Filed 8/26/26 P. v. Luna CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085699

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCE416362)

v.

JOHN AGAPITO LUNA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Frank L. Birchak, Judge. Affirmed.
Garrick Byers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanksi and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

After the trial court denied John Agapito Luna’s motion to suppress
evidence, Luna pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance in
exchange for a suspended prison sentence and two years of probation. Luna
appeals from the judgment, arguing the trial court improperly denied the
motion to suppress. In addition, Luna challenges two conditions of his
probation as unconstitutional. We reject Luna’s challenges and affirm the
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After he was charged with possession of a controlled substance for sale
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11351; count 1), Luna filed a motion under Penal Code
section 1538.5, subdivision (i) to suppress evidence obtained after he was
detained returning to the United States by customs and border patrol (CBP)
agents at the Cross Border Xpress (CBX), the bridge connecting the Tijuana

airport to the United States Custom Center.1 Luna was detained at CBX
after he returned home from a vacation in Mexico with his wife.
At the evidentiary hearing on the motion, his defense counsel clarified
his argument that Luna’s detention by CBP agents constituted an illegal
arrest, and that evidence obtained as a result should be excluded from trial.
At the hearing, Chula Vista Police Department detective Jeffrey Laine
testified that on February 13, 2023, he obtained a warrant to search Luna’s
person and the business where Luna was employed, AAMCO, for evidence of
cocaine, cocaine derivatives, and any associated paraphernalia. After the
warrant was granted, Laine contacted a CBP agent he had worked with in
the past and asked him to put an “alert” on Luna to be detained at CBX if he
crossed into the United States. Laine asked the CBP agent to contact him if
Luna was detained so Laine could execute the search warrant at CBX.
The next night, around 11:30 p.m., Laine received a call from the CBP
agent that Luna had been detained. Laine, who had been asleep in bed,

1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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dressed, found childcare, and drove to the CBX. He arrived there around
1:00 a.m., and contacted Luna about 15 minutes later. Laine told Luna he
was the subject of a search warrant and showed him a copy of the warrant.
Laine also asked Luna for his cell phone, which was included in the warrant,
and Luna gave him his phone.
While Laine was with Luna, another group of police officers prepared to
execute the warrant at AAMCO. Laine told Luna they intended to search
AAMCO and asked him for access to the store so police could avoid damaging
the building when they entered. Luna agreed to provide them with his keys
to the store, and his wife accompanied another police officer to Luna’s truck
at a relative’s house where the keys were located. Once officers had the keys,
they executed the search of AAMCO shortly after 2:00 a.m. During the
search, police found a tool bag on top of a set of lockers that contained
approximately 793 grams of cocaine. As a result, around 2:30 a.m., Laine
arrested Luna and took him to the Chula Vista police station. After the
arrest, Laine provided Luna his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384
U.S. 436.
Luna’s wife also testified at the evidentiary hearing. She stated that
she was with Luna when customs officials stopped him around 11:30 p.m.
and escorted him out of sight. She and her bags were not searched, except
through the customs machines. A police officer came out around 2:00 a.m.
and told her he needed the keys to AAMCO from Luna’s truck. She then
arranged to meet the officer at her relative’s home where the truck was
parked.
At the hearing, the parties stipulated that the court could receive the
search warrant into evidence under seal. The court also admitted
documentation of Luna’s flight and arrival into Tijuana, a text his wife sent

3
him while he was detained by CBP, and a document Luna signed consenting
to a search of his cell phone.
After argument, at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied
Luna’s motion to suppress. The court explained, “[w]e all know that
execution of a search warrant on a location and a person carries with it the
ability to detain occupants or subjects of the search warrant for a reasonable
amount of time and not unreasonably.” The court found it was reasonable for
Laine to perform a coordinated search, detaining Luna and simultaneously
preparing to search the AAMCO store to prevent removal or disposal of the
contraband, and to prevent Luna from leaving the country. The court also
found it was appropriate for customs officials to detain Luna based on Laine’s
request after he obtained the search warrant, and that Laine conducted his
search of Luna within a reasonable amount of time given the circumstances.
After the denial of the suppression motion, Luna pleaded guilty to
possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351;
count 1). He also admitted two strike prior convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
668, & 1170.12). At the sentencing hearing, the court granted Luna’s motion
under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, and struck
his two strike priors. The court suspended the execution of a four-year prison
term and granted Luna two years of probation. Luna timely appealed from
the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I
Motion to Suppress
Luna asserts the court’s denial of his motion to suppress was error
because the CBP’s detention of him violated the Fourth Amendment. The
Attorney General responds that there was no constitutional violation because

