Filed 8/11/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B340015
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA433157
v.
LIDIO VALDEZ
MALDONADO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Martha Matthews and Robert Vanderet, Judges.
Affirmed.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Taylor Nguyen and Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
The jury convicted Lidio Valdez Maldonado of the continual
sexual abuse of his daughter. On appeal, Maldonado’s lone claim
is that he had a constitutional right to be present at a pretrial
competency hearing. We affirm. Undesignated code citations are
to the Penal Code.
I
The government may not criminally prosecute a mentally
incompetent defendant. Federal and state law forbid it. (People
v. Bertsch and Hronis (2026) 19 Cal.5th 183, 226–227 (Bertsch).)
A defendant is mentally incompetent if, as a result of a mental
health disorder, the defendant is unable either to understand the
nature of the criminal proceedings or rationally to assist counsel
in the conduct of a defense. (§ 1367, subd. (a).) Section 1368
establishes the procedure by which California state courts
determine competency.
II
We summarize the preliminary proceedings, which were
extensive, and then we describe the trial.
A
Maldonado claimed a witch named Perla made him rape
his daughter. The trial court spent some 26 months determining
if Maldonado was truly psychotic. A psychologist chosen by
Maldonado’s defense attorney ultimately opined Maldonado was
malingering. This psychologist concluded Maldonado was more
comfortable in a psychiatric hospital than in prison, and that
explained his witch story. After this expert stated this opinion,
the defense attorney stopped contending Maldonado might be
incompetent and instead acquiesced in the expert’s evaluation.
The court in turn concluded Maldonado was competent to stand
2
trial. The jury convicted Maldonado, who at trial skipped his tale
about Perla the witch.
That is the overview. Now we fill in details.
Beginning in 2013, Maldonado raped his 13-year-old
daughter four times a week for about a year. Police learned of
the situation in 2014 and went to Maldonado’s workplace.
Maldonado fled. It took years to catch him.
On August 9, 2021, the court called Maldonado’s case for a
preliminary hearing in Department 34 of the Clara Shortridge
Foltz Courthouse . Sometimes referred to simply as the Criminal
Justice Center, this main courthouse is in downtown Los Angeles,
about six miles from the Mental Health Court in Hollywood. At
the preliminary hearing, the defense attorney declared a doubt
about Maldonado’s mental competence. Judge Aceves ordered a
court-approved psychiatrist to examine Maldonado.
The court’s authorization of this expert was under section
730 of the Evidence Code, which empowers courts to appoint
experts who work directly for the court rather than for one side or
the other. The use of court-appointed experts is unusual in the
scope of litigation generally, but within the mental health
context—at least within the Los Angeles Mental Health Court—it
has been routine for decades. (Wiley, Taming Patent: Six Steps
for Surviving Scary Patent Cases (2003) 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1413,
1426–1427 [describing the Los Angeles Mental Health Court’s
use of court-appointed expert witnesses; cf. Brown v. Los Angeles
Unified School District (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1113 (conc.
opn. of Wiley, J.) [the option of court-appointed experts has
existed in California for generations, but few judges have tried it
because parties in general civil litigation usually fear it and
rarely suggest it].)
3
Because the defense declared a doubt, Judge Aceves
transferred the case to the Hollywood Mental Health Court,
where in August 2021 Judge Bianco considered a report from the
appointed expert, Dr. Rebecca Najera. Najera concluded
Maldonado was not competent. Both sides and the court treated
this report as definitive. By stipulation, then, the Mental Health
Court adjourned the criminal proceedings and ordered
involuntary medication for Maldonado’s mental condition, as
prescribed by his treating psychiatrist.
The prosecution and defense counsel attended this August
2021 hearing. Maldonado, however, was not present: his defense
attorney waived his presence. At a later hearing at which
Maldonado was present via video, the mental health court
ordered Maldonado committed to a locked psychiatric facility for
treatment. Officials transported Maldonado to Atascadero State
Hospital, which is more than 200 miles from downtown Los
Angeles.
More than a year later, in September 2022, the case
returned to Mental Health Court. Judge Harrison presided. The
Public Defender’s office and the District Attorney’s office both
appeared. Counsel again waived Maldonado’s presence. The
court reviewed a report by appointed expert Dr. David Stone, who
concluded Maldonado was competent to stand trial. Maldonado’s
lawyer did not question or object to this report, so far as the
record shows. The court agreed with the expert, reinstated
criminal proceedings, and ordered the case returned to the
Criminal Justice Center. Again, this result effectively was a
stipulation: the parties and the court agreed with the court-
appointed expert.
4
On July 24, 2023, back downtown, Judge Aceves held a
hearing in which the public defender again declared a doubt as to
Maldonado’s competence. Judge Aceves appointed a county-
approved psychiatrist to examine and to report on Maldonado.
The court transferred the case back to the Hollywood Mental
Health Court. There, Judge Matthews presided. Maldonado’s
attorney waived Maldonado’s appearance at this hearing.
Judge Matthews appointed Dr. Alete Arom to examine
Maldonado and to report on his current mental status under
section 1368, which governs the procedure for determining a
defendant’s mental competence to stand trial. Arom was, and is,
on the Superior Court’s list of approved mental health experts.
