IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH MAYOR,
Petitioner,
v.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and ROSS
VALLEY SANITATION DISTRICT,
Respondents.

S287261

First Appellate District, Division Four
A169465

Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
ADJ10036954

August 24, 2026

Justice Evans authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger,
Groban, and Kim* concurred.

*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
 MAYOR v. WORKERS’ COMP. APPEALS BD.
S287261

Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

Joseph Mayor was awarded total and permanent
disability for an injury he suffered while working for Ross Valley
Sanitation District (Ross Valley). Ross Valley timely filed a
petition for reconsideration of the award. At the time, Labor
Code section 59091 provided that a petition for reconsideration
“is deemed to have been denied” by the Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Board (Appeals Board) “unless it is acted upon within
60 days from the date of filing.” (Stats. 1992, ch. 1226, § 5,
p. 5766.) The Appeals Board did not act on the petition for
reconsideration until 144 days after it was filed. The Appeals
Board represented that it failed to act because it did not receive
notice of the petition for reconsideration until after the 60-day
statutory window expired. The issue before us is whether the
Appeals Board may equitably toll former section 5909’s 60-day
deadline for the Board to act on a petition for reconsideration
when the Board did not receive the petition until after the
deadline elapsed. The Court of Appeal held that former section
5909 is mandatory, and the Appeals Board exceeded its
jurisdiction when it acted on the petition for reconsideration
outside the 60-day statutory period. (Mayor v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeals Bd. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1297, 1309 (Mayor).)

1
Further unlabeled statutory references are to the Labor
Code.

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 MAYOR v. WORKERS’ COMP. APPEALS BD.
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

We agree with the Court of Appeal that the deadline in
former section 5909 is mandatory and that the Appeals Board
may not equitably toll its own deadline to act. Tolling operates
to allow litigants to pursue claims outside of an applicable
statute of limitations when certain equitable considerations are
present. It does not apply to the Appeals Board’s own deadline
to act. While there may be some narrow circumstances in which
due process considerations could permit the Appeals Board to
act outside of the 60-day deadline, Ross Valley has not asserted
that its due process rights were violated, and the Board’s
automatic tolling of its own deadline is not the appropriate
mechanism to resolve such concerns. We therefore affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeal granting Mayor’s petition for
writ of mandate.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2013, Joseph Mayor suffered an industrial
injury while working for Ross Valley Sanitation District. Mayor
filed a workers’ compensation claim and a workers’
compensation judge (WCJ) issued an award finding Mayor
totally and permanently disabled. On March 23, 2023, Ross
Valley timely filed a petition for reconsideration of the WCJ’s
award. Mayor filed a timely answer to the petition. Within 15
days of the filing of a petition for reconsideration, regulations
require the WCJ to either prepare a report and make a
recommendation to the Appeals Board regarding how to dispose
of the petition, rescind the award and initiate further
proceedings, or rescind the award and issue an amended award.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10961; see also id. § 10962.) For
reasons unclear in the record, the WCJ did not take any action
on the petition for reconsideration.

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

The Appeals Board in turn did not take action within 60
days of the filing of the petition for reconsideration. Seventy-
four days after filing its petition for reconsideration, Ross Valley
sent a letter to the Appeals Board inquiring as to the petition’s
status. This is the first and only time Ross Valley communicated
with the Appeals Board about the petition. There is no
indication in the record that the Appeals Board responded to
this inquiry.
Nearly five months (144 days) after the petition for
reconsideration was filed, the Appeals Board issued an opinion
and order granting the petition for reconsideration. Attached to
the order was a “Notice Pursuant to Shipley [v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1104 (Shipley)]” that provided:
“Reconsideration has been sought with regard to the decision
filed on March 2, 2023. Labor Code section 5909 provides that
a petition for reconsideration is deemed denied unless the
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board acts on the petition
within 60 days of filing . . . . The petition(s) was filed on March
23, 2023. The Appeals Board first received notice of the
petition(s) on or about June 15, 2023 . . . . The Opinion and
Order Granting Petition for Reconsideration filed
simultaneously with this Notice may be considered timely if
issued within 60 days of the Appeals Board receiving notice of
the petition(s).”2
Mayor filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of
Appeal requesting that the opinion and order granting the

2
According to the Appeals Board, a Shipley notice is not an
order or opinion of the Appeals Board; instead, it provides notice
to the parties that the Appeals Board will be considering Shipley
when it issues its final opinion.

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 MAYOR v. WORKERS’ COMP. APPEALS BD.
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

petition for reconsideration be rescinded as untimely and void,
and he requested to enforce the WCJ’s award of permanent
disability in his favor. Mayor argued the 60-day deadline in
former section 5909 was mandatory and jurisdictional, so the
Appeals Board acted in excess of its powers when it granted the
petition for reconsideration after the deadline passed.
While the writ petition was pending, the Appeals Board
issued an opinion and order granting the petition for
reconsideration and decision after reconsideration. Shortly
thereafter, the Appeals Board rescinded its opinion and order
and issued a revised order addressing Shipley. It took the
position that Shipley “properly recognized that in workers’
compensation, deprivation of reconsideration without due
process — without . . . full de novo review of the record in the
case — ‘offends’ the fundamental right of due process, as well as
the Appeals Board’s mandate to ‘accomplish substantial justice
in all cases.’ ” The Appeals Board also noted that with respect
to petitions for reconsideration that it does not receive within 60
days of filing “due to irregularities outside the petitioner’s
control,” under Shipley, the Appeals Board “acts to grant or deny
such petitions for reconsideration within 60 days of receipt of
any such petition, and thereafter to issue a decision on the
merits. By doing so, the Appeals Board also preserves the
parties’ ability to seek meaningful appellate review.” (Italics
added.)
Turning to this case, the Appeals Board acknowledged
Ross Valley filed a timely petition for reconsideration on March
23, 2023. According to the Appeals Board, it did not receive the
petition until more than 60 days after it was filed due to an
administrative irregularity that was neither party’s fault. The
Appeals Board concluded that it could toll the time for it to act

