Filed 8/18/26 P. v. Lovett CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFO

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F089560
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF197910A)
v.

JORDAN DERRICK LOVETT, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Andrew
Kendall, Judge.
Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Dina Petrushenko and
Rosanne Rust, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Guerra, J.
 INTRODUCTION
After pleading no contest to one count of attempted unlawful sexual intercourse
with a person under 18 years of age (Pen. Code, §§ 261.5, subd. (d), 664),1 defendant
Jordan Derrick Lovett was sentenced to two years of formal probation under terms and
conditions attached to his probation report, which included, among other things, obeying
the directives of his probation officer and not frequenting locations where minors
congregate without a probation-approved responsible adult.
About three months after the sentencing hearing, defendant attended a basketball
game on a kids appreciation day where the majority of spectators were minors; he also
failed to comply with various directives given by his probation officer in the subsequent
months. The court found defendant had violated his probation terms, revoked probation
and imposed a one-year prison sentence.
On appeal, defendant argues the circumstances do not support the trial court’s
finding he willfully violated his conditions of probation such that revocation was
warranted. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
In June 2024, defendant pled no contest to one count of attempted unlawful sexual
intercourse with a person under 18 years of age (§§ 261.5, subd. (d), 664), with dismissal
of the other two felony counts, which included arranging a meeting with the intent to
commit a sexual offense (§ 288.4, subd. (b)) and contacting or communicating with a
minor with the intent to commit a sexual offense (§ 288.3). On September 10, 2024,
defendant was sentenced to two years of formal probation; defendant appeared remotely
for the sentencing hearing as he was living in South Carolina at the time.
Among other probation conditions, defendant was prohibited from “knowingly
associat[ing] with minors under the age of 18, []or frequent[ing] places where minors

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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congregate, unless in the presence of a responsible adult approved by Probation”; he was
required to “[o]bey all reasonable instructions of the probation officer”; register as a tier 1
sex offender under section 290; and he was required to “successfully complete [a] sex
offender management program and abide by all conditions of the program .…”
After sentencing, at a hearing on a defense motion regarding the conditions of
probation, the court ordered defendant to appear personally on November 18, 2024.
Subsequently, on November 1, 2024, defense counsel filed another motion to modify the
terms of probation to allow defendant to remain in South Carolina pending the transfer of
probation pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS;
§ 11180 et seq.). According to the motion and supporting documentation, defendant had
registered as a sex offender in South Carolina immediately after he was sentenced, and he
then called Kern County Probation Department about the transfer of probation to South
Carolina. The Kern County probation officer informed defendant that he had to return to
California. However, a sheriff’s deputy in South Carolina informed defendant that, as a
registered South Carolina sex offender, he was not allowed to leave South Carolina
without permission—defendant was also told by the deputy that if he had to make a court
appearance in California on November 18, 2024, he would have to return to South
Carolina within three days. With these conflicting requirements from different law
enforcement agencies, defendant filed the motion for an order allowing him to remain in
South Carolina pending transfer of probation pursuant to the ICAOS.
On November 18, 2024, after a hearing on the ICAOS issue, the court ordered that
defendant was “allowed to remain in South Carolina pending the transfer of probation
process, which includes a 45-day investigatory period by the receiving state of South
Carolina, with the understanding he will report monthly and as directed.” The order
further provided the “Probation Office is ordered to allow [defendant] to leave Kern
County and the state of California as stated above effective immediately.” Finally, the
court indicated the travel permit was issued under ICAOS Rules, rule 3.102(c).