(See Panel of Psychiatrists, Psychologists, and Neuropsychologists
(updated Aug. 3, 2026) Los Angeles Superior Court
PanelOfPsychiatristsPsychologists.pdf> [as of Aug. 7, 2026],
archived at
The Mental Health Court’s appointment of Arom was on
the motion of Maldonado’s counsel.
That is, Maldonado’s defense attorney selected the mental
health expert to evaluate Maldonado. Arom was the consensus
choice: the court and the prosecution agreed with Maldonado on
Arom. Once again, the hearing was not adversarial.
Maldonado’s attorney waived Maldonado’s appearance at
this hearing.
Judge Matthews set a future hearing date of September 18,
2023. With the attorneys’ consent, the court continued the case
to wait for Arom’s report.
5
B
Arom wrote her report on October 15, 2023. She concluded
Maldonado was competent to stand trial.
During her video interview with Maldonado, Arom told him
that her evaluation of him was not confidential. Maldonado said
he understood.
In addition to this interview, Arom also based her opinion
on:
● an April 8, 2022 report by Dr. Travis McGee that
concluded Maldonado was not competent;
● an August 30, 2022 report, also by McGee, opining
Maldonado was competent; and
● a September 22, 2022, evaluation by Dr. David C.
Stone concluding Maldonado was competent.
The record does not include the McGee and Stone reports.
Arom also consulted other materials, such as police reports.
Arom noted Maldonado was 53 years old. He denied any
psychiatric history, and he initially claimed he had never been
psychiatrically hospitalized.
Maldonado “did not display any attention and
concentration issues, and he was able to have typical back-and-
forth conversation. … He claims to hear a witch named ‘Perla,’
who talks to him regularly and threatens and insults him. He
believes that she has controlled his behavior, including those
[acts constituting] the instant offense. However, he did not
respond to internal stimuli during the interview and did not seem
at all internally preoccupied. He was completely alert and
oriented and able to focus on the conversation at hand.
Furthermore, his thought process was never tangential or
6
disorganized. He was able to be linear even in his description of
Perla the Witch.”
Maldonado began smoking methamphetamine about 2010.
“[A]round 2017, while regularly abusing
methamphetamine, he started to experience auditory
hallucinations and paranoia. He reported to the treatment team
that he was psychiatrically hospitalized on three occasions
around 2019 related to beliefs that witchcraft was being
performed on him. Each time, the police took him to the hospital
while he was detoxifying from methamphetamine, including one
time when he was transferred to a hospital in Modesto for 45
days. He told the treatment team that in 2019, while he
continued to use methamphetamine, he set a fire to a pile of
clothing near his residence in an attempt to scare the witch
away.”
Arom concluded that, “[u]ltimately, I do not believe that
Mr. Maldonado has a verifiable psychiatric diagnosis. It could be
that he suffered from a methamphetamine abuse disorder when
he was out in the community, as apparently he used
methamphetamine regularly, and it could be that at the time, it
caused him some psychotic symptoms; however, at this point,
there is not enough evidence to indicate that he has any type of
psychotic disorder. Given his above-mentioned long-standing
history with methamphetamine, it seems likely that he does have
methamphetamine use disorder. It is possible that[, at] the time
of the use, he was feeling paranoid, and that could be when his
voice began, although he told me that the voice began when the
witch entered his life in 2005. Regardless, I do not believe that
the witch is an actual hallucination. At worst, he is feigning the
entire situation to avoid punishment. At best, he believes that
7
there is some type of witch bothering him, which helps him to
explain or justify his behaviors and makes him feel less
responsible or guilty without [there] being actual hallucinations
or delusions. That is, the belief could be some type of theory or
excuse he has made for himself in order to explain away his
behaviors to himself and/others. For instance, he shared that his
entire family has forgiven him because they all know that if he
has done anything bad, it was because the witch made him do it
and that he also forgives himself and does not feel regret or
remorse because it was out of his control. Perhaps he has
convinced himself of this as a way to mitigate the negative
feelings or self-judgment. Even if he does have beliefs about the
witch, I do not believe that they are preventing him from being
able to be competent to stand trial, and I think that if he chose to,
he could put them aside and work with counsel to construct his
case.” (Italics added.)
According to Arom, the “description of the witch throughout
our interview is not consistent with a psychotic disorder. The
story itself is too organized, linear, and specific and only related
to his instant offense. It relates to his victim’s mother, and he
essentially blames the witch for forcing the mother of his children
to leave him and therefore leaving him alone with his daughters.
The beliefs about the witch are inconsistent with a psychotic
disorder because they are not accompanied by the typical thought
and behavioral disturbances of a person with his type of active
set of hallucinations and delusions. For instance, he did not
display any disorganized thinking or tangential or loose
associations. His descriptions of the witch are perfectly linear,
although obviously not logical, because having a witch speak to
someone is on its face bizarre and unusual. Despite telling me
8
that he was hearing the voice during our interview, he was not
internally preoccupied or distracted. Most clients with psychosis
do not actively hear voices during an interview, because they are
externally focused on the conversation that is occurring. If they
are hearing voices during the interview, they are not able to
communicate effectively at the moment that they are
hallucinating, they often pause, looking distracted or mumbling
under their breath. None of this happened during our interview,
and he claimed to be hearing voices concurrently while we spoke,
yet he was able to communicate perfectly and effectively with me.
