Filed 8/27/26 Amanda F. v. David S. CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
AMANDA F.,
Respondent, A172101
v.
DAVID S., (City & County of San Francisco
Appellant. Super. Ct. No. FDI-22-797070)
David S. (husband or father) appeals from a domestic violence
restraining order (DVRO) granted under the Domestic Violence Prevention
Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.; DVPA)1 after a long-cause hearing over six
days. Husband was ordered to stay away from his separated wife, Amanda F.
(wife or mother); to have no contact with her other than communication about
court-ordered visitation with their child; and not to abuse her by, among
other things, harassing her, threatening her, annoying her, or disturbing her
peace. Husband contends his conduct was not abuse, his due process rights
were violated, and the trial court failed to make the necessary factual
findings required to issue a mutual restraining order. We affirm.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
1
BACKGROUND
Husband and wife married shortly after meeting in August 2019. They
had a son, Gabriel S., in November 2020. In September 2022, husband
committed an act of infidelity and the parties agreed to divorce.
On September 30, 2022, wife reported to police that husband pushed and
shoved her into a door frame during an argument. Husband was arrested,
and wife obtained an emergency protective order. On October 6, 2022, wife
filed a petition for a DVRO and for dissolution of marriage.
In addition to the one instance of physical aggression in September
2022, wife alleged multiple instances of abusive behavior by husband.2 She
asserted husband was erratic, volatile, verbally aggressive, and controlling.
His negative behavior was usually in the presence of their son, Gabriel. Wife
alleged that husband isolated her from her family and friends by not allowing
visitors during 2020 and that he governed when she should work. She also
alleged husband failed to pay court-ordered spousal support and attorney’s
fees. Wife claimed husband broke and threw things in their house when he
became angry with her.
The trial court heard testimony on six different dates in February,
May, August, and September 2024. Both parties were represented by
counsel. Husband and wife testified, as well as wife’s sister, and wife’s friend
and neighbor. Husband denied wife’s accusations of physical assault and
that he broke and threw things in their home when he was angry. The
district attorney’s office dismissed the criminal charges against husband.
2 Husband does not provide a record citation to wife’s petition for a
DVRO. Our summary of wife’s allegations is based on the trial court’s
written findings and orders attached to the DVRO (Judicial Council Forms,
form DV-130 (form DV-130)).
2
The trial court’s written findings attached to the mandatory form
DV-130, Restraining Order After Hearing, found insufficient evidence to
support wife’s allegations of physical abuse or coercion and control, including
financial control. The findings state the court did not consider husband’s
outstanding financial orders as evidence of abuse under the DVPA. However,
the court found husband’s communications with wife, some of which occurred
in the presence of Gabriel, were disturbing, lacked civility, and were not
peaceful. “[Husband’s] demeanor and conduct is [sic] troubling when
[husband] feels the need to express his concerns and ‘make a record’ or
document evidence in the presence of Gabriel to support his position in
pending dissolution and child custody matters. . . . Based on the various TPA
[TalkingParents application3] messages and video evidence presented,
[husband’s] communications lacked civility and were not peaceful. [Husband]
would verbally demand why his son was dressed as he was; demand an adult
appear on video and state in clear and certain terms that he was making a
record for court proceedings—all in the presence of Gabriel. The Court finds
exposing this young child to court proceedings and the [husband’s] choosing
to use limited custodial time with his son to ‘make a record’ against [wife]
disturbing. . . . [¶] Based on the totality of the evidence, the Court grants the
Petitioner’s request for a [DVRO] for a period of one year . . . .” The findings
list 12 terms and conditions regarding custody and visitation, including that:
“[p]eaceful communication is allowed only on the TPA about Gabriel’s
visitation, medical and school matters”; “[p]arties are reminded that any
failure to follow court orders may affect respective parental rights”; “[p]arties
shall not to make [sic] any disparaging comments about the other parent
3 TalkingParents is an online coparenting communication tool. (See
Melissa G. v. Raymond M. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 360, 364.)
3
within earshot of the child”; and “[p]arties shall not discuss or make any
comments about court proceedings and lawsuits within earshot of the child.”
The DVRO form DV-130 ordered husband to stay away from and not to abuse
or contact wife, other than brief and peaceful communication about court-
ordered visitation through TPA.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The DVPA authorizes a court to issue a protective order “ ‘ “ ‘to restrain
any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence
and ensuring a period of separation of the persons involved’ ” upon
“reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” ’ ” (Parris J. v.