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 MAYOR v. WORKERS’ COMP. APPEALS BD.
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

on the petition for reconsideration until the petition was
available to the Board, so that its order granting reconsideration
was timely.
While the writ petition was pending, the Legislature
enacted Assembly Bill No. 171 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.)
(Assembly Bill 171), which amended former section 5909 to
state: “(a) A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been
denied by the appeals board unless it is acted upon within 60
days from the date a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals
board. [¶] (b)(1) When a trial judge transmits a case to the
appeals board, the trial judge shall provide notice to the parties
of the case and the appeals board. [¶] (2) For purposes of
paragraph (1), service of the accompanying report, pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 5900, shall constitute providing notice.
[¶] (c) This section shall remain in effect only until July 1, 2026,
and as of that date is repealed.” (Stats. 2024, ch. 52, § 27,
repealed by its own terms; replaced by Stats. 2024, ch. 52, § 28,
eff. July 1, 2026.3)
The Court of Appeal granted Mayor’s writ petition. It held
former section 5909 is mandatory and the Appeals Board
exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing an order granting Ross

3
The sunset provision that was to take effect July 1, 2026,
would have reinstated former section 5909’s requirement that
petitions for reconsideration are deemed denied unless acted
upon within 60 days from the date of filing. Since we granted
review, the Legislature repealed the sunset provision. As a
result, section 5909 maintains the amended trigger for the
Appeals Board to act on a petition for reconsideration as 60 days
from the date the trial judge transmits the case to the Board.
(Stats. 2026, ch. 83, § 19, eff. July 13, 2026; see also Sen. Rules
Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill 171
(2025–2026 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 29, 2026, p. 2.)

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 MAYOR v. WORKERS’ COMP. APPEALS BD.
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

Valley’s petition for reconsideration more than 60 days after it
was filed. (Mayor, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 1301.) In so
concluding, the Court of Appeal followed Zurich American Ins.
Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1213
(Zurich), which held that the Appeals Board acted in excess of
its jurisdiction in granting a petition for reconsideration after
the 60-day deadline passed. (Mayor, at p. 1301, see also Zurich,
at pp. 1230, 1236, & fn. 17.)
We granted review. Since that time, we have granted
review and deferred further action in other matters raising the
issue presented here until after this case is decided. (City of
Salinas v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th
801, review granted Nov. 19, 2025, S293212 (City of Salinas)
[holding former section 5909 is mandatory but not jurisdictional
and facts supported application of equitable tolling]; Ishal v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., review granted Feb. 19, 2025,
S288364; L.A. Specialty Produce Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals
Bd., review granted Jan. 29, 2025, S288040; Zenith Ins. Co. v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 510, review
granted Apr. 29, 2026, S295357 (Zenith) [following City of
Salinas and concluding facts did not support application of
equitable tolling].)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Relevant Legal Background
Article XIV, section 4 of the California Constitution
expressly vests the Legislature “with plenary power, unlimited
by any provision of this Constitution, to create, and enforce a
complete system of workers’ compensation, by appropriate
legislation.” Section 4 also “ratified and confirmed” “the
creation and existence of the industrial accident commission of

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 MAYOR v. WORKERS’ COMP. APPEALS BD.
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

this State” and vested plenary power in the Legislature “to
provide for the settlement of any disputes arising under such
legislation . . . by an industrial accident commission.” (Cal.
Const., art. XIV, § 4.) This provision also declares that “the
administration of such legislation shall accomplish substantial
justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without
incumbrance of any character.” (Ibid.)
To this end, the Legislature enacted the Workers’
Compensation Act, a comprehensive statutory scheme in the
Labor Code. (§ 3201 et seq.; see also id. § 3201 [“This division
and Division 5 (commencing with Section 6300) are an
expression of the police power and are intended to make
effective and apply to a complete system of workers’
compensation the provisions of Section 4 of Article XIV of the
California Constitution”].) At the time of former section 5909’s
enactment, all workers’ compensation matters were handled by
the Industrial Accident Commission. (See, e.g., former § 5900,
Stats. 1937, ch. 90, p. 302 [permitting an individual to petition
the Commission for rehearing]; see also former § 5908, Stats.
1937, ch. 90, p. 304 [permitting the Commission to rescind, alter,
or amend an order, decision, or award].) In 1965, the
Commission’s responsibilities were divided between two newly-
created entities — the Appeals Board, which took on the
Commission’s judicial functions, and the Division of Workers’
Compensation (DWC), which received the Commission’s
administrative responsibilities. (See former § 110, subd. (a),
Stats. 1965, ch. 1513, p. 3556; former § 111, Stats. 1965,
ch. 1513, p. 3557; former § 123, Stats. 1965, ch. 1513, p. 3559.)
The DWC is authorized to employ workers’ compensation
administrative law judges (§ 123), who have authority to issue
orders and awards necessary to fully adjudicate workers’

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 MAYOR v. WORKERS’ COMP. APPEALS BD.
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

compensation cases. (Cal. Code Regs, tit. 8, § 10330.) “Orders,
findings, decisions and awards issued by a workers’
compensation judge shall be the orders, findings, decisions and
awards of the . . . Appeals Board unless reconsideration is
granted.” (Ibid.)
Sections 5900 through 5911 govern petitions for
reconsideration of workers’ compensation awards. Any person
aggrieved by a decision or award of the Appeals Board or the
WCJ may petition the Appeals Board for reconsideration.
(§ 5900, subd. (a).) “[T]he appeals board may, with or without
further proceedings and with or without notice affirm, rescind,
alter, or amend the order, decision, or award made and filed by
the appeals board or the workers’ compensation judge on the
basis of the evidence previously submitted in the case, or may
grant reconsideration and direct the taking of additional
evidence.” (§ 5906.)
“The petition shall be made only within the time and in
the manner specified in this chapter.” (§ 5900, subd. (a).)
Section 5909 lays out the time for the Appeals Board to act on a
party’s petition for reconsideration. The version of section 5909
that was operative at all relevant times in this case provided:
“A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by
the appeals board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from
the date of filing.” (Stats. 1992, ch. 1226, § 5, p. 5766.)
Anyone “affected by an order, decision, or award of the
appeals board” may file a petition for writ of review of that order.
(§ 5950.) “The application for writ of review must be made
within 45 days after a petition for reconsideration is denied, or,
if a petition is granted . . . within 45 days after the filing of the
order, decision, or award following reconsideration.” (Ibid.)

