Filed 8/21/26 In re I.M. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re I.M., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

MARIN COUNTY HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. A175337
M.M.,
(Marin County Super. Ct.
Defendant and Appellant. No. JD0000196)

M.M. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s January 2026
jurisdictional and dispositional orders as to her minor child, I.M.1 (born in
2010), contending substantial evidence did not establish the current risk of
serious physical harm necessary to establish jurisdiction and did not
establish circumstances warranting minor’s removal. Mother further
contends the removal of minor from her custody in the absence of substantial

1 The minor is a transgender youth who expressed he uses he/him

pronouns and a name different from his legal name. Although portions of the
appellate record continue to use female pronouns and the minor’s birth name,
we will refer to him as “minor” and utilize his preferred pronouns.

1
evidence violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Referral and Investigation
On October 27, 2025,2 mother called the San Rafael Police Department
to report minor missing. Officers responded to the family’s home, where they
found minor. Minor stated he had informed his mother he was with a friend.
He told the officers he was “worried about his mother’s mental health”
because the previous day, “she stated that if [minor] were to leave, she would
overdose on medication and find a way to kill herself.” Minor informed them
that his mother was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and was on the autism
spectrum. He said that “the family [was] poor and ha[d] limited resources for
food,” and “his friend’s mother had been feeding him.” Minor noted that
mother had sent “odd” text messages to his friend’s mother, who was
reportedly also concerned about mother’s mental health. Minor stated he
“felt safe at home but fear[ed] his mother will follow through with killing
herself” if he was not home.
After speaking with minor, officers contacted mother by phone, who
was out driving and looking for minor. The officers explained minor had
returned home, but mother refused to drive back as she was having a “mental
breakdown” due to minor running away. Mother reported that she “was not
suicidal, that [minor] was transgender and did not know how to handle this,
and that [minor] was ungrateful”; mother “wished that she had the life she
had provided for [minor].” Officers said they needed to speak with mother in
person and observe the home, but she refused. They later discovered mother
“barricaded . . . in the bathroom” after returning home without being seen.

2 Subsequent dates are in 2025 unless otherwise indicated.

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Officers inspected the home, “which appeared to be clean, organized, and
stocked with food.” Marin County Health and Human Services (Department)
opened a referral and investigation.
The following day, October 28, a child welfare worker conducted an
unannounced home visit. Mother was upset and had an “elevated voice, tone,
and stepp[ed] towards [the worker] stating, ‘she started all this’ . . . [and that
the worker] ‘[was] causing problems.’ ” The worker expressed concern for
minor and questioned mother’s use of she/her pronouns for the minor; mother
replied, “ ‘[I]t’s super annoying, she’s a girl.’ ” Mother continued to refer to
minor by his prior name and stated she “[didn’t] support [the] gender change”
and “wishes people would stop supporting it.” The worker expressed concern
for minor’s and mother’s mental health, but mother “refused to engage in
further conversation,” sign paperwork, including the “Release of
Information,” or take written materials concerning public benefits rights.
When asked whether she would be open to complete a safety plan with the
Department, mother replied, “ ‘you can take her’ ” and “ ‘you can take her ass
back’ to Modesto with her family or with her uncle in Santa Cruz as well.”
Mother refused to provide family contact information, called the worker a
“bitch,” and told her to “ ‘get the hell away from [her]’ ”; mother stated she
would call law enforcement and a lawyer and claim “the Department was
stalking her.” Mother told the worker to leave and “come back with a
warrant.”
The worker interviewed minor the same day, who “presented in baggy
clothing and appeared tired and withdrawn,” evidenced by “low sagging
eyelids, looking down, and talking in a low monotone voice.” Minor explained
that mother was “more of a roommate” and “things have ‘gotten worse than
before.’ ” Mother was “struggling with ‘self-harm and suicidal things.’ ” The