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the CBP appropriately detained Luna at the international border based on
Laine’s request, which was premised on a valid search warrant. We agree
with the Attorney General.
A
Legal Principles
“The Fourth Amendment provides ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures ….’ (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) This guarantee has been
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and
is applicable to the states. (See Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 [federal
exclusionary rule applicable to the states].) A similar guarantee against
unreasonable government searches is set forth in the state Constitution (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 13) but, since voter approval of Proposition 8 in June 1982,
state and federal claims relating to exclusion of evidence on grounds of
unreasonable search and seizure are measured by the same standard.
[Citations.] ‘Our state Constitution thus forbids the courts to order the
exclusion of evidence at trial as a remedy for an unreasonable search and
seizure unless that remedy is required by the federal Constitution as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.’ ” (People v. Camacho
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 829–830.)
“A search is presumptively reasonable, and thus in compliance with the
Fourth Amendment, if supported by a warrant describing with particularity
the thing or the place to be searched.” (People v. Meza (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
520, 534.) “ ‘ “The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement [is] to
prevent general searches. By limiting the authorization to search to the
specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the
requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its

5
justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging
exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 534–
535.)
It is also well established “that, ‘ “searches made at the border,
pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by
stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are
reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.” ’ ”
(People v. Endacott (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1349.) “ ‘Routine searches
of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant ....’ ” (People v. Laborde
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 870, 874; see also United States v. Flores–Montano
(2004) 541 U.S. 149, 152–153 [“Congress, since the beginning of our
Government, ‘has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine
searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in
order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of
contraband into this country.’ ”].)
In addition, “[t]he Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative stops,
when they are ‘unreasonable.’ (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19 & fn. 16;
United States v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 682.) Our state Constitution
has a similar provision. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) A seizure occurs whenever
a police officer ‘by means of physical force or show of authority’ restrains the
liberty of a person to walk away.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 229
(Souza).) In contrast to what is required to effectuate an arrest, “a police
officer’s seizure of a person need not in all cases be justified by probable cause
to arrest for a crime.” (Id. at p. 230.)

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 “Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances
known to the arresting officer ‘ “ ‘warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in
the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed [by the person to be
arrested].” ’ [Citations.] By contrast, the temporary detention of a person for
the purpose of investigating possible criminal activity may, because it is less
intrusive than an arrest, be based on ‘some objective manifestation’ that
criminal activity is afoot and that the person to be stopped is engaged in that
activity.” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 230.) “ ‘The guiding principle in
determining the propriety of an investigatory detention is “the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental
invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” [Citations.] In making our
determination, we examine “the totality of the circumstances” in each case.’ ”
(People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 463.)
“ ‘In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the
historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to
determine whether the law as applied has been violated. [Citation.] We
review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential
substantial evidence standard. The ruling on whether the applicable law
applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to
independent review. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In evaluating whether the fruits
of a search or seizure should have been suppressed, we consider only the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.”
(People v. Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262, 268.)
B
Analysis
We agree with the Attorney General that no illegal detention or arrest
occurred in this case. Thus, the evidence Luna seeks to suppress was not the

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product of an unlawful search or seizure. The authority of the customs
officials who detained Luna at CBX is broad. They were permitted to detain
Luna for a routine inspection without any suspicion of wrongdoing. Here,
however, the CBP agents were acting on reasonable suspicion based on
Laine’s instruction to hold Luna and alert Laine so that he could execute a
search warrant. Laine informing the CBP agents of the search warrant and
his direction to hold Luna created sufficient probable cause for the border
officials to detain him for a reasonable amount of time to allow Laine to
arrive and execute the search warrant.
Specifically, Luna was initially detained for only as long as it took
Laine to reach CBX and present him with the search warrant—just over an
hour and a half. In that time, Luna was not handcuffed and had access to his
cell phone. Further, once Laine presented Luna with the warrant around
1:30 a.m., Laine’s team had already assembled outside of the AAMCO to
execute the search of the store and the search was completed in less than an
hour. As the trial court pointed out, the total time of detention was
approximately three hours from the initial stop by CBP officials, at around
11:30 p.m., to Laine’s arrest of Luna at around 2:30 a.m. after the cocaine
was found in the AAMCO store. Contrary to Luna’s argument, this was not a
prolonged amount of time given the circumstances.
Further, the exigency of the situation also justified the relatively short
detention. Had Luna not been detained during this time, he would have had
the opportunity to take steps to destroy the contraband or facilitate its
removal from the AAMCO store, or to flee the country himself. (See Illinois
v. McArthur (2001) 531 U.S. 326, 331–332 [warrantless detention for several
hours while police obtained a warrant and conducted a search of the suspect’s
home was reasonable where officers had “good reason to fear” contraband

