that the ‘bad touches’ continued on a nightly basis
up until defendant’s arrest, the evidence was sufficient to support the
conclusion that at least two incidents of touching with lewd intent occurred
within the statutory limitation period . . . .” We affirmed Bunn’s convictions.
B. Proceedings Following Bunn’s First Appeal
From 2008 to 2019, Bunn filed five petitions for writs of habeas corpus
in this court, several of which included claims that his sentences violated the
ex post facto clause based on argument similar to the statute of limitations
argument we rejected on direct appeal.4 We denied all of these petitions.
In August 2022, the trial court received correspondence from the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) describing errors in
the abstract of judgment with regard to Bunn’s sentence. The letter
explained that the abstract of judgment indicated Bunn had been sentenced
to 25 years to life on each lewd act count, plus a 25-year-to-life
“enhancement” on each count under section 667.71. But section 667.71 “is
not an enhancement that carries an additional term . . . but rather an
alternate sentencing scheme where the [base] sentence becomes 25 years to
Life.” At the same time, while the information had charged Bunn with a

4 In a less developed version of the argument presented in his current

appellate briefing, Bunn urged that the Habitual Sexual Offender Law
became effective in November 1994, while he was charged with committing
lewd acts against Jane Doe between August 1994 and August 2002,
suggesting it was unclear whether he was convicted for conduct that occurred
only before the law went into effect.

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“strike prior” allegation that would “double[] the [base] term imposed,” a
corresponding finding was not reflected on the abstract of judgment.
The CDCR letter concluded, “Pending a reply from the Court we have
recorded Counts 001 and 002 as sentenced to 25 years to Life pursuant to
PC 667.71 and the term doubled to 50 years to Life pursuant to PC 667(b)-(i)
or PC 1170.12 (strike prior).” As we have recounted, this was exactly the
sentence that the trial court imposed at Bunn’s original sentencing hearing.
Our Supreme Court has affirmed it is an appropriate and lawful sentence.
(See People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 159 (Murphy) [appropriate to
“apply both the Three Strikes law and section 667.71” based on same
underlying prior conviction].)
Soon after receiving the CDCR correspondence, the trial court issued
an amended abstract of judgment reflecting that Bunn was subject to two
consecutive 25-year-to-life sentences for two counts of lewd acts and had been
sentenced pursuant to both the Habitual Sexual Offender Law and the Three
Strikes Law. The associated minute order stated that the court was making
a “correction” to the abstract of judgment and did not suggest it was
modifying Bunn’s sentence. However, the amended abstract of judgment did
not specifically indicate that each of Bunn’s 25-year-to-life sentences under
the Habitual Sexual Offender Law was doubled under the Three Strikes Law
or state that his total consecutive sentence was 100 years to life. As we will
discuss, that ambiguity has created some confusion.
Around two years after the trial court issued the amended abstract of
judgment, Bunn filed two documents on the same date in July 2024: a
“[m]otion for [r]esentencing”—which referred to a “notice” he had received
“[s]ome time ago” indicating he was “eligible for re-sentencing”—and a
“[s]entencing [m]emorandum” arguing that his sentence was unlawful

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because it was not established at trial that he perpetrated his offenses after
November 30, 1994, the effective date of relevant amendments to section
667.71. These filings were addressed by a different trial court judge than the
one who had initially sentenced Bunn in 2004 and the one who had issued
the amended abstract of judgment in 2022. The court denied Bunn’s motion
for resentencing in a written order explaining that the court had already
“resentenc[ed]” Bunn in response to the CDCR correspondence. The court
also “decline[d] to resentence [Bunn] under its own discretion.” Bunn
appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdictional Issues
While not addressed by the parties, the weight of authority holds that,
“outside of a habeas corpus petition or some other posture where they
independently have jurisdiction to do so,” both trial and appellate courts lack
jurisdiction to correct an unauthorized sentence after its execution begins
and where the defendant’s conviction is final. (See People v. Boyd (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 56, 65–71 (Boyd) [discussing split in authority on this issue];
see also People v. Mohammed (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 222, 230–233.) Neither
the CDCR’s letter prompting the trial court to issue an amended abstract of
judgment in 2022 nor Bunn’s non-statutory motion for resentencing filed in
2024 arose in such a posture. (See People v. Singleton (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th
783, 790–797 [similar letter from CDCR did not confer jurisdiction to modify
sentence]; Boyd, at pp. 61, 65–71 [trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction
to consider “freestanding” motion to correct an unauthorized sentence].)
Still, in the interests of justice and judicial economy, we may treat
Bunn’s appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and address its merits.
(See Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 71–72.) Considering there is

