Filed 8/27/26 Salem v. Aljojo CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
NADIA KAMEL SALEM, B346381
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 22STCV09355)
v.
ADNAN MOHAMED ALJOJO,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Maurice A. Leiter, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Kassouni Law and Timothy V. Kassouni for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Zach’s Law and Zachary C. Skidelsky for Defendant and
Respondent.
Nadia Kamel Salem sued her eldest son, Adnan Mohamed
Aljojo, for the cancellation of a quitclaim deed obtained by fraud.1
After a bench trial, the trial court held that Adnan fraudulently
obtained title to Nadia’s home but found the statute of limitations
barred her claim. To reach the latter conclusion, the court relied
on statements appearing in a letter offered by Adnan as proof
that Nadia retained a law firm to pursue him for fraud more than
four years before filing her case. Nadia contends the letter
contained hearsay and its admission constituted prejudicial error.
We agree with Nadia, reverse the judgment, vacate the
award of prevailing party costs, and remand the matter with
directions to enter judgment in her favor.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the 1990s, Nadia and her husband Mohamed Aljojo
immigrated to Los Angeles and purchased a family home on
Clinton Street. They have seven children, including Adnan,
Amal, Emad, Adel, and Huda. In 1994 and 1998, Nadia and
Mohamed executed durable powers of attorney, appointing
Adnan as their attorney-in-fact to manage the family home. In
2001, Mohamed and Nadia conveyed the Clinton home to Nadia
as her separate property. Mohamed died in 2020.
A. The Quitclaim Deed, Revocation, and Demand Letter
In January 2016, Nadia traveled with Adnan to the United
States Embassy in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to transfer money
between banks. Adnan presented Nadia with a document written
in English to complete the transfer of funds. Nadia did not read
1 In accordance with the appellate briefing, we refer to the parties
and their family members by first name. We intend no disrespect.
2
or speak English and signed the document without reviewing it.
The document Nadia signed was actually a quitclaim deed
transferring title to the Clinton home to Adnan.
In July 2017, Adnan and Adel were engaged in a dispute
concerning Adel’s right to occupy the Clinton home. Nadia
executed a formal revocation of Adnan’s power of attorney to
prevent his ouster of Adel. Adnan filed an unlawful detainer
action against Adel, and his counsel in that action purportedly
received a letter dated September 28, 2017, from a law firm
stating it represented Nadia. The letter demanded that Adnan
return title of the property to Nadia.
B. Complaint and Trial
Nadia commenced this action on March 16, 2022, and filed
the operative first amended complaint alleging a single claim to
cancel the quitclaim deed due to fraud and nondelivery. (See Civ.
Code, § 3412.) The complaint alleged Adnan “fraudulently
represented to [Nadia] that she was signing a bank authorization
form when, in fact, she was signing a quitclaim deed” conveying
the Clinton home to Adnan. Nadia requested an order cancelling
the quitclaim deed. Adnan’s demurrer and motion for summary
judgment, each raising statute of limitations defenses based upon
the September 2017 demand letter, were overruled and denied.
The court held a three-day bench trial on Adnan’s statute of
limitations defense and Nadia’s underlying claim. Nadia testified
she never intended to convey the Clinton home to Adnan. Amal
and her children, Adel and his family, and Huda lived in the
Clinton home at various times. Nadia did not learn about
Adnan’s fraudulent conduct in obtaining title to the home until
2022 when Amal told her Adnan “got the house in his name.”
3
On cross-examination, Nadia was questioned about the
2017 disagreement over Adel’s occupation of the Clinton home.
Nadia knew about the “issues between” Adel and Adnan and
tried to “reconcile” their conflict by revoking Adnan’s power of
attorney. Nadia denied knowing “any attorneys” involved in the
unlawful detainer action Adnan filed against Adel. Nadia “did
not help” Adel find a lawyer to defend himself. She testified, “I
am the owner of the house. I told him [to] take away the lawsuit,
Adnan. Adel is your brother and the house belongs to me. I came
here to reconcile between them.”
Nadia was then asked about the 2017 revocation. She
admitted cancelling Adnan’s power of attorney at an American
consulate in Saudi Arabia. When asked if her “lawyer in
California type[d] up this document and ask you to have it
notarized,” she replied, “I don’t have an attorney at all.” Nadia
“never hired an attorney” and never saw an attorney for the
revocation. Asked why she revoked Adnan’s power of attorney,
Nadia replied, “When Adnan wanted to kick out Adel, I am the
owner of the house. How could he do this without my
knowledge?” Nadia “did not know” Adnan claimed ownership of
the Clinton home during this dispute. “If [Adnan] said ‘this is my
house,’” Nadia “would have kicked him out myself. This is my
house, not his house.”
