Filed 8/20/26 P. v. Reed CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)

THE PEOPLE, C103571
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 23FE019734)
v.

FREDERICK VINCESON REED,
Defendant and Appellant.

In July 2023, defendant Frederick Vinceson Reed got into an altercation with the
victim E.P. outside a homeless shelter where both men were staying. A jury found Reed
guilty of simple battery and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily
injury, and he was sentenced to two years in prison.
Reed’s appointed counsel asked this court to independently review the record to
determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436.) Reed filed a supplemental brief alleging several trial and evidentiary
errors. Having reviewed the record, we find no merit to Reed’s contentions. However,
we conclude the trial court erred in orally reciting the total amount of custody credits to
which he is entitled and erred regarding the restitution fines imposed. Accordingly, we
shall modify the judgment to award 196 days of custody credit and impose and stay a

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$450 parole revocation restitution fine to match the total restitution fine imposed by the
trial court. We find no other arguable error that would result in an outcome more
favorable to Reed and affirm the judgment as modified.
BACKGROUND
In March 2025, an amended information charged Reed with battery resulting in
serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d); count one)1 and assault by means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count two). Two
aggravating circumstances were also alleged. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)
[crime involved great violence], (b)(3) [prior prison term].) The trial court granted
Reed’s request to bifurcate the aggravating factors.
Prior to trial, Reed filed a motion in limine pursuant to Evidence Code section
1103 to introduce four instances of E.P.’s character for violence, including: (1) a May
2015 domestic violence incident where E.P. pushed a woman in the shoulder at a mall;
(2) an October 2016 incident where E.P. hit a man with a metal bat and kicked him in the
face; (3) a May 2017 incident where E.P. made multiple threats to a Solano County
sheriff’s officer while E.P. was incarcerated at the Solano County jail; and (4) a January
2021 incident where E.P. jumped on top of a man, strangled him, and threatened to kill
him. The trial court ruled the May 2015 and October 2016 incidents were admissible, but
excluded the remaining two incidents after finding they were more prejudicial than
probative under Evidence Code section 352.
At trial, E.P. testified that on July 10, 2023, he lived in a Sacramento homeless
shelter and got into an altercation with Reed, whom he did not know. While E.P. ate in
the shelter’s dining hall, Reed stood behind him and started harassing and threatening
him, telling E.P. he was “gonna fuck [him] up.” E.P. told Reed, “[i]f it’s that serious, you

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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can see me up the hill and back it up.” Reed agreed. E.P. removed his shirt and walked
to the hill, which was located about a block from the shelter, and Reed followed a few
minutes later. Once there, they exchanged more words but did not physically fight. Reed
called someone, and E.P. returned to the shelter as Reed followed.
After returning to the shelter, E.P. walked outside to his car to get his shirt. As
E.P. walked back from his car toward the shelter’s driveway, Reed walked toward E.P.
and their paths crossed near the end of the driveway. The two men exchanged more
words and Reed punched E.P. in the face. Reed repeatedly struck E.P. as he tried to get
away. Reed continued to pursue E.P. while hitting him in the body; E.P. eventually
grabbed Reed’s legs and they fell to the ground. E.P. got on top of Reed, but an
individual, later identified as Reed’s son, pushed E.P. off Reed and the altercation ceased.
E.P. was bleeding extensively and believed his nose was broken; he returned to the
shelter to seek medical attention. E.P. went to the hospital where he was diagnosed with
“multiple facial fractures”; he had surgery on his nose a month later as a result of the
attack. He also had pain on his left side from Reed hitting him in the body.
E.P. admitted that during the incident he had a knife clipped in his pocket.
Although the clip was visible, the knife was not, and E.P. never removed the knife or
threatened Reed with it.
Video surveillance cameras located outside the shelter captured Reed striking E.P.
at the end of the driveway and the assault that followed. The video, which had no audio,
was admitted at trial and shown to the jury.
During the second day of trial, Reed moved to relieve his appointed counsel under
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. He complained that counsel had not subpoenaed
several witnesses seen in the surveillance video and failed to present police body camera
footage showing E.P. correcting certain inaccuracies contained in the officer’s report.
Defense counsel explained tactical reasons for not calling each of the witnesses,
including that several said they had not seen anything and that at least two other