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authority holding that an unauthorized sentence may be corrected at any
time (see, e.g., People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 988–993), and to
put any doubts concerning the validity of Bunn’s sentence to rest, we employ
that approach here. (See also People v. Hiscox (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 253,
258 (Hiscox) [appellate courts will address in the first instance ex post facto
violations resulting in an unauthorized sentence].) Having assumed
jurisdiction in this manner, we may then address the confusion concerning
the amended abstract of judgment. (See People v. Mitchell (2001)
26 Cal.4th 181, 185–188 [appellate courts that have properly assumed
jurisdiction of cases should order correction of an abstract of judgment that
does not accurately reflect the sentencing court’s oral judgment].)
B. Motion for Resentencing
Bunn claims the trial court erred in denying his 2024 motion for
resentencing, arguing that his convictions for lewd acts violated the ex post
facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. (U.S. Const., art. I, § 10;
Cal. Const., art. I, § 9.) Contrary to Bunn’s position that the trial court’s
failure to specifically address this argument requires reversal, “ ‘ “we review
the ruling, not the court’s reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any
ground, we affirm.” ’ ” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 39.)
The ex post facto clause protects individuals from “unforeseeable
punishment.” (People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1221.) It does this by
prohibiting legislatures from “retroactively alter[ing] the definition of crimes
or increas[ing] the punishment for criminal acts.” (Collins v. Youngblood
(1990) 497 U.S. 37, 43, italics added; see also People v. Grant (1999)
20 Cal.4th 150, 158.) Bunn asserts the clause was violated because his
alleged abuse of Jane Doe occurred from August 1994 through August 2002,
and relevant amendments to the Habitual Sexual Offender Law, under which

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he was sentenced, first became effective on November 30, 1994.5 Similar to
the statute of limitations theory we rejected in his first appeal, Bunn claims
it is unclear whether the two counts of lewd acts of which he was convicted
arose from abuse he perpetrated after those amendments became effective.
Bunn relies on Hiscox to support this argument. In overturning a One
Strike sentence on ex post facto grounds, Hiscox held that where “the jury
was not asked to make findings on the time frame within which the offenses
were committed, the verdicts cannot be deemed sufficient to establish the
date of the offenses unless the evidence leaves no reasonable doubt that the
underlying charges pertained to events occurring on or after November 30,
1994.” (Hiscox, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 261, italics added.) Here, the
evidence meets that standard. As we explained in rejecting Bunn’s argument
about the statute of limitations, in light of Jane Doe’s testimony that Bunn’s
“ ‘bad touches’ continued on a nightly basis up until [his] arrest, the evidence
was sufficient to support the conclusion that at least two incidents of
touching with lewd intent occurred within the [asserted] statutory limitation
period” extending to August 1996. We now hold the evidence was not only
sufficient but overwhelming: given that Jane Doe was nine years old at the

5 The Habitual Sexual Offender Law was enacted one year prior to the

One Strike Law and was then amended in the same bill in which the One
Strike Law was enacted. (People v. Hammer (2003) 30 Cal.4th 756, 766–767
& fn. 10.) Originally, it defined a “habitual sexual offender” as a person who
previously served a prison term for certain offenses and was “[c]onvicted in
the present proceeding” of either two or three specified offenses against two
or three “separate victims.” (Stats. 1993, ch. 590, § 2, p. 3069.) As amended,
it defines a “habitual sexual offender” as a person previously convicted of
specified offenses “and who is convicted in the present proceeding of one of
those offenses.” (Stats. 1993–94, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 14, § 2, p. 8572.) As
amended, the Habitual Sexual Offender Law established a sentence of 25
years to life for Bunn’s crimes, compared to the maximum term of eight years
under section 288, subdivision (a).