Furthermore, he did not describe any type of long-standing
history of delusions except as it relates to this witch appearing
[in] his life around 2005. Typically, clients with schizophrenia do
not have one singular voice or singular delusion, and the subject
matter is more disorganized, consisting of many voices, noises,
sounds, and general disorganization. Knowing exactly who the
voice is and when the voice entered the person’s life and having
only one voice that speaks with a purpose and a motive and sends
coherent messages to a person is atypical of a client experiencing
a thought disorder.”
“After reviewing all of the records I was provided, I
ultimately conclude that he is malingering for the purpose of
secondary gain. Most clinicians who met him also found his
presentation to be inconsistent with a psychotic diagnosis.
Furthermore, even though he was prescribed psychotropic
medication, his symptoms did not remit in any way, which is also
atypical of someone with schizophrenia. Although many clients
have refractory schizophrenia and sometimes symptoms persist,
to remain [at] exactly the same level of symptomology even on
psychotropic medications is unusual. Although it does occur, in
9
those cases the clients are typically so severe that they present as
overall disorganized, bizarre, and almost incoherent. Also,
hallucinations are typically the first symptom to dissipate once
antipsychotics are begun even if delusions remain. The fact that
this is not the case with Mr. Maldonado calls into question
whether or not he actually had a mental illness that needs to be
treated. Ultimately, when he was found competent to stand trial,
he was not actually on any medication, because the hospital felt
that there was no particular diagnosis or symptoms to treat. [⁋]
Throughout the chart, there are specific references to his
malingering, and I believe that all of their conclusions are
accurate.”
Arom supported her conclusion that Maldonado was
malingering with other evidence from his records. For instance,
Maldonado said that, if his sentence is life in prison, he will be
“killed in prison, because they don’t like sex offenders.”
“In a nonchalant attitude,” Maldonado consistently stated
he had “no motivation to leave the hospital.” Maldonado
acknowledged he was more comfortable in the state hospital than
he had been in jail, and that he would prefer to stay at the
hospital for the rest of his life. “At that point, the staff began to
suspect that he was feigning his impairments to avoid being
returned back to court.”
Arom said Maldonado could understand the nature of the
criminal proceedings. He knew the charges against him. He
understood the different kinds of pleas and the roles of the
courtroom actors.
Maldonado also could assist in the conduct of his defense.
“If he so chooses, he can cooperate with counsel in constructing
his defense. Any lack of cooperation or indication that he is
10
unable to cooperate is, in my opinion, volitional. I considered the
idea of the symptoms involving the witch very carefully.
Although there is no way to be entirely certain that he is
malingering, many other clinicians opine that he is, and so do I.
[⁋] However, even if we presume that he does believe that the
witch is real, or even if he is having hallucinations about the
witch, whether it is due to psychosis or methamphetamine
induced psychosis, it does not interfere with his ability to
rationally assist counsel constructing his defense. … He also
understands that there is DNA evidence against him, and the
DNA evidence is quite convincing. He said that he would not
take his case to trial because ‘they are going to believe the DNA
over the witch no matter what happens.’ ”
Arom commented that “Mr. Maldonado is likely to be
difficult to work with because of his fear of facing his charges and
unwillingness or difficulty accepting the potential outcome of his
case. Furthermore, it seems likely that somewhere along the
line, a doubt could be declared again about the witch, because he
does sound psychotic. However, it seems well established that
his symptoms are not attributable to a psychotic disorder or any
other type of [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual] diagnosis and
therefore should be considered to be feigned. He will be
especially difficult to work with if he is not provided with an offer
that he feels is fair; however, this would once again be due to his
personality traits rather than to any type of underlying
psychiatric disorder. Any lack of cooperation would be of his own
choosing.”
Arom’s final conclusion was that Maldonado was competent
and he needed no mental health services. “He was in the state
hospital for many months where many different clinicians had
11
the chance to observe him, assess him, and treat him.
Ultimately, they tapered him off of medication, not believing that
it was helping him because of the lack of an underlying diagnosis.
By the end of his stay, he was not prescribed any medication. …
[H]e is not amenable to treatment, and treatment does not seem
like it would be effective. It does seem that perhaps Mr.
Maldonado has some anxiety about the potential outcome of his
case, especially as he contemplates whether he will spend a
lifetime in prison marked as a sex offender.”
C
On October 16, 2023, Judge Matthews of the Mental Health
Court held a hearing to review Arom’s report. The hearing was
brief. The court called the matter and asked for appearances.
The deputy public defender and the deputy district attorney
stated their names and job titles. The prosecutor immediately
said, “The People submit on Dr. Alete Arom’s report opining that
Mr. Maldonado is competent to stand trial.” Defense counsel
agreed: “Yes. [W]e’re submitting on the report.”
We emphasize words in Judge Matthews’s response:
“Okay. Mr. Maldonado’s appearance is waived due to the
unavailability of video, and both parties submit on Dr. Arom’s
report. The court receives that report into evidence, and on the
basis of that evidence finds that Mr. Maldonado is competent to
stand trial. Criminal proceedings are reinstated. We are at day
0 of 10 for a preliminary hearing. Mr. Maldonado is ordered to
the Foltz Courthouse downtown, Department 34, tomorrow,
October 17. L.A. Sheriff’s Department to transport him.” (Italics
added.)
This was another instance of consensus decisionmaking in
the Hollywood Mental Health Court.
