IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
JASON ROBERT HYATT,
Defendant and Respondent.

S290426

Fourth Appellate District, Division Three
G063126

Orange County Superior Court
19NF3055

August 6, 2026

Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban,
Evans, and Goldman* concurred.

*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, Division Four, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
 PEOPLE v. HYATT
S290426

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

Penal Code section 1381 permits a defendant who “has
been sentenced to and has entered upon a term of imprisonment
in a state prison” to demand that the district attorney promptly
bring any other pending criminal charges to trial. If the district
attorney fails to try the defendant’s outstanding charges within
90 days, the charges must be dismissed.
In this case, the trial court, sitting as a magistrate,
dismissed a felony complaint based on a district attorney’s
failure to comply with a Penal Code section 1381 demand. The
defendant made the demand after he was sentenced to a state
prison term on unrelated charges but before he had been
delivered to prison custody. The District Attorney appealed,
arguing that the section 1381 demand was premature.
Disagreeing, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of the
felony complaint.
As the case comes to us, it presents two questions. The
first question is whether the Court of Appeal should have
entertained the District Attorney’s appeal in the first place. The
answer turns on whether the magistrate’s dismissal order
qualified as a dismissal in a “felony case” appealable by statute
in the Court of Appeal (Pen. Code, §§ 1235, 1238, subd. (b)(8)),
even though the dismissed felony allegations had been made
only by complaint and not by indictment or information. The
second question concerns the merits of the Court of Appeal’s

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

decision. The answer to that question turns on the meaning of
the statutory phrase “has been sentenced to and has entered
upon a term of imprisonment in a state prison.” (Id., § 1381.)
Does the phrase mean that the demand may be made as soon as
the court has pronounced a sentence including a term in state
prison? Or must the defendant have been both sentenced and
delivered to prison custody?
As to the first question, we conclude, in common with the
Court of Appeal in this case, that a magistrate’s order
dismissing a felony complaint is a dismissal order in a “felony
case” that may be appealed to the Court of Appeal. As to the
second question, we conclude, contrary to the Court of Appeal in
this case, that a defendant has not “entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a state prison” for purposes of Penal Code
section 1381 until the defendant’s “actual delivery . . .into the
custody of the Director of Corrections.” (Pen. Code, § 2900,
subd. (a).) Before the defendant has been delivered into prison
custody, a Penal Code section 1381 demand is premature.
I.
In November 2019, the Orange County District Attorney
filed a felony complaint accusing defendant Jason Robert Hyatt
of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury
(Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), with two serious felony priors.
A magistrate oversaw Hyatt’s arraignment, at which Hyatt
entered a plea of not guilty. But the magistrate never conducted
a preliminary examination on the complaint, due in part to
repeated continuances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, as
well as Hyatt’s later failure to appear.
The Orange County complaint was still outstanding when,
on August 12, 2022, Hyatt was sentenced to a six-year prison

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

sentence on unrelated charges in Riverside County. The same
day, Hyatt’s counsel in the Riverside matter personally served
the Orange County District Attorney with a demand under
Penal Code section 1381 (section 1381). The demand, signed by
Hyatt’s counsel, informed the District Attorney that Hyatt was
“currently committed to a term of imprisonment in the
California Department of Corrections,” and that as of August 12,
2022, he was “in the custody of the Riverside County Sheriff’s
Department, pending transportation to the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation[.]” The letter
provided Hyatt’s full name, the name and address of the county
facility holding him, and the name, address, and phone number
of his counsel. The letter demanded that the Orange County
charge be brought to trial within 90 days. The District
Attorney’s office stamped the demand letter as “received” on
August 17, 2022.
On August 25, 2022, a deputy district attorney sent a
response to Hyatt at the Riverside County Jail, without copying
or otherwise notifying Hyatt’s counsel, who had prepared and
signed the demand letter.1 The response stated that because

1
This was evidently an error. As the District Attorney
acknowledges, an attorney should not directly communicate
with a party known to be represented by counsel; the deputy
district attorney should have directed his communications to
counsel and not to Hyatt himself. Had this error not occurred,
this case might well not be here. As the Court of Appeal
majority observed, “had the District Attorney simply complied
with its obligation to communicate with Hyatt’s attorney, rather
than sending its response letter to Hyatt at the county jail,
Hyatt’s attorney could have obviated this dispute by promptly
sending (or advising Hyatt to send) another section 1381

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

Hyatt sent his demand letter “while still in county jail, the
demand is invalid . . . and does not invoke the running of the 90-
day time limit” set by section 1381. As a result, the District
Attorney had decided to “take no further action at this time.” As
the Court of Appeal observed, and the District Attorney
apparently concedes, there is no evidence in the record that
Hyatt received this response. The District Attorney filed the
response letter in the docket of the Orange County Superior
Court on September 2, 2022. Five days later, Hyatt was
admitted into Wasco State Prison.
Ten months later, while still at Wasco State Prison, Hyatt
sent a second Notice and Demand for Trial on a form provided
by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR), again seeking trial of his pending charges within 90
days. After receiving this second letter, the District Attorney
initiated a CDCR transport to bring Hyatt to Orange County for
a preliminary hearing. But before the magistrate conducted a
preliminary examination on the felony complaint, Hyatt filed a
motion to dismiss pursuant to section 1381, based on the
original demand sent in August 2022. The magistrate agreed
that Hyatt’s first letter satisfied the statutory requirements,
found that the People had failed to bring him to trial within 90
days, and dismissed the complaint. The District Attorney
appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeal. The notice of

demand once Hyatt arrived in prison.” (People v. Hyatt (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 735, 744–745 & fn. 7.) While the omission has
no bearing on the legal issues presented in this appeal, the case
nonetheless illustrates why lawyers must comply with their
duty to properly communicate with represented defendants
through counsel.

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

appeal cited Penal Code section 1238, subdivision (a)(8) (section
1238(a)(8)), which authorizes the People to appeal “an order or
judgment dismissing or otherwise terminating all or any portion
of the action” in a felony case. (§ 1238(a)(8); see also Pen. Code,
§ 1235 (section 1235).)
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of
the felony complaint under section 1381. (People v. Hyatt, supra,
109 Cal.App.5th 735 (Hyatt).) As an initial matter, in an
unpublished portion of the opinion, a unanimous court rejected
Hyatt’s contention that the court lacked jurisdiction because the
case was not a “felony case” appealable to the Court of Appeal
under sections 1235 and 1238(a)(8). The court reasoned that the
People’s filing of a felony complaint initiated a “felony case” even
though the magistrate dismissed the complaint, and no
information or indictment was ever filed in the superior court.
(Hyatt [unpublished portion].) In so holding, the court relied on
People v. Rodriguez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 326, which had
similarly concluded that the Court of Appeal may adjudicate the
People’s appeal of a magistrate’s order dismissing felony counts.
The court distinguished People v. Nickerson (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 33 (Nickerson), which had held a magistrate’s
order reducing a felony charge to a misdemeanor should have
been directed to the appellate division of the superior court,
which has jurisdiction over appeals in “misdemeanor cases”
(Pen. Code, § 1466), rather than the Court of Appeal. The court
in this case agreed with the result in Nickerson, but disagreed
with a portion of the opinion reasoning that a felony case
commences only after an information or indictment is filed in
the superior court or a felony complaint is certified to the
superior court following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. (See
Nickerson, at p. 38; Hyatt, at p. 741.)