3
prior evening, after minor told mother he intended to move out, mother
“ ‘started to go off and threatened to kill herself’ stating she would ‘spend the
rest of the $50 on the drugs she needed’ to kill herself as she ‘already had
half.’ ” Minor stated he was an anxious person and his mother’s behavior
“ ‘gets to [him] a lot and [he] get[s] nervous because she is my mom.’ ” Minor
was unaware what drugs his mother possessed because she kept them in a
safe.
Minor further stated that mother had autism and bipolar disorder and
was “ ‘not really an emotionally there mother,’ ” “ ‘one day she is perfectly fine
and then she is not.’ ” For as long as he could remember, mother made
suicidal statements. Mother would leave him at home for hours, telling him
she was going to go kill herself. She often yelled, “accused people of
brainwashing him,” and sent long text messages to his support people. Given
a scale of one to 10, minor described his relationship with his mother
“regularly as a 4 or 5 and on a good day would be 5 or 6 and that last night it
was a 2.” Minor stated he felt safe going home because “ ‘I know she won’t
hurt me, but I feel a little bit uncomfortable because I don’t want to get yelled
at.’ ”
Minor also explained that mother told his teachers and friends to stop
referring to him by his preferred name and instead “refer to him as his dead
name” which scared him. His mother was “ ‘absolutely not accepting’ of his
identity” and said “really mean things” to him. Minor described mother as
“ ‘the main cause of [his] stress,’ ” as she provided “ ‘probably the minimum
care[] a parent can do.’ ” He did not believe she could care for herself.
Mother “had a problem with alcohol in the past and would drive intoxicated
with him in the car and tell him she was going to kill them both.”

4
 Also on October 28, the worker spoke with a neighbor, who stated
mother had sent her long, incoherent texts. Minor came to her house twice
the night before and was “ ‘so scared of his mother.’ ” For a long time, mother
made daily statements about killing herself by taking Klonopin. The
neighbor did not believe mother was a threat or that she would intentionally
hurt minor.
The worker interviewed minor again on October 29. Minor explained
that mother was upset by the investigation. Minor stated his hygiene was
bad because his mother did not help him. Minor wore baggy, dirty clothing
covered in dog hair. Minor reported cutting himself in sixth or seventh grade
but denied doing it anymore. He previously attended therapy in Santa Cruz
but had not since they left the area.
The same day, the worker left a voicemail and texted mother asking to
speak. Mother responded by text message; she refused to communicate, used
minor’s former pronouns, and threatened to contact an attorney if the
Department contacted her again.
On October 30, the Department placed minor into protective custody.
During his removal from the home, mother screamed, and minor was
emotionless and calm. Minor left at the residence the bag of food he was
given, stating, “ ‘she needs it more than I do.’ ” Minor did not take his
belongings with him because he was “ ‘too worried’ ” about his mother.
Also on October 30, the neighbor reported that the previous day,
mother had locked minor out of the house. When the neighbor approached
mother, she refused to let minor inside and claimed they were moving to
Santa Cruz. The neighbor observed some of minor’s belongings at the
dumpster.

5
 The worker also spoke with the mother of minor’s best friend, who had
never met mother, but mother had sent her “incoherent” and aggressive text
messages, threatened her, and accused her of “brainwashing” minor. Minor
had told her that mother planned to kill herself.
On October 31, the worker texted mother to confirm the upcoming court
date, convey all communication with minor must be through the Department,
and offer a pre-hearing visit. Mother stated her sister “ ‘is looking to take
custody’ ” because “ ‘[w]e believe this is a calculated plan by your people to
steal our child.’ ” Mother represented more family members may be available
to take custody, “ ‘as supervised visits will not be an option since I don’t feel
safe with your little clique of kidnappers . . . and I am leaving the county.’ ”
Thereafter, the worker spoke with minor about leaving school with his
aunt. Minor told the worker he did not want to go with his aunt, felt safe in
his placement, and his mother’s messages made him uncomfortable.
The worker interviewed mother’s sister, who opined both mother and
minor had mental and physical health issues that were “ ‘severe’ ” and noted
mother’s PTSD diagnosis.
The worker interviewed minor’s “stepfather,”3 who was no longer in a
relationship with mother. He stated mother “ ‘is as crazy as they come,’ ” but
maintained she was not a physical danger to herself or minor despite her
suicidal statements.
On November 3, the Department filed a petition against mother4
alleging minor fell within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Welfare

