Filed 8/21/26 Trevino v. Homeless Veterans Emergency Housing Facility CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

REYNALDO TREVINO, H053647
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 23CV413758)

v.

HOMELESS VETERANS
EMERGENCY HOUSING FACILITY,

Defendant and Respondent.

Reynaldo Trevino claimed his employer, Homeless Veterans Emergency Housing
Facility (Housing Facility), violated Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b) by
retaliating against him for reporting a dangerous electrical transformer across the street
from its facility.1 The trial court granted nonsuit on that claim after Trevino’s
presentation of evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 581c, subd. (a).) Because the record
lacks sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that Trevino believed he was reporting
unlawful conduct, his report of the dangerous condition was not protected by
section 1102.5, subdivision (b). We will affirm.

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code. Trevino raised other
claims, but the resolution of those claims is not at issue in this appeal.
 I. BACKGROUND2
A. Trevino’s Complaint

Trevino’s complaint includes six causes of action: (1) wrongful termination in
violation of public policy; (2) sexual harassment in violation of the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12940); (3) retaliation for opposing FEHA violations;
(4) failure to prevent and stop harassment, discrimination, and retaliation (Gov. Code,
§ 12940); (5) whistleblower retaliation (§ 1102.5); and (6) failure to pay overtime
(§§ 510, 1194).
As to the fifth cause of action, Trevino alleged that Housing Facility employed
him from August 2021 until it terminated his employment on September 13, 2022. He
alleged that the day before his termination, he “noticed that an electrical pole outside the
facility was damaged and sparking” so he called emergency services. Emergency
services shut off the power to repair the line. Irvin Goodwin, Housing Facility’s chief
executive officer, fired Trevino a day after expressing frustration with Trevino’s decision
to call emergency services.3 Claiming his termination was a violation of public policy
and section 1102.5, Trevino alleged that his termination was an act of “whistleblower
retaliation” and that he “reported to supervisors, and refused to participate in, [Housing
Facility]’s activities that [he] reasonably believed … would result in a violation of, or
noncompliance with, state or federal regulations, statutes or Constitutional provisions.”4

2
We focus our background on the claim resolved by nonsuit.
3
Trevino named Goodwin as a defendant but directed only the second cause of
action for sexual harassment against him.
4
Many of Trevino’s factual allegations relate to claims of sexual harassment,
discrimination, and associated retaliation. Trevino’s first cause of action for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy and fifth cause of action for whistleblower
retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 both appear to reference theories
based on his decision to report the electrical pole and alleged FEHA violations.

2
B. Trial Evidence
1. Trevino’s Testimony

Trevino “heard a loud crackling sound” while sitting in his office. Walking
around the building to investigate, Trevino discovered that “across the street … in front
of a residential house, … from the power pole to the transformer there was about a foot to
a foot and a half … arc of electricity coming from the power line, the top of the power
line, to the transformer.” Trevino called 9-1-1, telling them where he was, that he was
safe, and where “the emergency [was] happening.” The fire department came, and
Trevino pointed to the ongoing electrical problem; he had no need to further
communicate with them. Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) arrived later with a cherry
picker. Trevino left the scene, never having spoken to anyone from PG&E.
Trevino returned to the facility and began warning coworkers to save their work in
anticipation of a power outage. Trevino had not been told that a power outage was
imminent but anticipated a shutdown impacting the general area.
Trevino informed Goodwin of the impending outage and Goodwin thanked him.
But when the power was turned off, Goodwin called Trevino into a meeting and
expressed frustration with Trevino for making an unauthorized call that had caused power
loss—resulting in lost productivity and endangering refrigerated food.
Goodwin terminated Trevino’s employment the next day. Trevino was told to
surrender his key and went to Goodwin’s office. Goodwin did not answer Trevino’s
questions but took Trevino’s keys and instructed Trevino to leave before Goodwin called
the sheriff.
2. Goodwin’s Testimony

Trevino reported a sparking electrical wire across the street from the facility,
causing the utility company to temporarily shut off power to the facility. Goodwin
agreed that Trevino was right to contact the utility company about the sparking electrical
wire and denied disciplining Trevino for doing so. What displeased Goodwin was

3
Trevino’s inclusion of the facility’s address in his report to the utility company:
Goodwin attributed the shutdown at the facility to Trevino’s decision to unnecessarily
include the facility’s address. Goodwin admitted that no one from the utility company
had confirmed his belief that the facility was on a different circuit than the one that was
sparking.
When Goodwin tried to speak to Trevino about the decision to include Housing
Facility’s address in the report, Trevino “had an attitude behind that.” After Trevino said
he did not like Goodwin, Goodwin told him to “ ‘go home and chill out and come back
… later.’ ” Trevino responded by throwing his keys at Goodwin, so Goodwin decided to
fire him.
C. Nonsuit, Judgment, and Appeal

After Trevino closed his case-in-chief, Housing Facility moved for nonsuit on
Trevino’s fifth cause of action for violation of section 1102.5, stating that Trevino had
“argued” it was “based upon [him] calling to report a sparking transformer.” Housing
Facility argued that Trevino failed to establish that what he reported was a violation of
law.
Trevino asked the court to consider authority cited in his trial brief regarding jury
instructions. In the brief, Trevino argued that his report of an “electrical [and] fire safety
violation” was protected activity, but he did not identify any specific statutes, regulations,
or rules he contended were violated.
After hearing argument, the trial court granted the motion because Trevino had not
presented evidence of “an employer … discriminating against an employee for reporting
unlawful conduct to the government” or “ ‘for reporting claims of illegal conduct by
fellow employees, as well as by an employer.’ ”
The trial resulted in a verdict in Trevino’s favor on his claim for unpaid overtime,
but otherwise against Trevino. The court entered judgment awarding Trevino $18,153.46