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

On the merits, a divided court concluded in a published
opinion that Hyatt’s section 1381 demand was effective to start
the 90-day clock, notwithstanding the fact that Hyatt had not
yet been delivered to the custody of the state prison. (Hyatt,
supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at pp. 741–748.) The majority reasoned
that statutory language requiring the defendant to have
“ ‘entered upon a term of imprisonment in a state prison’ ” was
not intended to describe a physical location, but rather “a type
of defendant who can invoke its provisions, i.e., those defendants
who are serving a state prison sentence.” (Id. at p. 744, quoting
§ 1381.) The court further reasoned that “[t]he fact that Hyatt
was temporarily incarcerated in county jail while awaiting
transfer to a state prison facility did not mean he had not begun
serving his state prison sentence or make his demand for a
speedy trial ineffective.” (Hyatt, at p. 742.) The Court of Appeal
acknowledged that other courts had reached a different
conclusion, but declined to follow them. (Id. at p. 747, discussing
People v. Gutierrez (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 105, 110–111
(Gutierrez), and People v. Clark (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 975, 980–
981 (Clark).)
Justice Motoike dissented. She criticized the majority for
adopting a “novel interpretation of section 1381 that is not only
unsupported by the statute’s plain language or any legislative
history, but constitutes an unwarranted departure from
decades-old, settled case law that has been followed by courts
and criminal law practitioners for the past 40 years.” (Hyatt,
supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 749 (dis. opn. of Motoike, J.).)
The District Attorney sought our review on the grounds
that the Court of Appeal erroneously interpreted section 1381,
creating a conflict with Clark and Gutierrez. In his answer to
the People’s petition, Hyatt renewed his challenge to the Court

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

of Appeal’s appellate jurisdiction. We granted review to address
both issues, each of which has given rise to disagreement among
the Courts of Appeal. Both present questions of statutory
interpretation; our review of those questions is de novo. (People
v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032 (Walker).)
II.
We begin with the jurisdictional question. In criminal
cases, the prosecution “ ‘has no right to appeal except as
provided by statute.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Mitchell)
(2024) 17 Cal.5th 228, 244, quoting People v. Williams (2005)
35 Cal.4th 817, 822–823.) “The circumstances allowing a
People’s appeal are enumerated in section 1238.” (People v.
Chacon (2007) 40 Cal.4th 558, 564.) The District Attorney’s
notice of appeal cited section 1238(a)(8), which permits the
prosecution to appeal an “order or judgment dismissing or
otherwise terminating all or any portion of the action[.]”2
(§ 1238, subd. (a)(8).) The authorizations in section 1238 are
bounded by section 1235, subdivision (a), which empowers
“[e]ither party to a felony case” to appeal certain questions of
law, specifying that “[t]he provisions of this title” — including
section 1238 — “apply only to such appeals.” (§ 1235, subd. (a).)
Subdivision (b) of section 1235 states that an appeal in a felony

2
In his briefing here, the District Attorney also invokes Penal
Code section 1238, subdivision (a)(1), which allows the People to
appeal “[a]n order setting aside all or any portion of the
indictment, information, or complaint.” The District Attorney
did not cite subdivision (a)(1) in his original notice of appeal, nor
did he mention subdivision (a)(1) in his briefing in the Court of
Appeal. We do not address whether subdivision (a)(1) provides
an additional basis for appealing a magistrate’s dismissal of a
felony complaint on section 1381 grounds.

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

case “is to the court of appeal” for the district. Thus sections
1235 and 1238 provide for Court of Appeal jurisdiction over
appeals only in “felony case[s].” (A separate provision, Penal
Code section 1466, governs appeals in infraction and
misdemeanor cases, which must instead be taken to the
appellate divisions of the superior courts.) Penal Code section
691 then provides that, “unless it is otherwise apparent from
context,” the term “felony case,” as used in the relevant part of
the Penal Code, means “a criminal action in which a felony is
charged[.]” (§ 691, subd. (f).)
The primary dispute between the parties is whether this
case counts as a “felony case” — that is, an action in which a
felony is “charged.” The District Attorney says it does; Hyatt
says it does not, and therefore no appeal lies under sections 1235
and 1238. This also, of course, is not an infraction or
misdemeanor case, so no appeal would lie under Penal Code
section 1466 either. Hyatt contends that what the District
Attorney should have done, rather than attempt to appeal the
dismissal of the complaint, was file a motion in superior court to
reinstate the complaint. (See Pen. Code, § 871.5.)
In interpreting statutes, we begin by examining the words
used, giving them their ordinary, commonsense meaning. (See,
e.g., Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1032.) Here, the District
Attorney seeks review of the dismissal of a criminal complaint
against Hyatt alleging that he committed felony offenses. In
ordinary legal usage, felony offenses charged by complaint are
commonly referred to as “felony charges,” and the resulting
action as a “felony case.” (E.g., People v. Cota (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1124 [“a felony complaint charged”];
Egelston v. State Personnel Bd. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1050,
1053 [the District Attorney “subsequently charged appellant in

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

a felony complaint”]; Teran v. Superior Court (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 371, 375 [“A felony complaint . . . charged
petitioner”]; see also, e.g., People v. Henson (2022) 13 Cal.5th
574, 584 (Henson) [“Prior to unification, the complaint in a
felony case was filed at the municipal court”].) Common usage
thus suggests that this is, in fact, a “felony case” (§ 1235) in
which felonies have been “charged” (§ 691), meaning the
prosecution is entitled to appeal the dismissal of those charges
to the Court of Appeal. Ultimately, we conclude that this
straightforward answer is in fact the correct answer. But the
question is more complicated than it may at first appear, owing
to the nuances of California charging procedure and the complex
history that gave rise to the present statutory regime.
A.
Hyatt’s central argument is that he was never formally
“charged” with a felony because the district attorney filed only a
complaint and not an indictment or information. To understand
the argument, we review some familiar background. Under
California law, a criminal complaint is, as a formal matter, filed
with the magistrate, not the superior court — unlike either an
indictment (which is presented to the superior court by a grand
jury) or an information, which can be filed in the superior court
only after the magistrate conducts a preliminary examination
on the felony complaint. (See §§ 738, 806, 889, 917 [collectively
establishing this framework].) The “magistrate’s primary role
relates to a defendant’s arrest and detention pending a court
trial”; by examining the felony complaint before the filing of an
information, the magistrate provides a check on the initiation of
formal felony prosecution. (Henson, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 588;
see also id. at p. 589 [discussing Hurtado v. California (1884)
110 U.S. 516].) This means that the filing of a felony complaint