3 The “stepfather” later clarified that he and mother had not been

legally married.
4 Father’s whereabouts were unknown at the time, and he is not a

party to this appeal. The Department later conducted due diligence

6
and Institutions Code5 section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Specifically, the
petition alleged “the child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the
child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness [¶] . . . as a result of the
failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to supervise or protect the child
adequately” and “by the inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for
the child due to the parent’s . . . mental illness, developmental disability, or
substance abuse.” The petition cited mother’s unmanaged mental health
symptoms which “appear[ed] untreated” and “impede[d] her ability to care”
for minor.
The Department filed a detention report on November 3, which stated
no additional reasonable efforts could be made to prevent removal because
there was no viable safety plan due to mother’s failure to cooperate, mother’s
dishonesty regarding minor’s mental health and inability to obtain assistance
for him, mother’s denial regarding safety issues and “severe mental health
challenges,” which made her unable to make a safety plan with the
Department, mother’s refusal to use minor’s preferred name and pronouns
and attempts to prevent others from doing so, and mother’s statements that
she plans to flee the county. The report also summarized 25 prior referrals
for mother, including the current referral in Shasta, Mendocino, Humbolt,
and Santa Cruz Counties;6 16 of the referrals expressed concern for minor,
beginning in 2014, when he was four years old.

attempting to locate father who was “likely living in San Francisco” but was
not able to determine his exact location.
5 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.
6 The referrals that began in 2008 involved an older sibling. Minor has
four half siblings; two had passed away in the prior year and a half, one in an
ATV accident and the other “unexpectedly.” Of the 25 referrals, “two were
Immediate Responses, nine were 10-day investigations, and 13 were

7
 At the detention hearing on November 4, the juvenile court admitted
the detention report into evidence. Mother filed documentation she asserted
was evidence of her medical issues, which, she represented, included a long
history of PTSD, trauma, and other health issues including lupus and cancer;
her own “timeline of events” surrounding the removal of minor from the
home; argument to counter the petition’s allegations; and photographs of
their home.7 Mother contested the Department’s assertion that there was no
safety plan because she had “immediately identified her sister.” Mother
claimed her reported suicidal statements were due to her grief from the
deaths of her older children and had been made when discussing with minor
mother’s “severe diagnosis and chronic illness.” The court ordered minor
detained.
II. Jurisdiction and Disposition
On December 5, the Department filed an amended juvenile dependency
petition8 and a jurisdiction/disposition report recommending the juvenile
court take jurisdiction over minor, declare him a dependent of the court,
order family reunification services, and order the parties adopt the case plan.
The report detailed mother’s written representation of several chronic
medical conditions including “PTSD, ADHD, autoimmune issues, chronic

Evaluated Out (EO). Departments substantiated General Neglect in 2010
and closed four referrals as inconclusive and five as unfounded.”
7 Mother appeared via Zoom. The documentation does not include any
medical records or diagnoses; it instead contains photocopies of certain
prescription bottles, definitions of the types of medicines purportedly
contained in each, mother’s own narration of her “medical history,” and an
“executive summary” representing “the concerns described are rooted in grief
and medical stress rather than neglect.”
8 We do not detail the amended allegations because the Department

filed a subsequent amended petition in January 2026.

8
pain, hypothyroidism, and a spinal condition currently under evaluation”
with “a positive Cologuard test for which she is undergoing follow-up testing.”
Mother explained her medical issues intensified after she “became disabled
following a divorce.” Mother claimed that despite her financial issues, minor
was always cared for, and she had stabilized their housing in 2021. Mother
represented she participated in “ongoing treatment” through therapy, and
her suicide-related statements to minor were “meant to be in a joking
manner, not meant in a literal sense or with the purpose of frightening”
minor. Mother claimed she “learned healthier communication tools and [wa]s
committed to using calm, grounded language going forward.”
The jurisdiction and disposition report summarized a November 14
interview with minor, in which he explained mother had “longstanding
unaddressed mental health issues,” and had only engaged in therapy when
they previously lived in Santa Cruz. Minor described mother as paranoid.
Minor recalled a pattern of mother “getting drunk, arguing with family,
making an announcement that they were leaving and packing their things,”
and then “they would be driving on the highway, and [mother] would be
‘saying things about killing us both’ and ‘that freaked [minor] out a lot for
obvious reasons.’ ’’ Minor reported that mother attempted to bribe him after
his removal from the home and told him he could “ ‘be a boy.’ ” Minor stated,
“As soon as I hit puberty she sort of gave up on raising me.” Minor informed
the worker about mother’s history of substance abuse, noting mother’s “drugs
of choice” were “acid, weed and ‘a lot of bad drugs’ ” and that mother “used to
sell marijuana with his father.” Minor stated mother introduced him to
marijuana at age 13 and mushrooms at age 14. Substances were “easily
accessible around the home,” and mother made them available to him.