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witnesses’ statements claiming E.P. had swung at Reed conflicted with the surveillance
video, which she believed would undermine Reed’s case. Counsel had also reviewed the
body camera footage and agreed that the officer’s initial report contained inaccuracies
that were properly corrected. After considering Reed’s complaints and defense counsel’s
responses, the court denied the Marsden motion. The court found counsel had made
reasonable strategic trial decisions and had adequately represented Reed.
Trial proceeded and Reed testified on his own behalf. He claimed E.P. was the
aggressor who tried to fight him after E.P. threatened him multiple times. Reed thought
E.P. had a weapon, although he admitted he did not see a weapon and E.P. never
threatened him with one. Reed walked back to the shelter after they met on the hill and
E.P. followed him, calling him a coward. Later, Reed went outside the shelter to meet his
son. Reed spotted E.P. outside near his car on the street; E.P. began to threaten him again
and began walking towards Reed. Reed was “pretty much afraid of the guy,” and
punched E.P. multiple times when they crossed paths because he did not want to give
E.P. the opportunity to hurt him.
Following deliberations, the jury found Reed not guilty of battery causing serious
bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count one) but guilty of simple battery (§ 242) as a lesser
included offense and guilty of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury
(§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count two). In a bifurcated court trial, the trial court found both
aggravating factors true.
The trial court sentenced Reed to the low term of two years in prison for the
assault offense and 180 days in the county jail for the misdemeanor battery, which it
stayed under section 654. The court orally awarded 98 days of actual credit plus 98 days
of conduct credit but calculated the total credit amount as 180 days of credit. The
abstract of judgment lists the total credit amount as 196 days. The court imposed a $300
restitution fine (§ 1202.4) for count two, an identical parole revocation restitution fine,
stayed pending successful completion of parole (§ 1202.45), and a $150 restitution fine

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(§ 1202.4) for the misdemeanor simple battery in count one. The court also imposed an
$80 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8) and a $60 court facilities assessment (Gov.
Code, § 70373); all other fines and fees were waived. The court reserved jurisdiction to
determine direct victim restitution. Reed timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Reed’s counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts and procedural
history of the case and requests this court to review the record and determine whether
there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Reed
was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of
the opening brief, and filed a supplemental brief raising numerous alleged errors.
Reed first argues his public defender provided ineffective assistance because she
failed to call two “character witnesses.” Reed, however, does not identify the “character
witnesses” or explain what evidence or information such unidentified witnesses might
have provided that would have resulted in a more favorable outcome. (People v.
Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218 [to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel’s
representation fell below the standard of a competent advocate and a reasonable
probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different].)
To the extent Reed argues that counsel should have called various people from the
surveillance video, defense counsel explained during the Marsden hearing her tactical
reasons for not calling those witnesses. Several said they had not seen anything, and the
others’ descriptions of the events contradicted the video surveillance showing the
incident. Counsel could rationally believe calling those persons as witnesses would be
more detrimental than helpful to Reed’s case. The decision to call various witnesses is a
matter of trial strategy and nothing on this record supports second guessing counsel’s
reasonable tactical decisions. (People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 989 [“[t]he