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 MAYOR v. WORKERS’ COMP. APPEALS BD.
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

Appellate review of an order or award of the Appeals Board is
limited to: whether “[t]he appeals board acted without or in
excess of its powers”; whether the order, decision, or award was
procured by fraud, was unreasonable, or was not supported by
substantial evidence; or whether findings of fact support the
order, decision or award. (§ 5952, subd. (a).)
The Court of Appeal here concluded the operative version
of section 5909 is mandatory. (Mayor, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1309.) In so doing, it adopted the analysis of Zurich, which
held that the Appeals Board acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when it granted a petition for reconsideration more than 60 days
after it was filed. (Zurich, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1231–
1236.) In that case, the Appeals Board granted a workers’
compensation insurer’s petition for reconsideration for study
more than nine months after it was filed, even though the
petition for reconsideration had been forwarded to the Appeals
Board about five weeks after it was filed. (Id. at pp. 1223–1224.)
The Appeals Board indicated that due to an administrative
irregularity, it first received notice of the petition for
reconsideration about a month before it granted the petition.
(Id. at p. 1224.) Zurich filed a writ petition, and the Court of
Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the
Appeals Board to rescind the order granting reconsideration.
(Id. at p. 1240.)
In concluding that the Appeals Board exceeded its
jurisdiction by acting on the petition for reconsideration after
the statutory period elapsed, the Zurich court noted the
operative version of section 5909 specifies a consequence for the
Appeals Board’s failure to act within 60 days of the petition’s
filing: the petition is deemed denied. (Zurich, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 1231.) The court observed that the legislative

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

history of the Workers’ Compensation Act indicated “the
workers’ compensation system is designed to achieve ‘ “average
justice” ’ that is ‘speedily and inexpensively administered’
instead of ‘exact justice’ that could consume too much time and
leave the claimant in debt. [Citation.] The Legislature struck
that balance in providing finality to the decision of the workers’
compensation judge, setting time limits in which the Board may
review a petition for reconsideration, and, upon expiration of
those limits, providing the parties with access to judicial
review.” (Id. at p. 1235.) The Zurich court additionally found
the structure of the statutory scheme supported its conclusion,
as section 5909 works in tandem with section 5950 — the
statute setting the deadline to seek review in the Court of
Appeal — and provides clarity as to when a party must file a
petition for writ of review. (Zurich, at p. 1235.)
Here, the Court of Appeal took the position that Assembly
Bill 171, which was enacted and took effect shortly after Zurich,
“essentially ratified Zurich’s interpretation of the governing
statutes.” (Mayor, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 1311; see also
id. at p. 1312 [changing the trigger date of the 60-day deadline
from the date of a petition’s filing to the date of transmission of
the case file to the Appeals Board “is a tacit acquiescence to
Zurich’s interpretation of former section 5909’s rule as
mandatory, since if the deadline was not mandatory and the
Board’s practice was permissible there would have been no
reason to alter the deadline”].) In rejecting the notion that a
party has a due process right to a decision on the merits of the
petition once they have filed a petition for reconsideration, the
Court of Appeal observed that the goal of the workers’
compensation system is “substantial, but expeditious, justice” so
“opposing parties need not subordinate their rights to prompt

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

resolution of disputes to accommodate open-ended delays that
the Board claims are necessary for it to rule on petitions for
reconsideration.” (Id. at p. 1315; see also Zurich, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 1237.)
B. Section 5909 Does Not Implicate the Appeals
Board’s Fundamental Jurisdiction
It is undisputed that the Appeals Board did not take any
action on Ross Valley’s petition for reconsideration within the
60-day period in the operative version of section 5909. The
question presented is whether the Appeals Board may apply
equitable tolling to extend its own statutory deadline to act on a
petition for reconsideration. This requires us to address two
underlying issues: whether the statutory deadline is
jurisdictional; and, if it is not, whether the Legislature intended
to preclude equitable tolling. (See Law Finance Group, LLC v.
Key (2023) 14 Cal.5th 932, 949, 952–953 (Law Finance).) The
Appeals Board argues that it was permissible to grant Ross
Valley’s petition for reconsideration after the 60-day deadline
passed because the statutory deadline is not jurisdictional and
is subject to equitable tolling. Mayor, in contrast, contends that
the deadline in the operative version of section 5909 is both
mandatory and jurisdictional and not subject to equitable
tolling.
We conclude that section 5909 does not implicate the
Appeals Board’s fundamental jurisdiction. We also conclude

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

that the Appeals Board lacks the authority to toll its own
deadline to act.4
Whether the version of section 5909 at issue in this case is
subject to equitable tolling and whether the statutory deadline
is jurisdictional are questions of statutory construction that we
review de novo. (See Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2025) 17 Cal.5th
510, 520.) “We employ familiar principles in this enterprise. We
begin with the text, considering the ordinary meaning of the
statutory language as well as the text of related provisions,
terms used elsewhere in the statute, and the structure of the
statutory scheme. [Citation.] If the text is clear, we must give
effect to it. If, however, the text is ambiguous, we may consult
extrinsic sources, including the legislative history. [Citation.]
In ascertaining the statutory meaning, we accord appropriate
weight to the interpretations adopted by the Workers’
Compensation Appeals Board in the course of official
proceedings.” (Id. at pp. 520–521; see also Larkin v. Workers’
Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 157–158.) But “[i]f

4
Amici curiae Mashallah Ishal and American Property
Casualty Insurance argue that the Appeals Board’s procedure of
issuing a perfunctory order granting a petition for
reconsideration to allow itself an opportunity to study the
factual and legal issues further (known as a “grant-for-study
order”) is not an appropriate method to resolve such petitions
because the statutory scheme requires a decision on the merits
to be made within the 60-day statutory period pursuant to
section 5908.5, so any petition for reconsideration resulting in
such an order should be deemed denied by operation of law. We
express no opinion on the propriety of the grant-for-study
practice or whether the Appeals Board is required to issue a
final decision on the merits within the 60-day statutory period
pursuant to section 5908.5.

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

the agency’s interpretation is clearly erroneous or unauthorized
under the statute, we will not give effect to its understanding of
the statute.” (Larkin, at p. 158.)
“As we have often observed, ‘the term “jurisdiction” has
“many different meanings.” ’ ” (Law Finance, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 949.) In this case, we are concerned with jurisdiction in its
fundamental sense. “ ‘ “[F]undamental jurisdiction cannot be
conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent. Rather, an act beyond
a court’s jurisdiction in the fundamental sense is null and void”
ab initio.’ ” (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2
Cal.5th 330, 339 (Kabran).) “In other words, when a party fails
to comply with a jurisdictional time bar, the court has no choice
but to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, even if equitable
concerns would support reaching the merits.” (Law Finance, at
p. 950.)
“ ‘Even when a court has fundamental jurisdiction,
however, the Constitution, a statute, or relevant case law may
constrain the court to act only in a particular manner, or subject
to certain limitations.’ [Citation.] We have described courts
that violate procedural requirements, order relief that is
unauthorized by statute or common law, or otherwise ‘ “fail[] to
conduct [themselves] in the manner prescribed” ’ by law as
acting ‘ “in excess of jurisdiction.” ’ ” (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th
at pp. 339–340.)
Given the “harsh consequences” of jurisdictional time
bars, “we apply a ‘presumption that statutes do not limit the
courts’ fundamental jurisdiction absent a clear indication of
legislative intent to do so.’ [Citations.] This approach reflects
‘ “a preference for the resolution of litigation and the underlying
conflicts on their merits by the judiciary.” ’ ” (Law Finance,