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 Defendant met with his probation officer (Pimentel) immediately after the hearing.
According to Pimentel, he told defendant that he could remain in South Carolina for
45 days pursuant to the court’s order, but he had to come back to California by January 2,
2025 (the end of the 45-day period), and defendant would have to remain in California
for seven to 10 days while a request for transfer of supervision was made pursuant to
ICAOS. Pimentel indicated that he had spoken with California ICAOS personnel in
Sacramento who had explained that defendant was required to be in California when the
transfer request was submitted and, while there was an expedited process for the request,
defendant would have to remain in California while the request was pending. Pimentel
gave defendant the name and number of the California ICAOS agent Pimentel had
spoken with and told defendant he could follow up with his attorney regarding this issue.
On December 1, 2024, defendant went to a women’s college basketball game in
South Carolina, which was held at noon on a Saturday—a kids appreciation event where
more than half of the attendees were minors. Defendant apparently said something
upsetting to a college player, security was called, and defendant was asked to leave by
campus police. When he gave responding officers his identification, they discovered he
was a registered sex offender. On December 7, 2024, a campus police officer notified
Pimentel about the basketball game. Pimentel received video from the game, showing it
was attended by about 150 people, with many minors in attendance.
On December 20, 2024, Pimentel reminded defendant by email that defendant was
required to report to probation in California on January 2, 2025, so the transfer request
could be processed. To do that, Pimentel reminded defendant that he had to stay in
California for seven to 10 days. Defendant responded that he was unaware that he had to
return on January 2, 2025, and the notice was too short for him to accomplish flying back
to California.
On December 23, 2024, defendant filed a motion for status, explaining he had
been told by Pimentel that the transfer of probation process had not been started, and the

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officer would not start that process unless defendant personally appeared in his office on
January 2, 2025, and remained in California for seven to 10 days. By declaration
supporting the motion, defense counsel asserted the issue of the transfer process had
already been resolved at the November 18, 2024, hearing without any objection. A
hearing was set for January 9, 2025.
In the meantime, defendant did not report to Pimentel on January 2, 2025.
Pimentel emailed defendant, directed him to report personally on January 7, 2025, but
defendant again did not do so. Pimentel filed a compliance declaration with the trial
court on January 7, 2025, indicating defendant had violated his probation conditions,
which included failing to report as directed and attending a basketball game without a
suitable adult where minors were congregating. Pimentel also sought a bench warrant for
defendant’s arrest, and recommended defendant serve 180 days in jail and for
reinstatement of probation.
On January 7, 2025, defendant filed a motion to recall the bench warrant. On
January 9, 2025, the court recalled the bench warrant for defendant’s arrest, and a status
and probation violation hearing was set for January 29, 2025.
Defendant personally appeared at the January 29, 2025, status hearing, and the
matters were set for a formal hearing on March 24, 2025. Defendant met with Pimentel
after the hearing. They discussed his return to South Carolina and that probation would
approve the travel. Pimentel provided defendant with a list of places sex offenders could
reside, provided him with financial assistance applications for counseling so he could
sign up and remain in compliance with his probation conditions, and gave him
instructions to register as a sex offender with bus passes to accomplish this. According to
Pimentel, however, defendant refused to tell Pimentel when he would return to California
to complete the transfer process, and defendant asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege.
Pimentel told defendant if he wanted a travel permit, he needed to give a date for his
return, but still defendant declined to do so. After defendant spoke with his counsel,

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Pimentel then told defendant he was not going to give permission to return to South
Carolina, and defendant would not be allowed to leave the state of California. He
instructed defendant to report again in two days, but he did not do so. Defendant
continued to report his location to the probation department, however, and Pimentel
ultimately determined defendant went back to South Carolina.
Pimentel filed a supplemental declaration on March 21, 2025, alleging additional
probation violations, including that (1) defendant failed to provide a current residence;
(2) he had absconded; (3) he failed to report in person as directed; (4) he failed to register
pursuant to section 290; (5) he failed to follow a probation directive within the time limit
imposed; (6) he left Kern County without permission of his probation officer; and (7) he
failed to enroll in counseling. Pimentel recommended revoking probation, and that
defendant be sentenced to the low term of one year in prison.
At an evidentiary hearing on March 24, 2025, two witnesses gave testimony
regarding defendant’s alleged probation violations. Adam Kirchenbauer, a police officer
at Woodland College in Charleston, South Carolina, testified regarding his encounter
with defendant at the college basketball game where he was working to provide security
for the game.
Pimentel also testified about the events leading to the hearing. Pimentel
acknowledged defendant was living in South Carolina at the time of sentencing, and
defendant had registered as a sex offender in South Carolina. Pimentel also
acknowledged defendant had told him South Carolina law enforcement had informed
defendant he could not leave South Carolina for more than three days. Pimentel knew
where defendant was living and working in South Carolina, and defendant allowed
Pimentel to search his phone and his person on January 29, 2025.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found the following probation
violations: defendant failed to report to the probation officer as directed on January 2,
2025; he failed to follow probation directives within the time limit imposed, including