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

and the magistrate’s preliminary examination on the complaint,
“while being in some sense the initiation of a criminal case
[citations], are components of a threshold proceeding that
precedes the formal trial court prosecution of the defendant and
that ensures that the district attorney or other prosecutorial
authority does not abuse his or her power.” (Henson, at p. 589.)
It is only once the information or other accusatory pleading is
filed in superior court that “formal trial court prosecution”
begins. (Ibid.; see id. at p. 588.)
As we have observed, this distinction between magistrate
proceedings and superior court proceedings was once clearer
than it tends to be in modern practice. At one time, private
parties could file criminal complaints directly with the
magistrate, without any involvement from a public prosecutor.
(Henson, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 587.) But this practice changed
more than 50 years ago, thanks to case law requiring that a
complaint be approved by the local district attorney. (Ibid.,
citing People v. Municipal Court (Pellegrino) (1972)
27 Cal.App.3d 193, 205–206.) In addition, and as particularly
relevant to Hyatt’s argument here, magistrate proceedings were
once conducted in different courts from the courts in which
felony trials were held. Before 1998, California had a two-tiered
system of trial courts, consisting of superior courts, which
handled felonies and high-value civil cases, and so-called
inferior courts (either municipal courts or justice courts), which
handled misdemeanors, infractions, and low-value civil cases.
(California Criminal Procedure and Trial Court Unification:
Background Study, California Law Revision Com. Report (2002)
pp. 2–4.) “Prior to unification, the complaint in a felony case
was filed at the municipal court,” with the municipal court judge
acting in the capacity of magistrate. (Henson, at p. 584.) But in

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

1998, “the voters approved Proposition 220, permitting
unification of the municipal and superior courts,” and every
county opted in favor of unification. (Id. at p. 593.) Now,
following unification, “the felony complaint that initiates the
magistrate proceeding is filed at the [superior] court” and
magistrate proceedings are now conducted by superior court
judges, sitting as magistrates. (Id. at pp. 588–589, citing Koski
v. James (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 349, 354–355; see generally id. at
pp. 586–590 [describing history of magistrate proceedings].)
As a result of these developments, the institutionally
separate role of magistrates “tends to be obscured in modern
practice.” (Henson, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 587–588.) But as
we explained in Henson, the formal legal distinction between
magistrate proceedings and superior court proceedings remains
relevant for a number of purposes in the law. (Id. at pp. 589–
590, citing Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239, 257
(Serna); see Henson, at p. 579 [holding, in part based on this
distinction, that section 954 permits a prosecutor to file a single
information in the superior court combining related offenses
that were the subject of separate preliminary examinations
before the magistrate].) The question before us is whether the
application of the appellate jurisdiction provisions in Penal Code
sections 1235 and 1238 is one of these purposes.
B.
Based on this institutional distinction between
magistrates and superior courts, Hyatt argues that the
preliminary proceedings against him before the magistrate
never matured into a “felony case,” as that term is used in
section 1235 and defined in Penal Code section 691. Because no
preliminary examination was held, and thus no information or

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other accusatory pleading was ever filed in the superior court,
in its capacity as a superior court, he contends that the People
never formally instituted a felony prosecution.
This argument derives from the opinion in Nickerson,
which articulated this view of what it means to “charge” a felony
within the meaning of Penal Code section 691. In Nickerson, the
court addressed what it described as a novel issue created by
trial court unification. (Nickerson, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p.
35.) The prosecutor in that case had filed a criminal complaint
alleging two misdemeanors, as well as a third “wobbler” offense
charged as a felony. But after the preliminary examination, the
magistrate exercised his power under Penal Code section 17,
subdivision (b)(5), to reduce the felony charge to a misdemeanor.
(Nickerson, at pp. 36–37.) The defendant was then tried for two
misdemeanors and convicted of one. He tried to appeal that
misdemeanor conviction to the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 36.)
The Court of Appeal rejected the effort, concluding that the case
was a misdemeanor case appealable only to the appellate
division of the superior court under Penal Code section 1466.
(Nickerson, at pp. 38–39.)
In the portion of the opinion on which Hyatt relies,
Nickerson reasoned that “a defendant is not ‘charged with a
felony’ within the meaning of Penal Code section 691” until an
accusatory pleading charging a felony is filed in superior court.
(Nickerson, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 38.) Nickerson cited
Penal Code section 949, which provides: “The first pleading on
the part of the people in the superior court in a felony case is the
indictment, information, or complaint in any case certified to the
superior court under Section 859a” — i.e., a complaint to which
the defendant has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
(Pen. Code, § 949, see id., § 859a.) In the Nickerson court’s view,

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a felony criminal complaint filed only with a magistrate does not
suffice. (Nickerson, at p. 38.)
Nickerson, in turn, relied for this conclusion on the
reasoning of Serna. In Serna, we were asked to consider
whether a four-year delay between the filing of a misdemeanor
complaint and the defendant’s arrest violated his constitutional
rights to a speedy trial. (Serna, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 245; see
Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; U.S. Const., amend. VI.) We held that a
misdemeanor complaint was a “formal charge” sufficient to
trigger a defendant’s right to a speedy trial. (Serna, at pp. 257,
262; see id. at pp. 251, 258.) We distinguished an earlier case,
People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 605, which had held that
the right to speedy trial did not attach upon the filing of a felony
complaint. We explained, among other things, that a “felony
complaint, unlike a misdemeanor complaint, does not confer
trial jurisdiction.” (Serna, at p. 257.) Rather, a “felony
complaint functions to bring the defendant before a magistrate
for an examination into whether probable cause exists to
formally charge him with a felony. Only if probable cause exists
may an information invoking the trial jurisdiction of the
superior court be filed . . . . This step, preliminary to formal
accusation in the court with jurisdiction over the prosecution of
the charge, does not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to
speedy trial[.]” (Ibid.)
Based on Nickerson and Serna, Hyatt argues that because
the felony complaint against him was dismissed by the
magistrate and thus never came under the jurisdiction of the
superior court, there was no “felony case” within the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeal. Neither decision persuades us to Hyatt’s
point of view.

