Filed 8/26/26 In re Z.C. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re Z.C. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E088062

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2500382)

v. OPINION

E.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Malvina Ovanezova,

Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, §21.) Affirmed in part; reversed in

part.

Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

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 Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy

County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant and appellant E.C. (Father) appeals the jurisdictional orders

adjudicating his two sons, Z.C. (born September 2010), and B.C. (born April 2012), as

dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,

subdivision (b).1 The children’s mother, T.C. (Mother), is not a party to this appeal.

Father argues that substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional finding that the

children have suffered or are at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm as a

result of his high-conflict separation from Mother. We agree and reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff and respondent Riverside County Department of Public Social Services

(DPSS) had repeated contact with this family in the spring and summer of 2025. In

March 2025, Mother sought domestic violence restraining orders (DVRO) against Father

in family court and was granted a temporary restraining order (TRO). Mother claimed in

her DVRO request that Father pointed a gun at her and threatened to kill her after

sexually assaulting her, and pointed a gun at B.C. a week earlier. The children were

interviewed by DPSS, and B.C. denied that Father had pointed a gun at him in a

threatening manner. Both children denied that Mother and Father had been physically

abusive to one another.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
specified otherwise.

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 As a result of the TRO, Father moved out of the family home and only had

supervised visitation with the children from March to July 2025. During the time Father

was living outside of the family home, both children’s grades dropped. Father initiated

dissolution of marriage proceedings on April 1, 2025.

At the end of March 2025, law enforcement executed a search warrant on the

family home in order to seize all of Father’s firearms pursuant to the terms of the TRO.

Mother unlocked the closet holding the firearms, allowing law enforcement to confiscate

the weapons. In April 2025, Mother notified law enforcement that she “found” three

additional firearms under her son’s bed. Mother later admitted that before law

enforcement arrived in March, she had taken these additional firearms from Father’s

collection and asked Z.C. to hide them under his bed. DPSS again interviewed the

children in April 2025. Both children were aware that the firearms were hidden under

Z.C.’s bed. Z.C. stated that he placed the firearms under his bed because Mother knew

deputies would not look under there, and Mother said it would be their secret. When law

enforcement confiscated these additional firearms, deputies discovered that one of the

rifles was loaded.

On July 3, 2025, the family court denied Mother’s DVRO request. Father stated it

was because the judge did not find Mother credible, and Mother stated it was because the

judge did not watch the full videos she presented. Father informed DPSS that this was

the third restraining order that Mother had sought against him that had been denied.

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 After Mother’s DVRO request was denied in July 2025, Mother moved out of the

family home while Father took the children on vacation for a week. After Father and the

children returned from vacation, B.C. informed Father that Mother had shown him and

Z.C. an explicit video of Father having sex with another woman. DPSS received a 10-

day referral alleging sexual abuse and emotional abuse of the children by Mother

following this disclosure.

When interviewed by DPSS in July 2025, B.C. stated that he gets along with

Father very well and feels safe with him, whereas he does not like spending time with

Mother and he feels angry when Mother speaks negatively about Father. B.C. confirmed

that Mother showed him “explicit videos” of Father and another woman having sex on

one occasion at some point between March and July 2025, when Father was not living in

the family home.

Z.C. stated that he gets along with Father very well and feels safe with him, and he

also gets along with and feels safe with Mother. Z.C. stated that Mother had shown him a

video about two months previously of Father having sex with another woman, on two

occasions. Z.C. indicated that he believed Mother did it to be spiteful towards Father.

Mother admitted that she “stupidly showed” B.C. a video of Father having sex

with another woman for the purpose of proving that Father was cheating, but stated she

knew it was a mistake that “adversely affects the children.” She denied showing the

video to Z.C.

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 Father disclosed significant concerns about B.C.’s behavior during the time Father

was living outside of the home, including B.C. putting a person-sized hole in the wall

with his skateboard, cutting his sheets with a knife, and destroying his gaming chair,

leading to Mother contacting a local crisis support team. Mother confirmed these

incidents took place. B.C. had been defiant and talking back, including saying things to

Father like “what the fuck are you going to do, hit me?” Both parents stated that B.C.’s

grades had recently dropped from straight A’s to straight D’s. In August 2025, Mother

reported that B.C. had been suspended from school for three days.

On September 5, 2025, Father reported to DPSS that B.C.’s grades had improved

to all A’s other than in math and that he had no behavioral concerns for either child at

that time. Father also stated that the parties had reached a temporary custody agreement

through their family law counsel wherein Mother had custody of the children every other

weekend and every Wednesday after school, although B.C. was sometimes refusing to

see Mother and would be “moody” after seeing Mother. This appears to have been an

informal custody agreement that was not filed as an order with the family court. Mother

stated that Father would use put-downs in front of the children, such as saying “you’re

crazy,” and that B.C. would repeat these comments.