Nadia was also cross-examined about a state bar complaint
Adel purportedly filed against the law firm that issued the
demand letter to Adnan.2 As before, Nadia testified she had
“never been to an attorney” in connection with the unlawful
2 According to questions posed by Adnan’s counsel during cross-
examinations of Nadia and Emad, Adel retained the law firm to
represent him in the 2017 unlawful detainer.
4
detainer action and denied wanting to join her son’s state bar
complaint.3 Emad echoed Nadia’s testimony: “My mother [has]
never seen an attorney. She never hired an attorney” and “has
nothing to do with the attorney of Adel.” Nadia and Emad also
testified about Adnan’s history of signing other people’s names on
financial documents.4
Nobody from the law firm that issued the demand letter
testified. Adnan’s prior counsel who purportedly received the
demand letter did not testify either.
Adnan testified he purchased the Clinton home but placed
title in his parents’ names to avoid child support payments.
Adnan admitted the initial deeds transferred title to his parents
and that he refinanced the home on Nadia’s behalf “[o]n multiple
occasions.” Though he admitted Nadia never told him she
intended to transfer the Clinton home to him, Adnan testified
that Nadia “gifted” it to him through the quitclaim deed. Adnan
acknowledged he had “forged names on documents bearing [his]
family members’ signatures” because he was “authorized to do all
of the work.” Adnan said that nobody in his family disputed his
claim of ownership in 2017.
When discussing the unlawful detainer action against Adel,
Adnan testified that his prior attorney forwarded him the
September 2017 demand letter. Over Nadia’s hearsay objection,
3 She testified, “I don’t know any attorneys. I have not hired any
attorneys except this one over here,” and “I have never been to an
attorney.”
4 In its statement of decision, the trial court observed, for
example, that Adnan had admitted to forging Emad’s signature in
various situations and “obtaining a false driver’s license in Emad’s
name, with Adnan’s picture. Adnan also admitted falsely claiming to
be Emad in a court proceeding.”
5
the court admitted the letter into evidence. The letter appears on
letterhead for the Law Offices of Phillip Myer, is addressed to
Adnan’s former counsel, is signed by a person identified as “Case
Manager Civil Litigation,” and attaches Nadia’s notarized
revocation of Adnan’s power of attorney. The letter states in
relevant part:
“This office has been retained by Nadia Salem
to pursue an action against your client Adnan Aljojo
for . . . return of the [Clinton home] which was
fraudulently transferred by your client pursuant to a
Power of Attorney (Now Revoked) . . .
“This letter will serve as a formal written
demand to your client Adnan Aljojo to return legal
ownership and transfer title of the above referenced
property back to our client Nadia Salem forthwith
and without compensation.”
C. Statement of Decision and Judgment
The court issued a statement of decision finding Nadia to
be the true owner of the Clinton home before execution of the
quitclaim deed. The court found Nadia’s testimony about signing
the quitclaim deed “credible, and Adnan’s testimony was not.” It
then found by “clear and convincing evidence that Adnan
obtained the [quitclaim deed] by fraud.”
Notwithstanding these findings, the court found Adnan met
his burden of establishing Nadia’s claim was barred under the
three-year statute of limitations for fraud. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 338, subd. (d).) In support, the court stated: “The evidence
showed that, on September 28, 2017, Nadia’s attorney sent a
letter to Adnan’s attorney, stating that Nadia would pursue a
claim against Adnan for, among other things, conversion and
return of the Clinton property. . . .” The court issued judgment in
6
favor of Adnan and awarded him $12,702 in prevailing party
costs. Nadia appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Demand Letter Is Inadmissible Hearsay
Nadia contends the trial court erred by admitting the
demand letter “to prove the truth of its contents,” namely, that
she retained Myer and was thus on notice of Adnan’s fraud.
Adnan agrees “[t]he letter was admitted solely to establish that
Appellant, through counsel, was on notice of the alleged fraud no
later than September 2017.” He argues, however, that this
constituted a non-hearsay purpose. We agree with Nadia.
The trial court’s admission of evidence is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. (Evans v. Hood Corp. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th
1022, 1040 (Evans).) The court’s discretion is “‘subject to the
limitations of legal principles governing the subject of its action,
and to reversal on appeal where no reasonable basis for the
action is shown.’ [Citations.] ‘The scope of discretion always
resides in the particular law being applied, . . . Action that
transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is
outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an “abuse”
of discretion. [Citation.]’” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University
of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.)
“Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the
truth of its content.” (Hart v. Keenan Properties, Inc. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 442, 447, fn. omitted (Hart); see Evid. Code, § 1200,
subd. (a).) “A document is generally a form of written verbal
expression. If it is prepared before trial and offered to prove the
truth of the words it contains, it is hearsay.” (Hart, at p. 447.)