Christopher U. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108, 115.) The DVPA defines domestic
violence as “abuse” perpetrated against enumerated individuals, including a
former spouse or cohabitant (§ 6211, subds. (a), (b)), and “ ‘abuse’ ” includes
engaging in “any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to
Section 6320.” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4).) Section 6320, in turn, includes
“disturbing the peace of the other party . . . .” (§ 6320, subd. (a).) As used in
the DPVA, “ ‘disturbing the peace of the other party’ refers to conduct that,
based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional
calm of the other party. This conduct may be committed directly or
indirectly, including through the use of a third party, and by any method or
through any means including, but not limited to, telephone, online accounts,
text messages, internet-connected devices . . . , or other electronic
technologies.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).)
The burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence. (Parris J. v.
Christopher U., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 116.) “ ‘The DVPA “confer[s] a
4
discretion designed to be exercised liberally, at least more liberally than a
trial court’s discretion to restrain civil harassment generally.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
We review the issuance of a DVRO for abuse of discretion, and we
review factual findings for substantial evidence. (Parris J. v. Christopher U.,
supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 116.) In applying this standard, we accept as true
all evidence supporting the trial court’s finding and resolve every conflict in
favor of the order. We do not reassess witness credibility or reweigh the
evidence. (Ibid.) In deciding whether the trial court properly exercised its
discretion, we consider whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.
When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, we
have no authority to substitute our view for that of the trial court. (In re
Marriage of Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 702.)
II. Substantial Evidence Supports DVRO
Husband argues his conduct did not constitute abuse. The DVRO is
based on the trial court’s finding that husband’s actions disturbed wife’s
peace. Husband fails to meet his heavy burden to demonstrate the trial
court’s finding is not supported by substantial evidence. (Ashby v. Ashby
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 512.)
As an initial matter, husband’s appellate briefing does not provide a
fair and adequate summary of the evidence presented at trial, both favorable
and unfavorable. (Ashby v. Ashby, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 512.) His
statement of facts provides background information about the parties’ brief
marriage and separation in a light favorable to him. It summarizes in one
two-sentence paragraph wife’s “litany of alleged abuse,” which included
emotional abuse and then incorrectly states that the trial court did not find
wife proved any of “these alleged events,” without ever summarizing the
allegations or the evidence. Although the trial court’s ruling did not find
5
sufficient evidence for some of wife’s allegations, it issued the DVRO based on
husband’s uncivil, unpeaceful, and disturbing communications. Husband’s
statement of facts concludes by stating the trial court’s ruling focused on
video calls between husband and Gabriel and then briefly summarizes only
one of two video calls entered into evidence. While we could consider
husband’s substantial evidence argument forfeited for his failure to present a
fair and adequate summary of the evidence, we exercise our discretion to
reach the merits. (Parris J. v. Christopher U., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p.
116.)
The evidence includes an April 1, 2024, video call between father and
Gabriel. Gabriel is at a friend’s home with mother. Mother is not on the
video call. Gabriel is in dress-up clothing. Father asks who put the dress on
Gabriel. Gabriel says mother did. Father then repeatedly asks if mother is
in the room. Jessica Robinson, the mother of Gabriel’s friend, is heard on the
video. Father questions Jessica about why Gabriel was in a dress and
whether she thinks it is appropriate. Jessica says she will not engage in
conversation with him. Father states Jessica should not be on the call, and
he accuses her of contempt of court. He states he is going to hang up and call
back in two minutes and expects mother to be on the call. Father ends the
call.
Several days later, during a second video call between father and
Gabriel, father immediately asks who put a dress on Gabriel. Gabriel says
mother did. Mother is not on the video call. Father asks where she is, and
Gabriel says she is downstairs. Father repeatedly asks who is in the room
with Gabriel, and Gabriel says a person named Taylor. Father repeatedly
demands the adult identify herself and states she does not have his
permission to be on the call. Father repeatedly asks Gabriel to show him the
6
person in the room. Gabriel does not respond. Father again asks who put
Gabriel in the dress. Gabriel again says mother did, and then he puts on
adult women’s shoes. Father objects to Gabriel’s wearing adult women’s
shoes. Father repeatedly asks for the adult in the room to take responsibility
for the unsafe situation, which he twice states is a prima facie case of child
neglect. No other adult appears in the video call. After arguing with Gabriel
about wearing the shoes, Gabriel says he wants to say good night and the call
ends.
When the videos were played at trial, the trial court asked husband
why he made comments about prima facie evidence of neglect. He
acknowledged he was making a record to bring to his attorneys.