9
Mother “ ‘got [him] into using [drugs] as a way to handle [his] mental
health’ ” and he would “ ‘have to get high to talk to her, it was that bad.’ ”
Minor reported he had been receiving text messages from someone
claiming to be “ ‘Kevin.’ ” Minor believed “Kevin” was actually his mother
because the information in the messages was information only she would
have. Minor stated the text messages were “designed to provoke a reaction”
from him and cited a message that his cats were without food. Minor said
mother “ ‘tells lies just to stress [him] out.’ ”
Regarding welfare checks, the SAFE (Specialized Assistance for
Everyone) Team had checked on mother on November 14, but she declined
resources because she believed the team was associated with the
Department. On December 1, the worker received “concerning” text
messages from mother and contacted the SAFE Team again. Mother had not
had any visits with minor since his removal on October 30 because mother
failed to confirm any that had been scheduled.
At the December 9 jurisdiction/disposition hearing, through counsel,
mother denied the allegations and requested a trial by declaration because
“being physically present in the trial setting [is] extremely difficult for her
mental health . . . .” The Department had no objection, and the court
scheduled a contested hearing for January 6, 2026.
Mother’s trial brief filed in advance of hearing argued minor was not in
substantial danger in the home and included the same previously submitted
documentation regarding her medical issues. Mother also submitted a
declaration as written testimony authorized as a “reasonable accommodation
for [her] diagnosed Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (CPTSD).”
Mother represented she was “under continuous medical care for CPTSD and
significant physical health conditions” and stored her medications in a locked

10
container. In the months prior to the petition, mother had discontinued some
medications to evaluate if she could manage her symptoms. Mother stated
she supervised minor appropriately for his age, but his “behavior and
emotional state changed noticeably” in October 2025; he had received “school-
based therapy” for about seven years until the start of the current school year
when he requested a break. Mother claimed that in October minor spent
time with his friend’s mother, an adult not known to mother, who fed him
“homemade weight-gain milkshakes . . . accompanied by repeated body-
shaming comments suggesting [minor] was underfed.” Mother stated minor’s
friend’s mother offered minor rides home, snacks, “and even suggested
[minor] moving to [her] home” where “there would be ‘no rules.’ ” Thereafter,
according to mother, minor “shaved his head unevenly, pierced his face and
body multiple times, and expressed an intention to leave home to avoid rules
and responsibilities.” Mother represented she temporarily kept minor home
from school to “avoid humiliation” but “personally retrieved schoolwork,
supervised completion, and ensured his grades did not decline.” Mother
explained she had initially refused to speak to officers because she had
experienced “an acute CPTSD-related response due to not being on all my
medications, that impaired verbal communication.” She denied any suicidal
intent and claimed her suicidal statements were “dark humor language.”
Mother also represented that “Kevin” is a family friend who is a part of the
LGBTQ community and “supports our family.”
The Department’s response requested that the juvenile court disregard
mother’s documentation (other than her sworn declaration) or give it minimal
weight. The Department argued its recommendation for the juvenile court to
sustain the petition and remove minor from the home was supported because
mother refused to meet with the Department, thereby precluding

11
determination of any therapy or medical treatment, had untreated mental
health issues that impacted minor’s physical and mental safety, and lacked
insight into her behavior. Minor joined in the Department’s response and
hoped for visitation and reunification services.
The Department filed a second amended juvenile dependency petition
on January 2, 2026, that added allegations that mother “threatened suicide
in front of [minor] and suggested that she would purchase drugs with the
intention to overdose,” described minor’s “chronic anxiety,” and asserted
mother’s “undertreated mental-health conditions are associated with
patterns of disorganized and uncooperative behavior, including paranoid
thought content, dysregulated and excessive written communication, and the
transmission of misleading and inappropriate messages to [minor] under an
alternate identity.”9
On January 6, 2026, the court held a combined contested
jurisdiction/disposition hearing at which it admitted the
jurisdiction/disposition report into evidence and adopted its facts.10 As to
jurisdiction, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that minor
“has suffered or there is a substantial risk that he will suffer serious physical
harm or illness because of mother’s inability . . . to adequately protect or
supervise the child due to [her] undertreated mental health issues” and thus,
sustained the petition. As to disposition, the court found there was clear and
convincing evidence of circumstances stated in section 361, subdivision (c)(1),

9 At the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the Department

clarified this amended petition was a “first” amended petition rather than a
second because the amended petition filed on December 5, 2025, was
“identical to the original petition.”
10 Mother was not present because of her anxiety and CPTSD.