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As an initial matter, both Serna and Nickerson are readily
distinguishable. Nickerson did not consider whether an appeal
from a magistrate’s dismissal of a felony complaint could be
taken before the Court of Appeal. Rather, the court held that
when a “matter goes before the magistrate for a preliminary
examination and the court as magistrate reduces all of the
felony charges from felonies to misdemeanors,” an appeal of the
resulting misdemeanor judgment belongs in the appellate
division of the superior court rather than the Court of Appeal.
(Nickerson, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 38.) As the Court of
Appeal in this case observed, that is a different question that
may well invoke different considerations from the issue we
confront here.3
Serna, for its part, concerned matters even further afield.
There we considered whether a misdemeanor complaint
amounted to a “formal charge” to which speedy trial rights
attach. In distinguishing felony cases, we not only noted that
there is a formal distinction between the effect of a misdemeanor
complaint and that of a felony complaint, but we emphasized
practical differences particular to the speedy trial context.
(Serna, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 257 [noting that “the filing of a
felony complaint, unlike indictment or accusation by

3
As the Court of Appeal in this case observed, Penal Code
section 17, subdivision (b)(5) (section 17 (b)(5)), provides that
when a wobbler is reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor, “it
is a misdemeanor for all purposes.” Hyatt disputes that this
provision adequately resolves the issue before the Nickerson
court, but that dispute is beyond the scope of our inquiry here;
the point is only that Nickerson’s broader conclusions about the
meaning of the term “felony case” were not clearly necessary to
the decision in that case.

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information, does not threaten oppressive pretrial
incarceration,” and comes with strict timelines that “ensure that
the defendant is not subjected to extended anxiety or public
opprobrium”]; accord, Henson, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 590.) We
had no reason to opine on the statutory definition of a “felony
case” for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.
Although Nickerson did opine on the meaning of the term
“felony case,” its opinion does not reflect the only possible
reading of the plain statutory text. The Nickerson opinion
assumes that when section 1235 and Penal Code section 691 use
the term “felony case,” and speak in terms of whether a felony
has been “charged,” that must mean there has been a “formal
accusation in the court with jurisdiction over the prosecution of
the charge.” (Serna, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 257.) This is not an
implausible conclusion to draw, but it is certainly not one
compelled by the statutory text. Neither section 1235 nor Penal
Code section 691 specifies that felony charges must be “formal”
or that they must be filed “in superior court.” And the Nickerson
opinion offers no clear reason why these provisions must be read
in a manner that limits appellate jurisdiction to those cases in
which there has been a formal felony accusation of the sort that
would, for instance, start the running of the constitutional
speedy trial clock, as in Serna.
Hyatt, again drawing on Nickerson, attempts to fill this
gap by way of Penal Code section 949, which specifies that “[t]he
first pleading on the part of the people in the superior court in a
felony case is the indictment, information, or the complaint
certified to the superior court [where the defendant has pleaded
guilty or nolo contendere],” while the “first pleading on the part
of the people in a misdemeanor or infraction case is a complaint
except as otherwise provided by law.” (Pen. Code, § 949.) But

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by its terms, that provision merely confirms that these superior
court filings are the first pleadings filed by the people in superior
court in a felony case. Penal Code section 949 neither states nor
necessarily implies that a felony complaint filed with a
magistrate does not “charge” a felony (§ 691) or that such a
complaint does not give rise to a “felony case” (§ 1235). And
aside from Penal Code section 949, Hyatt points to nothing in
the Penal Code that would shed any light on the matter.
C.
While Hyatt’s argument about when a “felony case” begins
is not clearly supported by the statutory text, neither is it clearly
foreclosed. It is therefore appropriate for us to examine the
history of the language for more insight into its meaning. (E.g.,
McHugh v. Protective Life Ins. Co. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 213, 227.)
That history supports the reading that ordinary usage would
suggest: A case dismissing a felony complaint is a “felony case”
over which the Courts of Appeal have jurisdiction.
The “felony case” language at issue was added to section
1235, and the present definition added to Penal Code section
691, as part of a 1998 overhaul of the Penal Code to implement
trial court unification. (Sen. Bill No. 2139 (1997–1998 Reg.
Sess.), Stats. 1998, ch. 931; see generally Snukal v. Flightways
Manufacturing, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 754, 763, fn. 2 [describing
several changes made by the 1998 court unification legislation].)
Before the legislation was enacted, section 1235 authorized the
Courts of Appeal to hear an appeal in a “criminal action within
the original trial jurisdiction of a superior court.” (Former
§ 1235, Stats. 1951, ch. 1674, § 132, p. 3855.) By contrast, Penal
Code section 1466 provided: “An appeal may be taken from a
judgment or order of an inferior court, in an infraction or

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

misdemeanor case, to the superior court . . . .” (Former § 1466,
Stats. 1992, ch. 78 (Sen. Bill 839), § 2.)
The 1998 court unification legislation amended the
appellate jurisdiction statutes to eliminate the references to
inferior versus superior courts. The legislation amended section
1235 by replacing the words “criminal action within the original
trial jurisdiction of a superior court” with “felony case.” (Stats.
1998, ch. 931, § 379.) It also amended Penal Code section 1466,
eliminating the reference to an “inferior court,” while retaining
reference to an “infraction or misdemeanor” case. (Id., § 424.)
Finally, it added Penal Code section 691, subdivision (f)’s
definition of a felony complaint as a “criminal action in which a
felony is charged,” and defined a “misdemeanor or infraction
case” in the following subdivision as “a criminal action in which
a misdemeanor or infraction is charged[.]” (Stats. 1998, ch. 931,
§ 354.) As a result of these changes, “ ‘[t]he proper appellate
procedure is no longer determined by which court (i.e., “inferior”
or “superior”) issued the order. It is now determined by the
“type” of case. [Citations.] If the order occurred in an “infraction
or misdemeanor case,” the proper appeal is to the appellate
division of the superior court. [Citation.] If the order occurred
in a “felony case,” the proper appeal is to the Court of Appeal.’ ”
(People v. Rodriguez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 326, 332; see also
ibid. [concluding that an appeal from an order dismissing felony
counts under section 1387 properly lies in the Court of Appeal].)
Hyatt insists the legislation was not intended to give the
prosecution a new appellate remedy — an appeal to the Court of
Appeal — when a magistrate dismisses a felony charge. He
relies on remarks from the California Law Revision
Commission, which drafted and proposed the legislation,
indicating that changes to the appellate jurisdiction statutes

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 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

were intended “to preserve existing procedures for criminal
cases by replacing references to superior court criminal cases
with references to felony cases.”4 (Trial Court Unification:
Revision of Codes (July 1998) 28 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep.
(1998) p. 73; see also id. at pp. 60, 406.) But as the District
Attorney points out, the discussion also emphasizes that the
legislation implemented a constitutional amendment that
“allow[ed] for statutory expansion of court of appeal
jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 73.) And perhaps most tellingly, in a
comment on the proposed revisions to section 1235 that were
ultimately enacted into law, the Report reads: “Section 1235 is
amended to accommodate unification of the municipal and
superior courts in a county . . . Appeals in felony cases lie to the
court of appeal, regardless of whether the appeal is from the
superior court, the municipal court, or the action of a
magistrate.” (Id. at pp. 455, 480, italics added.) Although Hyatt
insists that this brief comment “was not intended to expand
appellate procedures” to include appeals from magistrate
proceedings, he fails to explain what else the Commission might

4
Proposition 220 made the constitutional changes necessary to
merge the superior and municipal courts, but required
implementing legislation to amend the many provisions of the
code affected by trial court unification. The Legislature tasked
the Law Revision Commission with recommending “statutory
changes that may be necessitated by court unification.” (28 Law
Rev. Com. Rpt. (1998) p. 6, quoting 1997 Cal. Stat. res. ch. 102;
see also Stats. 1998, ch. 91.) The Commission prepared a
lengthy report proposing dozens of amendments to the code,
with explanatory comments. In the sections of the Penal Code
relevant here, the Legislature enacted the Commission’s
proposed amendments verbatim.