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decision whether to call certain witnesses is a ‘matter[] of trial tactics and strategy which
a reviewing court generally may not second-guess’ ”].)
Reed next contends defense counsel should have called the arresting officers as
witnesses. He seems to assert he was not initially charged with a crime because the
officers determined he and E.P. engaged in mutual combat. It was only after the district
attorney’s office received E.P.’s medical records that it decided to charge him. While it
may or may not be true that the arresting officers found the parties engaged in mutual
combat, “[i]t is well settled that the prosecuting authorities, exercising executive
functions, ordinarily have the sole discretion to determine whom to charge with public
offenses and what charges to bring.” (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 134.) The
prosecution’s authority to charge is founded upon the principle of separation of powers
and generally is not subject to supervision by the judicial branch. (Ibid.)
Reed asserts the evidence against him was insufficient because E.P. allegedly lied
during his testimony about having a weapon or putting something in his car, E.P. was not
credible, and it was E.P.’s word against his own. Reed bears the burden to show the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. (People v. Paredes (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 858, 863.) In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the
whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment and we do not reevaluate
witness credibility or reweigh evidence. (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57; People
v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 106.) “A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is
unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence [i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value] to
support” ’ the jury’s verdict.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357; Brooks, at
p. 57.)

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 Here, Reed failed to meet his burden to show the evidence was insufficient to
sustain the assault and battery convictions. (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at
p. 357.) E.P. admitted that he had a knife in his pocket, which he never took out, and
Reed conceded he never saw a weapon nor did E.P. ever threaten him with a weapon
during the incident. Thus, their testimony did not conflict regarding the weapon, and the
jury reasonably could have inferred that Reed was unaware E.P. had the knife in his
pocket throughout their encounter. And we fail to see how whether E.P. lied about
putting something in his car would have affected the outcome at trial or the jury’s
rejection of Reed’s self-defense claim. The jury heard from both Reed and E.P. and saw
the assault on video, and they alone could judge the credibility of the witnesses and
evidence. That they believed E.P. over Reed does not mean insufficient evidence
supports his assault and simple battery convictions.
Reed also argues that the police reports showed his innocence and implies they
should have been admitted at trial. Police reports and related witness statements
collected by police are hearsay because they were created out of court and are offered for
the truth of the matter asserted in the report. (Evid. Code, §§ 1200, subd. (a) [hearsay is
an out-of-court statement offered to prove that its assertion is true], 1201 [multiple
hearsay admissible only if each hearsay statement is admissible under hearsay exception];
see also People v. McVey (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 405, 415 [in general, “police reports do
not fall under the business records exception” to the hearsay rule and are inadmissible].)
Reed has identified no exception to the hearsay rule that would have permitted admission
of the police reports, and any statements contained therein, for their truth.
Reed also complains that his trial was unfair because the video surveillance did
not show the jury what occurred in the 45 minutes that led up to the assault. While it may
be true that the jury viewed an excerpt of the total video surveillance, both Reed and E.P.
testified about what occurred in the build-up to the incident and their testimony was
largely consistent. Thus, the jury was made aware of the events leading up to Reed

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punching E.P. in the face, even if the previous 45 minutes of surveillance video was not
introduced at trial.
After reviewing the record, we have determined the trial court erred in
pronouncing judgment regarding custody credits and the parole revocation restitution
fine. As previously noted, the trial court awarded Reed 98 days of actual credit and 98
days of conduct credit (§ 4019), but made a mathematical error in announcing Reed’s
total credit as 180 days rather than 196 days. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181,
185 [judgment is the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment; an abstract of
judgment is not the judgment of conviction and does not control if different from the trial
court’s oral pronouncement of judgment].) We shall modify the judgment to award Reed
196 days of custody credit. Because the abstract of judgment already reflects the proper
total of 196 days, it need not be corrected regarding custody credits.
The court also imposed a total restitution fine of $450 ($300 for the felony assault
and $150 for the misdemeanor battery) under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), but only
imposed a $300 parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45. These amounts
must be identical. Accordingly, we shall modify the judgment to impose a $450 parole
revocation restitution fine, which is stayed pending successful completion of parole.
We find no other arguable error that would result in an outcome more favorable to
Reed.
DISPOSITION
Reed’s convictions are affirmed. The judgment is modified to award Reed 196
days of custody credit and to impose a $450 parole revocation restitution fine, which is
stayed pending successful completion of parole. The clerk of the trial court shall prepare
an amended abstract of judgment that lists a $450 restitution fine (§ 1202.4) and a stayed

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$450 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45), and shall forward a copy of the
amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As so modified,
the judgment is affirmed.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

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