12
and the Department made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need
for removal.
In making its findings, the court noted the minor’s chronic anxiety and
fear mother might take her own life, stating, “this is a 14-year-old young man
who voiced his concerns about his mother’s mental health issues, her use of
illicit drugs, and the fact that she may be purchasing drugs with the
intention to overdose.” The court rejected mother’s contention that her
comments regarding suicide were “dark humor” and instead concluded
“mother also lacks insight into what those types of comments . . . would have
on an adult as well as a child.” The court found by clear and convincing
evidence that minor would not be safe in mother’s care because mother was
“creating a hostile home environment,” minor believed mother has repeatedly
used illicit substances, mother has untreated mental health issues, and
mother has “refused to acknowledge she needs this greater help.” The court
stated, “I have no basis to conclude that mother can provide a safe home for
this child, that she can provide sound parental advice and care and that she
can actually provide for the needs of this child at this time.” In its findings
and orders, the court found mother made no progress toward alleviating or
mitigating the causes necessitating placement. The court declared minor a
dependent of the court and ordered family reunification services for mother.
Mother appeals.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional
orders are not supported by substantial evidence, and the removal of minor
from mother’s custody in the absence of substantial evidence violated her
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. We disagree.

13
 I. Jurisdictional Order
Section 300, subdivision (b) “authorizes jurisdiction if a child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious
physical harm or illness as a result of the failure or inability of the parent to
adequately supervise or protect the child.” (In re Isabella F. (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 128, 139.) “ ‘The statutory definition consists of three elements:
(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms;
(2) causation; and (3) “serious physical harm or illness” to the minor, or a
“substantial risk” of such harm or illness.’ ” (Ibid.)
“The elements must be met ‘based on the facts in existence at the time
of the hearing.’ ” (In re L.G. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1208, 1225.) But “the
court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume
jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.” (In re Cole L.
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602.) “ ‘ “[P]ast conduct may be probative of
current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will
continue.’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, “ ‘[t]he court may consider past events in deciding
whether a child currently needs the court’s protection’ ” [citation], but there
‘ “must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged
conduct will recur.” ’ ” (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 416 (L.B.).)
“ ‘We review the jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence.
[Citation.] We consider the entire record, drawing all reasonable inferences
in support of the juvenile court’s findings and affirming the order even if
other evidence supports a different finding. [Citation.] We do not consider
the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.’ ” (L.B., supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at pp. 411–412; In re Albert T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 207, 217
[substantial evidence may include reasonable inferences, but they must be
logically and reasonably related to evidence in the record].) “ ‘The appellant

14
has the burden to demonstrate there is no evidence of a sufficiently
substantial nature to support the findings or orders.’ ” (In re Lana S. (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 94, 103.)
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in sustaining jurisdiction
because the evidence was insufficient to establish a “current, nonspeculative
risk of serious physical harm at the time of the jurisdictional hearing.”
Mother argues the court’s reliance on evidence of her mental health and
minor’s “emotional response” to support its finding that minor was at a
substantial risk of serious physical harm was also error. Mother cites minor’s
lack of physical injuries and claims, “emotional harm alone does not satisfy
jurisdiction.” (Citing In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 829
[mother’s mental and substance abuse problems and father’s mental
problems were never connected to actual physical harm to children or created
a substantial risk of causing actual serious harm].) She further asserts
“mental illness alone is insufficient to support jurisdiction absent evidence
that it places the child at risk of physical harm.” Mother instead positively
cites her ongoing therapy, her “insight into her communication” with minor,
and a “commitment to improvement” that was not contradicted by “any
expert testimony, medical evidence, or specific factual showing that Mother’s
mental health rendered her unable to safely parent or created a risk of
physical harm to [minor].” Mother claims even her threats of self-harm “were
not accompanied by any evidence of attempts, plans, or actions suggesting
imminent danger,” thus, mother contends, the Department failed to establish
the required nexus between her conduct and a substantial risk of serious
physical harm to minor. Mother argues that the reported substance use and
exposure for minor was not corroborated or mentioned in the petition and,