On September 10, 2025, DPSS filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision

(b)(1), regarding both children. The petition set forth three allegations, only the first of

which (b-1) includes Father: “The parents neglect the health, safety, and mental

wellbeing of the children in that the children are being exposed to a high-conflict

separation, as a result the child [B.C.] is displaying defiant behaviors, physical outbursts

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and a decrease in academic performance.” The other two allegations (b-2 and b-3) were

made against Mother with respect to her showing explicit sexual material to the children

and allowing the children to have access to firearms that were loaded and hidden from

law enforcement.

On September 15, 2025, Mother claimed to DPSS that she did not place the

firearms under the children’s bed or allow the children to place them under the bed; she

just “thought” about doing so and had placed the firearms in the garage instead.

DPSS interviewed the children again on September 23, 2025. B.C. stated that

school has been going well other than math class, that he has been learning to play the

guitar, and that he feels safe at home with Father. B.C. also said Mother had been

visiting him and Z.C. at home, that visits have been going well, and he feels safe with

Mother. At that time, Mother was temporarily residing in the family home again because

of construction being done at her house. B.C. stated that his parents were communicating

well and had not had any verbal or physical altercations, and neither parent had been

speaking negatively about the other. Z.C. stated he had been doing well in school, having

scored in the top tenth percentile nationally in all subjects. Z.C. did not express any

concerns about his brother and said his brother had not engaged in any physical outbursts

in months. Z.C. also stated he felt safe with both parents, that Mother and Father were

communicating well and had not engaged in verbal or physical altercations.

In October 2025, at the initial hearing, the juvenile court found that a prima facie

showing had been made and ordered the children to remain in the custody of Mother and

Father.

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 The children were interviewed again in October 2025 after the initial hearing.

Both children reported that their parents were getting along. Father reported that B.C.

had started doing better in July and his grades had improved, although he was showing

“teen behaviors.”

In December 2025, when DPSS interviewed the family again, Mother was still

residing in the family home at least part of the time. Father reported that Z.C. had

recently pushed Mother. Z.C. stated that Mother was “getting in his face” about paying

her back $10, so he pushed her to have space between them but he did not push her hard

and Mother did not push, hit, or strike him. Z.C. said that he was not scared of Mother

and he simply wanted some space between them. Mother said Z.C. did push her and

apologized to her a week later, but she thought she “broke a rib,” although she was not

going to seek medical treatment. Both children denied that Mother and Father were

arguing or exposing them to family conflict.

In January 2026, Father reported to DPSS that Mother and Z.C. got into an

argument about Z.C.’s dirt bike being moved into the garage, and Z.C. had punched

Mother’s bedroom door. DPSS spoke with Z.C., who stated that he was upset that

Mother wanted him to move his dirt bike that was parked in “her” spot, because she was

rarely home, so he had been using it. Z.C. confirmed he punched Mother’s bedroom

door, but Mother was antagonizing him by saying things like “You[‘re] going to shove

me? [You’re] going to push me, come push me.” Mother called the police, who Z.C.

stated spoke with Mother and him and then left without taking further action. Z.C.

showed the DPSS social worker that he had a faint, light red mark on his third finger and

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said that it did not hurt. DPSS also confirmed that Z.C. had excellent grades, all A’s

except for one class where he had a C but would be able to bring his grade up to an A

after submitting another assignment. It appears that Mother again moved out of the

family residence after this incident.

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in February 2026, Father’s counsel

requested that the juvenile court find allegation b-1 to be untrue as to Father because he

had not neglected the health, safety, and well-being of the children, Father was the

primary caretaker who attended to all of their needs, and the conduct alleged was “stale.”

The juvenile court found all of the allegations in the petition to be true after

modifying allegation b-1 to use past tense phrasing as follows: “ ‘The parents neglected

the health, safety, and mental well-being of the children, and that the children were being

exposed to a highly conflict [sic.] separation. As a result, the child [B.C] is displaying

defiant behaviors, physical outbursts and a decrease in academic performance.’ ” The

court noted that it was stating the petition in past tense because “we are terminating

dependency with juvenile custody orders, and in essence, a safety plan that the parents

will participate in family counseling.”

The juvenile court issued custody exit orders, with Mother having custody of the

children on the first, second, and fourth weekends of the month as well as Wednesdays

from after school until 7:00 p.m. A final custody judgment was entered by the juvenile

court in March 2026.

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 DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, it is unclear in Father’s briefing whether he intends to

challenge all three allegations set forth in the section 300 petition, or just allegation b-1 as

the sole allegation pertaining to him. Father did not expressly state that he was

challenging only allegation b-1, and DPSS addressed all three allegations in its briefing.

However, based on the overall posture in Father’s briefing, including his use of headings

that reference a singular allegation against him, as well as the fact that Father challenged

only allegation b-1 at the jurisdictional hearing, we ascertain that Father is only

challenging allegation b-1 in his appeal.

