Filed 8/25/26 Park v. Choi CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

NAM HO PARK et al., B350087

Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCV40599)

SANG TAE CHOI,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed.

Sang Tae Choi, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

Yonsei Law Firm, Jean Kwon and John Y. Kim for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
_________________________
 Sang Tae Choi appeals from the trial court’s denial of his
motion seeking to set aside the default judgment entered against
him and in favor of plaintiffs Nam Ho Park and Nesten, Inc.
Choi moved to set aside under Code of Civil Procedure1 section
473, subdivision (b) (473(b)), and on the grounds that he had
not been served in the underlying action. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 28, 2022, plaintiffs Park, an individual,
and Neston, Inc., a California corporation, filed a complaint for
defamation against defendants Sunday Media Inc., dba Sunday
News USA (Sunday News), a print and digital newspaper, as
well as individuals James Yoo and Choi. The complaint alleged
that Choi was the chief editor of the Sunday News and Yoo was
a reporter employed by the Sunday News. Plaintiffs alleged that
defendants “caused to be written, edited and published, both in
print and digitally, in the Sunday News USA numerous articles
accusing Plaintiffs . . . of having engaged and continuing to
engage in numerous and continuing acts of fraudulent, unethical
and illegal conduct.” Sunday News and Yoo are not parties to
this appeal.
According to the case register, the summons was issued on
December 29, 2022. The proofs of service for the summons and
complaint are not part of the appellate record. The case register
that was provided includes three separate entries reflecting that
plaintiffs filed “Proof of Personal Service” as to Choi, Yoo, and
Sunday News on March 6, 2023. The case register does not

1 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise stated.

2
specify whether the proofs of personal service were for the
complaint and summons.
None of the defendants filed a responsive pleading.
Plaintiffs filed a request for default and, on January 10, 2024,
requested entry of default judgment. Plaintiffs also filed a proof
of service for their request for default judgment indicating that
all three defendants were served via mail at 3600 Wilshire Blvd.,
Suite 620, Los Angeles, CA 90010 (3600 Wilshire). On April 8,
2024, plaintiffs filed a second request for default judgment
with supporting materials and again provided a proof of service
reflecting that the documents were served via mail to all
defendants at 3600 Wilshire. On May 28, 2024, the court
entered default judgment in favor of plaintiffs for $10,829.95
($10,000 in damages and $829.95 in costs) against defendants.
On June 18, 2024, the court served notice of entry of judgment
on plaintiffs’ counsel.
On July 7, 2025, Choi—representing himself—filed a
motion to vacate the default judgment.2 In Choi’s notice of

2 The record, although incomplete, seems to suggest that
Choi may have filed multiple motions to vacate the default
judgment. For instance, the case register and the record
before us include an opposition to Choi’s motion to vacate filed
by plaintiffs on June 30, 2025, with a hearing date of July 14,
2025. The hearing on the motion to vacate that is the subject
of this appeal was held on August 5, 2025. There is also an
additional filing by plaintiffs captioned, “Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Opposition to [Choi’s] Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment,” filed on August 26, 2025—weeks after
the hearing where Choi’s motion was considered and denied.
Choi’s notice of appeal identified only the August 5, 2025 order,
which decided his motion to vacate filed on July 7, 2025, and

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motion he stated that he was seeking “an order vacating the
default judgment entered against him pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 473(b), on the grounds that Plaintiff failed
to properly serve Defendant and improperly sought default
in bad faith.” Choi also purportedly based his motion “on the
grounds that the underlying complaint arises from protected
activity under California’s anti-SLAPP statute [§ 425.16], as
the defendant is a journalist and the conduct alleged arises from
acts in furtherance of his constitutional right to free speech and
reporting on matters of public interest.” Choi additionally asked
the trial court to impose sanctions against plaintiffs’ counsel
for improperly securing a default judgment against him.
Choi argued relief was proper under section 473(b) because
he was “not served properly and was unaware of the proceedings
until after the default judgment was entered.” Choi further
stated that he “acted diligently once he became aware.” Choi also
argued the default judgment was void because it was “obtained
without proper service,” citing Renoir v. Redstar Corp. (2004)
123 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1152 (Renoir). Although Choi did not
specifically cite section 473, subdivision (d) (473(d)), Renoir
considered the application of that section to the defendants’
request to set aside a default judgment. (Renoir, at pp. 1147–
1148.)3