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remaining in California after January 29, 2025, enrolling in counseling, and registering as
a sex offender in California; and defendant’s presence at the basketball game violated the
condition that he not frequent places where minors congregate without a suitable
responsible adult. The court further found defendant was not amenable to treatment on
probation, the court revoked defendant’s probation, and sentenced defendant to one year
in prison.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standards and Standard of Review
“In conducting a probation revocation hearing, a trial court exercises its discretion
to ‘revoke and terminate the supervision of the person if the interest of justice so require
and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of the probation or
parole officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the conditions of their
supervision, or has subsequently committed other offenses, regardless of whether the
person has been prosecuted for those offenses.’” (People v. Gray (2023) 15 Cal.5th 152,
163, quoting § 1203.2, subd. (a).) “The facts supporting a probation revocation must be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Gray, supra, at p. 163, citing People v.
Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 447 (Rodriguez).) Trial courts have “very broad
discretion” in determining whether a probationer has violated probation. (Rodriquez,
supra, at p. 443.) “However, the evidence must support a conclusion the probationer’s
conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation.” (People
v. Galvan (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 978, 982.)
“The terms ‘willful’ or ‘willfully,’ … imply ‘simply a purpose or willingness to
commit the act …’ .… Stated another way, the term ‘willful’ requires only that the
prohibited act occur intentionally.” (In re Jerry R. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438.)
Appellate courts review a probation revocation decision for an abuse of discretion;
the trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Rodriquez, supra,
51 Cal.3d at p. 447; People v. Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766, 773; People v. Kelly

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(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 961, 965.) “‘[O]nly in a very extreme case should an appellate
court interfere with the discretion of the trial court in the matter of denying or revoking
probation.’” (Rodriquez, supra, at p. 443.)
II. No Abuse of Discretion Established
Defendant argues the trial court’s ruling is not supported by substantial evidence.
According to defendant, the evidence shows defendant was making efforts to comply
with his conditions and his probation officer’s directives. He had reported his location to
probation’s online check-in system, he had turned on his location for tracking, and
probation knew he was living in South Carolina. As for the basketball game, defendant
argues the evidence shows any violation of his conditions was not willful: he was by
himself in the stands the entire time he was at the event; and the officer did not see him
interacting with anyone else. Defendant also notes he is a regional center client with a
documented learning disability diagnosis.
The People maintain that even if what defendant argues is true, it does not negate
the substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s ruling that defendant willfully
violated the terms of his probation. He was told twice he had to appear in person on
January 2, 2025, at Kern County Probation, but he did not appear; he also failed to appear
on January 7, 2025, and February 1, 2025. He did not comply with Pimentel’s directive
that he enroll in counseling and register in California as a sex offender, and he left Kern
County and California after January 29, 2025, against probation’s express direction.
Finally, the People argue, he attended a basketball game where more than half of the
attendees were minors, some of whom were seated near defendant, and he failed to leave
the arena until he was asked to leave. According to the People, this violated the condition
defendant was not to frequent locations where minors congregate without a suitable
responsible adult.
The record reflects some confusion about the ICAOS Rules for transferring
probation from a sending state (here, California) to a receiving state (here, South