This raises the question of whether Father’s appeal may be moot, because neither

he nor Mother is challenging the jurisdictional findings against Mother, and we may

therefore affirm the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction regardless of our decision on

allegation b-1. (In re Andrew S. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 536, 542 fn. 2.) “However, when,

as here, the outcome of the appeal could be ‘the difference between father’s being an

“offending” parent versus a “non-offending” parent,’ a finding that could result in far-

reaching consequences with respect to these and future dependency proceedings, we find

it appropriate to exercise our discretion to consider the appeal on the merits.” (In re

Quentin H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 608, 613.)

The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings are reviewed for substantial evidence,

while drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the juvenile court’s

findings and orders. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) If substantial evidence

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supports the jurisdictional findings, “we affirm the order even if other evidence supports

a contrary conclusion.” (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 168.)

Allegation b-1 was pled pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), which provides

in relevant part that a child is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court where the child

“has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm

or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] [t]he failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to

adequately supervise or protect the child.” The statute accordingly requires three

elements: “(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms;

(2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial

risk’ of such harm or illness.” (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820 [abrogated

in part by In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 629-633, which held that the first element did

not require parental fault].) The risk of harm to the child must exist at the time of the

jurisdictional hearing, “ ‘some reason to believe the acts may continue in the future.’ ”

(Rocco M., at p. 824.)

We agree with Father that there is insufficient evidence to support the b-1

allegation. The statute “means what it says. Before courts and agencies can exert

jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), there must be evidence indicating that the

child is exposed to a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re Rocco

M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 823.)

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 The need for there to be a risk of physical harm to the child for purposes of section

300, subdivision (b), was emphasized in In re Jesus M. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 104

(Jesus M.). There, the mother had a restraining order against the father, and the father

violated the restraining order repeatedly by calling her and sending her text messages,

following her while she was driving, and denigrating her to the children. (Id. at p. 106.)

However, the children “showed no signs of physical abuse, and denied that either parent

abused them or made them feel unsafe.” (Id. at p. 107.) The Jesus M. court reversed the

court’s jurisdictional findings made pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 300, holding

that although the father’s conduct was “[r]eprehensible” and “detrimental to the

emotional welfare of his children,” such conduct “did not demonstrate a risk of physical

harm to the children justifying the assertion of jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of

section 300.” (Id. at 113.)

In this instance, there is no evidence in the record of any serious physical harm or

risk of serious physical harm to either child resulting from Father’s conduct described in

allegation b-1. Both children repeatedly stated that they felt safe with both parents and

that they had not seen their parents engage in verbal or physical altercations, even during

the time period when Mother had temporarily moved back into the family residence.

In its briefing, DPSS argues that allegation b-1 is factually supported by B.C.

punching holes in his walls, destroying property, cutting items with knives, and requiring

crisis-team intervention, and Z.C. pushing Mother, punching her door, and demonstrating

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an “ ‘increasing level of aggression.’ ”2 These behaviors, although certainly concerning,

do not fall within the ambit of the physical harm contemplated by section 300,

subdivision (b)(1), and instead are reflective of the children’s emotional damage. We

note that DPSS’s brief repeatedly refers to the children’s emotional state rather than

physical harm, e.g., “The parents’ ongoing, unresolved conflict contributed to the

children’s deteriorating emotional state.”

DPSS attempts to tie the children’s conduct to the physical harm requirement by

arguing that the children “engaged in physical conduct creating a substantial risk of

serious physical harm to themselves and others.” However, section 300, subdivision (c),

specifically highlights a child’s “untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others” as

evidence of emotional damage rather than a type of physical harm.3 As with the children

in Jesus M., “[t]here was evidence to suggest the children were suffering emotionally,”

2 This quote is not directly from Z.C.’s psychiatrist, as DPSS claims, but instead
is taken from an email written by Mother, who claimed that the psychiatrist “is concerned
about the increasing level of aggression” unrelated to Z.C.’s existing diagnoses or
medications. There was nothing in the record reflecting that DPSS confirmed this
statement with Z.C.’s psychiatrist.
We also question whether we can consider Z.C.’s behavioral issues at all with
respect to allegation b-1, as the allegation only references B.C. and not Z.C. The
reviewing court may not affirm a jurisdictional decision based on a factual finding that
was not made by the juvenile court. (See In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 605-
606 [the petition sustained by the juvenile court did not allege the mother’s denial of
domestic violence incident and refusal to participate in services as a basis for jurisdiction,
so appellate court could not affirm on that basis].)

3 Section 300, subdivision (c), provides in relevant part that a child is within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court where the child “is suffering serious emotional damage,
or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe
anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others,
as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian.” (Italics added.)

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but DPSS did not allege emotional abuse under subdivision (c) of section 300. (Jesus M.,

supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 112.) Instead, DPSS elected to assert jurisdiction under

subdivision (b) despite the “absence of substantial evidence of a risk of serious physical

harm.” (Ibid.) The children’s emotional damage alone cannot support a section 300,

subdivision (b), jurisdictional finding, as Jesus M. makes clear.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institutions Code

section 300, subdivision (b), allegation b-1 is reversed. In all other respects, the

judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS.

MILLER
Acting P. J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON
J.

RAPHAEL
J.

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