this court will limit its consideration to the pleadings before
the court with respect to that motion.
3 In Renoir, the plaintiffs obtained a default judgment
enforcing a foreign judgment, but no summons had been issued
or served on the defendants. (Renoir, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1147–1148.) The defendants moved under section 473(d)

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 Although the proof of service for the summons and
complaint was not included in the record before this court, Choi’s
declaration states that the proof reflects that “service was made
at [3600 Wilshire].” Choi asserted that he “never received mail
at that address when served” and argued that the “address used
for service is not connected to Defendant.” Choi further stated
that he did not become aware of the default judgment until
June 9, 2025, when he “searched the court record online and
discovered the entry.” He stated that he had “never received
any papers relating to this lawsuit” until June 9, 2025 when
he obtained them himself. Choi argued that, once he learned of
the default judgment, he “acted diligently.” Choi also stated that
“[t]his is not the first time Plaintiff’s attorney has filed for default
against [him] without proper service[,] . . . [and] appears to be a
deliberate and abusive litigation tactic,” and asked the trial court
to award sanctions as a result.
Choi further contended that the complaint arose from
his conduct as a journalist covering matters of public interest
and that, under the anti-SLAPP statute, section 425.16, “lawsuits
targeting such protected speech are subject to early dismissal.”
As a result, Choi argued that the court should “recognize this
matter as an unlawful SLAPP suit and shift the burden to
Plaintiff to establish a probability of prevailing.”

to set aside the default judgment as void on the ground the court
lacked personal jurisdiction over them. (Renoir, at pp. 1147–
1148.) Section 473(d) provides: “The court may . . . on motion of
either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void
judgment or order.”

5
 Choi attached to his declaration a proposed answer to the
complaint. It included various affirmative defenses, including
that his activities were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute,
citing section 425.16. Aside from his brief declaration, Choi
provided no additional documents or evidence in support of
his motion to vacate.
Plaintiff Park, represented by counsel, opposed the motion.
He argued the motion was untimely, as Choi had filed it more
than a year after the notice of entry of judgment was entered.
Park cited section 663a, subd. (a), in support of this proposition.4
Park also argued Choi and the other defendants were properly
served “at the then address” for Sunday News5 under the
substitute service provisions of section 415.20. Park contended
that Choi’s anti-SLAPP defense was untimely, and sanctions

4 Section 663a provides that a motion to set aside and
vacate a judgment must be filed within 180 days after the entry
of judgment. (§ 663a, subd. (a)(2).) However, this provision
applies to judgments specified in section 663, which relate only
to judgments “based upon a decision by the court, or the special
verdict of a jury,” and does not apply to judgments entered
by default, as in the instant case. (§ 663.)
5 Park’s brief specifies that this address was “3580 Wilshire
Blvd., Suite 1000[,] Los Angeles, CA 90010.” This appears to
be a typographical error. Choi acknowledged that the address
reflected in the proof of service was 3600 Wilshire. In addition,
other proofs of service that are included in the record reflect
3600 Wilshire as the service address for all three defendants.
The 3600 Wilshire address was also the address of a certified
letter sent to Choi and Yoo prior to the filing of the complaint
requesting a retraction of the allegedly defamatory material.