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time of trial in 2004, she would only have been a few months old in 1994.
There is no reasonable doubt that the abuse she described occurred on or
after November 30, 1994, and not only when she was an infant.
People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in People v. Villegas (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 253, 281,
fn. 9, is instructive. The defendant in that case raised a similar argument to
Bunn’s, based on the amendment of the One Strike Law to apply to
defendants convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child (§ 288.5), effective
in 2006. (Valenti, at p. 1174.) The court of appeal vacated One Strike
sentences imposed for two counts perpetrated during periods of time that
entirely predated the relevant amendment. (Ibid.) But as to counts involving
abuse that commenced before the 2006 amendment and continued well after
it, the court found no ex post facto violation. (Id. at p. 1177.) Analogous to
this case, the evidence showed that one victim “was sleeping over at
defendant’s house nearly every weekend—and defendant molested him on
nearly every visit,” starting in 2004 and continuing “until at least 2010.”
(Ibid.) A second victim was similarly abused “[e]very time [he] visited”
defendant’s house, from 2005 through 2007. (Id. at pp. 1177–1178.) In
Valenti, the ex post facto determination turned on whether the last act
necessary to trigger the continuous sexual abuse statute occurred after the
statute’s effective date. By comparison, this case presents a far more
compelling set of circumstances to reject Bunn’s ex post facto claims. Jane
Doe’s extremely young age during a short period before enactment of the
relevant amendments to the Habitual Sexual Offender Law makes it even
more clear that her testimony described a course of recurring abuse
perpetrated predominantly, if not entirely, after the statute was amended.

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 In sum, Bunn is not entitled to resentencing based on ex post facto
principles.
C. Ambiguity in the Amended Abstract of Judgment
In their initial appellate briefing, the parties both indicated that
Bunn’s 100-year-to life aggregate sentence was unauthorized and was
appropriately corrected by the trial court in 2022. They appeared to agree
that the court had modified his sentence to an aggregate 50 years to life. But
as we have explained, the CDCR correspondence to which the court was
responding did not suggest that Bunn’s 100-year-to-life sentence was
unauthorized, only that the abstract of judgment reflected errors in the
details of how that sentence was imposed under the applicable statutes.
We requested supplemental briefing on this point. In response, the
People now maintain, consistent with our understanding, that the trial court
did not alter Bunn’s sentence in 2022. Bunn continues to claim that his 100-
year-to-life sentence was unauthorized and the court appropriately reduced it
to an aggregate sentence of 50 years to life. In a footnote to his opening
appellate brief, he suggests that his elevated sentence under the Habitual
Sexual Offender Law was not subject to doubling under the Three Strikes
Law. But he cites no support for this proposition, which is directly contrary
to Murphy, an opinion by our Supreme Court issued over 20 years ago. Bunn
does not address Murphy or further explain his position in his supplemental
brief.
As we have explained, it is clear from the record that Bunn was
sentenced to two consecutive 25-year-to-life terms under the Habitual Sexual
Offender Law, doubled under the Three Strikes Law to two consecutive 50-
year-to-life terms, for a total commitment of 100 years to life. This is exactly
how the 2022 letter from CDCR interpreted Bunn’s sentence, and there is no

11
indication that the trial court resentenced Bunn by making a “correction” to
the abstract of judgment in response to that letter. Because the court did not
actually modify Bunn’s sentence, it was not required to recalculate his
conduct and custody credits when it issued the amended abstract of judgment
as Bunn contends. (See People v. Powell (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 595, 604–
606 [trial court was not required to recalculate presentence credits when
correcting clerical error in the abstract of judgment].)
Ultimately, despite the trial court’s attempt to correct it, the amended
abstract of judgment remains confusing. We will remand the matter for the
court to make further corrections clarifying that Bunn remains subject to an
aggregate sentence of 100 years to life.
III. DISPOSITION
Treating Bunn’s appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the
petition is denied. The matter is remanded to the trial court to make
appropriate corrections to the amended abstract of judgment to clarify that
Bunn remains sentenced to two consecutive 25-year-to-life terms under the
Habitual Sexual Offender Law, doubled under the Three Strikes Law to two
consecutive 50-year-to-life terms, for a total commitment of 100 years to life.
The clerk of the superior court is directed to prepare a further amended
abstract of judgment reflecting those changes and forward a certified copy to
CDCR.

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 _________________________
SMILEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
HUMES, P. J.

_________________________
BANKE, J.

People v. Bunn / A171934

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