12
It was Maldonado’s absence from this competency hearing
that gave rise to the issue in this appeal.
D
On October 17, 2023, the case returned downtown, where
the court held a preliminary hearing and set the matter for trial.
The defense did not declare a doubt as to Maldonado’s
competence. Judge Vanderet presided over the jury trial in late
July 2024.
At trial, the evidence was that, for about a year, Maldonado
raped his 13-year-old daughter four times a week. She told no
one: “I was just scared. I didn’t want to tell anybody.” In 2014,
the daughter became pregnant and gave birth in a bathroom.
“The baby fell in the toilet.” The infant was stillborn with
deformities characteristic of incest. DNA testing confirmed
Maldonado was the father. Maldonado fled and remained at
large for years.
The jury deliberated for 43 minutes before returning a
verdict of guilty. The sentence was 25 years to life.
III
The Sixth Amendment gives defendants in criminal
prosecutions the right to be personally present at any proceeding
in which their appearance is necessary to prevent interference
with opportunity for effective cross-examination. (People v.
Alvarez (2025) 18 Cal.5th 387, 450.) Due process similarly
guarantees the right to be present at any stage that is critical to
the outcome and where the defendant’s presence would
contribute to the fairness of the procedure. (Ibid.) Due process,
however, does not require defendants’ presence at hearings
without a jury on matters where the defendants’ presence bears
13
no reasonable and substantial relation to their opportunity to
defend the charges against them. (Id. at pp. 450–451.)
Maldonado’s absence from the October 16, 2023, competency
hearing did not interfere with either an opportunity for effective
cross examination or the hearing’s fairness. Moreover, assuming
there was interference, it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Neither the defense nor the prosecution presented live
testimony at the competency hearing. Both counsel chose to
submit the matter of competency entirely on the expert report of
Dr. Alete Arom.
Given the nature of competency proceedings, defense
counsel have the right to waive a live hearing and to submit on
psychiatric reports without violating defendant’s due process
rights, even over a client’s objection. (Bertsch, supra, 19 Cal.5th
at pp. 229–230;
; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 903–904 [nothing
“precludes a defense attorney from waiving a jury, forgoing the
right to present live witnesses, and submitting the competency
determination on the psychiatric reports filed with the court”];
People v. Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965, 972–973
[“[C]onsiderations that cause us to conclude that counsel need not
entrust key decisions to the client also compel the conclusion that
the client may not veto those same decisions. Whether or not the
client objects, counsel must be allowed to do what counsel
believes is best in determining the client’s competence”]; People v.
McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1168–1169 [rejecting the
argument that submission on reports was unconstitutional,
noting defense counsel could waive “available incidents of the
hearing procedure, i.e., the right to jury trial and the rights to
14
present oral testimony and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses”]; see generally People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102,
131 [“Although it arises in the context of a criminal trial, a
competency hearing is a special proceeding, governed generally
by the rules applicable to civil proceedings”].)
Maldonado does not argue cross-examination of Arom
would have been effective or would have increased the hearing’s
fairness.
Maldonado maintains he could have convinced his counsel
to call him as a witness and thereby could have contributed to the
hearing’s fairness, but that argument is incorrect here.
First, Maldonado does not suggest what testimony he
would have proffered in response to Arom’s detailed report such
that his counsel might have altered his thoughtfully charted
course and been persuaded to let him testify. (See People v.
Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 533 [finding defendant’s absence
from a hearing harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part
because defendant remained silent about what he would have
said or conveyed, and also because it appeared defendant and
counsel had the opportunity to review in advance the written
submissions pertinent to the hearing].)
Moreover, Maldonado could have intelligently aided his
counsel’s decision to withhold or to offer Maldonado’s testimony
only if Maldonado had been competent. A finding of competence
was the actual and all-but-ordained result of the uncontested
hearing. (See § 1369, subd. (c)(1) [“If neither party objects to any
competency report submitted pursuant to subdivision (b), the
court may determine the competency of the defendant based on
any such competency report”].) Yet Maldonado’s argument is
premised on him being allowed to testify to his incompetence. “If
15
a defendant were to assert that he or she was incompetent,
allowing such a defendant to attempt to prove his or her own
incompetence would be nonsensical.” (People v. Lightsey (2012)
54 Cal.4th 668, 697; but see People v. Harris (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 984, 993–994 [“[W]hen defense counsel seeks to
prove defendant’s incompetence over his or her objection, and the
defendant expresses the desire to testify that he or she is
competent, counsel should permit defendant to so testify, unless
the court separately determines that the defendant is
incompetent to do so”].)
To the extent Maldonado may be suggesting it was
necessary for the court to witness his demeanor, that argument,
too, is not persuasive here. This non-jury competency hearing
occupies less than one page of a reporter’s transcript and could
not have lasted more than a few minutes. What demeanor
Maldonado might have displayed in that time is speculative. And
the point of declaring doubt and soliciting the expert report was
to obtain expert explanations for his conduct. (See People v.
Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 585 [defendant’s suggestion that
jurors should have had the opportunity to watch him react to re-
read testimony rested entirely on speculation and did not
overcome a finding of harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt];
Sturgis v. Goldsmith (9th Cir. 1986) 796 F.2d 1103, 1112
(Sturgis) (dis. opn. of Wallace, J.) [“[A] defendant’s demeanor and
behavior ‘could be so easily contrived as to be of little
persuasiveness in the light of all other evidence’ ”].)