4
against Housing Facility for unpaid overtime plus fees and costs.5 Trevino timely
appealed.
II. DISCUSSION6
“A defendant is entitled to a nonsuit if the trial court determines that, as a matter
of law, the evidence presented by plaintiff is insufficient to permit a jury to find in his
favor.” (Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 291 (Nally); see also
Code Civ. Proc., § 581c, subd. (b) [permitting nonsuit as to “some but not all of the issues
involved in the action”].)
We review de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court. (Nally,
supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 291; see also Joyce v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
1478, 1490 [“[i]ssues of statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to de novo
review”].) “ ‘We will not sustain the judgment “ ‘unless interpreting the evidence most
favorably to plaintiff’s case and most strongly against the defendant and resolving all
presumptions, inferences and doubts in favor of the plaintiff a judgment for the defendant
is required as a matter of law.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Although ‘a judgment of nonsuit must not
be reversed if plaintiff’s proof raises nothing more than speculation, suspicion, or
conjecture, reversal is warranted if there is “some substance to plaintiff’s evidence upon
which reasonable minds could differ.” ’ ” (Garcia-Brower v. Premier Automotive
Imports of CA, LLC (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 961, 971; see also Joyce, at p. 1488
[“ ‘[n]onsuit may be granted only if there is no substantial evidence upon which
reasonable minds could differ’ ”].)

5
The trial court also entered judgment for Goodwin against Trevino, with each to
bear their own costs and fees.
6
Housing Facility has not filed a respondent’s brief. Without its participation,
“we ‘decide the appeal on the record, the opening brief, and any oral argument by the
appellant’ [citation], examining the record and reversing only if prejudicial error is
shown.” (Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 334.)

5
 We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Housing Facility was entitled to a
nonsuit on Trevino’s claim for a violation of section 1102.5, subdivision (b) because
Trevino’s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to permit a jury to find that he
actually believed that he was reporting a violation of or noncompliance with a statute,
rule, or regulation when he reported the sparking transformer.
“Section 1102.5 is ‘California’s general whistleblower statute.’ ” (Contreras v.
Green Thumb Produce, Inc. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1251, 1259.) Subdivision (b)
prohibits retaliation “against an employee for disclosing information … to a government
or law enforcement agency … if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the
information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or
noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether
disclosing the information is part of the employee’s job duties.” “This provision
‘ “reflects the broad public policy interest in encouraging workplace whistle-blowers to
report unlawful acts without fearing retaliation.” ’ ” (Contreras, at p. 1259.) Its
protections require both a subjective belief in the unlawfulness of the act reported and the
objective reasonableness of that belief: “Section 1102.5(b) … ‘does not protect
employees who do not believe or who unreasonably believe that the information they are
disclosing shows a violation of the law.’ ” (Contreras, at pp. 1259–1260; see also People
ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 719, 731 (Kolla’s).)
We need not question the objective reasonableness or subjective good faith of
Trevino’s belief that the transformer presented an unsafe condition and a threat to public
safety. But the whistleblowing activity that section 1102.5 is designed to protect requires
more than this. Trevino’s statutory claim requires his reasonable belief that he was
reporting a legal violation. So Trevino’s reliance on authority concerning wrongful
termination in violation of public policy does not help him.7 (See Green v. Ralee

7
Similarly, Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th
1378, 1385–1386, disapproved on another ground by Lawson v. PPG Architectural

6
Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71; City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998)
18 Cal.4th 1143, 1158–1161; Gantt v. Sentry Ins. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1085; Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 178.) We are not asked to decide whether
and when termination for reporting a safety hazard violates public policy, only whether
Trevino’s evidence would support a reasonable jury finding that Housing Facility
violated section 1102.5, subdivision (b).
Trevino introduced no evidence that he believed what he was reporting amounted
to a legal violation. In a trial brief, Trevino argued that the condition he reported
implicated specified codes and regulations, and he asked the court to instruct the jury that
a “power line or transformer” that is “sparking or arcing” is “in violation of electrical or
fire safety regulations.” But despite his litigation position, Trevino never testified that,
when he made the report, he believed that he was reporting a violation of law. Nor does
he advance such a claim on appeal. Indeed, in his appellate briefing he identifies no
statute, rule, or regulation that he believed may have been violated.8
Instead, Trevino maintains that his subjective understanding of the law is
irrelevant because the statute requires only “reasonable cause to believe” that the
information he disclosed in turn disclosed a legal violation, not an actual subjective belief
that the information disclosed a legal violation or a subjective understanding of the law.
(See § 1102.5, subd. (b).) But our Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to protect

Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 718, footnote 2, does not support Trevino’s
assertion that the statute “protects disclosures concerning unsafe conditions”: The
protected activity in Patten was the disclosure of allegedly unauthorized use of public
assets. In contrast, the court found internal administrative disclosures about needing
more staff for safety purposes insufficient as a matter of law because they did “not show
any belief on [the reporter’s] part that she was disclosing a violation of state or federal
law in any sort of whistleblowing context.” (Patten, at p. 1385.)
8
At most, Trevino’s briefing gestures without citation towards “electrical safety
regulations, fire codes, and the fundamental public policy of protecting human life and
safety” that he contends are “implicate[d]” by the condition he reported.

7
only employees who actually believe that the information they are disclosing shows a
violation of law. (Kolla’s, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 731.) We follow our Supreme Court’s
statutory interpretation.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

8
 LIE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

WILSON, J.

CHUNG, J.

Trevino v. Homeless Veterans Emergency Housing Facility
H053647


Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.