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 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

have meant by including the “action of a magistrate” in a list of
“felony” matters appealable to the Court of Appeal.
In sum, the legislative history supports the conclusion
that the statutory language most naturally suggests: If a
superior court judge, sitting as a magistrate, dismisses a felony
complaint, that dismissal may be appealed to the Court of
Appeal pursuant to its statutory jurisdiction over appeals in
“felony case[s].” (§ 1235; see id., § 1238.)
D.
Hyatt contends, finally, that the district attorney should
have challenged the magistrate’s order using the procedures set
forth in Penal Code section 871.5 (section 871.5), rather than
appealing directly to the Court of Appeal.
Section 871.5 provides that “when an action is dismissed
by a magistrate” pursuant to section 1381 and some other
similar sections, “the prosecutor may make a motion in the
superior court within 15 days to compel the magistrate to
reinstate the complaint or a portion thereof and to reinstate the
custodial status of the defendant under the same terms and
conditions as when the defendant last appeared before the
magistrate.” (§ 871.5.) A corresponding subdivision of section
1238 expressly authorizes the people to appeal the superior
court’s order “denying the motion of the people to reinstate the
complaint or a portion thereof pursuant to Section 871.5.” (Pen.
Code, § 1238, subd. (a)(9); see also id., § 871.5, subd. (f).)
At the outset, the fact that orders denying a section 871.5
reinstatement motion appear in the list of orders appealable
under sections 1235 and 1238 would seem to pose a problem for
Hyatt’s position regarding the Court of Appeal’s exercise of
jurisdiction here: as discussed above, those sections “apply only”

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 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

to appeals in a “felony case.” (§ 1235, subd. (a).) When a
superior court denies a motion to reinstate a felony complaint,
there has been no indictment, information, or complaint
certified pursuant to Penal Code section 859a filed in the
superior court. (Pen. Code, § 949.) Nevertheless, section 1238
plainly treats such denials as occurring in a felony case. This
would appear to undermine Hyatt’s contention that no “felony
case” arises from the filing and subsequent dismissal of a felony
complaint.
Hyatt responds by pointing to legislative history which, in
his view, shows that subdivision (a)(9) was intended as a narrow
exception to the general non-appealability of magistrate
dismissals. Section 871.5 was first enacted in response to a
perceived gap in the available pathways to appeal a magistrate’s
order dismissing all or part of a felony complaint. Before
unification, then-extant divisions of authority between
magistrates and trial courts, on the one hand, and between
Courts of Appeal and superior courts, on the other, gave rise to
substantial uncertainties about whether magistrates had the
power to dismiss felony complaints under various dismissal
statutes directed at “courts,” and, if so, where an appeal from
such dismissals would lie. (See generally People v. Mimms
(1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 471, 475–480.) The Legislature
responded in 1980 by enacting legislation that amended a
number of statutory provisions to explicitly authorize
magistrate dismissals. (See Landrum v. Superior Court (1981)
30 Cal.3d 1, 17, fn. 4.) At the same time, the Legislature enacted
section 871.5 to “provid[e] a means by which the district
attorney can appeal a magistrate’s order to dismiss an action”
under various statutory authorities. (Ibid., citing Stats. 1980,
ch. 938, § 4, at p. 3192.) Not long thereafter, the Legislature

20
 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

amended section 871.5 “to add all other statutory grounds for a
dismissal of the complaint by a magistrate” including section
1381. (Mimms, at p. 478, fn. 7.)
Although nothing in the text of section 871.5 says that it
is exclusive of other applicable review procedures, Hyatt relies
on Mimms to argue that the District Attorney’s only path to
review runs through section 871.5. In Mimms, a pre-unification
case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the appellate division
of the superior court lacked jurisdiction to review a dismissal
under the version of Penal Code section 1466 then in effect. In
a brief treatment of the issue, Mimms held that “section 871.5
is the exclusive method by which the People may obtain a review
of a magistrate’s order of dismissal.” (Mimms, supra,
204 Cal.App.3d at p. 481.) The court reasoned that treating
section 871.5 as the exclusive means of challenging a
magistrate’s dismissal would “avoid the confusion apparent in
using Penal Code section 1466 to review a magistrate’s order of
dismissal,” as well as various practical difficulties, including
appellate delay. (Mimms, at p. 481.) 5
Mimms does not help Hyatt’s case. The court there
considered the appealability of an order from an “inferior court”
under former Penal Code section 1466. It did not speak to
whether a magistrate’s dismissal order was appealable to the
Courts of Appeal under the version of section 1235 then in force,

5
Hyatt also points to People v. Shrier (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th
400, 409, which postdates unification. But Shrier simply quoted
the “exclusive method” language from Mimms in a brief rule
statement — and the court there was not considering the
propriety of a direct appeal, because the People arrived at the
Court of Appeal after making and losing a motion for
reinstatement of the complaint under section 871.5.

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

much less the version in effect today. And more to the point, as
the Court of Appeal has since observed, the legislation
implementing trial court unification — including pertinent
changes to section 1235 — has cleared up the confusion that
prompted the exclusivity rule of Mimms. (See People v.
Rodriguez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 326, 332 [agreeing that “the
exclusivity rule stated in Mimms is essentially a relic of the days
before unification of the municipal and superior courts”].) Hyatt
does not deny the point; he simply asserts that “[e]ven if section
871.5 is not always the exclusive method of seeking review of a
magistrate’s dismissal, it was an efficient and readily available
method here, and direct appeal to the court of appeal was the
wrong method.” For reasons already explained, we are
unpersuaded by Hyatt’s argument that direct appeal to the
Court of Appeal was the “wrong method.” Because Hyatt offers
no other reason to think that the prosecutor was bound to
proceed in superior court under section 871.5, the argument
fails.
In sum, the appellate jurisdiction statute permitted the
Court of Appeal to adjudicate the People’s appeal of a
magistrate’s order dismissing a felony complaint. (§§ 1235,
1238.) We disapprove People v. Nickerson (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 33, to the extent the reasoning of the opinion is
inconsistent with this conclusion; going forward, courts should
not rely on Nickerson’s conclusions about when a felony is
“charged” within the meaning of Penal Code section 691.
III.
Having concluded that the Court of Appeal had
jurisdiction over the appeal, we now turn to the merits of its
reading of section 1381. As the court acknowledged, its reading