In addition to all this, the trial court later had an
opportunity to assess Maldonado when he requested a hearing
under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. After hearing from
Maldonado personally, defense counsel reminded the court of the
16
competency proceedings and that conclusion was that Maldonado
was not suffering from “a [delusional] process or mental health
condition at all.” The trial court responded “based on his
conversation with the court, I sort of agree. … I cannot find that
he is not able to assist you.” The defense attorney again did not
declare a doubt as to Maldonado’s competence. The trial
concluded.
Maldonado’s presence would not have increased the
fairness of his hearing.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WILEY, Acting P.J.
We concur:
VIRAMONTES, J.
SCHERB, J.
17
Wiley, J., concurring.
I wrote for the panel, which unanimously agrees there was
no harmful error in this case. I write separately, and more
broadly, to explain my further view there was no error at all.
I
The first step is to describe the Los Angeles Superior
Court’s specialized system for handling competency questions in
criminal cases. This large superior court has a longstanding,
substantial, and specialized Mental Health Division. (Mental
Health Courts, Judicial Branch of California
courts/mental-health-courts> [as of Aug. 7, 2026], archived at
of experience appreciate the important role this specialized
system plays in the administration of justice.
A courthouse exclusively devoted to mental health issues is
now located on Hollywood Boulevard in the Hollywood area of Los
Angeles. (Hollywood Courthouse, Los Angeles Superior Court
Aug. 7, 2026], archived at
is the Hollywood Mental Health Court. (Los Angeles County, New
Hollywood Courthouse, Judicial Branch of California
of Aug. 7, 2026], archived at
When an issue of trial competency arises in the course of a
criminal prosecution, the Los Angeles Superior Court has
procedures about when the judge in that other courthouse
transfers the matter to the Hollywood Mental Health Court,
which specializes in evaluating mental health issues. When
there is a transfer, the prosecutors and public defenders in the
non-specialized criminal court typically hand off the case to their
colleagues assigned full-time to the mental health court. If the
case returns to the non-specialized courthouse, the original
attorneys on both sides resume their duties.
Many people do not know much about the realities of
mental illness. Judges, prosecution and defense attorneys, and
staff assigned to Hollywood Mental Health courthouse, however,
gain long-term familiarity with this world. (Cf. Garcia, Inside
LA’s mental health court: Meth, homelessness and the judge who
wants to help (Apr. 23, 2025) CalMatters
[as of Aug. 7, 2026], archived at
[when criminal defendants’ mental competency to stand trial is at
issue, their cases are redirected to the specialized Mental Health
Court].)
For those unfamiliar with the arcane world of mental
illness, entering this world is a learning experience. A typical
first reaction is dismay at seeing how profoundly an incurable
disease like schizophrenia can impair a life and burden a family.
Common symptoms include delusions: false, fixed beliefs the
defendant genuinely and deeply holds to be true. Another
reaction is deepened respect for those in the system—including
defense attorneys—who have devoted careers to serving this
population.
Newly-assigned bench officers at this courthouse typically,
and quickly, stop using words like “crazy” and “nuts.”
These repeat players at the Hollywood Mental Health
Court learn the ins and outs of the Diagnostic and Statistical
2
Manual. (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(Aug. 6, 2026) Wikipedia
Aug. 7, 2026], archived at
They gain some familiarity with the evolving array of psychiatric
medications. (Psychiatric medication (Jul. 18, 2026) Wikipedia
Aug. 7, 2026], archived at
acquire experience with decoding mental health jargon like
“internal stimuli,” “hearing an unseen person,” and “emotionally
labile.” They learn auditory hallucinations are common and
visual hallucinations are not. And so forth.
These veterans also become familiar with the mental
health experts on the court’s approved list of such experts. (See
(See Panel of Psychiatrists, Psychologists, and Neuropsychologists
(updated Aug. 3, 2026) Los Angeles Superior Court
PanelOfPsychiatristsPsychologists.pdf> [as of Aug. 7, 2026],
archived at
Patent: Six Steps for Surviving Scary Patent Cases (2003) 50
UCLA L. Rev. 1413, 1426–1427 [describing the Mental Health
Court’s use of court-appointed expert witnesses].) The lawyers on
both sides can come to share respect for selected experts who
have proven themselves reliably impartial and trustworthy. The
lawyers can be confident the judge will share their trust.
Karl Fenske was the public defender who represented
Maldonado at trial. The summer the defense was declaring a
doubt about Maldonado’s competence, Fenske published an
article about the Los Angeles Mental Health Court. Fenske
wrote that, “[a]lthough imperfect, the [Hollywood] Mental Health
3
Court has a range of effective options which simply aren’t
available within the criminal courts.” (Fenske, Los Angeles can’t
allow mental health court to fail (Aug. 2, 2023) Daily Journal
The context for this case is familiar to the trial lawyers and
judges who make the system run. Those lacking this hands-on
experience may wonder why a case can bounce back and forth
between a criminal court and a mental health court for years.
One reason is that medication can enormously help a psychotic
defendant by combatting delusions, but that the benefit recedes if
the defendant stops the medication and loses competency—again.