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Carolina) where the supervisee is a sex offender. Moreover, because defendant registered
as a sex offender in South Carolina before the probation transfer to South Carolina was
effected, this apparently put into question whether defendant was lawfully permitted to
leave South Carolina for the number of days necessary for Kern County Probation to seek
reporting instructions and transfer defendant’s supervision to South Carolina.
Notwithstanding these issues, however, substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that defendant violated his probation terms and conditions. Entirely
independent of the transfer process, defendant was found to attend an event under
circumstances that violated one of his probation conditions. Specifically, defendant was
prohibited, in the absence of a probation-approved responsible adult, from frequenting
places where minors congregated. This condition was imposed at the sentencing hearing,
and defendant signed and initialed a form on November 18, 2024, that set out the
conditions of his probation—he had actual and ample notice of this condition. Although
defendant may not have known before he arrived at the game on December 1, 2024, that
it was a kids appreciation event, the evidence shows minors were the majority of
spectators at the game, and the trial court was entitled to infer this would have been
obvious to defendant as he sat in the stands. Defendant could have left the game when he
observed how many minors were present, but he chose to stay until he was asked to
leave.
Defendant argues Kirchenbauer testified defendant was seated by himself the
entire time he was at the basketball game, and he did not see defendant interacting with
anyone. This argument, however, points to evidence that, at best, might support a
different conclusion, which does not undermine the substantial evidence supporting the
trial court’s finding, nor does it establish an abuse of discretion. (See People v.
Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 883–884 [under substantial evidence review standard,
reviewing court does not consider whether there is evidence to support a contrary finding,
but whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s choice between conflicting

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evidence and reasonable inferences arising from such evidence]; see also People v. Clair
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 655 [that another factfinder could view the facts differently
establishes only the possibility of a difference of opinion, not an abuse of discretion].)
Moreover, as the trial court pointed out, while defendant was not seated directly
next to any minors nor was he interacting with minors, the probation condition was
broader than that—it prohibited defendant from being present in a location where minors
congregate. This violation alone is sufficient to affirm the trial court’s revocation of
defendant’s probation. (People v. Taylor (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 393, 395 [“probation
may be revoked if there are reasons for the court to believe from the probation report that
[the] defendant has violated any of the terms or conditions of probation”].)
Beyond this, the trial court also found defendant failed to follow probation’s
directives, including within the time limit imposed by the directives. The trial court
pointed out defendant had failed to report to Pimentel as directed on January 2, 2025,
which was a violation of the condition that defendant obey all directives of his probation
officer. Whatever conflict defendant faced in South Carolina by returning to California,
the fact was his probation had not yet been transferred to South Carolina and defendant
was bound to comply with his probation conditions (which included following the
directives of his probation officer) while the parties sorted out their dispute over the
process. Defendant knew as early as November 18, 2024, there was a conflict in
interpretation of the trial court’s travel permit order and the ICAOS transfer process, and
that Pimentel was requiring him to report in California on January 2, 2025. Yet, no
request for judicial intervention was made by defendant until December 23, 2024—after
Pimentel’s email exchange with defendant on December 20, 2024. Despite knowing the
issue had not been resolved judicially, defendant did not report to Pimentel in person on
January 2, 2025. Defendant’s failure to report on January 2, 2025, is substantial evidence
defendant violated a condition of his probation.