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were unwarranted, as there was “no evidence to suggest that
the only known address” for Sunday News “was not the proper
address to serve all of the Defendants.”
The trial court heard Choi’s motion on August 5, 2025 and
denied it without prejudice. The parties relied upon a settled
statement as a summary of the proceedings in the trial court.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(a).) The entirety of the statement
summarizing the oral proceedings is as follows:
“Appellant argued improper service, lack of notice,
vacated office address, and diligence upon actual
notice. [¶] Respondents argued service was proper
and motion untimely. [¶] Court denied motion
without prejudice, citing lack of diligence and
insufficient evidence.”
The court’s minute order includes its written ruling. With
respect to Choi’s invocation of the anti-SLAPP statute, the
court noted that this argument related to the sufficiency of the
pleadings and as such was not properly raised in the motion
to vacate. The court therefore did not consider it, and solely
considered Choi’s arguments related to default.
The court found Choi’s motion to vacate untimely under
section 473(b), which requires a motion for relief based on
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, to be
filed within six months after entry of judgment.
Notwithstanding the untimeliness of Choi’s motion, the
court recognized that, “ ‘[a]fter six months from entry of default,
a trial court may still vacate a default on equitable grounds even
if statutory relief is unavailable.’ ” The trial court cited the rule
set forth in Stiles v. Wallis (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1143, 1147–
1148, requiring that the party seeking relief from a default

7
judgment must: 1) “demonstrate that it has a meritorious case,”
2) “articulate a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense
to the original action,” and 3) “demonstrate diligence in seeking
to set aside the default once it had been discovered.”
The trial court considered Choi’s argument that he “never
resided or conducted business at the site listed in the Proof of
Service.” It found that given plaintiffs’ allegations that Choi was
the chief editor of the Sunday News, and service was made at the
Sunday News’ then-address, service was permitted under section
415.20, subdivision (b), which allows service at the party’s usual
place of business.6 The court found that Choi was required to
“submit facts which could show he never conducted business at
the address in which he served as chief editor” to demonstrate
that service was not valid. The court also found that Choi did not
“provide any facts as to how he learned of this litigation . . . [for]
the Court [to] determine whether he showed diligence in seeking
to set aside default.” In the absence of this evidence, the court
found that it could not grant the relief requested and denied
the motion without prejudice.

6 Section 415.20, subdivision (b)(1), states in relevant part:
“If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable
diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, . . .
a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and
complaint at the . . . usual place of business, or usual mailing
address . . ., in the presence of . . . a person apparently in charge
of their office, place of business, or usual mailing address . . ., and
by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint
by . . . first-class mail, . . . with postage prepaid, to the person
to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and
complaint were left.”

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 On September 30, 2025, Choi filed a notice of appeal from
the May 28, 2024 default judgment and the August 5, 2025 order
denying his motion to vacate the default judgment.7
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of review and appellate principles
We review a trial court’s order denying a motion to
vacate a default judgment for abuse of discretion. (County of
San Bernardino v. Mancini (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1102–
1103 [§ 473(b) motion]; County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1230 [equitable relief].) We will reverse
the trial court’s order only if its “decision exceeded the bounds
of reason in light of the circumstances before” it. (Gorham, at
p. 1230.) “In doing so, we determine whether the trial court’s
factual findings are supported by substantial evidence [citation]
and independently review its statutory interpretations and
legal conclusions.” (Ibid.) We uphold the trial court’s ruling
“if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether such basis
was actually invoked.” (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996)
13 Cal.4th 25, 32.)

7 Choi’s notice of appeal indicates that he is appealing both
the default judgment and the August 5, 2025 order denying
his motion to vacate the default judgment. Choi’s opening brief,
however, states only that he is appealing the August 5, 2025
order. Any appeal from the default judgment itself is untimely.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(A)–(C) [appeal must be filed
on or before the earlier of 60 days after service by the court clerk
or a party of notice of entry of judgment or 180 days after entry
of judgment].) Accordingly, we consider only whether the trial
court erred in its August 5, 2025 order denying Choi’s motion
to vacate the default judgment.