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 950.) Thus, even if a statute contains
mandatory language, we will not assume it implicates a court’s
fundamental jurisdiction; instead, “our Legislature ‘must do
something special, beyond setting an exception-free deadline,’ ”
to designate a statute as jurisdictional. (Ibid.) “[J]urisdictional
rules are mandatory, but mandatory rules are not necessarily
jurisdictional.” (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 342.)
“Legislative intent that a time limit be jurisdictional may
be signaled where the statute sets forth time limits in ‘unusually
emphatic form,’ by ‘reiterat[ing] its limitations several times in
several different ways,’ or, for example, by asserting that ‘ “no
[relief] shall be allowed or made after the expiration of the
period of limitation prescribed . . . unless a claim . . . is filed . . .
within such period.” ’ ” (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 343,
quoting United States v. Brockamp (1997) 519 U.S. 347, 350–
351.)
Statutes we have found to “include such clear markers of
legislative intent that their respective deadlines are
jurisdictional” include the deadlines in the Code of Civil
Procedure to file a notice of intent to seek a new trial and for the
court to rule on a motion for new trial. (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th
at p. 344; see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 659, subd. (b) [deadlines to file
a notice of intention to move for a new trial “shall not be
extended by order or stipulation”], 660, subd. (c) [“the power of
the court to rule on a motion for new trial shall expire 75 days
after the mailing of notice of entry of judgment . . . or 75 days
after service . . . of written notice of entry of judgment”], italics
added.) In Kabran, we distinguished the language in these
statutes from the language in Code of Civil Procedure section
659a, which sets a related deadline for a moving party to file
briefs and accompanying documents in support of the motion for

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

new trial of “[w]ithin 10 days of filing the notice.” We held Code
of Civil Procedure section 659a was not jurisdictional because it
did not have similar language or such “clear limits on
jurisdiction” as Code of Civil Procedure sections 659,
subdivision (b) and 660, subdivision (c), and because section
659a had “no ‘ “consequence or penalty” ’ for noncompliance with
the affidavit filing deadlines.” (Kabran, at p. 344.)
We conclude that section 5909 does not implicate the
Appeals Board’s fundamental jurisdiction. While petitions for
reconsideration in the workers’ compensation context function
similarly to civil motions for a new trial, we discern no language
in section 5909 that is similar to the clear jurisdictional
language in Code of Civil Procedure sections 659, subdivision (b)
and 660, subdivision (c). Former section 5909 neither expressly
mentions jurisdiction nor deprives the Appeals Board of the
power to act after the 60-day period. The plain language of the
statute simply sets a timeline for the Appeals Board to act on a
petition for reconsideration and the triggering date for the 45-
day window for a petitioner to file a writ petition with the Court
of Appeal. Thus, the Appeals Board’s issuance of a grant-for-
study order after the 60-day period expired was in excess of its
jurisdiction, but the Appeals Board did not lack fundamental
jurisdiction to issue the order after the period ended.
Statutory context supports this conclusion. Section 5803
expressly provides that the Appeals Board “has continuing
jurisdiction over all its orders, decisions, and awards made and
entered under the provisions of this division . . . . At any time,
upon notice and after an opportunity to be heard is given to the
parties in interest, the appeals board may rescind, alter, or
amend any order, decision, or award, good cause appearing
therefor.” This continuing jurisdiction is limited by section

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

5804, which provides in part that “[n]o award of compensation
shall be rescinded, altered, or amended after five years from the
date of the injury except upon a petition by a party in interest
filed within such five years and any counterpetition seeking
other relief filed by the adverse party within 30 days of the
original petition raising issues in addition to those raised by
such original petition.” The broad grant of continuing
jurisdiction in section 5803, limited only by the five-year
deadline in section 5804, indicates that the Appeals Board is not
deprived of fundamental jurisdiction when the 60-day period in
section 5909 expires.
The legislative history of section 5909 also does not
suggest any intent to deprive the Appeals Board of fundamental
jurisdiction to act on a petition for reconsideration more than 60
days from its filing. As the Appeals Board observes, when
section 5909 was enacted, workers’ compensation matters,
including rehearing petitions, were handled by a single agency:
the Industrial Accident Commission. Section 5909 originally
provided: “A petition for rehearing is deemed to have been
denied by the commission unless it is acted upon within thirty
days from the date of filing. The commission may, upon good
cause being shown therefor, extend the time within which it may
act upon such petition for not exceeding thirty days.” (Former
§ 5909, Stats. 1937, ch. 90, p. 304.)
In 1965, the Legislature created the Appeals Board and
the DWC. It provided the Appeals Board with authority over
judicial functions and charged the DWC with administration,
including employment of workers’ compensation judges. (See
former § 110, subd. (a), Stats. 1965, ch. 1513, p. 3556; former
§ 111, Stats. 1965, ch. 1513, p. 3557; former § 123, Stats. 1965,
ch. 1513, p. 3559.) Significantly, even though the Legislature

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created two different bodies, it did not substantively amend the
deadline or procedures for petitions for reconsideration set forth
in section 5909.
In 1992, the Legislature amended the statute to the
version at issue here. The statute omitted the 30-day extension
period and extended the time for the Appeals Board to act on
petitions for reconsideration to 60 days. (Stats. 1992, ch. 1226,
§ 5909, p. 5766; see also Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No.
3758 (1991–1992 Reg. Sess.), p. 2.) From the statute’s original
enactment, the triggering date for the Appeals Board to act was
consistently the filing date of a petition for reconsideration —
even after it became clear to courts that the workers’
compensation “system ha[d] become . . . inefficient.” (Shipley,
supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1108.)
In 2024, the Legislature for the first time changed the
triggering date of the 60-day period to act on a petition for
reconsideration from the date of filing to the date the trial judge
transmits the petition to the Appeals Board. (Stats. 2024,
ch. 52, § 27.) The Legislature observed, “[e]xisting law provides
[that] . . . a petition for reconsideration is automatically
considered denied if the [Appeals Board] does not to [sic] take
action within 60 days from the date the petition was filed.”
(Assem. Com. on Budget, Concurrence in Sen. Amends. to
Assem. Bill No. 171 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended June
22, 2024, p. 1, italics added.) The Legislature additionally
described the effect of Assembly Bill 171 as simply “modif[ying]
procedures by which the appeals board must act on a petition
for reconsideration” (Sen. Rules Com., 3d reading analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 171 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended June
22, 2024, p. 2) by “deem[ing] a petition for reconsideration to
have been denied by the WCAB unless it is acted upon by the