15
absent a showing that any substance use resulted in harm to minor, the
claims cannot support jurisdiction.
But mother’s characterization of the evidence is one-sided and too
narrowly reads the law. There are myriad ways in which one can
demonstrate a parent’s “failure or inability . . . to adequately supervise or
protect the child,” as is required by section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A). (See
e.g., In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 850 (L.W.), disapproved on another
ground in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 560, fn. 18 [affirming
jurisdictional findings where record reflected mother’s substance abuse
issues, that she smoked cocaine in her child’s presence, and had been
arrested for driving under the influence twice]; In re L.G., supra, 118
Cal.App.5th at p. 1227 [mother’s mental illness had caused behaviors that
put eight-month-old child at risk of neglect including potentially harming
herself].) Similarly, being “at substantial risk of serious physical harm” is a
fact specific determination that can come in many forms. (L.B., supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 416 [significant history of domestic violence and evidence of
mother’s own assaultive behavior sufficient for jurisdictional finding]; In re
Travis C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226 (Travis C.) [affirming
jurisdictional findings where mother threatened suicide in the children’s
presence and continued to drive alone with her children even when
experiencing effects of her mental illness].) Here, like in L.W. and Travis C.,
substantial evidence supports the court’s determination that mother’s
inability to adequately supervise or protect minor created a substantial risk
of harm.
Mother minimizes her undertreated mental health issues and their
impact on minor’s physical safety, claiming her suicide threats were dark
humor and the supervision she provided was appropriate for a teen of minor’s

16
age. Yet mother acknowledged her severe grief after the deaths of her two
older children, repeatedly stated how minor’s gender identification seriously
upset her, implied a lack of control over minor’s behavior change in October,
and admitted to the juvenile court that she had stopped taking her
medication, which rendered her “unable” to speak to law enforcement on
October 27.
The record is replete with examples of how this inability to supervise or
protect minor created a substantial risk of his physical harm. For example,
minor detailed to the Department on two occasions a pattern of mother
“getting drunk, arguing with family, making an announcement that they
were leaving and packing their things,” and then “they would be driving on
the highway, and [mother] would be ‘saying things about killing us both’ and
‘that freaked [minor] out a lot for obvious reasons.’ ’’ (See In re J.N. (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1025 [recognizing the “ ‘horrific’ ” risk of drinking and
driving]; L.W., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 850.) Minor represented mother
had made “suicidal statements ‘ever since [he could] remember,’ ” and then
would leave him alone for hours telling minor she was going to go kill herself.
Mother’s threats were so frequently repeated and so specific, for example,
“stating she would ‘spend [money] on the drugs she needed’ to kill herself as
she ‘already had half.’ ” Mother’s threats demonstrate her dangerous conduct
that is likely to result in abandonment and/or physical harm to minor will
reoccur. (In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 607 [jurisdiction finding
may not be based on a single episode of conduct and requires evidence that
“[t]he earlier threatening conduct will recur”].) Although mother is correct
that “[t]he fact that [she] has a mental illness, without more, is insufficient to
support jurisdiction,” here, there is ample evidence that her mental illness

17
put minor at substantial risk of physical harm.11 (Travis C., supra,
13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1226.)
Moreover, mother’s assertion that her drug use and exposure of minor
to drugs was “uncorroborated” and did not place minor at substantial risk of
physical harm ignores the accepted fact that using illicit substances around
children can create a substantial risk of harm and certainly providing drugs
to her minor child creates an even greater risk. (See e.g. L.W., supra,
32 Cal.App.5th at p. 850; In re Lana S., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 104–
105 [parents’ exposure of methamphetamine to children supported the court’s
jurisdictional finding].) Minor repeatedly discussed with the worker mother’s
history of substance abuse that included the use of “acid, weed and ‘a lot of
bad drugs.’ ” Minor claimed mother used to sell marijuana with minor’s
father and stated mother had given him marijuana at age 13 and mushrooms
at age 14. Minor stated the substances were “easily accessible around the
home”; mother “ ‘sort of got [him] into using that as a way to handle my
mental health,’ ” and that he would “ ‘have to get high to talk to her, it was
that bad.’ ” Minor estimated that he last used marijuana near the end of the
summer, only a few months before these proceedings began. Minor’s
ingestion of and exposure to drugs furnished by mother presents another
basis for his ongoing substantial risk of physical harm. (In re Lana S., at
pp. 104–105.)
In addition, mother’s undertreated mental health issues negatively
impacted minor’s mental health in such a way that further created a
substantial risk of future physical harm. Minor reported intense anxiety