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 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

of that provision differed from the reading other courts had
given it in previous decades. (See Gutierrez, supra,
30 Cal.App.4th at pp. 110–111; Clark, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 980–981.) We conclude the Court of Appeal’s contrary
reading was in error.
First enacted in 1931, section 1381 provides, as amended,
that any defendant who “has been sentenced to and has entered
upon a term of imprisonment in a state prison,” but still faces
other pending criminal proceedings, may demand that “the
district attorney of the county in which the matters are pending
shall bring the defendant to trial or for sentencing within 90
days after the person shall have delivered to said district
attorney written notice of the place of his or her imprisonment
or commitment and his or her desire to be brought to trial or for
sentencing[.]” (§ 1381; see Stats. 1931, ch. 486, p. 1060.) If the
defendant is not brought to trial within 90 days, “the court in
which the charge or sentencing is pending shall . . .
dismiss the action.” (§ 1381.)
Section 1381 is one in a series of statutory speedy trial
provisions we have described as “ ‘supplementary to and a
construction of’ ” the constitutional right to a speedy trial.
(People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 766.) The
overarching purpose of the provision is to allow incarcerated
defendants to clear outstanding charges in a timely fashion.
(See People v. Simpson (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 177, 181 [section
1381 “was placed in the law so that a prisoner could clean up
pending charges . . . so that he would not have these charges
hanging over him and waiting for him on his release”].) And the
primary function of the 90-day timeline, as courts have
described it, “ ‘ “ ‘is to permit a defendant to obtain concurrent
sentencing at the hands of the court in which the earlier

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 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

proceeding is pending, if such is the court’s discretion.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Wagner (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1039, 1056.)
“Because failure to comply with section 1381 results in ‘the
drastic sanction of dismissal’ [citation], courts have required
defendants to comply strictly with statutory requirements.”
(People v. Garcia (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 1187, 1191.) The
dispute in this case concerns one statutory requirement in
particular. Section 1381 states that only a defendant who “has
entered upon a term of imprisonment in a state prison” can
make a valid demand. (§ 1381.) Hyatt argues that his section
1381 demand — which was sent from county jail while he
awaited post-sentencing transfer to state prison — complied
with the statute because he had by then “entered upon a term of
imprisonment.” The District Attorney counters that a
defendant must submit a section 1381 demand while physically
“in a state prison.”
To resolve this interpretive dispute, we again begin by
consulting the ordinary meaning of the words used. (People v.
Hammer (2003) 30 Cal.4th 756, 762.) But parsing the words
“entered upon a term of imprisonment in a state prison,” at least
in isolation, yields no clear answers. At the time section 1381
was enacted, the leading American dictionary defined the verb
“enter” as “to go or come into a place or condition.” (Webster’s
New International Dictionary, p. 730 (1930 ed.).) This is, of
course, the heart of the dispute: The District Attorney contends
that section 1381 requires entry into a place (state prison), while
Hyatt thinks it requires entry into a condition (serving a term
of imprisonment). The addition of “upon” does not resolve the
difficulty. The same dictionary entry gives two examples of this
prepositional phrase, one physical, the other conceptual: “the
explorers entered upon a desert tract,” and “to enter upon a

24
 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

career.” (Webster’s New International Dictionary, p. 730 (1930
ed.).)
That brings us to the phrase that immediately follows:
“term of imprisonment in a state prison.” The District Attorney
contends that this clause can be interpreted only as requiring
physical presence. We are unpersuaded. It is not obvious that
“in a state prison” should be parsed as a separate prepositional
clause identifying the place from which a demand must be sent.
Instead, those words might serve an adjectival function, to
distinguish a state prison sentence from other possible
conditions of confinement, like a term in county jail. Use of the
indefinite article (“in a state prison” rather than “in state
prison”) is perhaps suggestive of location, but not
unambiguously so.
The Court of Appeal sought to unravel this knot by
consulting surrounding provisions concerning other categories
of individuals who may make section 1381 demands. (See, e.g.,
Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644,
659 [courts must construe words in context].) As the court
observed, section 1381 applies not just to defendants in state
prison, but to persons housed in several other types of custodial
institutions, including any offender who: (1) “has been
sentenced to and has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a
county jail for a period of more than 90 days”; (2) “has been
committed to and placed in a county jail for more than 90 days
as a condition of probation”; (3) “has been committed to and
placed in an institution subject to the jurisdiction of the
Department of the Youth Authority”; or (4) “has been committed
to the custody of the Director of Corrections pursuant to Chapter
1 (commencing with Section 3000) of Division 3 of the Welfare

25
 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

and Institutions Code and has entered upon his or her term of
commitment[.]” (§ 1381, italics added.)
The Court of Appeal concluded that these surrounding
provisions unambiguously favored Hyatt’s proposed
interpretation of section 1381. The court reasoned that use of
“placed in” with respect to several other categories of offenders
signified an express requirement of physical presence and
inferred that the different language respecting state prisoners
was clearly meant to have a different, non-physical meaning.
(Hyatt, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 792.) In dissent, however,
Justice Motoike drew the opposite conclusion from the
provisions respecting other defendants, noting that “section
1381 uses the word ‘in’ with respect to all categories of
defendants,” reflecting an overarching intent to require all types
of offenders to reach their physical location of confinement
before making a section 1381 demand. (Id. at p. 750, fn. 2 (dis.
opn. of Motoike, J.).)
We do not find the provisions respecting other types of
defendants to be particularly telling in either direction, much
less dispositive of the question before us. For one thing, the verb
“place” partakes of much the same ambiguity as “enter”; it can
refer to a physical location, but it also sometimes refers to a
condition. (See Merriam-Webster Dict. (2026 ed.) [defining
“place” as “to put in as if in a particular place or position” and
as “to put in a particular state”].) The use of the preposition “in”
is, if anything, even more ambiguous. And neither the Court of
Appeal majority nor the dissent explained what to make of the
fourth category, offenders in narcotics treatment facilities
“committed to the custody” of the Department of Corrections,
who have “entered upon [their] term of commitment.”

26
 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

More fundamentally, it is unclear that the Legislature’s
wording choices with respect to these other categories have any
bearing whatsoever on its intended meaning of the phrase
“entered upon a term of imprisonment in a state prison”; they
may simply reflect differences in the types of custodial settings.6
The statutory language regarding other types of offenders does
not, in short, unambiguously reveal the intended meaning of a
“term of imprisonment in a state prison.” (See Moore v.
California State Bd. of Accountancy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 999, 1011–
1013 [declining to apply the maxims of noscitur a sociis or
ejusdem generis where they did not help to “ascertain and
effectuate the underlying legislative intent”].)
Taking a different tack, the District Attorney invokes the
usual rule directing us to avoid, if possible, “a reading that
renders any part of a statute superfluous.” (People v. Aguilar
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1030.) Section 1381 provides that a
defendant may file a demand when that person “[1] has been

6
For example, an order committing a juvenile to confinement in
the Youth Authority is not a “sentence” to a term of
“imprisonment.” (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (d); In re
Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530–531, 533; In re James A. (1980)
101 Cal.App.3d 332, 338.) The same can be said of an order
placing a defendant on probation, with a condition that the
defendant serve a period of confinement in a county jail. Upon
granting probation, the court either suspends imposition of the
sentence or imposes the sentence but suspends its execution.
(Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (a); People v. Brasley (1974)
41 Cal.App.3d 311, 315.) Section 1381’s differing terminology
for those “committed to and placed in” the youth authority or in
county jail as a condition of probation, and those “sentenced to
and . . . entered upon a term of imprisonment in a state
prison . . . or county jail,” reflects the different nomenclature for
each disposition.