8
would be destroyed by suspect].) Given these facts, the decision to detain
Luna at CBX while the search was completed was not an unlawful arrest or a

detention that lacked reasonable suspicion.2
Luna argues that CBP’s detention of him was unlawful because CBP
did not have specific statutory authority to detain him to assist the Chula
Vista Police Department. He points to state and federal statutes that
authorize federal law enforcement officers to make arrests in certain
circumstances, but provides no legal authority for his assertion that the CBP
officials were not authorized to detain him during the short period of time it
took Laine to reach CBX. Specifically, Luna points to section 830.8, which
grants federal law enforcement officers the ability to make arrests in
California under certain circumstances so long as they have been certified

2 Because we conclude no unlawful arrest occurred, we do not reach the
question of whether an exception to the exclusionary rule applies. In other
words, there is no illegally seized evidence at issue in this case that is subject
to exclusion.

9
with the same training requirements as California peace officers.3 Here, the
statute is not applicable, because no federal law enforcement officer

purported to arrest Luna for violating state or federal law.4

3 The statutes provide, in part: “(a) Federal criminal investigators and
law enforcement officers are not California peace officers, but may exercise
the powers of arrest of a peace officer in any of the following circumstances:
[¶] (1) Any circumstances specified in Section 836 of this code or Section 5150
of the Welfare and Institutions Code for violations of state or local laws. [¶]
(2) When these investigators and law enforcement officers are engaged in the
enforcement of federal criminal laws and exercise the arrest powers only
incidental to the performance of these duties. [¶] (3) When requested by a
California law enforcement agency to be involved in a joint task force or
criminal investigation. [¶] (4) When probable cause exists to believe that a
public offense that involves immediate danger to persons or property has just
occurred or is being committed. [¶] In all of these instances, the provisions of
Section 847 shall apply. These investigators and law enforcement officers,
prior to the exercise of these arrest powers, shall have been certified by their
agency heads as having satisfied the training requirements of Section 832, or
the equivalent thereof. [¶] This subdivision does not apply to federal officers
of the Bureau of Land Management or the United States Forest Service.
These officers have no authority to enforce California statutes without the
written consent of the sheriff or the chief of police in whose jurisdiction they
are assigned. [¶] (b) Duly authorized federal employees who comply with the
training requirements set forth in Section 832 are peace officers when they
are engaged in enforcing applicable state or local laws on property owned or
possessed by the United States government, or on any street, sidewalk, or
property adjacent thereto, and with the written consent of the sheriff or the
chief of police, respectively, in whose jurisdiction the property is situated.”
(§ 830.8, subds. (a)–(b).)

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 Likewise, Luna’s reliance on several federal statutes does not require
reversal of the order denying his motion to suppress. Luna cites 8 U.S.C.
sections 1357 and 1358, and 19 U.S.C. sections 482, subdivision (c) and 1582.
8 U.S.C. section 1357 creates authority for immigration officials to conduct
searches and make arrests in certain circumstances. (See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357, subd. (a)(4)–(5) [“Any officer or employee of the [Immigration and
Naturalization] Service [of the Department of Justice] authorized under
regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without
warrant– [¶] (4) to make arrests for felonies which have been committed and
which are cognizable under any law of the United States regulating the
admission, exclusion, expulsion, or removal of aliens, if he has reason to