Another reason is that fully competent defendants can feign
mental illness. Some malingering is transparent, but a proficient
fraud or a cultivated fantasy can take years for professionals to
discern. That happened here.
II
Maldonado claims his constitutional rights were violated
when his lawyer waived his appearance and the October 16, 2023
competency hearing proceeded without him.
To summarize, Maldonado’s absence violated neither his
right to confront witnesses nor his right to due process. His
lawyer had decided cross-examining the sole witness—the court-
appointed expert psychologist his lawyer had selected—could not
further Maldonado’s cause. Maldonado’s presence could not have
affected this decision. Nor would it have aided the search for
truth, which is the goal of cross-examination. Maldonado’s
presence would not have added to the fairness of the hearing.
The hearing was perfectly fair. Both sides had notice and an
4
opportunity to be heard. Both sides were represented by counsel.
The proceedings were professional and courteous. The consensus
decisionmaking was by informed and reasonable stipulation.
Maldonado’s absence detracted from neither the reality nor the
appearance of fairness.
I now explain the basis for this summary.
Two constitutional rights are germane.
First, the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment
gives defendants the right to be personally present at any
proceeding in which their appearance is necessary to prevent
interference with their opportunity for effective cross-
examination. (People v. Alvarez (2025) 18 Cal.5th 387, 450–451
(Alvarez).)
Second, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause
guarantees defendants a right to be present at any stage critical
to the outcome where their presence would contribute to the
fairness of the procedure. California’s state constitution also
gives the right to be personally present at critical proceedings.
(Alvarez, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 450–451.)
These provisions do not, however, mean defendants have a
right to be present when the court hears or discusses questions of
law or other matters as to which their presence bears no
reasonable and substantial relation to their opportunity to defend
against the charges they face. (Alvarez, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp.
450–451.)
A
Maldonado suffered no confrontation clause insult. His
lawyer chose to submit on the Arom report. Maldonado does not
attempt to impeach this lawyer’s professional decision to refrain
from calling and questioning Arom. The attorney evidently
5
believed Arom’s report was right, or that she could not advance
Maldonado’s interests by questioning Arom in person.
Maldonado fails to identify some stone left unturned in Arom’s
report. Nor does he suggest any way in which examining Arom
would have profited him.
Cross-examining Arom at this competence hearing would
have made no sense. Maldonado’s own attorney had selected
Arom from the court’s familiar panel of experts. We can presume
this was a well-informed decision by an attorney who worked
daily in the Hollywood Mental Health Court and who knew the
lay of the land. On its face, the Arom report was professional and
of high quality: as we have seen, it was lengthy, careful, detailed,
and nuanced. There was no obvious weakness, no gap in logic.
For the lawyer looking for impeachment material, this tree
offered no fruit.
Maldonado’s confrontation clause argument fails.
B
Neither did Maldonado’s absence infringe his right to due
process. The central concern of due process is fundamental
fairness. (Salas v. Cortez (1979) 24 Cal.3d 22, 27.) This
competency hearing was fundamentally fair: lawyers all around;
notice and a full opportunity to be heard; and informed and
collegial decisionmaking on the merits.
This hearing thus was extremely fair.
Maldonado’s presence could not have added fairness.
Maldonado’s only concrete suggestion is in his reply brief, where
he mentions his “right to testify.”
Maldonado’s exercise of a supposed right to testify could not
have contributed fairness to the competency hearing. A
moment’s reflection proves it.
6
Begin by presuming Maldonado was competent. If so, he
cannot fault the hearing’s fairness. The court did find him
competent: the hearing produced the substantively correct
result, in an open, orderly, courteous, and procedurally fair
setting where his attorney had the unrestricted opportunity to
present everything to Maldonado’s best advantage.
Now presume Maldonado was incompetent. By definition,
then he then would have been unable to make a rational decision
about whether to testify. An attorney with Maldonado’s best
interests at heart represented him. That attorney decided calling
Maldonado as a witness would be unhelpful. It would not
increase the fairness of a competency hearing to have an
incompetent client attempting to testify over the professional
advice of counsel, thereby exposing the client to the prosecution’s
cross. As one seasoned criminal defense attorney reputedly said,
“Watching your client endure cross-examination is like watching
a baby crawl across the freeway.” The more incompetent the
client, the more agonizing the prospect.
“How can a person whose competence is in doubt make
basic decisions regarding the conduct of a proceeding to
determine that very question? … Whether or not the client
objects, counsel must be allowed to do what counsel believes is
best in determining the client’s competence.” (People v.
Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965, 972–973 (Masterson).)
Maldonado’s due process challenge fails.
C
Maldonado cites seven cases.
1
Maldonado’s most substantial citation is to the split
decision in Sturgis v. Goldsmith (9th Cir. 1986) 796 F.2d 1103
7
(Sturgis).) The dissent in that opinion, however, had the better
argument. I respectfully reject the Sturgis majority’s analysis.
The Sturgis case began when Bill Sturgis killed a woman.
Arizona state prosecutors charged Sturgis with murder, and his
lawyer declared a doubt. This led to five competency hearings
over about four years. Some hearings were contested: at least
eight mental health professionals, including seven psychiatrists,
reported or testified about Sturgis. Some professionals suggested
he was feigning mental illness. Sturgis himself testified at one
hearing. At that same hearing, his attorney also cross-examined
several psychiatrists. (Sturgis, supra, 796 F.2d at p. 1105.)