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 MAYOR v. WORKERS’ COMP. APPEALS BD.
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

appeals board within 60 days from the date a trial judge
transmits a case to the appeals board.” (Assem. Com. on Budget,
Concurrence in Sen. Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 171, supra, as
amended June 22, 2024, p. 1.)
Mayor argues the 2024 amendment to former section 5909
establishes that the statute is jurisdictional by indicating a
legislative response to Zurich. We are not persuaded. There is
no mention of fundamental jurisdiction in the legislative history
of Assembly Bill 171. To the contrary, the legislative history
indicates the Legislature acquiesced to Zurich’s interpretation
of section 5909 as mandatory and merely intended to implement
a “short-term fix to the Board’s need for resources to meet
former section 5909’s deadline.” (Mayor, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1312.) Further, the 2024 amendment to the statute, like
prior versions of the statute at issue here, does not contain any
express language depriving the Appeals Board of power to act
after the 60-day deadline.
Mayor notes that the statutes governing the deadline to
file a petition for reconsideration (§ 5900, subdivision (a)), the
deadline for the Board to grant reconsideration on its own
motion (§ 5900, subdivision (b)), and the deadline to file a
petition for writ of review (§ 5950) in the reconsideration scheme
have been found to be jurisdictional. (See, e.g., United States
Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1962) 201
Cal.App.2d 545, 549, 550 [holding § 5900, subd. (b) is
jurisdictional]; Camper v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1992)
3 Cal.4th 679, 686 (Camper) [holding § 5950 is jurisdictional].)
We observed in Kabran that a deadline might be jurisdictional
if it forms an “interconnected timing scheme” with other
jurisdictional deadlines. (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 344.)
Unlike section 5909, however, the plain language of sections

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

5900, subdivision (a) and 5950 “include such clear markers of
legislative intent that their respective deadlines are
jurisdictional.” (Kabran, at p. 344.) Specifically, section 5900,
subdivision (a), states that petitions for reconsideration “shall
be made only within the time and in the manner specified in this
chapter.” (Italics added.) Moreover, section 5950 permits a
party to file a petition for writ of review “within the time limit
specified in this section” and any petition “must be made within
45 days after a petition for reconsideration is denied, or, if a
petition is granted . . . within 45 days after the filing of the
order, decision, or award following reconsideration.” (Italics
added.) No similar emphatic language is present in section
5909. “It is significant that the Legislature, while using
language to identify [a] closely related time limitation[] in this
set of statutes as jurisdictional, did not use similar language
with regard to the” deadline to act upon a petition for
reconsideration. (Kabran, at p. 344.) It is true that, like section
5909, section 5900, subdivision (b) does not contain emphatic
language indicating that the deadline was intended to be
jurisdictional. But United States Pipe is not a decision of this
court and did not consider the statutory context or legislative
history that we have considered here, which demonstrate that
the 60-day period in section 5909 is a mandatory procedural
deadline rather than a limit on the Board’s fundamental
jurisdiction.
Mayor also argues that in J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union
High School Dist. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 648 and Bonnell v. Medical
Board (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1255 we held that Government Code
sections 911.6, subdivision (c) and 11521, subdivision (a) —
which require a court or agency to act within a certain
timeframe or the matter is deemed denied — are jurisdictional.

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

But we did not consider whether these statutes were
jurisdictional in the fundamental sense in these cases. In J.M.,
we found that equitable tolling was not warranted on its facts
when addressing whether a minor’s late claim application
against a public entity could proceed forward when minor’s
counsel failed to timely file a petition for relief in the superior
court after the application was deemed denied. (J.M., at pp.
651–652.) In Bonnell, we considered the amount of time a state
administrative agency can stay its decision pursuant to
Government Code section 11521, subdivision (a) in order to
review a duly-filed petition for reconsideration. (Bonnell, at p.
1258.) As “ ‘ “cases are not authority for propositions not
considered” ’ ” (B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th
1, 11), these cases do not support Mayor’s argument that the
mere inclusion of “deemed to have been denied” language in
section 5909, without more, reflects a clear legislative intent to
render the statute jurisdictional.5

5
In another decision of this Court, Evans v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 753, 755, we suggested in dicta
that the Board “retains jurisdiction” to issue a new decision on
reconsideration complying with section 5805.5 because it
originally granted reconsideration within the statutory time
period required by an earlier version of section 5909 (see Stats.
1965, ch. 1513, p. 3601, § 180). The issue in Evans was whether
it was a violation of section 5905.5 [requiring a statement of
reasons and evidence when the Appeals Board grants or denies
a petition for reconsideration] for the Board to grant
reconsideration and vacate a trial referee’s decision granting a
petition to reopen an employee’s workers’ compensation claim
without a statement of reasons. (Id. at pp. 754–755.) Like J.M.
and Bonnell, Evans is not determinative of whether section 5909
is jurisdictional because that question was not before this Court.

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

C. The Appeals Board May Not Equitably Toll
the Deadline to Act in Section 5909
Of course, “[e]ven if a statute of limitations is
nonjurisdictional, the Legislature still may preclude the court
from applying equitable doctrines like tolling and estoppel.”
(Law Finance, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 952.) “The doctrine [of
equitable tolling] allows our courts, ‘in carefully considered
situations’ [citation], to exercise their inherent equitable powers
to ‘soften the harsh impact of technical rules’ [citation] by tolling
statutes of limitations.” (Saint Francis Memorial Hospital v.
State Dept. of Public Health (2020) 9 Cal.5th 710, 724 (St.
Francis); see also id. at p. 729 [equitable tolling “applies only ‘in
carefully considered situations to prevent the unjust technical
forfeiture of causes of action’ ”].) It is not “ ‘a cure-all for an
entirely common state of affairs.’ ” (Id. at p. 724; Law Finance,
at p. 954 [same]; see also Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31
Cal.4th 363, 370 [tolling only applies “in carefully considered
situations to prevent the unjust technical forfeiture of causes of
action”].)
As with our jurisdictional analysis, we examine the
statutory text and the legislative purpose of the statutory
scheme, as either or both may indicate a legislative intent to
prohibit equitable tolling. (See Law Finance, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 953; see also Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 371 [“equitable
tolling should not apply if it is ‘inconsistent with the text of the
relevant statute’ ”]; St. Francis, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 720.)
We conclude that the Appeals Board’s practice of self-
tolling the 60-day deadline in section 5909 is not supported by
the plain language of the statute or its purpose. The statute
does not expressly permit the Appeals Board to consider a
petition for reconsideration outside of the 60-day statutory