4 Luna points to People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, as a correct use of
section 830.8, which he contrasts with this case. In Redd, an automatic
appeal from a death sentence, a federal park police officer saw a suspicious
vehicle parked next to a national park area. (Id. at p. 712.) The officer
contacted dispatch, who informed him the car was not properly registered.
(Ibid.) The officer then contacted the driver of the car, who gave him a fake
name, raising the officer’s suspicion further. (Ibid.) The officer arrested the
driver for providing a fake name, and for having no license and an expired
registration. After the arrest, the officer found the driver’s license and
learned from dispatch the driver had multiple outstanding warrants for his
arrest, including on a murder charge. (Id. at p. 713.) A subsequent inventory
of the car yielded additional evidence in the murder investigation. (Ibid.)
The defendant driver moved to suppress the evidence found in the car,
arguing the federal park police officer did not have authority to arrest him
under section 830.8 for various reasons. (Id. at p. 715.) The Supreme Court
rejected the defendant’s claims, finding that the officer was qualified to make
the arrest under section 830.8. (Id. at p. 716–717.) Neither section 830.8 nor
Redd is applicable here because Luna was not arrested by a federal law
enforcement officer. Rather, he was detained at the international border
returning from Mexico for a reasonable amount of time to allow Laine to
execute a valid search warrant.

11
believe that the person so arrested is guilty of such felony and if there is
likelihood of the person escaping before a warrant can be obtained for his
arrest, but the person arrested shall be taken without unnecessary delay
before the nearest available officer empowered to commit persons charged
with offenses against the laws of the United States; and
[¶] (5) to make arrests– [¶] (A) for any offense against the United States, if
the offense is committed in the officer’s or employee’s presence, or [¶] (B) for
any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States, if the officer or
employee has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed or is committing such a felony, if the officer or employee is
performing duties relating to the enforcement of the immigration laws at the
time of the arrest and if there is a likelihood of the person escaping before a
warrant can be obtained for his arrest.”].) Again, here, no arrest or search
was made by federal officials.
The subsequent provision, 8 U.S.C. section 1358, states, “The officers in
charge of the various immigrant stations shall admit therein the proper State
and local officers charged with the enforcement of the laws of the State or
Territory of the United States in which any such immigrant station is located
in order that such State and local officers may preserve the peace and make
arrests for crimes under the laws of the States and Territories. For the
purpose of this section the jurisdiction of such State and local officers and of
the State and local courts shall extend over such immigrant stations.” Luna
asserts this provision did not authorize his eventual arrest because “at the
CBX there was no disturbance of the peace and there was no crime.”
However, Luna does not dispute the validity of the warrant or Laine’s
authority to be admitted to the immigration station to execute the warrant

12
under 8 U.S.C. section 1358, which on its face applies to the circumstances
presented here.
Finally, Luna argues that 19 U.S.C. sections 482, subdivision (a) and
1582, which authorize customs officials to search for suspected merchandize
subject to custom duties, did not authorize his detention. Luna is correct that
these provisions authorize particular types of searches at the United States’
borders. These provisions, however, have no bearing on the issues presented
in this case and do not support his contention that his detention by border
officials to facilitate execution of a valid search warrant violated his Fourth

Amendment rights.5
II
Probation Conditions

5 Luna also relies heavily on United States v. Santa Maria (1994) 15 F.3d
879, to support his contention that his detention was unlawful. In that case,
border patrol agents entered private land under the authority of 15 U.S.C.
1357 for the purpose of preventing illegal entry by non-citizens into the
United States because of the private property’s proximity to the international
border. (Id. at pp. 880–881.) The agents suspected marijuana might be
contained in a mobile home on the property only because they had previously
found drugs on the same property; they saw no other sign of illegal activity.
(Id. at p. 880.) The border patrol agents, acting without a warrant, entered
the mobile home and found a large quantity of marijuana. (Ibid.) The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order denying the
defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding 15 U.S.C. section 1357 (which
authorized only the agents’ ability to search for illegal entry) did not
authorize the agents to conduct a search for drugs without a warrant or
probable cause, and that no such probable cause was present. (Id. at
pp. 881–883.) Santa Maria does not support reversal here. As stated, the
CBP officials did not conduct any non-routine search of Luna’s person or
luggage, and they detained him for only a short time to allow for the
execution of a valid warrant.