Husband argues the videos only demonstrate his “frustration” with
Gabriel’s wearing dresses and that the trial court “fixated” on that
frustration. He claims his conduct was not abuse under section 6320.
Husband improperly focuses only on portions of the record in isolation and
ignores other evidence in support of the trial court’s findings.
The trial court’s ruling is expressly based on “the totality of the
evidence” and husband’s “communications with [wife]” and his “demeanor
and conduct . . . when [he] feels the need to express his concerns and ‘make a
record’ . . . .” It states: “Based on the various TPA messages and video
evidence presented, [husband’s] communications lacked civility and were not
peaceful.” Husband does not mention the testimony of wife or Jessica, which
is further evidence in support of the DVRO. Jessica testified she
accompanied wife to visitation exchanges multiple times since December
2022. At one exchange at a police station, husband demanded the exchange
occur outside, contrary to prior exchanges that occurred inside the station.
Husband was angry, frustrated, and aggressive, and he blocked wife from
7
entering the building. They walked around him, and as they entered the
station husband threatened to file a report against wife. Gabriel was crying
and clinging to wife. Wife testified to the same incident and stated husband
was inches from her face shouting at her. Wife also testified to another
exchange in March 2024, when husband was agitated and confrontational
with her because she did not agree to have visitation exchanges at his church
without a supervisor. At another exchange at the police station in June 2024,
husband was aggressive and accusatory toward wife about what Gabriel was
wearing.
As the trial court stated, it considered the totality of the circumstances
and determined that husband’s conduct warranted the DVRO. Conduct
involving communications can constitute abuse under the “ ‘disturbing the
peace’ ” provision of the DVPA. (Bassi v. Bassi (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1080,
1105 (Bassi).) Here, there is sufficient evidence to support the finding that
husband’s repeated conduct in communicating with wife violated the
disturbing the peace provision of the DVPA. Even if the evidence could have
supported a contrary finding, we may not reweigh the evidence or reassess
witness credibility. (In re Marriage of Hill & Dittmer (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th
1046, 1051–1052.)
Husband cites S.M. v. E.P. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1249 and
summarizes its facts, but not its holding, and then claims that “[j]ust as in
S.M. v. E.P.” the trial court findings here establish that husband’s conduct
did not place wife in reasonable fear of serious bodily injury or constitute
behavior that may be enjoined under section 6320. Although the trial court
did not find sufficient evidence of wife’s physical abuse allegations, it did find
that husband’s communications with wife were disturbing, lacked civility,
and were not peaceful. “Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction of
8
physical injury or assault.” (§ 6203, subd. (b).) Behavior that disturbs the
peace of the other party may constitute abuse and may be enjoined. (§§ 6203,
subd. (a), 6320, subd. (a).) S.M. v. E.P., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th 1249, is
distinguishable because its holding reversing a DVRO is based on a record
that establishes the trial court’s misunderstanding of its authority to limit
the legal effect of the DVRO and its “attempt[] to create its own version of a
restraining order that did not require a finding of abuse . . . and that would
not trigger the presumption against sole or joint custody.” (Id. at p. 1268.)
Here, the trial court found husband’s communications with wife constituted
abuse under the DVPA.
Husband also relies upon Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, which
held that a single social media post by one former partner claiming physical
and verbal abuse by the other former partner was not sufficient to support
the issuance of a DVRO based on destruction of a party’s mental and
emotional calm. (Id. at p. 13.) As discussed ante, here there was evidence of
multiple instances of husband’s aggressive and confrontational behavior
during communications with wife at visitation exchanges, as well as video
call evidence in which husband made accusations of child neglect and
demanded to speak with wife.
Husband acknowledges case law holding that statements made outside
the presence of the protected party may constitute abuse if they disturb the
peace of the protected party. (In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1498–1499; Altafulla v. Ervin (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th
571, 574.) However, he argues that the conduct in those cases was more
extreme and disturbing than his conduct here. While that may be, it does not
mean husband’s conduct is insufficient to support the DVRO. (Bassi, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at p. 1106 [the “broad authority conferred by the DVPA . . .
9
allows the court to consider ‘the totality of the circumstances’ in determining
whether the conduct ‘destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other
party’ (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (c))”]; K.L. v. R.H. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
965, 981 [“What disturbs the peace of a person differs in each case”].)
III. Trial Court Did Not Violate Husband’s Due Process Rights
Husband contends the trial court violated his due process rights. His
argument is cursory and unclear. He first contends that the trial court’s
ruling refers to TPA messages but does not specify which specific
communications were abusive. The TPA messages were admitted into
evidence, and husband was questioned about them during the trial. He
provides no authority for his position that his due process rights were
violated because the trial court’s ruling does not identify specific details of
some of the evidence it references as part of the totality of the circumstances.