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 “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure
that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct
and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis
of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.”
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 (Jameson);
Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [error must
be affirmatively shown].) “ ‘In the absence of a contrary showing
in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action
will be made by the appellate court.’ ” (Jameson, at p. 609.)
To overcome this presumption, the appellant “ ‘has the burden
of providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide
an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be
resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Ibid.)
We are mindful that Choi represents himself on appeal,
as he did in the trial court. Nevertheless, he is “to be treated
like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater
consideration than other litigants and attorneys.” (Barton v.
New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th
1200, 1210.)
2. Choi did not demonstrate the trial court abused
its discretion
Choi moved to vacate the default judgment for lack of
proper service and expressly cited section 473(b) as the legal
basis for that argument. Under that statute, “a court may relieve
a party from a default or default judgment due to ‘mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect’ if the party files
an application for relief within six months from the date of
the default.” (Kramer v. Traditional Escrow, Inc. (2020) 56
Cal.App.5th 13, 28 (Kramer); § 473(b).) Choi’s motion—filed

10
more than a year after entry of the default judgment—was
untimely under section 473(b) as a matter of law. (See, e.g.,
Manson, Iver & York v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, 42
[“The six-month time limit for granting statutory relief [under
section 473(b)] is jurisdictional and the court may not consider
a motion for relief made after that period has elapsed.”].)
The trial court’s denial of Choi’s motion under section 473(b)
was therefore not an abuse of discretion.
Choi additionally argues on appeal that “[a] default
judgment entered without proper service is void because the
court lacks personal jurisdiction.” Citing Peralta v. Heights
Medical Center, Inc. (1988) 485 U.S. 80 (Peralta), Choi also
asserts that “[a] judgment entered without constitutionally
adequate notice violates due process and cannot stand.” He
acknowledges that he argued to the trial court that service
at 3600 Wilshire was improper and that the court denied him
relief. Choi’s only support for his argument that the trial court’s
decision was in error is his bare claim that service was effected
“based on a vacated office address.”
While Choi is generally correct that “[f]ailure to give notice
violates ‘the most rudimentary demands of due process of law,’ ”
he also fails to identify the specific legal basis for the relief that
he seeks. (Peralta, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 84.) To the extent that
Choi is seeking equitable relief,8 “[a] party seeking relief under

8 While Choi did not specifically rely on section 473(d),
this provision also allows a party to move to set aside a default
judgment that is valid on its face, but void due to improper
service, without time limit. (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94
Cal.App.4th 540, 544; California Capital Ins. Co. v. Hoehn
(2024) 17 Cal.5th 207, 215, 223–226.) Whether a party seeking

11
the court’s equitable powers must satisfy the elements of a
‘stringent three-pronged test’: (1) a satisfactory excuse for not
presenting a defense, (2) a meritorious defense, and (3) diligence
in seeking to set aside the default.” (Kramer, supra, 56
Cal.App.5th at p. 29, quoting Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994)
8 Cal.4th 975, 982–983.) The trial court applied this standard
to find that Choi did not satisfy these requirements, and thus
denied relief. We cannot find error in the trial court’s conclusion.
With respect to the first criterion—a satisfactory excuse
for not presenting a defense—lack of service can provide
such an excuse. (Politsch v. Metroplaza Partners, LLC (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 397, 407.) This was Choi’s argument below
and on appeal. The trial court, after reviewing the record
and hearing the parties’ argument, found that the record
demonstrated that Choi “was the chief editor of Sunday News
USA, and service was made at then Sunday News USA[’s]
address,” and that Choi had failed to provide “facts which could
show [Choi] never conducted business at the address in which
he served as chief editor.” It additionally found the record

to set aside a default judgment due to lack of service may achieve
a different outcome through application of the equitable powers
of the court than through an application of section 473(d) is an
open question. (California Capital, at p. 227.) Nonetheless, relief
under 473(d) on the basis that a facially valid judgment is void
due to lack of service similarly requires that the court determine,
based on extrinsic evidence, whether service was properly
effected. (California Capital, at p. 216, fn. 3.) The trial court’s
factual finding regarding the validity of service therefore resolves
Choi’s claim whether it is considered under either theory.