27
 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

sentenced to and [2] has entered upon a term of imprisonment
in a state prison.” (§ 1381, italics added.) As the District
Attorney notes, if a person who has been sentenced to state
prison but not yet been delivered to prison custody has “entered
upon a term of imprisonment,” then it is not clear what work
that phrase is doing; it would appear to suffice that the
defendant has been “sentenced to . . . a term of imprisonment in
a state prison.” Hyatt does not respond. We agree with the
District Attorney that the inclusion of both phrases suggests
that the Legislature meant for “entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a state prison” to capture a different concept
from the mere fact of sentencing. But, without more, it does not
necessarily follow that the Legislature intended to impose a
requirement of physical presence in prison. (See, e.g., People v.
Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 993 [“ ‘ “[T]he canon against
surplusage is [merely] a guide to statutory interpretation and is
not invariably controlling.” ’ ”].)
The critical issue, in the end, is what “entered upon a term
of imprisonment in a state prison” might mean, if not merely
having received a sentence to a state prison term. Section 1381
itself supplies no clear answers. But another provision of the
Penal Code, section 2900, expressly defines when a term of
imprisonment commences in terms that support the District
Attorney’s proposed physical entry requirement. Subdivision (a)
of that section provides in full: “The term of imprisonment fixed
by the judgment in a criminal action commences to run only
upon the actual delivery of the defendant into the custody of the
Director of Corrections at the place designated by the Director of
Corrections as a place for the reception of persons convicted of
felonies.” (§ 2900, subd. (a), italics added, (section 2900(a)).)
The following subdivision then states that, with certain

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 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

exceptions for emergencies and concurrent sentencing not
relevant here, “the place of reception shall be an institution
under the jurisdiction of the Director of Corrections.” (§ 2900,
subd. (b).) A subsequent provision, Penal Code section 2900.5,
subdivision (a), then clarifies that “all days of custody of the
defendant,” including time in county jail, “shall be credited upon
his or her term of imprisonment.” (§ 2900.5, subd. (a); discussed
in Hyatt, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 746.)
Section 2900(a) is not a new rule. Materially similar
language has appeared in the statute books for more than 150
years. In 1872, the Legislature enacted a predecessor, former
section 670, as part of California’s first modern Penal Code,
which provided that “the term of imprisonment fixed by the
judgment in a criminal action commences to run only upon the
actual delivery of the defendant at the place of imprisonment[.]”
(1872 Penal Code, § 670, italics added.) That was the definition
on the books in 1931, when section 1381 was enacted.7
As Hyatt rightly notes, section 2900(a) is not, by terms,
incorporated into the title containing section 1381 and it
appears in a different part of the Penal Code. We do not import
it mechanically. But “ ‘[i]t is a well settled rule that different
statutes relating to the same subject are to be considered
together.’ ” (People v. La Barre (1924) 193 Cal. 388, 391.) And,
contrary to Hyatt’s contention, nothing in the text or
surrounding context of section 2900(a) indicates that its
definition of when a “term of imprisonment” commences is

7
Former section 670 was moved to section 2900 in 1941. (Stats.
1941, ch. 106.) The legislature replaced “at the place of
imprisonment” with the current language (“into the custody of
the Director of Corrections . . .”) in 1945.

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 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

limited to some limited or technical purpose.8 The definition
appears in Part 3 of the Penal Code (“Of Imprisonment and the
Death Penalty”), in the title “Imprisonment of Male Prisoners in
State Prisons,” in the chapter “Execution of Sentences of
Imprisonment.” In other words, section 2900(a) is in exactly the
place one would look for generally applicable statutory guidance
as to when a “term of imprisonment” begins.
The same was even more clearly true of the historic
precursor of section 2900(a). From the time of its enactment in
1872, through the drafting of section 1381 in 1931, the
comparable language of former section 670 appeared in a
catchall title labeled simply “General Provisions,” addressing
various matters relating to crime and their punishments. (1872
Pen. Code, former § 670, p. 160; 1924 Pen. Code, § 670, p. 420.)

8
Hyatt argues to the contrary, relying on People v. Gonzalez
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 115 (Gonzalez). Gonzalez addressed a
different question: whether, for purposes of the consecutive
sentencing provision of former section 667, subdivision (c)(8), a
defendant sentenced to state prison for probation violations and
held in the sheriff’s custody at the county jail pending the
resolution of other charges, can be said to be “already serving”
the prison sentence on the probation violations. The court
answered yes. In so holding, the court rejected the defendant’s
reliance on section 2900: “Section 2900 concerns the
commencement of a ‘term of imprisonment’ and is in a chapter
regarding custody credits. As the People correctly recognize,
section 2900 is not incorporated into former section 667,
subdivision (c)(8).” (Gonzalez, at p. 122.) We have no occasion
here to review the distinct statutory interpretation issue
presented in Gonzalez, but its conclusions about the meaning of
the term “already serving” in former section 667, subdivision
(c)(8) have no direct bearing here.

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 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

The Court of Appeal in this case does not appear to have
considered section 2900(a). But the majority did cite Penal Code
section 2900.5, subdivision (a), which, as noted, provides that
“all days of custody of the defendant,” including time in county
jail, “shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment.”
(Hyatt, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 746.) Unlike the more
categorical definitional language in section 2900(a), Penal Code
section 2900.5 is clearly a provision of limited scope, for use in
calculating sentencing credits. And to the extent it speaks to
the issue at all, it appears to presuppose that a “term of
imprisonment” commences upon a defendant’s arrival. This is
no surprise, since Penal Code section 2900.5 was written against
the backdrop of section 2900(a); it was not until section Penal
Code 2900.5 was enacted in 1971 that criminal defendants
became eligible for credits against their prison sentence for time
spent in custody before delivery to the Director of Corrections.
(Former § 2900.5, added by Stats. 1971, ch. 1732, § 2, p. 3686.)
The fact that Penal Code section 2900.5 might provide a credit
against that term does not mean, as the Court of Appeal
supposed, that “the time Hyatt spent in [county] custody was
part of his state prison sentence” for purposes of section 1381.
(Ibid.)
This statutory backdrop naturally informs the
interpretation we give to the Legislature’s choice to require a
defendant to enter “upon a term of imprisonment in a state
prison” before making a section 1381 demand. The Penal Code
provides that “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according
to the context and the approved usage of the language, but
technical words and phrases, and any others as may have
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, shall be
construed according to that peculiar and appropriate meaning.”