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Hearsay evidence is inadmissible except as provided by law.
(Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (b).)
An out-of-court statement may be admitted for a
nonhearsay purpose “if the statement is ‘“significant irrespective
of the truth or falsity of its content.”’ [Citation.]” (Evans, supra,
5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1043–1044.) “‘“The first and most basic
requirement for applying the not-for-the-truth limitation . . . is
that the out-of-court statement must be offered for some purpose
independent of the truth of the matters it asserts. That means
that the statement must be capable of serving its nonhearsay
purpose regardless of whether the jury believes the matters
asserted to be true. . . .”’” (Hart, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 447,
citations omitted; see id. at p. 448 [“the nontruth purpose for
which a statement is offered must be relevant”].)5 This limitation
“can prove analytically elusive when the words themselves also
make an assertion. [Citation.] If the words are admitted for a
nonhearsay purpose the jury is not allowed to consider the truth
of any substantive assertion, . . .” (Id. at p. 448.)
Courts have admitted out of court statements for the
nonhearsay purposes of establishing the speaker’s knowledge or
state of mind (Colarossi v. Coty US Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
1142, 1150; Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 114,
125 (Taylor)). Out of court statements may also be admitted for
5 “For example, suppose A hit B after B said, ‘You’re stupid.’ B’s
out-of-court statement asserts that A is stupid. If those words are
offered to prove that A is, indeed, stupid, they constitute hearsay and
would be inadmissible unless they fell under a hearsay exception.
However, those same words might be admissible for a nonhearsay
purpose: to prove that A had a motive to assault B. The distinction
turns not on the words themselves, but what they are offered to prove.”
(Hart, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 447–448.)
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the nonhearsay purpose of showing an “effect on the listener”
(People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1115; People v. Scalzi
(1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 901, 907 (Scalzi)) or to demonstrate
“certain information” was imparted to the listener (People v.
Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 863 (Montes)). The demand letter
was not used for any of these nonhearsay purposes.
The key disputed fact in this case was whether Nadia had
notice or knowledge of Adnan’s fraud in September 2017. (See
Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d); Kline v. Turner (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373–1374.) Adnan admits he offered the
demand letter to establish this fact. If Nadia had authored the
letter, it might be used for the nonhearsay purpose of showing
her knowledge of an accrued claim in 2017. (See Taylor, supra,
65 Cal.2d at p. 125.) But Nadia did not author the letter. A case
manager associated with an attorney named Myer, neither of
whom testified at trial, purportedly wrote the letter.
The only way to “link” Nadia to the demand letter was
through the truth of the substantive assertion in the letter
itself—that Myer was retained by Nadia to pursue an action
against Adnan for fraud. (See Hart, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 448.)
Because the letter was offered for the truth of the matter
asserted, Nadia’s hearsay objection should have been sustained.
(See ibid.; see also In re Marriage of M.P. & M.C. (2025) 116
Cal.App.5th 1096, 1107 [same principle]; Am-Cal Investment Co.
v. Sharlyn Estates, Inc. (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 526, 541 (Am-Cal
Investment) [same].)
The authorities cited by Adnan do not persuade us
otherwise.6 Almost all of them address statements offered to
6 Adnan’s appellate brief cites these cases generally, “providing no
help as to what part of the opinion has relevance to this case.” (In re
9
show the effect on the listener. (E.g., People v. Bell (2019) 7
Cal.5th 70, 100; Montes, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 863; Scalzi,
supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 907.) The demand letter was not
offered to prove the effect on its recipients; it was offered to
attribute knowledge or notice of a claim to Nadia. Adnan failed
to establish whether Nadia received the demand letter or had any
affiliation with its author. It was error to admit the demand
letter for its truth.
B. The Error Was Prejudicial
Nadia contends the error was prejudicial. We agree.
Reviewing courts may not reverse a judgment or set aside a
verdict “by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence” unless
the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Evid. Code, § 353,
subd. (b); see F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1107;
Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) To establish a miscarriage of justice,
Nadia must demonstrate prejudice, “‘that is, that a different
result would have been probable if the error had not occurred.’
[Citation.]” (Evans, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040.)
Nadia has established prejudice. As discussed, the court
admitted the demand letter to establish Nadia’s notice for
purposes of claim accrual under Adnan’s statute of limitations
defense, a “critical issue involved in the trial.” (Am-Cal
Investment, supra, 255 Cal.App.2d at p. 541.) Its finding that the
September 2017 demand letter established such notice was
unsupported by legally admissible evidence. (Compare id. at
pp. 534–535, 541–543.)