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 Luna challenges two probation conditions. The first, labeled 7.d on the
formal probation order, requires Luna to “[a]ttend and successfully complete
[an] individual cognitive behavior … counseling program approved by the
[parole officer (P.O.)] if directed by the P.O.” and to “[a]uthorize the counselor
to provide progress reports to the probation officer or court when
requested ….” The second condition Luna challenges, condition 14.c,
prohibits him from traveling to Mexico. Although Luna did not object to the
conditions in the trial court, he argues condition 7.d is both an improper
delegation of judicial authority and unconstitutionally vague. He contends
condition 14.c is unconstitutionally overbroad. The Attorney General
responds that Luna forfeited these arguments and, alternatively, that the
conditions are valid.
First, we agree with the Attorney General that Luna’s assertion that
condition 7.d is an improper delegation of judicial authority is forfeited.
(People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 235 (Welch).) To the extent he had
concerns about the court’s delegation of authority to the probation officer, he
could have objected and asked the trial court to address those concerns when
the condition was imposed. By accepting this probation term without
objection, Luna deprived the trial court of the opportunity to narrow or
modify the condition if appropriate. The purpose of the forfeiture rule is to
avoid precisely this situation—where an objection would have permitted the
trial court to address the concern or make a better record to support the
court’s decision. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 881 (Sheena K.).)
In any event, even if we were to exercise our discretion to consider the
claim, we would conclude that the challenged condition is a reasonable and
appropriate delegation of authority. The court is statutorily required to
delegate authority over probationers to probation officers. (§ 1203.1,

14
subd. (j).) The pragmatic reason is that the goals of probation include
reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer—and a trial court “is poorly
equipped to micromanage selection of a [treatment or counselling] program.”
(People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 308.)
Moreover, Luna did not object to a related condition (condition 6.r),
which requires that he “[p]articipate and comply with any assessment
program if directed by the [probation officer].” That acquiescence effectively
concedes that the trial court properly delegated the discretion to select tests
designed to diagnose Luna’s rehabilitative needs. It would make little sense
to withhold a concomitant delegation of discretion to direct his participation
in reasonable treatment plans designed to meet those needs once they are
understood.
Luna also contends that condition 7.d is unconstitutionally vague
because there is no indication he has cognitive issues that would require such
treatment. Again, even if the issue had been properly preserved by objection
in the trial court, we would disagree. A probation condition “ ‘must be
sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and
for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to
withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness.” (Sheena K., supra, 40
Cal.4th at p. 890.) Here, condition 7.d is not unconstitutionally vague. It
plainly directs Luna to participate in cognitive behavior counseling if directed
by the probation officer.
In addition, the record does not show that Luna has been directed by a
probation officer to participate in any such counseling. In the future, if he is
directed by a probation officer to comply with this condition in a manner that
does not give him sufficient information to discern what conduct is required,
he may challenge the manner in which the condition has been implemented.

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(§§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(1), 1203.3, subd. (a); see People v. Keele (1986) 178
Cal.App.3d 701, 708 [trial court retains jurisdiction to review probation
officer’s actions].)
We also reject Luna’s assertion that condition 14.c, precluding him
from traveling to Mexico, is unconstitutional. “A probation condition that
imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor
those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as
unconstitutionally overbroad.” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.)
While an overbreadth challenge can present a pure question of law,
evaluating whether a sentencing court narrowly tailored a condition to the
probationer’s circumstances, based on the record, does not. (Id. at pp. 887–
888.) Here, Luna contends there is no need for a total prohibition of travel to
Mexico, which requires this court to look to the record to determine the
appropriateness of the condition. Because Luna did not raise this objection in
the trial court, he has forfeited the issue. (Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 234–
237.)
In any event, we agree with the Attorney General that Luna has not
shown the condition is unconstitutionally overbroad in this case. While all
citizens enjoy a federal constitutional right to travel, that right is not
absolute and may be reasonably restricted in the public interest. (People v.
Relkin (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1188, 1195.) Where a probation condition
infringes on the constitutional rights of the probationer it must be “narrowly
drawn to serve the important interests of public safety and rehabilitation”
and be “specifically tailored to the individual probationer.” (In re Babak S.
(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1084; see People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398,
406 [“Imposing a limitation on probationers’ movements as a condition of
probation is common, as probation officers’ awareness of probationers’

16
whereabouts facilitates supervision and rehabilitation and helps ensure
probationers are complying with the terms of their conditional release.”].)
Here, the travel ban to Mexico is sufficiently tailored to the
circumstances of Luna’s case. Although the conduct banned is not criminal,
it is indirectly related to the crime he committed. Luna possessed nearly 800
grams of cocaine for the purpose of sale. Although there is no evidence in the
record that Luna had smuggled drugs across the border, the amount of
cocaine and his admitted frequent trips to Mexico provided him with the
opportunity. Prohibiting Luna from travel to Mexico during his two years of
probation eliminates the risk that he would engage in transport or sale of
drugs across international borders.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

MCCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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