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

(§ 7, subd. (c), italics added.) It would have been surprising for
the Legislature to silently depart from the established definition
of when a “term of imprisonment” begins. Construing section
1381 “in light of the whole system of law of which it is a part,”
(Pacific Southwest Realty Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1991)
1 Cal.4th 155, 169), we conclude that when the Legislature
referred to a defendant’s “entry upon a term of imprisonment in
a state prison,” the most natural conclusion is that the
Legislature intended to require a defendant’s delivery into
prison custody, in keeping with section 2900 (a) and its
precursor statute. This generally occurs upon physical reception
at the prison. (§ 2900, subd. (a).) So, as a general rule, physical
presence in state prison is a condition of a valid section 1381
demand.
The Court of Appeal drew a different conclusion from the
drafting history of section 1381, noting that the bill at one time
would have required that the defendant be brought to trial
“ ‘within ninety days after such defendant has been delivered to
such state prison.’ ” (Hyatt, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 746,
quoting Assem. Bill No. 1917 (1931 Reg. Sess.) as introduced
Apr. 9, 1931.) The court concluded that the deletion of the
italicized language revealed a conscious choice not to require
that the defendant be physically present in state prison. As the
District Attorney notes, however, the deletion of the challenged
language was made as part of an unrelated shift in approach:
Rather than start the 90-day clock upon the delivery of the
defendant to prison, the Legislature instead chose to start the
90-day clock upon the sending of a demand letter. In specifying
when that letter could be sent, the Legislature employed a
phrase — “entered upon a term of imprisonment in a state

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

prison” — that background law would have suggested to be the
essential equivalent of delivery to a state prison.
It is not surprising that the Legislature in 1931 would
have wished for persons sentenced to state prison to await their
arrival in prison custody before submitting a section 1381
demand. Even today, when submitted from a state prison,
compliance with a section 1381 demand requires the
coordination of various disparate actors in the criminal justice
system, including both state officials in the Department of
Corrections and local district attorneys. As the facts in this case
illustrate, permitting defendants to send section 1381 letters
while awaiting imminent transfer from county jail would
require the cooperation of yet another layer of officialdom — the
local sheriffs who oversee county-level detention. As the
dissenting justice below observed, logistical difficulties can arise
“when the defendant is still in the postsentencing process of
being transferred between institutions, such as from a county
jail to a state prison where the defendant is ultimately settled
to serve out the term of imprisonment imposed.” (Hyatt, supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at p. 750 (dis. opn. of Motoike, J.); see
Gutierrez, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 111 [citing the “difficulty
of tracking appellant” whose section 1381 demand listed only his
county jail address and identification].)
However significant those difficulties might be today, they
would of course have been more daunting in 1931, when there
were no computers, cell phones, fax machines, scanners,
freeways, or even electric typewriters. If the defendant filed a
section 1381 demand before delivery into prison custody, the
prosecution might well have had difficulty locating and
definitively identifying the defendant, using only the technology
and methods of communication available at the time.

33
 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

Identification problems would have been compounded if, as was
not uncommonly the case, the defendant used more than one
alias (see, e.g., Clark, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 981) or had a
common name that was shared by multiple inmates. It is not
surprising that the 1931 Legislature would have attempted to
reduce these difficulties by requiring defendants to mail their
section 1381 demands from prison, thus substantially
simplifying the task of tracking them down.
Hyatt argues that we should err on the side of starting the
90-day clock earlier rather than later because courts may toll
the 90-day limit in appropriate cases and ordinarily the
prosecution can simply refile charges if the 90-day time limit
lapses. (See People v. Boggs (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 851, 854–
855 [tolling 90-day period where the defendant was unavailable
for trial in one county because he was being detained for trial in
another]; § 1387 [providing for refiling of felony charges after a
section 1381 dismissal].) But tolling is only available in a
limited number of cases, and refiling is generally not an option
where the felony charge has been dismissed more than once (see
People v. Juarez (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1164, 1167 [“Penal Code
section 1387 generally permits a felony charge to be dismissed
and refiled once, but not twice”]). In any event, Hyatt’s reliance
on the possibility of refiling dismissed charges only underscores
the ways in which his reading of the statute departs from its
purpose. Section 1381 is designed to expedite trial; it “was never
intended to be used as a means of avoiding prosecution.” (People
v. Eldridge (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 91, 95, citing Boggs at p. 855.)
Defaults arising from mere logistical confusion frustrate section
1381’s goal of expediting criminal proceedings, without actually
protecting the defendant’s speedy trial rights.

34
 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

We recognize that a prison custody requirement may
raise its own practical concerns. Hyatt, for instance, notes that
while defendants typically still have access to counsel at the
conclusion of sentencing to assist them in preparing speedy trial
demands, they may well lack access after arriving in state
prison. And as the Court of Appeal noted, requiring a defendant
to wait until delivery to prison custody may in some cases impair
“for reasons completely outside the defendant’s control, the
defendant’s ability to promptly dispose of his or her case and
secure the potential benefit of concurrent sentencing.” (Hyatt,
supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 747.)
There are, however, ways to mitigate these concerns.
Defense lawyers may, for instance, assist their clients in
preparing section 1381 demands even though the demand may
not be sent before the client is transferred to prison custody.
And as the District Attorney acknowledged at oral argument, in
the event an unusually long delay in transfer interfered with a
defendant’s opportunity to obtain a concurrent sentence in a
pending matter, the sentencing court could consider in its
discretion whether to adjust the defendant’s credits accordingly.
Ultimately, whether these concerns should prompt a
different approach to section 1381 demands is a matter only the
Legislature can decide. Our job is to give effect to the law as the
Legislature has enacted it. After considering the existing
language of the provision and its broader statutory and
historical context, we now confirm the understanding of section
1381 reflected in decades of prior case law. Section 1381’s
requirement that a defendant “enter[] upon a term of
imprisonment in a state prison” requires that the defendant
have been delivered to prison custody before submitting a
speedy trial demand.

35
 PEOPLE v. HYATT
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

IV.
Because the operative section 1381 demand in this case
was sent before the defendant had been delivered to prison
custody, the demand did not start the 90-day clock. We reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and remand the case to
that court with directions to remand the matter to the
magistrate with orders to reinstate the felony complaint.

KRUGER, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
GOLDMAN, J.*

*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, Division Four, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

36
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Hyatt
__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 109 Cal.App.5th 735
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S290426
Date Filed: August 6, 2026
__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior
County: Orange
Judge: Justin Glenn-Leistikow
__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Todd Spitzer, District Attorney, and Mina Said, Deputy District
Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Garrick Byers, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for
Defendant and Respondent.

Cindi B. Mishkin for Appellate Defenders, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):

Mina Said
Deputy District Attorney
300 North Flower Street
Santa Ana, CA 92703
(714) 469-4129

Garrick Byers
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 150786
San Rafael, CA 94915
(510) 965-9505