At the fifth hearing, Sturgis was not present. His attorney
submitted on the reports of doctors Wellish and Tuchler, who
both wrote Sturgis could assist in his defense and could
understand the proceedings. The court ruled Sturgis was
competent. (Sturgis, supra, 796 F.2d at p. 1105.)
At trial, Sturgis conceded he was the killer. His defense
was insanity. The jury convicted Sturgis, and the Arizona
Supreme Court affirmed. (State v. Sturgis (1976) 113 Ariz. 311,
312.)
Sturgis unsuccessfully petitioned the federal district court
for habeas relief.
By a two-to-one vote, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed.
The majority reasoned the state trial court violated
Sturgis’s constitutional rights by finding him competent at a
hearing at which Sturgis was not present. “A competency
hearing is intricately linked to the fullness of a defendant’s
ability to defend against the charge.” (Sturgis, supra, 796 F.2d at
p. 1108.) The logic requiring a defendant’s presence at trial also
applied to the pretrial competency hearing. (Ibid.) “The
8
defendant’s demeanor and behavior in the courtroom can often be
as probative on the issue of his competence as the testimony of
expert witnesses.” (Id. at p. 1109.) The majority concluded
Sturgis had been deprived of a constitutional right.
The Sturgis dissent wrote the majority opinion was
“fundamentally flawed.” (Sturgis, supra, 796 F.2d at p. 1111 (dis.
opn. of Wallace, J.).) That majority opinion was the first to hold
“that a defendant’s presence at a competency hearing is
constitutionally mandatory.” (Ibid.)
The dissent made four criticisms I endorse.
First, the majority wrongly equated a competency hearing
with trial. A trial is an adversarial adjudication of guilt designed
to be final, but a competency hearing is unconcerned with guilt.
Neither is a competency hearing final. Rather, the focus is
whether a defendant—at that moment—could understand and
participate in the trial. (Sturgis, supra, 796 F.2d at p. 1111 (dis.
opn. of Wallace, J.); see People v. Samuels (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489,
496 [“the sole purpose of the section 1368 hearing is to determine
defendant’s competence, not his guilt”]; cf. People v. Bertsch and
Hronis (2026) 19 Cal.5th 183, 267–268 [the right to confrontation
is a trial right that does not apply with full force at a preliminary
hearing].)
There is no necessary finality because the competency issue
can resurface, as it did for both Sturgis and Maldonado—
repeatedly.
Second, defendants’ presence may at times be detrimental
to their interests because they may “be affected adversely by
hearing testimony” about their mental condition. (Sturgis, supra,
796 F.2d at p. 1112 (dis. opn. of Wallace, J.).) It can take
considerable self-control to listen to people saying “you are
9
insane.” Some clients lack impulse control, and their conduct will
be on the record and visible to the judge. They inadvertently can
create a record detrimental to self-interests: a record that may be
fully available to future prosecutors.
Third, “[t]he majority declares that a “defendant’s
demeanor and behavior in the courtroom can often be as
probative on the issue of his competence as the testimony of
expert witnesses.” … While this may be true in regard to
proceedings in front of a jury deciding his guilt or innocence, a
competency hearing entails different considerations because a
defendant’s demeanor and behavior ‘could be so easily contrived
as to be of little persuasiveness in the light of all other evidence.’
” (Sturgis, supra, 796 F.2d at p. 1112 (dis. opn. of Wallace, J.)
quoting United States v. Makris (S.D.Tex. 1975) 398 F.Supp. 507,
511.)
This point is forceful in this case, where the stipulated
expert concluded Maldonado had been presenting an inauthentic
self for years.
Fourth, the majority “vacillat[ed] between the right to
presence and due process [and] can only be read as resting on
some due process ground that Sturgis’s absence gave the
proceeding an ‘appearance of impropriety.’ ” (Sturgis, supra, 796
F.2d at p. 1112 (dis. opn. of Wallace, J.).)
That also is my reading of the majority opinion in Sturgis,
which never explained to whom Sturgis’s hearing appeared to be
unfair, and why.
The dissent concluded the majority opinion had stretched
its concept of fairness beyond reasonable limits. (Sturgis, supra,
796 F.2d at p. 1112 (dis. opn. of Wallace, J.).)
10
The majority offered no effective response to the dissent’s
points. Nor did the majority ascribe significance to the
participation of Sturgis’s own lawyer in the process. That lawyer
knew Sturgis and knew the doctors who evaluated Sturgis. Yet,
for the Sturgis majority, that attorney’s professional judgment
did not rate a mention, let alone deference. The Sturgis majority
presumed it knew better what was good for Sturgis than did the
lawyer who actually knew Sturgis’s mind.
It would be possible to distinguish Sturgis. The state court
setup in Arizona may not have had a mental health court that
operated as effectively and collegially as does the one in the Los
Angeles Superior Court. The Sturgis majority offered little
information about how that Arizona state process worked. Was
there any specialized mental health court? Did specialized
lawyers and judges staff that court, if it existed? Did the state
system have a tradition of informed and collegial decisionmaking
on competency issues? Were defense attorneys typically
knowledgeable and opinionated about which court-approved
mental health expert the court would appoint to evaluate the
client about whom the lawyer had declared a doubt? The Sturgis
majority did not say. Our case differs, because the Los Angeles
Mental Health Court has these features.