11 Mother’s reliance on In re N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at page 558, is

distinguishable because there the petition charged the parent under section
300, subdivision (b)(1)(D), not subdivision (b)(1)(A).

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because of his mother’s behavior, stating it “ ‘gets to [him] a lot and [he] get[s]
nervous because she is my mom.’ ” Minor described mother as “ ‘the main
cause of [his] stress.’ ” Mother refused to utilize minor’s preferred name and
pronouns, telling the social worker she “doesn’t support [the] gender change.”
Minor told the worker that her lack of support made him “ ‘really scared,’ ”
and when minor was removed from the home, mother attempted to “bribe
him” with an implication she would accept his gender identity if he returned.
Mother appeared to have sent minor text messages as “Kevin” that
threatened the death of his cat by refusing to feed it and were “designed to
provoke a reaction from him” because mother “ ‘tells lies just to stress [him]
out.’ ”
Substantial evidence in the record demonstrates how this behavior of
mother’s created a past and ongoing risk of physical harm to minor. For
example, minor reported cutting himself in sixth or seventh grade, and
although he denied continuing self-harm, he repeatedly was locked out of or
left the home—as was reported by his neighbor and as he did the night of the
October 27 call to police—sometimes staying with the families of friends.
Minor presented as “tired and withdrawn,” his hygiene was “bad” because his
mother was “lousy” with assisting him or caring for him, and he was observed
wearing baggy clothing covered in dog hair. Mother’s declaration
acknowledged minor’s behavior changed in October 2025, exhibited in part by
an unevenly shaved head and numerous new piercings that purportedly led
mother to keep minor home from school to avoid humiliation. This record
permits a reasonable inference of a substantial risk that minor’s emotional
distress caused by his mother could lead to additional self-harm or
destructive and physically dangerous behavior. (In re Albert T., supra,
144 Cal.App.4th at p. 217; In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 778 [“ ‘Some risks

19
may be substantial even if they carry a low degree of probability because the
magnitude of the harm is potentially great’ ”].)
Moreover, mother’s threatening and erratic actions throughout the
dependency proceedings corroborate and support minor’s narration of
mother’s conduct and the petition’s allegations. Mother sent “incoherent” and
“concerning” texts to multiple individuals interviewed and the worker. She
threatened the worker investigating the petition and accused her of being
part of a “little clique of kidnappers” and attempting “to steal our child.’ ”
Mother refused a SAFE welfare check simply because she associated it with
the Department. And mother repeatedly threatened to leave the county,
consistent with her history of moving between Marin, Santa Cruz, Shasta,
Humboldt, and Mendocino Counties. Her behavior throughout the
proceedings demonstrates the risk to minor that was present at the time of
the jurisdictional hearing.
Mother’s contention that the court’s determination “rested on
speculation” is unpersuasive. Indeed, it is not necessary for the court to
“precisely predict what harm will come” to minor, but it is sufficient that her
mental health issues and choices “create a substantial risk of some serious
physical harm or illness.” (Travis C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1227.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order. (L.B.,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 416.)
II. Dispositional Order
We next address mother’s challenges to the juvenile court’s
dispositional order.
Before a juvenile court may order a child removed from his or her
parent’s physical custody, the court must find there is clear and convincing
evidence that there is or would be a substantial danger to the child’s physical