(See Tun v. Wells Fargo Dealer Services, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 309, 329
[rejecting argument made in summary fashion without supporting legal
authority].)
Next, husband contends that during trial the trial court referenced
video evidence presented at another court hearing. He claims it is unclear
what the evidence was and then concludes that the trial court “very likely
considered evidence over the months of hearings that is outside the record,”
which violated his due process rights. A review of the record does not support
husband’s claim. The record clarifies that following a chambers conference
the trial court summarized the discussions with the parties and referred to a
video call between father and Gabriel that was presented at another recent
hearing. Both the trial court and counsel for wife stated on the record that
the video evidence the trial court mentioned was not evidence in the DVRO
hearing. Then, during husband’s continued cross-examination, the video
10
calls from April 1, 2024, and April 3, 2024, were both played and entered into
evidence, with no objection. Our review of the record indicates that the video
evidence the trial court initially referenced that was presented at a prior
hearing was then entered into evidence at the DVRO hearing. Husband was
presented with the evidence and had an opportunity to testify about it. There
was no due process violation.
Husband further argues that the trial court “prevent[ed] the testimony”
of one of husband’s witnesses. His brief does not adequately explain what the
witness would have testified about, how it was relevant, or the basis for the
trial court’s alleged ruling. (Cryoport Systems v. CNA Ins. Cos. (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 627, 633 [“Simply hinting at an argument and leaving it to the
appellate court to develop it is not adequate”].) The portion of the record to
which husband cites indicates that the trial court questioned whether the
witness’s testimony was relevant to impeach anything wife had testified
about up to that point in the hearing. It ultimately concluded the witness’s
testimony was not relevant “at this time.” Husband’s counsel reserved the
right to call the witness at a later date but apparently never did so. The trial
court expressly stated it was not precluding her from testifying. There was
no due process violation.
IV. DVRO Was Not a Mutual Restraining Order
Husband’s final argument is that the trial court failed to make the
necessary factual findings required under section 6305 for the issuance of a
mutual restraining order. Section 6305 states that the court “shall not issue
a mutual order enjoining the parties from specific acts of abuse described in
Section 6320 unless . . . : [¶] (1) Both parties appear and each party presents
written evidence of abuse or domestic violence [and ¶] (2) The court makes
detailed findings of fact indicating that both parties acted as a primary
11
aggressor and that neither party acted primarily in self-defense.” Husband
contends that the DVRO was a mutual order because in the three-page
attachment to the mandatory form DV-130, Restraining Order After Hearing
(§ 6221, subd. (c)), the trial court’s terms and conditions included the
following, which apply to both parties: “Peaceful communication is allowed
only on the TPA about Gabriel’s visitation, medical and school matters”;
“Parties are reminded that any failure to follow court orders may affect
respective parental rights”; “Parties shall not to make [sic] any disparaging
comments about the other parent within earshot of the child”; and “Parties
shall not discuss or make any comments about court proceedings and
lawsuits within earshot of the child.” Further, the attachment also states:
“Petitioner [wife] must inform Respondent [husband] of matters concerning
health, education and welfare of Gabriel.”
Wife argues that the trial court found only husband committed abuse
and that the terms and conditions referenced by husband are neutral and do
not rise to the level of a mutual restraining order. She has not appealed and
does not contend that the DVRO improperly implicates her conduct. The
three-page attachment was attached to the 10-page form DV-130, which
identifies wife as the protected person and husband as the restrained person
and orders husband not to abuse or contact wife and to stay away from her,
with the exception of peaceful communication through TPA regarding child
visitation. Husband does not cite any authority holding that a DVRO entered
on form DV-130, which restrains only one party, but also includes attached
terms and conditions similar to those imposed here, constitutes a mutual
restraining order. We are not persuaded that the inclusion of the referenced
terms and conditions transforms the DVRO into a mutual restraining order
invoking section 6305. However, even if we were to consider the DVRO to be
12
a mutual restraining order, husband has not demonstrated how he is
prejudiced by terms and conditions that require wife to communicate
peacefully, follow court orders, and not make disparaging comments about
him or discuss court proceedings in the presence of their child. (Freeman v.
Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523, 528 [“There is no presumption of
prejudice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) Instead, the
burden to demonstrate prejudice is on the appellant”].)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs
on appeal.
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Burns, J.
Chou, J.
A172101/Amanda F. v. David S.
13