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deficient of facts related to Choi’s discovery of the litigation,
thus failing to provide sufficient evidence of his diligence.
There is no contrary showing in the record on appeal that
would allow us to conclude that the trial court lacked substantial
evidence for this finding. As the trial court discussed, under
section 415.20, plaintiffs were allowed to serve Choi with the
summons and complaint by leaving a copy of it at his usual
place of business. (§ 415.20, subd. (b)(1).) Choi did not include
the proof of service of the summons and complaint as part of the
record on appeal and has made no argument that it was facially
invalid. Choi admits that he was editor9 of the Sunday News,
and now contends that plaintiffs “relied on an office address
that was vacated or not [Choi’s] valid office at the relevant time.”
There is no evidence in the record to support this claim.
Choi provides only his attestation that he “never received
mail at [3600 Wilshire],” and that at the time of service his
“correct address has been 3435 Wilshire [B]lvd[.,] [S]te[.] 1900,
Los Angeles, CA 90010” (3435 Wilshire). First, neither assertion
—that Choi had not previously received mail at 3600 Wilshire
and that his personal address was 3435 Wilshire—even if
accepted as true, would preclude a finding that 3600 Wilshire
was the correct address for Sunday News, or that Sunday News
was his usual place of business. Second, Choi presented no
evidence to support either of those statements, and the trial court

9 While he admits that he was an editor, he contends that
he was “not the company owner, corporate officer, or executive
who controlled the business.” Even accepting this representation,
it does not alter the court’s analysis of whether he was served
at his “usual place of business.”

13
was not required to accept his representations as true nor
find that service was improper. (See Lee v. Yan (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 975, 978–979 [affirming denial of motion to vacate
default judgment for lack of service where trial court found that
defendant’s unsupported assertions that service address was not
her place of business were insufficient].) Giving the appropriate
deference to the trial court’s factual findings, and the
presumption that its order was correct, we cannot find that the
trial court erred in implicitly finding that Choi was served at the
Sunday News address in accordance with the substitute service
provisions of section 415.20 and concluding that service was
proper. (See Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608–609.)
The trial court additionally found the record deficient of
facts related to Choi’s discovery of the litigation, thus failing to
provide sufficient evidence of his diligence, “an essential element
of equitable relief.” The record also provides substantial evidence
to support this finding. Choi declared he first learned about the
default judgment on June 9, 2025, when he “searched the court
record online and discovered the entry.” He filed his motion
to vacate the default judgment on July 7, 2025. Although Choi
declared he was unaware of the entry of the default judgment,
he did not state that he was unaware of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit
against him.10 Nor did he explain how he came to search the
online “court record” for this case. The trial court reasonably
could infer Choi knew about the case in order to have looked up
the court docket. As Choi did not explain when or how he first

10 Although Choi argued in his motion to vacate that he was
“unaware of the proceedings,” no statement to support this
argument exists in his declaration.

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learned about the litigation itself, the court did not abuse its
discretion in finding it could not find that he acted diligently
in seeking to set aside the default judgment.11 (Lee v. Yan,
supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 978 [“The story did not recount
an impossibility, but it did require context to be plausible.
[Movant] left out the necessary context.”].)
We therefore conclude that Choi did not meet his burden
of demonstrating that “on the basis of the record presented to
the appellate court, . . . the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal. 5th
at p. 609.)

11 Choi made no argument on appeal regarding the trial
court’s ruling with respect to his anti-SLAPP argument. We
therefore do not consider this argument and deem it forfeited.
(Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014,
1075 [point not raised is forfeited].)

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 DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s August 5, 2025 order. The
parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

OCHOA, J.*

We concur:

ADAMS, P. J.

HANASONO, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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