S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 412.) “[I]t is not the role of an
appellate court to carry appellate counsel’s burden.” (Ibid.)
10
Adnan contends any evidentiary error was harmless
because the statute of limitations ruling “did not rest solely” on
the demand letter. In support, he avers additional evidence
established: (1) Nadia “retained counsel, investigated the
transaction, and formally threatened litigation”; (2) Nadia “joined
with her son Adel” to file a state bar complaint against the
attorney affiliated with the letter; and (3) the demand letter was
“accompanied” by Nadia’s revocation of Adnan’s power of
attorney. We address, and reject, each averment in turn.
Adnan cites no evidence other than the demand letter to
support his first averment that Nadia “retained counsel,
investigated the transaction, and formally threatened litigation.”
The citations he provides are to the demand letter itself and the
court’s statement of decision. Neither constitutes independent
evidence. (See Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care, Inc. (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 1361, 1379 [statement of decision “is not evidence”].)
Adnan’s second averment is also unsupported by the
record. Adnan cites his own trial exhibit to establish Nadia’s
joinder to a purported state bar complaint filed by Adel against
the law firm that authored the demand letter. That exhibit, a
screenshot of a typewritten message dated March 27, 2018,
bearing a handwritten signature, provides: “I Nadia Kamel
would like to join the complaint my son, Adel Aljojo, filing [sic]
against the law offices of Philip [sic] Myer.” When shown this
exhibit at trial and asked if she signed it, Nadia testified, “What
is this for?” and “I don’t know because Adnan would sign my
name everywhere.” Adnan did not identify who authored the
writing, how Nadia’s signature came to appear on it, how he
obtained a copy of it, or how he obtained personal knowledge of
Adel’s state bar complaint or the nature thereof. Adel did not
11
testify, and no state bar complaint was offered into evidence to
corroborate the writing Nadia disavowed. Without such
evidence, the writing Adnan offered into evidence does not
corroborate Nadia hiring or consulting with the law firm.
The same is true of Adnan’s final averment. The fact that
Nadia’s revocation was attached to the demand letter proves only
that the person who prepared the letter had the revocation in
their possession. The only admissible evidence contextualizing
Nadia’s revocation was her own testimony. Nadia testified that
she revoked Adnan’s power of attorney to “reconcile” his ongoing
dispute over occupancy of the Clinton home with Adel. When she
executed the revocation, Nadia believed she owned the home, did
not know that Adnan claimed ownership, and wanted him to stop
exercising her power as the owner. Absent other contextualizing
evidence, it cannot be reasonably inferred from the revocation
that Nadia was on notice Adnan had fraudulently procured her
signature on the quitclaim deed. (See Roddenberry v.
Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651 [“Speculation or
conjecture alone is not substantial evidence”].)
Independent of the hearsay statements in the demand
letter, Adnan presented insufficient admissible evidence to prove
the facts upon which he based his statute of limitations
affirmative defense. (Bowser v. Ford Motor Co. (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 587, 613–614 [declarations of alleged agent “‘are not
admissible to prove the fact of his agency or the extent of his
power as such agent’”].) The judgment must thus be reversed.
A reversal of judgment “‘“based on insufficiency of the
evidence should place the parties, at most, in the position they
were in after all the evidence was in and both sides had rested.”
[Citations.] . . . “[F]or our justice system to function, it is
12
necessary that litigants assume responsibility for the complete
litigation of their cause during the proceedings.”’ [Citation.]”
(Frank v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 805, 833–
834; see Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc.
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1, 16 [absent sufficient evidence to support
judgment, proper remedy is reversal with directions].) As the
party asserting a statute of limitations defense, Adnan bore the
burden to “prove the facts necessary to enjoy its benefit.”
(Samuels v. Mix (1999) 22 Cal.4th 1, 10.) Adnan has neither
requested retrial nor cited authority in his appellate brief
authorizing retrial as a remedy for a successful appeal on
grounds of insufficient evidence supporting the judgment.
We therefore reverse the judgment, vacate the prevailing
party cost award in Adnan’s favor and, in light of the court’s
findings in favor of Nadia on the merits, direct the lower court to
enter judgment in her favor.7
7 In light of our conclusions, we do not address Nadia’s remaining
contentions. (See Prouty v. Gores Technology Group (2004) 121
Cal.App.4th 1225, 1237, fn. 4.)
13
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to
the trial court with directions to vacate the prevailing cost award
in favor of Adnan and enter a modified judgment in favor of
Nadia on her claim for cancellation of the Quitclaim Deed (Civ.
Code, § 3412). Nadia shall recover costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, Acting P. J.
We concur:
TAMZARIAN, J.
DAUM, J.
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