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

period or to equitably toll the 60-day deadline. To the contrary,
the statute’s plain language cuts off any further action by the
Appeals Board after 60 days by deeming petitions for
reconsideration denied by operation of law if the Board does not
take action within that timeframe.
The statute’s plain language indicates that its purpose is
to limit the time for the Appeals Board to act so that petitions
for reconsideration do not languish. (See Zurich, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 1235.) This purpose is inconsistent with
equitable tolling, particularly when the basis for the tolling is
the Appeals Board’s own inefficiency or neglect.
We acknowledge that the purpose of the Workers’
Compensation Act generally is not limited to the expeditious
resolution of workers’ compensation cases. The Act is also
intended to “accomplish substantial justice in all cases . . .
inexpensively, and without incumbrance of any character.”
(Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4.) Permitting the Appeals Board to
engage in the practice of self-tolling, however, impacts all
litigants. This case is instructive. Mayor’s award of total and
permanent disability occurred in March 2023 and, as Mayor’s
counsel confirmed at oral argument, Mayor has not received any
compensation since that time even though the deadline for Ross
Valley to file a writ petition pursuant to section 5950 expired on
July 6, 2023. The Appeals Board’s practice of self-tolling opens
the door to open-ended extensions of the time for the Board to
act on reconsideration petitions, undermining the purpose of
Article 14, section 4 of the California Constitution.
The 2024 amendment to section 5909 supports our
conclusion that the statute is not subject to equitable tolling by
the Appeals Board. By changing the trigger date for the 60-day

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

deadline from the date a petition is filed to the date a petition is
transmitted to the Appeals Board, the Legislature has
demonstrated that it understands the distinction between these
dates and knows what language to use if it wishes for the
Appeal’s Board’s timeline to act to run from a petition’s
transmission date. The Legislature did not use such
accommodating language in the version of section 5909 at issue
here.
More fundamentally, the Appeals Board misapprehends
the doctrine of equitable tolling in two ways: who may assert
tolling; and the type of deadline that may be tolled. As we have
observed, equitable tolling excuses litigants from filing
deadlines such as statutes of limitations. (See St. Francis,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 719–720.) “ ‘Statute of limitations’ is the
collective term applied to acts or parts of acts that prescribe the
periods beyond which a plaintiff may not bring a cause of
action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th
797, 806.) The Appeals Board is neither a party nor a litigant
in workers’ compensation proceedings. Nor is former section
5909 a statute of limitations, as it does not fix the time by which
a party or a litigant must bring a claim or cause of action.
Instead, the 60-day period merely sets a timeline for the Board
itself to act. We are not aware of any precedent applying
equitable tolling to decisional deadlines imposed on an
adjudicative body.
The elements and history of the equitable tolling doctrine
also demonstrate that the doctrine does not apply in this case.
The doctrine has three elements: “[(1)] timely notice [of
plaintiff’s claims] to the defendant, [(2)] lack of prejudice to the
defendant, and [(3)] reasonable and good faith conduct by the
plaintiff.” (St. Francis, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 726, italics added;

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

see also id. at p. 724.) Ross Valley, as the petitioner, is not
seeking tolling of a deadline applicable to it; instead, the
Appeals Board is tolling its own deadline to act. Further, Ross
Valley did not cause any delay, so the reasonableness of its
conduct is not at issue or dispositive and would not facilitate
tolling here.
The Board maintains that Shipley permits it to equitably
toll the 60-day deadline to act on a rehearing petition whenever
it does not receive the petition within the 60-day period,
regardless of the reason. Shipley, however, involved due
process, not equitable tolling. In Shipley, an employee timely
petitioned for reconsideration, but the Appeals Board failed to
act on the petition within the 60-day statutory deadline.6
(Shipley, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1106.) The employee
inquired about the status of the petition after the deadline
expired, and an Appeals Board clerk represented that the file
had inadvertently been sent to archives. (Ibid.) The Board
requested the file’s return. Over the course of several months,
the employee inquired twice more about the status of the
petition, and after another unsuccessful attempt to request the
file, the employee was ultimately allowed to reconstruct a
duplicate file. (Id. at pp. 1106–1107.) Throughout this time, the
employee “received reassurances from the board that his
petition would be considered either after his file was found or

6
At that time, section 5909 provided, “A petition for
reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the appeals
board unless it is acted upon within 30 days from the date of
filing. The appeals board may, upon good cause being shown
therefor, extend the time within which it may act upon such
petition for not exceeding 30 days.” (Stats. 1965, ch. 1513,
p. 3601, § 180.)

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

after he reconstructed a duplicate file.” (Id. at p. 1108.)
Nonetheless, the Appeals Board denied the petition, concluding
it had been denied by operation of law pursuant to section 5909
since no action had been taken on the petition within the
statutory time period. (Id. at p. 1107.)
The Shipley court held that “the time period after which a
petition for reconsideration is deemed denied by operation of law
was tolled while the board misplaced [employee’s] file and led
him to believe his petition would eventually receive
consideration.” (Shipley, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1107.) In so
holding, the court relied on the Constitutional directive that
administration of workers’ compensation legislation
“ ‘accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously,
inexpensively, and without incumbrance of any character’ ” and
section 3202’s mandate to liberally construe the Workers’
Compensation Act “ ‘with the purpose of extending their benefits
for the protection of persons injured in the course of their
employment.’ ” (Ibid.) It observed that “the time periods must
be based on a presumption that a claimant’s file will be available
to the board; any other result deprives a claimant of due process
and the right to a review by the board.” (Ibid., italics added.)
After emphasizing that the petitioner acted reasonably, the
Shipley court concluded, “[Petitioner’s] right to reconsideration
by the board is likewise statutorily provided and cannot be
denied him without due process. Any other result offends not
only elementary due process principles but common
sensibilities. [Petitioner] is entitled to the board’s review of his
petition and its decision on its merits.” (Id. at p. 1108.)
While the Shipley court held the deadline “after which a
petition for reconsideration is deemed denied by operation of law
was tolled” (Shipley, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1107), it never