My disagreement with the Sturgis majority, however, is
fundamental. I reject the Sturgis majority opinion, root and
branch.
My dear colleagues, whom I respect and cherish, opt to
decide this case on narrower grounds. I respect their judgment
and admire their wisdom. Deciding narrowly generally
minimizes the chance of present error.
11
In this case, however, there are costs as well as benefits to
a narrow decision. A narrow decision today casts uncertainty on
the practice at issue in future cases. Sensible prosecutors will, in
light of this uncertainty, steer clear of it. They will insist
defendants appear at all competency hearings, and sensible trial
judges will back them up. Imagine the torment of bringing back
a victim, like the one in this case, to relive her childhood horrors
in a second trial necessary only because the first trial was tainted
by a pretrial hearing like the one at issue today. No feeling
prosecutor or trial judge would risk that.
What then will be lost? If video appearances suffice,
perhaps very little. But video appearances are imperfect
substitutes for in-person hearings. Experienced judges know, for
instance, people can stand behind the camera and signal answers
to the witness. If a video appearance is undesirable or infeasible,
then patients will have to take buses to court, perhaps from 200
miles away. The multi-day stay in Los Angeles can disrupt a
patient’s medication routine and health regimen. If harm to
future patients is the long-run result of Maldonado’s appeal, we
gain further proof of the law of unintended consequences.
2
Maldonado also cites United States v. Gillenwater (9th Cir.
2013) 717 F.3d 1070, 1073 (Gillenwater). This case held a
defendant has a constitutional and federal statutory right to
testify at a federal pretrial competency hearing and only the
defendant, not counsel, can waive the constitutional right to
testify.
Gillenwater’s holding may diverge from California state
law. (See Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 966–967, 972–973
[in competency proceeding, counsel may waive jury trial and
12
make other decisions regarding jury trial, even over defendant’s
objection]; cf. People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1116
[“the trial court must advise the [mentally disordered offender]
defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and, before
holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right
from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence—
that is, evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt—that the
defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary
waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver
decision”].)
We do not confront the Gillenwater issues in this case. For
our purposes, the significance of Gillenwater is its approving
citations of Sturgis. (See Gillenwater, supra, 717 F.3d at pp.
1077–1085 & fn. 5.) These citations ignore the Sturgis dissent
and repeat, but do not fortify, the logic of the Sturgis majority.
Gillenwater therefore contributes no independent force to
Maldonado’s argument.
3
People v. Ford (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 385, 392 is inapposite
because, in that case, the “Attorney General does not dispute that
appellant was denied his constitutional right to be present” at a
hearing to determine competence. A different Attorney General
has decided, wisely, to withhold a similar concession in
Maldonado’s case. A precedent based on a faulty concession is
not authority for a dispute lacking that vital concession.
4
People v. Jernigan (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 131, 137
(Jernigan) “reject[ed] defendant’s contention that the trial court’s
failure to obtain his personal waiver of the right to be present at
the hearing violated his right to due process.” I agree with this
13
holding, which is contrary to Maldonado’s argument. The
Jernigan opinion also held the defendant there had waived any
right to appear at the hearing. (Ibid.) That holding is not
relevant to this case.
5
People v. Harris (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 984, 993 assumed
the defendant had a right to be present at a competency hearing
and then ruled no prejudice flowed from transgressing this
assumed right. I would hold there is no such constitutional right
under the circumstances of this case. A contrary assumption in
an earlier decision presents no conflict with my analysis.
6
Maldonado cites In re Waite’s Guardianship (1939) 14
Cal.2d 727, 729. This venerable decision reviewed a bizarre
ruling by a trial court in a guardianship action. The trial court
strangely refused to allow the defense attorney to put his client
on the stand. The trial court said “I don’t want to hear from her.
… If you have any medical testimony I will be glad to hear it, but
I don’t want to hear from the lady. I don’t know anything
personally about her mental condition.” The Supreme Court
rightly slapped down this outrageous trial court ruling. (Id. at p.
730.)
Maldonado’s case is unlike the Waite situation, where
defense counsel and client together tried to get the client’s side of
the story into the record, but the trial judge peremptorily and
unjustifiably blocked them. This citation is inapposite.
7
Maldonado cites Cramer v. Tyars (1979) 23 Cal.3d 131, 134,
138. Cramer v. Tyars concerned the constitutional right against
self-incrimination. In this case, our high court held
14
developmentally disabled people may not invoke this Fifth
Amendment right when subject to a petition for civil commitment
to the state Department of Health. Therefore the government
can call them as witnesses at their commitment hearings. (Id. at
p. 137.) “[N]o witness has a privilege to refuse to reveal to the
trier of fact his physical or mental characteristics where they are
relevant to the issues under consideration.” (Ibid.) This holding
is irrelevant.
* * * * * * *
As a matter of professional judgment and practice, criminal
defense counsel may prefer to have their clients attend most or
all competency hearings in the Los Angeles Superior Court. The
defense attorney, however, may decide to proceed without the
client for many valid reasons, including a reluctance to disturb
the client’s medication regimen at the distant hospital placement.
The client has no constitutional right to upset the results of that
competency hearing on account of being excluded from it. I would
affirm without qualification.
WILEY, Acting P.J.
15