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health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being if returned
home, and there are no reasonable means to protect the child without
removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) “[T]he juvenile court must . . . consider[] not
only the parent’s past conduct, but also current circumstances, and the
parent’s response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court
intervention.” (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.) Section 361,
subdivision (e), requires the court to “make a determination as to whether
reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal
of the minor from their home . . . .” “ ‘The parent need not be dangerous and
the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate.
The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.’ ” (In re M.D. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 836, 856–857.)
When reviewing a juvenile court’s dispositional orders, we determine
whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could have found removal necessary by clear and convincing
evidence.12 (In re I.R., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 520.) We view the record
in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s order and indulge in
reasonable inferences that the juvenile court might have drawn from the
evidence. (See Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1008–1009.)
As in the jurisdictional context, Mother argues the evidence is
insufficient to warrant minor’s removal from the home because there was no
substantial danger to minor’s physical health or safety, and “emotional harm

12 We note the parties appear to disagree over the appropriate standard

of review. Mother contends we review the court’s disposition finding for
substantial evidence, whereas the Department contends disposition orders
are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. We agree with mother that the
appropriate standard of review is substantial evidence. (In re I.R., supra,
61 Cal.App.5th at p. 520; In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 245.)

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alone in the absence of a corresponding risk of serious physical harm does not
justify removal” under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). Mother also asserts
insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that there were no
reasonable means by which the child’s physical health could be protected
without removal. We disagree.
Here, the same evidence supporting the court’s jurisdiction finding
provides sufficient evidence for removal even considering the higher standard
of clear and convincing evidence. As previously discussed, the record
contains substantial evidence of mother’s consistent pattern of emotionally
damaging behavior to minor related to her mental health issues, namely
repeatedly threatening to kill herself and minor, her failure to accept minor’s
gender identity, neglect of his care, and attempts to “provoke a reaction” out
of minor through text messages utilizing a pseudonym.
Mother claimed she participated in therapy with “psychologists,
psychiatrists, counselors, and social workers,” but did not submit to the trial
court any specific evidence of the nature or duration of treatment other than
describing it as “ongoing.” Contrary to mother’s assertions on appeal, her
continued behavior throughout the proceedings permits an inference that
mother is not participating in therapy as she contends—in fact, in mother’s
sworn declaration, she explains her failure to speak with the officers was a
result of “an acute CPTSD-related response due to not being on all my
medications.” This statement is consistent with minor’s observations of
mother’s “longstanding unaddressed mental health issues,” for which, to his
recollection, she received no services after their move to Marin County.
Mother asserts that emotional harm is insufficient to justify removal
under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). We rejected a similar argument in In re
H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 720, and explained “case law has long

22
construed section 361 as allowing removal where ‘return of the child would
create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s physical or emotional
well-being.’ ” As previously discussed, minor was emotionally distressed
because of his mother’s mental health issues, behavior, and treatment. But
also, as discussed, mother’s conduct, which included her drug use and minor’s
encouraged ingestion, driving with minor while under the influence,
physically neglecting minor, and locking him out of the house, also created a
substantial risk of physical harm. (See In re L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at
p. 245 [substantial evidence supported removal of child from father’s custody
was necessary to protect child’s physical and emotional well-being].)
Together, there is no question that substantial evidence supports the court’s
clear and convincing determination.
Substantial evidence also supports the court’s finding that there were
no less restrictive alternatives to removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Mother
claims her “initial resistance to law enforcement and the Department does
not establish that less restrictive means would be ineffective.” But mother
ignores her refusal to cooperate in the investigation or safety plan, threats to
workers, and erratic text messages to minor, the Department, and other
witnesses. Mother failed to confirm any visits with minor and appeared to
lack insight into how her behavior was impacting her child even at the time
of the disposition hearing, including minimizing her threats of self-harm.
Mother cites her sister as a viable caregiver, but minor declined to go home
with his aunt, and without mother’s participation in the creation of a safety
plan, that foreclosed that option for the court at the time of hearing. Under
these circumstances, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude by clear
and convincing evidence that mother had not yet demonstrated sufficient
progress in eliminating the conditions that led to the dependency, and there

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were no sufficiently reasonable means to protect minor other than removal.
(In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“In light of mother’s failure to
recognize the risks to which she was exposing the minor, there was no reason
to believe the conditions would not persist should the minor remain in her
home”].)
Finally, mother contends minor’s removal from her custody in the
absence of substantial evidence violated her rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Because we
conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination,
her argument fails.
DISPOSITION
The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.

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 DESAUTELS, J.

We concur:

RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.

MILLER, J.

In re I.M (A175337)

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