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

mentioned the equitable tolling doctrine or considered or
applied the elements of equitable tolling to the facts. Instead,
Shipley reasoned that a party petitioning for reconsideration
had a statutory right to review by the Appeals Board, and the
petitioner was denied that right without due process due to the
Appeals Board’s failure to review the petition and its
misrepresentations that it would do so. As Shipley did not
consider the equitable tolling doctrine, it does not support the
Appeals Board’s argument that it may equitably toll its deadline
to act on a reconsideration petition when it does not receive the
petition within the 60-day statutory period.
Apart from the unique facts of Shipley, there may be other
circumstances in which the failure to rule on a timely-filed
reconsideration petition would raise due process concerns. But
as this and other recent cases demonstrate, the Appeals Board
has routinely invoked Shipley as a workaround to address a
recurring, systemic problem with the Board’s functioning — the
Board’s failure to implement processes that would ensure it
receives the petition for reconsideration or the case file in a
timely manner. (See Zenith, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 518,
review granted; City of Salinas, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 810–811, review granted; see also Shipley, supra, 7
Cal.App.4th at p. 1108 [observing the Appeals Board has noted
its awareness of “ ‘situations . . . where . . . petitions were not
processed at the district office and thus never reached the
Appeals Board resulting in a denial by operation of law’ ”].)
Even if these circumstances presented due process concerns,
such longstanding failures, without more, do not justify a self-
administered remedy that permits the Board to routinely toll its
own statutory deadline to act, rather than a filing deadline
applicable to a litigant.

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

Moreover, it is the petitioner, as the party adversely
affected by the denial of their petition for reconsideration, who
must assert their due process rights, not the administrative
board that is tasked with ruling on the petition. Here, the
Appeals Board purported to rely on Shipley to act outside of the
statutory 60-day period simply because it received the file after
the deadline passed due to an unspecified administrative
irregularity. Ross Valley has not asserted that its due process
rights were violated. We therefore need not decide what
circumstances, if any, would give rise to a due process violation
when a timely-filed petition for reconsideration is deemed
denied by operation of law. As a general rule, under the
operative version of section 5909, a petition for reconsideration
will be denied by operation of law if not acted upon within 60
days of the date of filing. Thereafter, a petitioner will have 45
days to file a writ petition with the Court of Appeal.
The Appeals Board goes further, arguing that due process
requires a decision on the merits of every timely-filed petition for
reconsideration. Relatedly, the Appeals Board maintains that
the denial of a petition for reconsideration by operation of law
violates section 5908.5, which states, “[a]ny decision of the
appeals board granting or denying a petition for reconsideration
. . . shall be made by the appeals board and not by a workers’
compensation judge and shall be in writing, signed by a majority
of the appeals board members assigned thereto, and shall state
the evidence relied upon and specify in detail the reasons for the
decision.”
The Appeals Board’s arguments ignore the plain language
of section 5909 and would render the statute superfluous. “We
seek to avoid ‘interpretations that render any language
surplusage.’ ” (Brennon B. v. Superior Court (2022) 13 Cal.5th

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

662, 691.) The plain language of the operative version of section
5909 clearly indicates that the Legislature contemplated a
petition for reconsideration would be deemed denied if not acted
upon within 60 days of its filing. “[W]e may not broaden or
narrow the scope of [a] provision by reading into it language that
does not appear in it or reading out of it language that does.”
(Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 545.) Deemed
denied provisions are relatively common (see, e.g., Gov. Code
§§ 911.6, subd. (c) & 11521, subd. (a)), and it would be surprising
if, as the Appeals Board implies, such provisions were
unconstitutional simply because a petition or application is
denied by operation of law due to inaction.
The Appeals Board’s argument also ignores the applicable
regulation providing that the WCJ’s decision is the final decision
of the Appeals Board unless reconsideration is granted. (Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10330.) We therefore reject the notion that
all timely-filed petitions for reconsideration must be decided on
their merits. The Legislature’s decision to deem a petition for
reconsideration denied if not acted upon within 60 days of its
filing is a constitutional exercise of its “plenary power . . . to
create . . . and enforce a complete system of workers’
compensation . . . to the end that the administration of such
legislation shall accomplish substantial justice in all cases
expeditiously, inexpensively, and without incumbrance of any
character.”7 (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4, italics added.)

7
We disapprove of Shipley v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.,
supra, 7 Cal.App.4th 1104 to the extent it suggests that all
parties necessarily have a due process right to Board review of
a petition for reconsideration after the 60-day deadline in

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

We rejected the Board’s interpretation of section 5908.5 in
Le Vesque v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627.
In that case, the issue was whether the Appeals Board could
adopt the report and recommendation of a referee in denying a
petition for reconsideration. This Court concluded the answer
was yes, as long as the report made the basis for the decision
reasonably clear. (Id. at p. 629.) In reaching this conclusion, we
emphasized that “we must read section 5908.5 together with
section 5909.” We observed that by permitting a petition for
reconsideration to be denied through inaction in section 5909,
“[t]he Legislature has . . . provided that . . . the appeals board
need not detail its factual and rational basis for so doing.” (Id.
at pp. 634–635.) We continued: “It is true that upon first glance
[that] section 5908.5 apparently imposes the same requirements
of detailed factual findings and statement of reasons upon the
appeals board when it acts after reconsideration as when it
denies a petition for reconsideration. But reading and
construing sections 5909 and 5908.5 together we cannot believe
the Legislature intended by section 5908.5 to require detailed
findings and reasons upon a denial of reconsideration if the
appeals board can avoid the requirement so easily under section
5909.” (Id. at p. 635, fn. 11, italics added.) Thus, section 5908.5
does not prohibit the denial, under section 5909, of petitions for
rehearing by mere inaction.
We recognize that once a reconsideration petition has been
denied by operation of law, a petitioner’s remaining route is by

section 5909. More is required to establish a due process
violation resulting from the failure to timely rule on a petition
for reconsideration than the simple filing of a reconsideration
petition and the expiration of the statutory deadline to act.