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 Moreover, Pimentel directed defendant on January 29, 2025, that he was to stay
within California, he was required to register as a sex offender in California, and
defendant was to sign up for the required counseling. Despite this, defendant did not
comply and instead returned to South Carolina. Pimentel testified he was initially willing
on January 29, 2025, to allow defendant to return to South Carolina until defendant
refused to give him a date when he would come back to California to process the transfer.
Due to this refusal, Pimentel testified he would not give defendant a travel permit, and
directed defendant not to leave the state.
While it is not difficult to imagine a probationer living in South Carolina would
find it difficult (if not impossible) to comply, on a moment’s notice, with a directive to
remain in California, defendant’s refusal to give Pimentel a date he would be back in
California to process the transfer was itself a violation of a probation directive and led
Pimentel to decline to give defendant a travel permit. Defendant knew what the
probation officer had asked him and declined to comply by refusing to respond. In
addition to providing a responsive answer to his probation officer, defendant also could
have sought shortened-notice judicial intervention of Pimentel’s subsequent directives to
stay in California. Instead, defendant simply became noncompliant—he refused to
answer, and did none of the things Pimentel instructed without seeking any judicial
intervention to potentially countermand Pimentel’s directives. That constituted a willful
violation of his probation conditions, and it supports the trial court’s finding of a
violation in this regard. (§ 7, subd. (b)(1) [the word “‘[w]illfully,’ when applied to the
intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to
commit the act, or make the omission referred to”]; see In re Rolando S. (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 936, 941 [willfully is generally used in law as a synonym for intentionally].)
Moreover, while there is evidence defendant and his sister were told by a sheriff’s
deputy in South Carolina that defendant could not leave that state for longer than three
days, defendant was not a South Carolina probationer at the time, and defendant has not

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identified what law prohibited him from leaving South Carolina’s jurisdiction under these
circumstances. The record on appeal is insufficient to conclude South Carolina’s laws
definitively precluded defendant’s lawful ability to stay in California for the time
necessary to satisfy his probation obligations regarding the transfer process. In other
words, the record is insufficient to show circumstances beyond defendant’s control
precluded him from staying in California to comply with Pimentel’s directives such that
his failure to do so was not willful. (Cf. People v. Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th
291, 295 [violations due to circumstances beyond the probationer’s control are not
willful]; see People v. Zaring (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 362, 379 [based on parental
responsibilities “common to virtually every family,” the defendant’s tardy appearance in
court was the result of last-minute circumstances, not the result of “irresponsibility,
contumacious behavior or disrespect for the orders and expectations of the court”; such
tardiness was not a basis to revoke probation and to do so constituted an abuse of
discretion].)
Defendant points to evidence that he was making an effort to comply with
probation even after January 29, 2025: he was reporting his location to the online check-
in system, and he had turned on his location for tracking; he had a court order allowing
him to travel to South Carolina, and the probation department knew he was living there.
Defendant maintains that, under Rodriguez, a clear and convincing showing is required to
establish a violation of probation, which cannot be established in light of these attempts
at compliance with his probation conditions.
Rodriguez does not aid defendant. In Rodriguez, the California Supreme Court
held the standard for establishing a probation violation is preponderance of the
evidence—the court declined to impose a clear and convincing standard. (Rodriguez,
supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 441 [“[c]onsiderations of both law and policy dictate that the facts
in a probation revocation hearing be provable by a preponderance of the evidence”].)
Moreover, attempts or successful compliance with some conditions do not mitigate other

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willfully violated conditions—a probationer cannot pick and choose with which
conditions he or she will comply.
In sum, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that
defendant willfully violated his conditions of probation, and defendant has not met his
burden of showing the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation as a result.2
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. We direct the Clerk/Executive Officer of this court to
serve this opinion on the Chief Probation Officer of the Kern County Probation
Department, the Kern County Public Defender, and the Kern County District Attorney.

2 Regrettably, it seems clear in hindsight that the ICAOS transfer process should have been
ironed out prior to or at the time of sentencing. Although the ICAOS transfer dispute is not
presented for adjudication in this appeal, the parties’ different understandings of the transfer
terms may have created an additional legal problem for defendant related to his (perhaps
premature) registration as a sex offender in South Carolina. There is no information in the
record regarding whether defendant actually incurred legal consequences by leaving South
Carolina, or whether he might be required to retain counsel in South Carolina to resolve any
outstanding issue in that regard. Should that be the case, we respectfully urge the Kern County
Probation Department, the Kern County Public Defender’s Office, and the Kern County District
Attorney’s Office, in the interests of justice, to voluntarily provide any affirmative assistance that
reasonably can be supplied to aid defendant in resolving outstanding legal repercussions in South
Carolina stemming from his probation and the transfer dispute.

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