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

way of a petition for writ of review before the Court of Appeal,
and a reviewing court considering such a petition for writ of
review is constrained by its limitations on review. (See § 5952.)
The statutory deadline in section 5909 creates certainty with
respect to the deadline to file a petition for writ of review and
when a workers’ compensation award is final. The Appeals
Board’s practice of equitable self-tolling undermines this
certainty.
D. The Court of Appeal Acted Appropriately in
Issuing a Writ of Mandate
The Appeals Board last argues the Court of Appeal erred
in issuing a writ of mandate rescinding the order granting
reconsideration. It maintains that its August 2023 order
granting reconsideration was not final and therefore Mayor had
suffered no injury that was redressable by petition for writ of
mandate. The Board further maintains that Mayor had a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy at law in the form of a petition for
writ of review from the Board’s final decision granting the
petition for reconsideration on the merits.8
“To obtain [writ] relief, a petitioner must demonstrate
(1) no ‘plain, speedy, and adequate’ alternative remedy exists
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1086); (2) ‘ “a clear, present . . . ministerial

8
The Appeals Board reads the Court of Appeal’s decision as
conflating administrative mandate with traditional mandate.
But the Court of Appeal did not refer to administrative mandate
and noted that a writ is appropriate in cases where mandamus
is available under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. The
Appeals Board agrees that traditional mandate is available to,
inter alia, “compel the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a), italics
added.) Accordingly, there is no indication that the Court of
Appeal conflated administrative and traditional mandamus.

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

duty on the part of the respondent” ’; and (3) a correlative
‘ “clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the
performance of that duty.” ’ [Citation.] A ministerial duty is an
obligation to perform a specific act in a manner prescribed by
law whenever a given state of facts exists, without regard to any
personal judgment as to the propriety of the act.” (People v.
Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340.)
Mayor has no available alternative remedy. As Mayor
contended below, the operative version of section 5909 imposed
a duty on the Appeals Board to act, if at all, within 60 days of
the filing of a petition for reconsideration. This duty is a
ministerial act contingent only on the timely filing of a petition
for reconsideration. If Mayor establishes that the Appeals
Board violated its statutory duty by granting reconsideration
after the 60-day period expired, the Court of Appeal may issue
a writ directing the Appeals Board to rescind its order granting
reconsideration. We therefore conclude that a petition for writ
of mandate filed in the Court of Appeal is the proper way for an
affected party to enforce section 5909.
The Court of Appeal found writ relief was not premature
because the Appeals Board granted reconsideration, asserted
jurisdiction, and ruled on the merits of the reconsideration
petition in the August 2023 order and subsequent February
2024 order. We agree. Mayor’s petition for writ relief addressed
the Appeals Board’s assertion of jurisdiction and whether the
Appeals Board violated a duty to abide by the statute when it
granted reconsideration after the 60-day period expired. Thus,
Mayor’s writ petition is appropriate because it challenged the
Appeals Board’s election to act on the petition for
reconsideration after it was deemed denied by operation of
law — a purely legal issue of broad importance. (See, e.g.,

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

Anderson v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1328
[extraordinary relief is warranted “because ‘ “the issues
presented are of great public interest and must be resolved
promptly” ’ ”].) In any event, even if the writ petition was
premature at the time it was filed, it is undisputed that it was
no longer premature after the Appeals Board issued its
February 2024 order.
We also are not persuaded that a petition for writ of review
following a final decision on a petition for reconsideration would
constitute an adequate remedy at law in this context. Mayor
argued below that he had a right to the expeditious
determination of his entitlement to workers’ compensation
benefits. Mayor should not be compelled to wait until an
unspecified future date to pursue a petition for writ of review in
an effort to enforce his award when he is not challenging the
merits of the reconsideration order. Moreover, writ relief is the
only way for Mayor to enforce the 60-day deadline in section
5909, a deadline that “protect[s] his right to an expeditious end
to workers’ compensation proceedings.” (Mayor, supra, 104
Cal.App.5th at p. 1310.) We agree with the Court of Appeal that
this right would be “meaningless if Mayor were forced to wait to
enforce it for months or years until the conclusion of further
proceedings.” (Ibid.)9

9
We note that Mayor’s writ petition would have been more
properly brought as a writ of prohibition. (See C.S. Smith
Metropolitan Market Co. v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 226,
228 [“The function of the writ of prohibition is to provide a
remedy when rigidity of the ordinary procedure fails to protect
a litigant from the wrongful exercise of jurisdiction by a court”];
Code Civ. Proc., § 1102 [“The writ of prohibition arrests the

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

The Appeals Board expresses concern that writ petitions
in nonfinal cases will divert Board resources and delay other
pending cases. We express no view on the Appeals Board’s
policy argument. This argument is best directed to the
Legislature, which is free to amend the statute if it wishes to do
so. Indeed, as we have already observed, the Legislature has
elected to eliminate the sunset provision in the 2024 version of
section 5909 and retain the trigger date for the Appeals Board
to act on a petition for reconsideration as the date the trial judge
transmits the case to the Appeals Board. (See Legis. Counsel’s
Dig., Sen. Bill No. 171 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.) as amended July
13, 2026, p. 3.) “Our task is to give effect to the statute as we
find it.” (Haggerty v. Thornton (2024) 15 Cal.5th 729, 741.)

proceedings of any tribunal . . . when such proceedings are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal”].)

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

III. DISPOSITION
Section 5909 serves an important function: it sets a
timeline for the Appeals Board to diligently act on petitions for
rehearing and provides clarity as to when the proceedings must
continue in the Court of Appeal. We therefore hold that the
Appeals Board may not equitably toll its own deadline to act on
such petitions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeal.10
EVANS, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
KIM, J.*

10
As Ross Valley has not requested any relief before this
Court, we do not decide whether, or on what grounds, Ross
Valley may obtain relief or pursue a remedy under the
circumstances of this case.
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

34
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Mayor v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 104 Cal.App.5th 1297
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S287261
Date Filed: August 24, 2026
__________________________________________________________

Court:
County:
Judge:
__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Shoemaker Law Offices and Elizabeth Hudson for Petitioner.

Horvitz & Levy, Lisa Perrochet, Bradley S. Pauley and Benjamin P.
Covington for American Property Casualty Insurance Association as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

DBL Law Group and Darren LeMontree for Mashallah Ishal as Amicus
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Anne Schmitz, Allison Fairchild, Eric D. Ledger and Andrew A. Wood
for Respondents.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):

Elizabeth Hudson
Shoemaker Law Offices
150 Glen Cove Marina Road East, Suite 103
Vallejo, CA 94591
(707) 552-1000

Benjamin P. Covington
Horvitz & Levy LLP
3601 West Olive Avenue, 8th Floor
Burbank, CA 91505
(818) 995-0800

Eric D. Ledger
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Floor 9
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 703-4580